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Abstract
EDUARDO CHIBÁS:
THE INCORRIGIBLE MAN OF CUBAN POLITICS
By
ILAN EHRLICH

Advisor: Professor Alfonso Quiroz
There is ample evidence to suggest that Eduardo Chibás (1907-1951),
despite never having been president, was of primary importance to Cuba’s political
system in the years 1940-1952.

As a congressman, senator and presidential

candidate who was also the island’s most popular radio commentator, Chibás was
afforded an excellent opportunity to alter government policy and shape public
opinion. Specifically, Chibás denounced what he saw as the vices and inadequacies
of Cuba’s fledgling democracy, especially corruption in public office. By all accounts,
Chibás was a man of unquestioned probity. Unlike his political rivals, who gained
financially from their elected positions, Chibás’ economic position declined – leading
him to sell the family residence, built by his father, to pay for his 1948 presidential
campaign.
Chibás’ participation in Cuba’s 1933 revolution, which overthrew the
dictatorial government of Gerardo Machado (1925-1933), and in the mass strikes of
1935, which opposed Fulgencio Batista’s first military regime (1934-1940),
enhanced his public stature and lent him further political credibility. Moreover, the
scandal-plagued Auténtico administrations of Ramón Grau San Martín (1944-1948)
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and Carlos Prío Socorrás (1948-1952) fell far short of the Cuban public’s
expectations – helping to swell the ranks of Chibás followers. Through personal
charisma and media savvy Chibás revived the prospect of efficient and transparent
governance through a renewal of the nation’s institutions led by his Ortodoxo party.
These hopes were dashed suddenly when Chibás shot himself three times in the
stomach during his broadcast of August 5, 1951. His death 11 days later deprived
the island of its most admired politician.
In the short term, Chibás’ influence was felt in the fact that the two major
candidates for the 1952 presidency were Roberto Agramonte (Chibás’ ex vice
presidential candidate), and Carlos Hevia – both of whom were honest, albeit uncharismatic, figures. Hevia was only the third most popular politician in his own
(Auténtico) party according to opinion polls. His nomination thus owed a great deal
to Chibas’ strident attacks on malversation. On the other hand, the disappearance of
Cuba’s most popular and magnetic politician surely facilitated the military coup,
headed by Fulgencio Batista, that took place a mere seven months after Chibás’
suicide.
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Introduction
The Centrality of Eduardo Chibás in Cuban Politics, 1940-1952
There is ample evidence to suggest that Eduardo Chibás, despite never
having been president, was of primary importance to Cuba’s political system in the
years 1940-1952. Aside from being a congressman and later a senator, he was also
the island’s most popular radio commentator – which afforded him an excellent
opportunity to shape public opinion. Chibás used this forum for self-promotion but
also to denounce what he saw as the vices and inadequacies of Cuban politics,
especially corruption in public office.

By all accounts, Chibás was a man of

unquestioned probity. Even his enemies admitted as much.1 Moreover, Chibás’
public stature and credibility were enhanced by his participation in Cuba’s 1933
revolution, which overthrew the dictatorial administration of Gerardo Machado
(1925-1933), and in the mass strikes of 1935, which opposed Fulgencio Batista’s
first military regime (1934-1940). Through personal charisma and media savvy he
raised expectations among many Cubans that economic prosperity, national
sovereignty, personal security and efficient and transparent governance were
possible through a renewal of the nation’s institutions led by his Ortodoxo party.
Founded in 1947, the Ortodoxo platform called for economic independence, political
liberty, social justice, constitutionalism and an insistence that the government
remain free of political pacts or coalitions. The party was also closely associated
with Chibás’ crusade against malfeasance.

This program attracted a diverse

“En Cuba,” Bohemia, May 30, 1948, 56. Specifically, ex-president Fulgencio Batista, who was hardly
a Chibás ally, admitted that while other Auténticos had asked him for money or favors while he was in
office, Chibás had never done so.
1
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following, including middle class sectors, rural laborers, urban workers and AfroCubans. The first three groups were disappointed by the successive Auténtico
administrations of Ramón Grau San Martín (1944-1948) and Carlos Prío Socorrás
(1948-1952). Among other things, the middle class was disgusted with pistolerismo
by so-called “action groups” with ties to the Auténticos. Rural laborers felt betrayed
by the Auténticos’ abandonment of its rehabilitation program, which had promised
new schools, cement floors in each bohío, sanitary latrines and good wells.2 Many
urban workers were disappointed by the Auténticos’ failure to substantially
improve the nation’s hospitals. Afro-Cubans maintained a large presence in the
Partido Socialista Popular (PSP), or Communist party, but were otherwise largely
unaffiliated with any of Cuba’s larger parties.3 Chibás actively recruited them,
emphasizing his personal friendships with two popular Afro-Cuban boxing
champions, Kid Chocolate and Kid Gavilán. Of course, all the above constituencies
also responded to Chibás’ denunciations of government corruption – which he
described on the radio every Sunday evening.
To date, analysts of Cuban political developments in the 1940s and early
1950s have not reached a consensus concerning Chibás.

For instance, the

sociologist Marifeli Pérez-Stable has minimized his importance, asserting that
Chibás focused more on catchy slogans than pressing issues such as economic
diversification, industrialization and defense of national sovereignty.4 This criticism
William S. Stokes, “The ‘Cuban Revolution’ and the Presidential Elections of 1948,” Hispanic
American Historical Review 31, no. 1 (Feb. 1951): 43.
3 Charles D. Ameringer, The Cuban Democratic Experience: The Auténtico Years, 1944-1952
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2000), 44.
4 Marifeli Pérez-Stable, The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course, and Legacy (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993), 50.
2
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is not entirely accurate. As a presidential candidate in 1948, Chibás necessarily
devised a host of campaign mottoes – the most famous of these being vergüenza
contra dinero (shame versus money). These were part and parcel of his attempt to
generate opprobrium against corrupt politicians. Moreover, Chibás had repeatedly
emphasized the need for national sovereignty since his days as a student
revolutionary. In a 1933 public speech, for example, he condemned “great foreign
monopolies” along with their “indigenous servants” and concluded that the revolt
currently underway sought not merely to depose Gerardo Machado but also to
“change…the economic structure of the regime.”5 In 1949, while a senator, Chibás
was briefly jailed for accusing the administration of Carlos Prío of giving preferential
treatment to the U.S. owned Cuban Electric Company. On the other hand, Chibás did
not extensively address the longstanding problems of sugar monoculture and the
island’s lack of industrialization. However, this was no guarantee he would have
ignored these issues had he been elected president. For example, the political
scientist William Stokes notes that in 1948 Chibás presented the “longest and most
detailed” party program of any candidate. This indicated a willingness to confront
the nation’s ills. At the same time, the Ortodoxo platform was remarkably similar to
that of the Auténticos.6 This reflected the fact that many Ortodoxo leaders, including
Chibás, were ex-Auténticos who felt their former party had abandoned its platform
in favor of personal enrichment and opportunistic political alliances. Thus, Ortodoxo

5
6

Luis Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, el Adalid de Cuba (México: Editorial Jus, 1955), 193.
Stokes, “The ‘Cuban Revolution,’” 72.
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promises to reform the electricity sector,7 to improve the nation’s hospitals, to
subsidize native entrepreneurs, to build more schools and to better the lot of the
island’s guajiros implicitly depended on the honesty of its leadership.
The political scientist Jorge Domínguez dismisses the impact of Ortodoxo
“reformist moralizing” as a “peculiarly middle-class concern.”8 He argues that this
was because the bourgeoisie formed part of the political elite and had media access,
where the topic was often discussed, but there was no substantial commitment to
structural reforms. However, a May 1951 poll in Bohemia, Cuba’s most popular
magazine, indicated that Chibás, apparently with multi-class support, was the
leading candidate for president in all six of Cuba’s provinces.9 In addition, the
heretofore dominant Auténtico party was sufficiently worried about the potency of
corruption as a political issue to nominate Carlos Hevia, an honest but reportedly
non-charismatic man, as its candidate in the 1952 presidential election. Domínguez
also repeats the charge (which has come from various quarters)10 that Chibás’
unrelenting criticism had the effect of “weakening the entire system” of Cuban
democracy.11 This claim is rather unconvincing. After all, Auténtico malfeasance
was the primary reason why Cubans questioned the legitimacy of their government.
For instance, Cuban peasants who were promised cement floors in their bohíos
“Los Candidatos Presidenciales Opinan Sobre El Grave Problema de la Electricidad,” Bohemia, May
23, 1948: 67, 74. Among the proposals were nationalization of the island’s electricity sector, a 50
percent reduction in tariffs and extension of service into rural areas – which he believed was
essential to agrarian reform.
8 Jorge Domínguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978),
113-114. Specifically, Domínguez cites figures for the party’s appeal under the leadership of Roberto
Agramonte, who succeeded Chibás after the latter’s suicide and was far less charismatic.
9 Bohemia, May 20, 1951: supplement, 8-9.
10 See Jaime Suchlicki, University Students and Revolution in Cuba, 1920-1968 (Coral Gables, FL:
University of Miami Press, 1969) and Eduardo Suárez Rivas, Los Días Iguales (Miami: n.p., 1974)
among others.
11 Domínguez, Cuba, 114.
7
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(according to the Auténtico platform) knew quite well, independently of Chibás, that
their situation remained unchanged. The same could be said of urban middle class
Cubans, who were shocked by pistolero violence in broad daylight by action groups
associated with the Auténticos.12 Perhaps the most forceful challenge to this view is
provided by University of Havana students, who were arguably Chibás’ most
devoted followers and who were among the few who offered to defend the
government from the March 1952 coup headed by Fulgencio Batista and the
military.
On the other side of the spectrum, the historian Charles Ameringer asserts
that Chibás was a “people’s champion” who represented the “outraged conscience of
the nation” and almost certainly would have been elected president had he lived. Of
course, Cubans were receptive to such a figure because the Auténtico party had
squandered nearly all its credibility during the Auténtico administrations of Ramón
Grau San Martín and Carlos Prío. In addition, while allowing that Chibás exposed
Auténtico corruption, Ameringer also notes that the Ortodoxo chief had a tendency
to exaggerate or even fabricate charges. Despite this shortcoming, he concludes that
Chibas’ death left “a great void” that was exploited by Batista and the military when

Perhaps the most notorious case was the Orfila incident in the city of Marianao on September 15,
1947. In this instance, Emilio Tro who headed the National Police Academy but was also chief of the
Union Insureccional Revolucionaria (UIR) and Mario Salabarría who was in charge of the Police
Bureau of Investigations but also a member of the Movimiento Socialista Revolucionaria (MSR), used
the forces under their command to conduct a battle over the course of several hours which resulted
in the death of Tró and four others. Both men were Grau appointees. Moreover, the battle was
broadcast live over the radio, embarrassing the Auténticos and giving rise to shock and revulsion
among the island’s citizens. Hugh Thomas notes that, “This pointless bloodshed caused a scandal
even in the blasé Cuban society, hardly reassured by the thirty-year gaol (sic) sentence imposed on
Salabarría, or by the realization that one of the most important gangster leaders was not removed
from the scene. Hugh Thomas, Cuba, the Pursuit of Freedom (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 755.
12
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they overthrew Cuba’s elected government in March of 1952. 13 In a similar vein, the
historian Luis Aguilar describes a “clamor” among the Cuban public for honest
politicians during this era. He suggests Chibás was the embodiment of their ideal,
dubbing him the “champion of many popular aspirations.” He also portrays Chibás’
suicide as a “staggering blow” which was a factor that enabled Batista and the
military to seize power.14 The recently deceased Cuban exile novelist, Guillermo
Cabrera Infante, also shared this opinion.

He concluded that Chibás’ death

“deprived the opposition of their natural leader” and plunged his party and the
country into “chaos,” greatly facilitating the takeover by Batista and the military in
1952.15 This view, which casts Chibás as almost a sine qua non of Cuban democracy
does not fully take into account the political and economic ills that plagued the
island.

Perhaps closest to the truth is an opinion expressed by Stokes, who,

referring to the 1948 election writes:
There is the strongest evidence that Cuban political opinion
desperately desired the “Revolution” (of 1933) to mean, at least,
fundamental departure from the venality, corruption, and fraud so
characteristic of Cuban colonial and republican politics. The evidence
is seen in the great support given to Chibás, whose almost sole
campaign asset was rectitude and integrity and passionate insistence
on honesty in government. His cries for genuine revolution, to begin
in this area, released emotional enthusiasm in all classes, and he
rallied many of Cuba’s great men to this cause.16

Ameringer, The Cuban Democratic Experience, 145,165.
Luis Aguilar. Cuba 1933, Prologue to Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 244.
15 Guillermo Cabrera Infante, Mea Cuba (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1994), p. 143.
Specifically, Cabrera Infante writes that, “With his death Chibás had deprived the political opposition
of their natural leader and had left his party in a chaos greater than the one the Republic was in then.
So, some months later, Batista carried out his infamous, fateful coup d’état that was both bloodless
and easy because President Prío chose not to resist, his bags always at hand.”
16 Stokes, “The ‘Cuban Revolution,’” 77.
13
14
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This statement presents Chibás not as an empty sloganeer or apostle of democracy
but as a genuine reformer who desired to renew Cuba’s faltering political system.
Clearly, the evaluations of Chibás’ role in Cuban politics are highly debatable and
hence ripe for in-depth study.
As a political biography this study will also be concerned with Chibás’
ideological evolution. Currently, this aspect is not entirely clear – especially in the
years before he entered the university and what influence his family and
socioeconomic background had on his way of thinking. His father, Eduardo Chibás y
Guerra, was a wealthy engineer and hombre de negocios who had produced the
maps of San Juan Hill used by Theodore Roosevelt’s Rough Riders during the
Spanish-American War. He had also been Secretary of Public Works in the shortlived administration of Carlos Manuel de Céspedes in 1933. His mother, Gloria
Ribas y Agramonte, was a niece of Eduardo Agramonte, Secretary of Foreign
Relations during Cuba’s first war of independence (1868-1878). In keeping with his
family’s status, Chibás attended the elite Colegio de Dolores in Santiago and later on,
when his parents moved to the capital, finished his secondary education at Belén,
a prestigious Jesuit institution. Chibás also traveled in Europe and the United States
and belonged to the Havana Yacht Club, the social center for the capital’s elite.
Chibás, like many members of his generation, was profoundly impacted by the
dictatorship of Gerardo Machado. While a University of Havana student, he became
involved with the radical, anti-Machado Directorio Estudantil Universitario (DEU).
His anti-government activities led to significant periods in jail and exile between
1927 and 1933. After the fall of Céspedes, Chibás personally nominated Grau for
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president on behalf of the students. During Grau’s brief first term as president,
Chibás outlined his thinking in a slew of public speeches. The revolution of 1933, he
claimed (as have a good number of contemporary Cuban scholars and politicians),
had not been a mere revolt of the type that had occurred with regularity during the
republic’s first three decades. Rather, this was a new development and part of an
ongoing process that sought to fundamentally change Cuba’s political system.
Specifically, Chibás railed against foreign monopolies, which, in his view, enriched
themselves and a few corrupt politicians at the nation’s expense. Chibás would
revisit this theme repeatedly throughout his political career, perhaps most famously
in his criticism of the U.S. owned Cuban Electric Company in 1949. To be sure, the
foreign domination of Cuba’s economy between 1902 and 1933 was high on the list
of grievances for Cuba’s student revolutionaries – Chibás included, although his
rhetorical fluency helped make him more visible than many others. Chibás was also
an avowed anti-communist, at least in part because that party had collaborated with
Batista in the late 1930s and also because he viewed international communism with
the same foreboding reserved for U.S.-style imperialism.
*

*

*

Chibás initially emerged as a leading politician and Auténtico party
spokesman after his election to Congress in 1940. Founded in 1934, the Auténticos
were a multi-class, reform party that rejected both Soviet-style communism and
imperialist capitalism much like the Peruvian Alianza Popular Revolucionaria
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Americana (APRA) led by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre.17 The Auténtico platform
emphasized nationalism, socialism and anti-imperialism. In its early years, the
party opposed Batista’s first military regime through both political and violent
means but by 1939 had resolved to pursue a peaceful course.

Above all,

autenticismo derived legitimacy from two factors. First, its core leadership had
participated in the struggle to oust Gerardo Machado in 1933. Second, its jefe
máximo, Ramón Grau San Martín, had briefly served as president that same year
(before being overthrown by Batista) and issued a series of popular decrees which,
among other things, legalized labor organizations, set price caps on electricity prices
and required that all businesses maintain a labor force that was at least 50 percent
Cuban. By 1947, however, a group of disaffected Auténticos led by Chibás believed
the party had abandoned its ideals and decided to form a new organization.
Specifically, they were disillusioned by the administration of Ramón Grau San
Martín, which had been accused of corruption and mismanagement.18 From a
personal standpoint, Chibás was also disappointed that Grau had bypassed him as
Ameringer, The Cuban Democratic Experience, 12. Also relevant here is the famous quotation by
Haya de la Torre, “¡Ni con Washington ni con Moscú!,” indicating his desire to find a path for Latin
America independent of these two ideologies.
18 The charges of corruption came from all quarters of Cuba’s society and political spectrum.
Francisco Ichaso, one of the founders of the ABC, described Grau’s last year in office as “one of the
most corrupt periods in the history of the Republic.” Francisco Ichaso, “El Proceso Auténtico,”
Bohemia, June 26, 1949: 87. In November of 1947, University of Havana students, among them Fidel
Castro, announced a “war against government graft.” Rolando E. Bonchea and Nelson P. Valdés, eds.,
Revolutionary Struggle, 1947-1958, vol. 1 of Selected Works of Fidel Castro (Cambridge, MA: MIT
University Press, 1972), 132. Moreover, government malfeasance was hardly limited to 1947.
Chibás himself had written a letter to Grau in January of that year listing a litany of complaints, chief
among them the corruption of government ministers and advisors – notably Inocente Álvarez the exminister of commerce who had reaped tremendous profits in Cuba’s barter deals with other Latin
American countries in 1945, César Casas, the present minister of commerce who Chibás accused of
dealing on the black market and José Manuel Alemán, the notoriously sleazy minister of education,
whom, Chibás claimed, was embezzling funds while schoolchildren were deprived of their lunches.
Luis Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 476-477. In January of 1949, shortly after Grau had vacated the
presidency, “Lawsuit 82” was submitted to the Criminal Panel of the Supreme Court, alleging that
Grau and his ministers had embezzled 174,241,840.14 pesos.
17
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the party’s presidential candidate in the 1948 election. Chibás ultimately competed
in that contest as head of the Ortodoxo party, winning 16 percent of the vote despite
having only a year to prepare and a rudimentary organization to support him. The
Ortodoxo symbol was a broom, reminding voters of its intention to sweep away
graft and inefficiency. In order to give himself and his fledgling organization a feisty
popular image, he set up the Ortodoxo headquarters in the old gymnasium of Eligio
Sardiñas – the popular Afro-Cuban boxing champion better known as Kid Chocolate.
He apparently also hoped to win support from the substantial Afro-Cuban
community in this manner.
Another constituency targeted by the Ortodoxos was the rural poor, who had
initially benefited from new schools along with expanded school lunch and health
programs under Grau’s first education minister, Luis Pérez Espinós, (1944-1946) an
honest man. A lavishly funded Ministry of Education19 made such things possible
but also tempted dishonest ministers to use the money for their own purposes. The
most notorious of these was José Manuel Alemán, its head between 1946 and 1947,
who embezzled a substantial portion of the ministry’s budget and filled its payroll
with ghost employees or botellas.20 A similar situation prevailed in the Ministry of
Public Health, where expenditures were at an all time high during Grau’s

Inciso K (Clause K) of Law Number 7, April 15, 1943 along with Decree Number 3603, December
13, 1943 mandated a nine-centavo tax on each sack of sugar produced, all of which went to the
Ministry of Education.
20 Ameringer, The Cuban Democratic Experience, 34-35. Specifically, he notes that, “Alemán did not
invent thievery in the Ministry of Education, but he would raise it to unprecedented levels.” This is
partially borne out by the fact that illiteracy levels for students ten years of age or over remained
static, at 23.6 percent, even as education spending represented one quarter of the national budget in
1947. More importantly, Auténtico ministers, when they did spend on education, neglected rural
areas, where the illiteracy rate was 41.7 percent. In Oriente province, a future Ortodoxo stronghold,
the illiteracy rate reached 49.7 percent.
19
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administration even as hospitals remained in short supply. The grandfather of
Reinaldo Arenas, the late 20th century Cuban exile novelist, was perhaps typical of
Chibás’ rural supporters. The old man was a peasant from Oriente province who felt
“great respect” for the Ortodoxo leader’s anti-corruption campaign and bought
a radio so he could listen to his “hero.” The broadcasts may have helped convince
him that Cuba’s politicians were “delinquents.”21 The urban lower class also felt the
sting of decrepit schools and badly managed hospitals, attracting them to Chibás,
who promised to channel government monies toward honestly administered public
services. Another group targeted for party appeals was Havana’s middle class,
especially given their revulsion to gangland style shootings (many in broad daylight)
by “action groups” associated with the Auténticos. Lastly, there was the island’s
youth, especially University of Havana students, who, according to the political
scientist Jaime Suchlicki, considered the Ortodoxo leader their “idol.”22
Chibás’ Sunday evening radio broadcasts (1943-1951) were the highest rated
on the island, confirming his reputation as the most admired politician in Cuba.
Richard Pack, a New York Times correspondent, characterized them as, “a half-hour
of verbal fireworks” from a man who was by turns, “reporter, crusader, gossip and
muckraker.” Pack acknowledged that some Cubans disapproved of Chibás’ antics
and deemed him “a clown, a demagogue or worse.” Even so, “Eddy,” as he was
known, not only “puts on a good show,” but was also scrupulously honest at a time
when corruption was widespread in Cuban politics.23 On the whole, Chibás coupled

Reinaldo Arenas, Antes que anochezca (Barcelona: Fábula Tusquets, 1998), 52.
Jaime Suchlicki, University Students and Revolution in Cuba, 56.
23 Richard Pack, “Report from Havana,” The New York Times, April 28, 1946, II, 7.
21
22
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personal magnetism with pleas for probity and accountability in government,
socioeconomic reform and Cuban nationalism. At times, Chibás was able to address
all these issues at once – as in the case of the U.S.-owned Cuban Electric Company.
During a 1949 broadcast, Chibás accused the Supreme Tribunal of Justice of taking
bribes after the court refused to overturn a 70 percent increase in electricity prices.
This imbroglio proved an ideal opportunity for Chibás, who inveighed against
judicial malfeasance, unfair rate hikes and a predatory foreign monopoly all in the
same breath. As a result, he was jailed for defamation, which appears to have
enhanced his reputation still further. Chibás, predictably, lost no time exploiting the
situation, proclaiming, “I’ll proudly go to jail to defend the (Cuban) people.”24
Evidently, many Cubans were convinced that he was the ideal leader. A May 1951
poll in Bohemia thus showed Chibás to be the most popular of all potential
presidential candidates – more than 10 percentage points ahead of his nearest
challenger and the favorite of all the nation’s social classes.25
From a personal and psychological stanpoint, Chibás was considered
somewhat eccentric. His nickname was “el loco,” or the crazy one – in part because
of the intemperate remarks that helped popularize his radio program and the
recklessness with which he made public accusations. Such impetousness was also
reflected in his private life, which reportedly included eight duels. Of course, Chibás’
“Por defender al pueblo iría a la cárcel con orgullo.” Bohemia. March 6, 1949: 46.
Bohemia. May 20, 1951: supplement, 8, 10. Among other things, the Bohemia poll broke down the
support of various presidential candidates by social class. Chibás was the leading contender among
four distinct groups of varying degrees of wealth and prestige. The first, which included business
owners, managers, executives, professionals and sub-professionals gave him 34.63 percent of their
support. For the second group, which included office workers, middle class employees and shop
assistants, the rate was 33.81 percent. In the third group, listed as “workers,” Chibás led the poll with
29.05 percent. The fourth and most humble of the groups, which counted domestic servants and
other “minor” professions, gave him 24.34 percent of their prospective votes.
24
25
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sense of drama, his inclination toward rashness, and sincere desire to inspire his
countrymen were united in his final act, a mélange of the personal and political,
which involved shooting himself in the stomach while broadcasting. He allegedly
had intended for the shot to ring out over the air, at the end of his weekly show, but
he had exceeded his allotted 25-minute slot and listeners instead heard an
advertisement for Café Pilon. Moreover, there is a dispute as to whether Chibás
intended to take his own life or whether he merely sought, in bizarre fashion, to
shift attention away from a dispute with Education Minister Arturo Sánchez Arango.
Specifically, Chibás had publicly accused Sánchez Arango of stealing funds
appropriated for supplies and school lunches in order to invest in Guatemalan real
estate. This charge was based on rumor and in fact Chibás had unwisely attacked
one of the most honest men in Prío’s cabinet. On the evening Chibás shot himself he
had promised to furnish proof for his allegation but, as none existed, may have
sought to settle the debate (and win sympathy) with an extreme gesture. Sánchez
Arango, in his 1972 memoir, claimed Chibás had attempted to do just that,
performing a mere “simulation of suicide” which involved a careful calculation of the
wound’s location so as to cause a grave (though not fatal) injury.26 Chibás, in fact,
survived for eleven days afterward – which lends a measure of credence to Sánchez
Arango’s assertion. Also this action, albeit excessive, does not appear inconsistent
with Chibás’ penchant for stunts, his history of erratic behavior, and gnawing fear of
losing ground in the polls.

26

Arturo Sánchez Arango, Trincheras de ideas...y piedras (San Juan: Editorial San Juan, 1972), xi.
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Seven months after Chibás died, Batista and the military overthrew Cuba’s
elected government. The connection between these events is a matter of much
speculation. It also raises an essential question that must be addressed by any
political biography: namely, what is the importance of the individual in history? In
particular the degree to which Chibás was central to Cuba’s political system
between 1940 and 1952 warrants a more thorough analysis – especially given the
evidence that suggests he was indeed highly important. This is relevant not only in
light of the 1952 coup but also in assessing whether an honest, competent politician
could have confronted Cuba’s shortcomings and maintained the viability and
prestige of an elective, democratic system. Is there reason to believe Chibás would
have been capable of mitigating the island’s deep-rooted ills of corruption, economic
inequality and over-dependence on sugar had he been elected president? Clearly,
the movement headed by Chibás addressed genuine Cuban concerns – namely
government corruption, the economic divide between urban and rural dwellers,
insufficient or shoddy public services, gangsterism, and predatory foreign
monopolies. More than any contemporary politician, he condemned these problems
and proposed to resolve them though renewal of the party system and reform of the
nation’s institutions. Such measures were by no means a panacea. On the other
hand, there is reason to believe that genuine reform would have restored a great
deal of confidence in Cuba’s government and dimmed enthusiasm for radical
solutions proposed by Batista and the military.

xix

THE WEAKNESS OF CUBAN POLITICAL PARTIES
AND PERVASIVENESS OF POPULIST TACTICS
This study will also briefly analyze the role of Cuban political parties from the
inception of the Republic into the 1950s in order to establish the degree to which
they were influential political actors or primarily vehicles for personalistic politics.
In this manner, the nature of the Cuban political system and Chibás’ influence within
that arena will be clarified. The political scientist Forrest Colburn, among others, has
deemed political parties the “weakest link” in Latin American democracies.27 More
specifically, he notes that, “with limited exceptions, political parties in Latin America
are not institutionalized, they are not stable, they do not have roots in society, they
are not independent of ambitious leaders, and they are not democratic in their
internal organization.”28 This echoes the analysis of the Cuban intellectual Fernando
Ortiz, writing in 1919,29 who lamented the island’s “lack of a regulatory law
regarding the internal organization of political parties and absence of guarantees of
legality of their interior activities” and a “lack of renewal of the directive
elements.”30 William Stokes, commenting on the situation in Cuba shortly after the
1944 election, pronounced the island’s peaceful transfer of power and minimal
evidence of fraud at the polls to be admirable developments. Even so, he noted that
“(t)he parties continued to hover around personalities, the alignments and shifts in
the coalitions responded to partisan profit rather than principle and program, (and)
Forrest Colburn, Latin America at the End of Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 37.
Ibid.
29 At the time of the writing, Ortiz was a member of the Liberal Party and member of Cuba’s House of
Representatives – affording him an insider’s perspective on the island’s political malaise.
30 Fernando Ortiz. “La crisis política cubana sus causas y remedios.” Orbita de Fernando Ortíz. (La
Habana: UNEAC, 1973), 103.
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the campaign featured wordy and windy defenses of honor rather than intelligent
analyses of economic, political and social issues.”31 In short, weak political parties
dominated by individual charismatic leaders were frequently the norm between
1902 and 1952 – a development that stifled reform, encouraged corruption and
muffled new voices and ideas in Cuban politics. Chibás was representative of this
trend as well, to a certain extent, which was one reason why his party lost a great
deal of effectiveness after his death.
During the Republic’s early years (1902-1933), the political sphere was
controlled by two political parties, both dominated by military veterans from the
independence struggle. According to the historian José Hernández, this is because
the United States desired to “keep Cuba quiet” after re-occupying the island between
1906 and 1909. As a result, the author claims the United States was willing to
“tolerate” the domination of Cuban politics by former military men.32 Consequently,
José Miguel Gómez, an ex-general of Cuba’s war of independence, controlled the
Liberal Party until his death in 1921. After that, his friend and former Secretary of
Government, Gerardo Machado, became the paramount figure in the party until he
was ousted by a nation-wide revolt in 1933. Machado not only dominated his own
party but also used his initial popularity as president, as well as co-optation and
coercion, to win the submission of Cuba’s political elite.

Thus, in 1926, the

William S. Stokes. “The Cuban Parliamentary System in Action, 1940-1947.” The Journal of Politics.
Vol. 11, No. 2 (May 1949): 351-352.
32 José M. Hernandez, Cuba and the United States: Intervention and Militarism, 1868-1933 (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1993).
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Conservatives and the smaller Popular Party agreed to “patriotically”33 work
together with Machado in an arrangement known as cooperativismo.

Thus, Luis

Aguilar noted that, “for all practical purposes, Machado had no political
opposition.”34 Similarly, the Conservatives were a virtual fiefdom of Mario García
Menocal, another ex-general from the independence war, until his demise in 1941.
Jorge Domínguez argues that the United States-Cuba relationship changed,
after the 1933 revolution, from imperialism to hegemony. As such, the United States
was no longer concerned with Cuba’s “details of internal rule.” Rather, its priority
was maintaining the “stability of the system as a whole,” especially as that system
benefited the United States economically (through trade) and politically (through
diplomatic loyalty). Hence, the United States focused less on the merits of individual
leaders than whether they would uphold the system.35 Fulgencio Batista, the army
sergeant who ruled behind the scenes between 1934 and 1940, was careful to
cooperate. Under him, the island’s political parties were relatively tame. For
example, in 1936 he permitted a presidential election with candidates from the
Liberals (Manuel de la Cruz), Conservatives (Mario García Menocal) and
Republicans (Miguel Mariano Gómez, son of José Miguel) competing for a highly
circumscribed office. Gómez, in a flawed vote, was victorious largely due to Batista’s
backing.

However, he was replaced within a year because of an unwelcome

Wilfredo Fernández, “Los nuevos horizontes,” Heraldo de Cuba, December 9, 1925, 2. Fernández,
who was a leader of the Conservatives, wrote that Machado’s programs were so good for Cuba that,
“true opposition was unpatriotic.”
34 Luis Aguilar. Cuba 1933, Prologue to Revolution (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972), 58.
35 Jorge I. Domínguez. Cuba: Order and Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978),
54.
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tendency to “seriously challenge” Batista.36 When Batista ran as a civilian in the
presidential election of 1940, which he won, he forged alliances with the Democratic
Party (formerly the Conservatives) and the newly legalized Communists – offering
both the perks of proximity to power in exchange for their support. Nevertheless, in
1944, Ramón Grau San Martín, a former University of Havana professor, was elected
president as head of the Auténticos. He had led this party since its formation in
1934. This was quite appropriate as much of its original membership had been
idealistic University of Havana students who, like him, had opposed and helped
topple the dictatorship of Machado (1928-1933).

Although Cuba’s 1940

constitution barred re-election, Grau considered this possibility throughout his term
but finally settled for a handpicked successor, Carlos Prío.
As a result of an administration characterized by nepotism,37 corruption,
pistolerismo and personal enrichment, Prío had severely eroded his party’s
credibility – providing Chibás, as head of the Ortodoxos with an excellent
opportunity to win the presidency in 1952, implement his reform program and
establish his party as a powerhouse in Cuban politics. His suicide, however, proved
to be a particularly crushing blow. In part, this was because the Ortodoxos, as a
relatively new organization, depended on Chibás’ personal popularity rather than
on a well developed party apparatus. After his death, Chibás was replaced on the
Ortodoxo ticket by Roberto Agramonte, his cousin and running mate from 1948.

Robert Whitney, State and Revolution in Cuba: Mass Mobilization and Political Change (Chapel Hill:
North Carolina University Press, 2001), 33. Specifically, he challenged Batista over perceived
military interference in civilian affairs.
37 Prío’s brother Antonio was named treasury minister despite having no qualifications for the
position.
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Agramonte, a former sociology professor and vice rector at the University of Havana
was a man of integrity, like Chibás, but he had a bland personality and very little
personal connection with the Cuban populace. Nonetheless, he led in the polls and,
as the U.S. historian Charles Ameringer notes, a win by Agramonte would have been
“a personal victory for the martyr Chibás” had Batista and the military not staged a
coup three months before the scheduled presidential election.38
*

*

*

This study will also analyze the degree to which populism permeated Cuban
politics and was used by Chibás as a mechanism to increase his influence and
impose his political program. Populism and populist tactics have long been a
mainstay of Cuban politics, both during the years 1940-1952 and before. Along with
Batista and Grau, Chibás operated in what the historian Michael Conniff describes as
the “heyday” of Latin American populism.39 This period, which roughly spanned the
1940s through the 1960s, was distinguished by increasing democratization and
expansion of the franchise in the region. This was certainly true in Cuba, where the
Constitution of 1940 upheld democracy and guaranteed the vote for women. Of
these three, Grau and Chibás hew closest to Conniff’s definition of populists as
leaders who had charismatic relationships with mass followings and who won
elections regularly.40 Grau, who was constitutionally barred from a second term, left
office diminished by scandal. Chibás, who was elected to the Cuban congress in
1940 and the senate in 1944, had perhaps reached the height of his popularity
Ameringer, The Cuban Democratic Experience, 175.
Conniff, Michael L., ed., Populism in Latin America (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press,
1999), 11.
40 Ibid., 7.
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shortly before committing suicide – especially as his reputation for probity made
him seem a perfect foil to Carlos Prío. Conniff also mentions the increasing role of
“new media.” This, in fact, is the realm where Chibás exceeded the reach of all
previous Cuban politicians. Radio had debuted in Cuba in the 1920s and was
widespread by the 1930s but no one other politician had exploited this medium to
greater effect. Chibás was in many ways ideally suited to the airwaves, especially
given his verbal pyrotechnics and apparent ability to read the public’s mood.
Moreover, an examination of Chibás’ innovative use of radio as political theater will
contribute to the general understanding of Cuban and Latin American populism
during the mid 20th century.

POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY AND METHODOLOGY
A political biography must take special care not to overstate its subject’s
talents, accomplishments and influence while at the same time offering an accurate
assessment of the individual’s impact.

This is especially pertinent given the

pervasive tendency to lionize “great men” of Latin America generally and Cuba
specifically. Hagiographies or favorably distorted portraits of Latin American icons
abound, ranging from Columbus to Cortés and Bolívar to Castro. Nor are such
treatments necessarily a relic of distant eras. For example, the British historian
Matthew Restall has drawn attention to the persistence of the “great man”
treatment accorded Cortés, among others.

He notes that Conquest: Cortés,

Montezuma and the Fall of Old Mexico, an account published in 1995 by the historian
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Hugh Thomas, includes a “glorification” of the Spanish conquistador and “an
endorsement of the myth that a few great and exceptional men made the Conquest
possible.”41 Further, lest Thomas be dismissed as something less than a “serious”
scholar, Restall also points out that the historian Charles Gibson, a widely respected
specialist of colonial Latin America, was not immune from such characterizations.
Spain in America, published in 1966, portrays Cortés as an “exception” and
“archetype” even as much evidence exists to suggest otherwise.42
In Cuba, a common variation on the “great man” theme involves premature
death – leaving unanswered questions as to what might have been. The island’s
greatest example (and exemplar) of this phenomenon is José Martí, who died during
the stuggle against Spain for independence.43 The reverence that Cubans of all
political persuasions feel (and have long felt) for Martí can be summed up in his
sobriquet, “El Apóstol.”

The religious overtone of this nickname is neither

metaphorical nor accidental for he is quite literally the national secular saint. As
such, a diverse collection of figures including Batista, Grau, Prío, Castro and certainly
Chibás claim to have been guided by his writings.44 The journalist Carlos Alberto
Montaner aptly sums up the situation, asserting that “to deny Martí would be to
renounce an ingredient – perhaps the basic one – of Cuban-ness.”45 This being the
case, biographers of Martí have been faced with a monumental challenge. Jorge
Matthew Restall, Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003),
18.
42 Ibid., 19.
43 Another figure, of almost equal acclaim and popularity is Antonio Maceo, who also died in the war
and is known as Cuba’s greatest military genius.
44 John M. Kirk, ““From ‘Inadaptado Sublime’ to ‘Líder Revolucionario’: Some Further Thoughts on
the Presentation of José Martí.” Latin American Research Review. Vol. 15, No. 3 (1980): 127-147.
45 Carlos Alberto Montaner, El pensamiento de José Martí. (Madrid: Plaza Mayor Ediciones, 1971), 4.
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Mañach, the public intellectual and onetime Ortodoxo, is representative. His 1933
biography, entitled Martí el Apóstol, is duly and unsurprisingly awestruck. He thus
concludes that, “Seldom has the personality and work of a man been so
consubstantial with the will of a whole people.”46 Post-revolutionary works on
Martí have been distorted as well but in a different fashion. According to the
literary analyst John Kirk, the early goal was to use Martí to “justify” the revolution
while later on conciliating his views with those of Marxism became the primary
object.47 Owing to these considerations, a first-rate biography of Martí remains
elusive.
Unlike Martí, who is universally beloved but diversely understood, Cuba’s
current “great man,” Fidel Castro, is a highly polarizing figure. On one hand, he is an
icon within Cuba and to left-leaning sectors in Latin America and the world at large.
The journalist and Castro biographer, Volker Skierka, described how Castro’s
celebrity in Argentina was such that his appearance at Nestor Kirchner’s 2002
inauguration easily overshadowed the event. Also, during his stay in Buenos Aires, a
speech meant for 800 invited guests quickly turned into an open-air affair attended
by tens of thousands of eager listeners.48 At the same time, Castro is absolutely
reviled by large portions of the Cuban exile community and United States
officialdom among others. The historian Luis Pérez, related in 1994 that a seething
anti-Castro “genre” had long since become “a veritable cottage industry” within the
United States, where a continuous stream of works dismiss him as a madman,

Jorge Mañach. Martí: Apostle of Freedom, (New York: Devon-Adair Co., 1953), 363.
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megalomaniac or menace.49 Nevertheless a handful of interesting biographies have
also appeared. These include Fidel: A Critical Portrait by the recently deceased
freelance writer Tad Szulc and Castro by the historian Sebastian Balfour. Szulc’s
book, published in 1986, is distinguished for its abiding interest in Castro’s
ideological evolution. In particular, he traces Castro’s contacts with the Cuban
communists in the pre 1959 and early revolutionary period. Balfour’s more recent
work (1995) describes Castro and his revolution as eminently adaptable. This
quality rather than any set of quasi-mystical powers, he argues, has been paramount
in maintaining his rule for nearly five decades. From a biographical standpoint,
Balfour demonstrates some skill in placing Castro in perspective.

The Cuban

leader’s cleverness is given full due (for example, his genius in the manipulation of
national symbols – especially Martí) but never hyperbolized. His faults, among them
persistent economic mismanagement, are not minimized either.
Eduardo Chibás, while far from approaching the status of Martí or Castro, has
nonetheless been the subject of a “great man” style hagiography.

Luis Conte

Agüero’s Eduardo Chibás: el Adalid de Cuba, published in 1955, represents the only
in-depth biography of Chibás in any language. Conte Agüero, a journalist and close
friend of Chibás, had been first secretary of the Ortodoxo party. As with Mañach in
1933, he was perhaps seeking a Cuban hero in the midst of brutal dictatorship – in
this case, that of Batista (1952-1958). While this book is a valuable source, it is also
unabashedly reverential, referring to Chibás at times as, “the greatest of all

Luis A. Perez, Jr., “Review of Fidel Castro by Robert E. Quirk,” The American Historical Review. Vol.
99, No. 5. (December 1994), 1786-1787.
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Cubans.”50 Given the impact of Chibás on Cuban politics during the 1940s and early
1950s, it seems clear that new scholarship in this area is warranted and would
contribute to a fuller understanding of the era. Further, this study will attempt to
more accurately assess Chibás’ actual impact on the evolution of the Cuban political
system.
In addition to Conte Agüero’s book, a host of smaller volumes and essays
have addressed Chibás and his place in Cuban politics. Elena Alavez Martín, a
professor at the Escuela Profesional de Periodismo “Manuel Márquez Sterling” in
Havana, has produced two short volumes on Chibás. The first, from 1994, is less
than 70 pages in length and provides a skeletal, approval-laden outline of the
Ortodoxo leader’s career. This was followed eight years later by La ortodoxia en el
ideario americano, which details the party’s struggle against corrupt Auténticos. As
with Conte Agüero, the author is not above bouts of admiration. Ramón Rodríguez
Salgado’s 1998 essay, entitled Ortodoxia chibasista: nacimento, liderazgo y acción de
un movimiento politico denounces Chibás’ “retrograde” anti-communism, but also
praises his strong support of national sovereignty, economic independence, political
liberty and social justice, which the author claims the Cuban revolution has attained.
More recently, in 2001, the historian Frank Argote-Freyre produced a brief article
entitled, “The Political Afterlife of Eduardo Chibás: Evolution of a Symbol, 19511991.” Here, the author examines how the Ortodoxo leader passed from icon of
various anti-Batista factions in the years 1952-1958 to revered martyr of the early
revolution (1959-1961) and finally to diminished status over the next three decades
50
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due to the regime’s increasingly communist orientation and a new generation of
heroes, especially Che Guevara.
Useful albeit cameo portraits of the Ortodoxo leader can also be found in
Samuel Farber’s Revolution and Reaction in Cuba, Jorge Domínguez’s Cuba: Order
and Revolution and Luis Aguilar’s Cuba 1933: Prologue to Revolution. None of these
address the evolution of Chibasista-style Cuban populism nor do they treat more
than superficially the Ortodoxo party’s formation, the degree to which it was
dominated by Chibas’ personal popularity and the consequences for its future after
his death. There are also quite a few publications of varying quality by politicians,
literary figures and other notables of the era. For example, Los días iguales, a
memoir by the former Liberal party head Eduardo Suárez Rivas sheds some light on
the political machinations of the era – especially regarding Auténtico malfeasance.
Mea Cuba, a collection of essays by Guillermo Cabrera Infante, offers details
surrounding Chibás’ suicide and its aftermath.
*

*

*

The methodology to be used in establishing Chibás’ centrality to the Cuban
political system during the years 1940-1952 will involve analysis of his legislative
program, radio show, party activities and administrative style.

Chibás was a

congressman (1940-1944) and senator (1944-1948, 1950-1951) and his legislative
contributions, including bills he proposed or supported will indicate his importance
in shaping the island’s politics. Another factor to be examined will be the influence
Chibás wielded as the nation’s most popular radio personality. Specifically, Chibás
was able to focus the attention of his listeners on the issues of corruption and

xxx

gangsterismo. He emphasized that these problems (both of which undermined the
government’s legitimacy) were resolvable by committed reformers and put them at
the forefront of Cuban political discourse. Thus, a 1951 Bohemia poll noted that
8.53 percent of respondents claimed “mala administración” as the worst aspect of
Carlos Prío’s term in office while another 2.2 percent mentioned “gangsterismo.”51
This, in turn, encouraged political parties (particularly the ruling Auténticos) to put
forth candidates untainted by corruption. An examination of the way in which
Chibás cultivated various sectors (i.e. blacks, rural dwellers, the middle class and
urban workers) of Cuban society will provide a sense of his ability to mobilize
support and generate enthusiasm for his program and the extent to which this led to
changes in Cuba’s political sphere. Finally, Chibás’ talent for administration must be
addressed. As previously noted, he was a man of probity who never embezzled,
took kickbacks or abused any position of authority he attained. In order to posit
Chibás as a potentially successful reformer, however, it will be proven that he
possessed a knack for delegating authority to those who not only shared his ethics
but also were efficient, talented and politically savvy. Such individuals, were they to
become the norm at the head Cuba’s institutions, could very well have inspired
renewed faith in the government. In this sense, an analysis of Chibás’ tenure as
Ortodoxo party chief (1947-1951), where he wielded executive power, will yield
essential clues about him as an administrator.

“¿Cualés son las peores obras o medidas del Gobierno del dr. Prío?,” Bohemia, May 20, 1951:
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CHAPTER OVERVIEW
The dissertation consists of ten chapters, beginning in May of 1947 just
before Chibás founded the Ortodoxo party and ending with his death by a selfinflicted gunshot wound in August of 1951. Chapter 1 opens with a description of
the tribulations and eventual suicide of Havana mayor Manuel Fernández
Supervielle. This tragedy offers a useful lens though which to view both Chibás and
Cuba’s political culture. Supervielle, who had promised to build a new aqueduct for
Havana, killed himself after the project was repeatedly blocked by President Ramón
Grau San Martín. Grau, who nurtured hopes of re-election, viewed the aqueduct as a
potential threat to his popularity. This was no simple matter of personal rivalry,
however.

Under Cuba’s 1940 constitution, Grau was prohibited from seeking

another term but nonetheless organized a discreet campaign to modify the rules.
This proved to be one of many instances in which Cuba’s laws were ignored or
dismissed by the men who helped craft them. Chibás attempted to check this
tendency by stirring public outrage during his popular radio broadcasts. In this
case, Supervielle’s suicide also was one of many factors that pushed Chibás to found
the Ortodoxo party. Chapter 2 describes Chibás’ messianic political style and his
close relationship with Cuba’s poorest citizens. It also follows his attempts to build
a viable political organization.

From the beginning, Ortodoxos were beset by

factionalism – especially between realists like Pelayo Cuervo, who proposed to
reform the island’s politics by uniting the flawed and often highly corrupt political
opposition and idealists such as Rafael García Bárcena, who believed the party
should stand alone.

Chapter 3 analyzes the preparations for Cuba’s 1948
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presidential election by all the major parties and an attempt by army chief Genovevo
Pérez Dámera to interfere in the political process. The role of Cuba’s courts in
upholding electoral law is also explored. Chapter 4 details Chibás’ frenetic and
innovative presidential campaign in which he attempted to defeat his rivals through
radio appeals and theatrical speeches rather than a political machine or vote buying.
Given the mass defection of realists, Chibás also firmly situated himself in the
idealist camp. Chapter 5 examines Chibás’ strong electoral showing, good for third
place overall, in which he garnered more than 300,000 votes. It also covers the
early days of Carlos Prío’s presidency, which was flawed but represented a genuine
improvement. For example, Prío sought to work with Cuba’s legislative branch
rather than ruling by decree. Chapter 6 looks at Chibás’ crusade against the United
States owned Cuban Electric Company, which landed him in prison when he accused
a judge of taking bribes from the company to ensure it could continue to charge
exorbitant rates. Chibás was largely jailed at the president’s behest as a means to
keeping him off the radio, where his criticism damaged Prío’s popularity. Chapter 7
explores Chibás’ fight to keep the government from negotiating a loan with United
States banks. Cuba had a long history of borrowing money on onerous terms from
United States lending institutions and he felt this placed an undue burden on the
nation’s economy and compromised the island’s sovereignty. Further, he charged
that much of the cash was either embezzled or funneled into political campaigns
meant to keep the government in power. Chapter 8 finds Chibás weakened by a
diaphragmatic hernia, which required two surgeries to correct. Nonetheless, Chibás
decided to test his popularity by running for an open senate seat against a disliked
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but well-heeled government sponsored candidate.

Chibás’ resounding victory,

which was achieved almost entirely without campaigning as he was often confined
to his bed, proved the limits of political machines and vote buying. Another popular
Ortodoxo radio broadcaster, José Pardo Llada, followed in Chibás’ footsteps and was
elected to congress by a wide margin. Chapter 9 highlights an attempt by President
Carlos Prío to abridge free speech in Cuba by invoking the so-called “gag decree”
against Chibás’ radio broadcasts. As the 1952 elections loomed, he hoped to damage
the Ortodoxo leader by looking for any pretext to disrupt his popular show. A
peaceful protest organized by Chibás against the decree was violently dispersed by
the government. Chapter 10 treats an attempt by Cuba’s courts to hold ex President
Grau responsible for his administration’s corruption. The process was scuttled by
President Prío, who feared his brother Antonio would also be among those indicted.
The chapter’s primary emphasis, however, is on Chibás’ polemic with Education
Minister Aureliano Sánchez Arango. This dispute led the Ortodoxo leader to shoot
himself in the stomach – a wound which eventually proved fatal. Besides serving as
an endpoint to Chibás’ life, this suicide also heralds the end of an era as democracy
in Cuba outlasted him by less than seven months.
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Chapter 1
“As Long As Any Cuban Suffers, I Will Fight For Him”

By spring of 1947, the mayor of Havana was frustrated, perplexed and
contemplating drastic measures. Having been elected on a platform of bringing
water to the parched capital city, Manuel Fernández Supervielle had failed and his
constituents were irate. Upon being recognized in public, chants of “agua” trailed
him relentlessly. During trips to the cinema, he sat apart from the crowd so as not to
be seen and if his image appeared on a newsreel it was greeted with derisive
whistles. Even Havana’s merchants, whom Supervielle had saved from a series of
onerous taxes in his former post as treasury minister, turned their backs on him.
Presiding over the celebration of Retailer’s Day, in the lush gardens of the Tropical
brewery, the mayor was greeted by angry demands that he fulfill his pledge to build
a new aqueduct.1
Supervielle was a proud man who took these slights to heart. His campaign,
marked by the slogan, “Havana will have water!” had aroused a genuine fervor –
especially as the city, with a population of 600,000, contended with a water supply
suited for 150,000.2 Now, a short while later, and despite his lengthy career as an
honest and conscientious politician, Havana’s denizens assumed he was a fraud and
a liar. Even so, he was not the sort to complain or welter in pity. At times,
Supervielle attempted to explain his predicament but always did so privately. One
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such case was on Sunday, April 20, when, accompanied by a group of municipal
employees, he visited a hospital where the chief of the city’s education department
was convalescing.

Finding himself among a sympathetic crowd and perhaps

responding to some gentle prodding, he began recounting the details of his ordeal.3
He confessed that his friend Ramón Grau San Martín, Cuba’s president and a fellow
member of the Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Auténtico), had persuaded him to
leave his post as treasury minister and run for mayor.

After taking office in

September of 1946, everything initially proceeded smoothly and with the
president’s full support. Grau’s enthusiasm was such that he once kept Clinton P.
Anderson, the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture waiting (and hungry, as Anderson had
been invited to dinner) for two hours while he and Supervielle examined
preliminary plans for the aqueduct.
Once the blueprints were finalized, Supervielle estimated the cost to be six
million pesos.4 He then contacted José Morell Romero, president of the Sugar
Workers Retirement Fund, who had offered to finance the aqueduct. 5

Morell

Romero not only considered lending to the city a good investment, he confessed to
unhappily presiding over 21 million “unproductive” pesos.6

The two quickly

reached a verbal agreement and then considered the legality of their proposed
Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 35, Expediente 1097: 104-106, Archivo Nacional de Cuba
(Hereafter ANC). Armando Mier Vega and Rafael Fernández Núñez, both of whom were present at
the hospital where Supervielle spoke, reproduced his words from memory just over two weeks later.
A slightly different account of the situation also appears in, “en Cuba, Municipio,” Bohemia, January
26, 1947, 38-39.
4 The Cuban peso during this period was interchangeable with the United States dollar.
5 Financing the aqueduct through a loan from the Sugar Workers Retirement Fund had been the
centerpiece of Supervielle’s plan, in large part for nationalistic reasons. President Grau had devised
the refrain, “An aqueduct without concessions and with Cuban money,” in response to a previous
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called for concessions and foreign funding.
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transaction. Supervielle, who was a lawyer before entering politics and had been an
elected member of the constituent assembly that drafted the island’s constitution,
devised a formula by which the loan would agree with the city’s legal code. The
following day, Supervielle arranged a meeting with Grau, Morell Romero and Jesús
Menéndez, president of the National Federation of Sugar Workers.

Menéndez

expressed approval, saying that water was always a good business and the aqueduct
would represent “another triumph for the working class.”7 As everyone prepared to
leave, Grau, who had been silent until then, warned in his smiling, affable manner
that the loan presently being negotiated did not fulfill “specific requirements” of the
constitution and urged them to be careful.

According to Morell Romero and

Menéndez, the mayor turned “intensely pallid” upon hearing these words and for
good reason.8 Instantly, the project was thrust into political quicksand. First, a
commission of legal experts was convened to examine the issue.

After they

assented, Grau convoked a committee of engineers to inspect the aqueduct’s
blueprint for design flaws. When none were encountered, the president contracted
a panel of financiers to analyze the cost. Finding no irregularities, Supervielle once
again approached Morell Romero. In the intervening two months, however, the
president of the Sugar Workers’ Retirement Fund had developed a case of cold feet.
Claiming the loan was now “a very big responsibility,” Morell Romero deferred to
the assemblies of workers, tenants and landowners that governed the fund.9 When

Ibid, 105.
“En Cuba: Municipio,” Bohemia, January 26, 1947, 39.
9 Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 35, Expediente 1097: 105, ANC.
7
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two of these delegations attached unreasonable conditions to their consent,
Supervielle was forced to abandon this avenue.10
At various points during Supervielle’s monologue, his listeners suggested he
make a declaration that would clarify the facts. The mayor replied that he preferred
not to harm anyone nor did he wish to hinder the country’s progress. As treasury
minister, he had witnessed the negative effect of scandals on Cuba’s economy. At
the same time, Supervielle repeatedly wondered why he had been made mayor if he
was only going to be thwarted. He also groped for an explanation as to why Grau,
whom he had believed to be a close friend, had changed his mind suddenly and so
completely. While the president’s behavior was surely vexing, both the mayor and
his sympathizers were wrong to imply his harassment in the street was the result of
an ignorant citizenry. For example, Bohemia, the nation’s most popular magazine,
reported on every stage of the negotiations.11 A piece appearing on January 26,
1947 informed readers not only of Grau’s reservation regarding the Sugar Workers
Retirement Fund but also of shady dealings in the municipal council, where
opposition aldermen demanded a “slice” of the six million pesos earmarked for the
project in exchange for their support.12

The public was even aware that the

“municipal first lady” had suggested her husband visit a blood bank as a way of
The tenants’ assembly approved the loan on the condition that Cuba’s legislature pass a law
establishing a Tribunal of Accounts. This, obviously, was outside of Supervielle’s control. The
landowners’ delegation also desired something from Cuba’s legislators. They demanded that the
Sugar Workers’ Retirement Fund, which had been established by presidential decree, must be
formalized by an act of Congress. Supervielle was powerless here as well. The workers’ delegation,
perhaps swayed by the enthusiasm of Jesús Menéndez, approved the loan without reservations.
11 Bohemia’s weekly circulation at this time was 140,000. Subsequently, the magazine conducted a
study in urban and suburban areas revealing that approximately six people read each issue. When
Bohemia’s rural subscribers were taken into account, the number of total readers each week was
“conservatively” estimated to be more than one million, or 20 percent of Cuba’s population. See: “Un
Survey de Bohemia Sobre Sus Lectores Adultos,” Bohemia, March 7, 1948: 58-59.
12 “En Cuba, Municipio,” Bohemia, January 26, 1947: 38.
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drumming up positive publicity. Cubans were later notified that Supervielle had
deceived them even in this small endeavor.

After being photographed by the

Havana newspapers with his shirtsleeve rolled up, the mayor refused to have his
blood drawn on account of his fragile health.13
As Supervielle wrestled with mounting disappointment, he was acutely
aware of the looming first anniversary of his election. With the Sugar Workers
Retirement Fund off limits, the mayor had no choice but to court foreign companies.
At the same time, these would almost certainly not pass muster with a president
who had sloganeered to the tune of, “An aqueduct without concessions and with
Cuban money.” Nevertheless, Supervielle entered negotiations with a series of
overseas ventures, including Frederick Snare Corporation of the United States and a
Canadian investment company, but each time he demurred before a deal could be
reached. On a different occasion, the mayor apparently considered a loan from the
owner of the building where he lived – perhaps believing the man, who was Cuban,
was preferable to a foreigner. The feverish, semi-distracted state of Supervielle’s
dealings led a Bohemia correspondent to write that, “In municipal circles, there is
speculation as to the identity of the next fortunate mortal who, within a week’s time,
will enter into negotiations with the mayor, with the objective of beginning the
eagerly awaited aqueduct, although it’s suspected the mayor will accommodate
whomever crosses his path next.”14
Two weeks after that Sunday in April, when Supervielle had unburdened
himself before some of the few people who still sympathized with him, he awoke
13
14

“En Cuba, Política: Ni sangre ni agua” Bohemia, April 6, 1947: 35.
“En Cuba, Municipio: Supervielle el Irresoluto,” Bohemia, May 4, 1947: 41.
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early and appeared bathed and clean-shaven in his garage at around 7:40 a.m.
There, as usual, he encountered Sergio Álvarez – the policeman assigned to protect
him since his days as treasury secretary. “Sergio,” said the mayor in a playful tone,
“you carry a revolver I don’t like. It’s old and ugly. Show it to me. One day, I’m
going to give you a new one.”15 Álvarez disarmed the pistol, a .38 caliber, and
handed it over. Supervielle briefly examined the weapon, insisted again it was not
to his taste and told Álvarez to call for a police car as he had an errand that required
attention. Álvarez, who was seated next to the mayor, asked for his gun, saying he
felt uncomfortable going out into the street unarmed. Supervielle returned the
weapon, watched Álvarez insert the magazine, and then snatched it from him.
Before Álvarez could respond, Supervielle quickly shot himself in the chest. Later
on, as the mayor’s corpse was laid out on a city hospital’s operating table, two
letters escaped from his jacket pocket: one addressed to the judge of instruction, the
other to his wife of 18 years. The former was dated May 2, two days before his
suicide. “I deprive myself of life,” it read, “because in spite of my efforts to resolve
the problem of water in Havana, multiple inconveniences and obstacles have been
placed in my way, making it impossible, and this implies for me a political failure
and leaves unfulfilled the promise I made to the people.”16
Among the first to arrive at Supervielle’s residence in the plush suburb of
Miramar was Eduardo Chibás, accompanied by his friend and political confidant,
Luis Orlando Rodríguez. They, along with two reporters who had preceded them,
listened as Aurelia Palacios, the mayor’s grief-stricken widow screamed, “Grau is
15
16

“En Cuba, Duelo,” Bohemia, May 11, 1947: 42.
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responsible! He’s the only one responsible for Manuel’s death!” She then looked at
Chibás and said, “You know everything. You have to awaken the people. You have
to open their eyes.”17
*

*

*

Eduardo Chibás cut a unique swath in Cuban politics. Eddy, as he was widely
known, was a 39 year old Auténtico senator. He also happened to be the island’s
most gifted orator, a bona fide radio celebrity and budding messianic figure whose
followers often compared him to Jesus Christ.18 His Sunday evening broadcasts
regularly topped the popularity charts, often surpassing the island’s famed
radionovelas.19

Richard Pack, a New York Times correspondent, characterized

Chibás as a “reporter, crusader, gossip and muckraker” who treated listeners to a
weekly half hour dose of “verbal fireworks.”20 The show offered more than mere
entertainment, however. Chibás urged his audience to expose examples of injustice
or corruption and every week letters poured in from all corners of the island. “As
long as any Cuban suffers,” he reminded listeners, “I will fight for him.” For this
reason, Supervielle’s widow pinned her hopes on Chibás, adding that some city

Ibid., 42-43 See also Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 502. When President Grau arrived at the
Supervielle residence shortly thereafter, he told the mayor’s wife, “Señora, the nation has lost one of
its most illustrious sons. You were a great help to him.” Without missing a beat, she replied, “And
you helped him to end up like this.”
18 For example, a letter to Chibás by Jorge González Rojas, of Havana, stated, “I admire your bravery,
courage and incorruptible dignity and I’m sure that just as God chose Jesus Christ to save Christianity
from the wave of perverts that exploited it, He has chosen you to realize a similar labor in Cuban
politics.” Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 34, Expediente 1089: 1, ANC. Another Chibás admirer
sent him a poem, the opening lines of which read, “Like Jesus Christ, you tell the truth to men without
scruples.” Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 35, Expediente 1094: 155, ANC.
19 The first radionovelas in Latin America were written and produced in Cuba during the late 1930s.
20 Richard Pack, “Report from Havana.” The New York Times, April 28, 1946, II, 7.
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council members had demanded $5000 apiece in exchange for supporting the
aqueduct.21
More to the point, it was no secret that Chibás had lately suffered troubles of
his own with Grau.22

In 1944, Grau had won the presidency in what many

considered the cleanest elections Cuba had ever held. Chibás, who gained a senate
seat in the voting, termed Grau’s restoration, “the glorious journey.” During the
campaign, Grau’s adherents had so effusive and greeted him with such ebullience
that he suffered broken bones in his right hand, which came to be known as the
“hand made sick by popularity.”23 He was also inundated with brief, laudatory
poems called décimas. In one, a female admirer from Santa Clara declared: “In the
end, Grau, who could possibly arrive in your presence and explain the impatience

“en Cuba, Duelo,” Bohemia, May 11, 1947, 43. See also, Conte Agüero, 503.
Chibás first met Grau as an impressionable 17 year old when they were both passengers on a
luxury steamship. Eddy, a recent high school graduate at the time, had been set to spend three
months in Europe with his parents and younger brother, Raúl. Grau, who was 20 years older, already
boasted a lucrative medical practice along with a professorship in physiology at the University of
Havana. During the next two decades, they fashioned a close personal and political relationship. In
1927, Grau backed the Directorio Estudiantil Universitario (Student Directorate) of the University of
Havana in its opposition to the “reform” of President Gerardo Machado y Morales (1925-1933) that
extended his term and provided for his illegal re-election. As a result, he endured intermittent jail
and exile during the next six years but also became the idol of many university students. Chibás
returned the favor by nominating Grau for Cuba’s presidency on behalf of the Student Directorate on
September 8, 1933. By this time, the island was in turmoil after Machado’s ouster on August 12 and
the overthrow of the United States sponsored successor government of Carlos Manuel de Céspedes
on September 5. Grau’s brief first presidency, known as the “100 days” (despite lasting 127), formed
the basis of his future political career. During this period, he issued a series of popular decrees that
enshrined the eight-hour day, minimum wages for cane cutters, voting rights for women, autonomy
for the University of Havana, a 45 percent reduction in the price of electricity and a mandate that half
of all workers in agriculture, commerce and industry be Cuban citizens. Grau was deposed on
January 18, 1934, but his decrees, few of which had been implemented due to the government’s
weakness, remained his calling card. In the decade that followed, when Fulgencio Batista ruled Cuba
first as a military strongman (1934-1940) and later as a democratically elected president (19401944), the frustrated promise of Grau’s tenure grew in the imagination of many Cubans. For this, the
former physiology professor owed a considerable debt to Chibás, his most charismatic and popular
disciple.
23 José Pardo Llada, “Gestos, manías y hábitos de nuestros hombres públicos,” Bohemia, May 4, 1947:
10.
21
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with which the People await you?”

24

According to Bohemia, the new president’s

inauguration set off “an explosion of popular jubilation never before seen in Cuba.”25
Grau thus entered office a near mythic figure, almost more ethereal than human, and
in this sense he was certain to disappoint. What no one expected, however, was for
the ex physiology professor to prove so tolerant of corruption and contemptuous of
the island’s constitution. On January 19, 1947, Chibás addressed a 12-page letter to
his friend.26 He urged Grau to end the re-election campaign being waged on his
behalf by government functionaries, to fire corrupt ministers and send them to the
courts for trial and crush the black market that raised the cost of living and made
wealthy men of dishonest officials.27 The re-election effort was particularly galling
for Chibás on two accounts. First, Cuba’s 1940 constitution, which both men had a
hand in crafting as members of the constituent assembly, strictly forbade the
practice and Grau’s own Auténtico party had proposed the measure, which had been
approved unanimously.28 Second, Chibás harbored presidential ambitions of his
own and longed to correct his erstwhile master’s mistakes. In any case, Grau
ignored the missive even as many of his policies sowed anger and distrust among
Cubans who had expected great things from him. Thus, an editorial in the weekly

Quoted in Vazquez Garcia, El Gobierno de la Kubanidad, 62.
“En Cuba, “Balance,” October 10, 1948: 107.
26 Chibás also sent his letter to the newspapers. On January 21, 1947, Diario de la Marina printed it in
its entirety.
27 The fact that Chibás now criticized Grau for fomenting the black market represented a complete
about face. During a broadcast of April 15, 1945, he had strenuously defended Grau’s system for
supplying Cubans with basic foodstuffs. He also excoriated Santiago Rey Perna, a Republican senator
from Las Villas, for lacking the moral authority to criticize Grau – especially given his poor record as
former governor of that province. Three days later, Chibás and Rey fought a saber duel in which the
former was lightly wounded on the forearm and back.
28 Although the constitution forbade consecutive re-election, ex presidents could run again after they
had been out of office for eight years.
24
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magazine Carteles declared, “Never has a government defrauded the faith of Cubans
so rapidly and radically as that of Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín.”29
On March 1, 1947 a bloc of pro-Chibás Auténticos, known as the grupo
ortodoxo, met in Senator Pelayo Cuervo Navarro’s home to discuss the formation of
a new political party. By this time, Grau had renounced re-election but those
present were certain he would take revenge. In their view, remaining within the
fold would be “political suicide.”30 Nevertheless, Chibás promptly shocked everyone
by asserting that the right “historical juncture,” had not yet presented itself.31
Cuba’s political sphere was fragmented, with no party attracting more than half the
island’s votes in presidential polls. As head of a new entity, Chibás reasoned, he
would require pacts in order to win the presidency. This would entail diluting the
prospective party’s platform just as the Auténticos had done in 1944 when they
allied with the Republicans.32 Chibás thus told the group, in what would become
one of his political hallmarks, that he was interested more in “ideology without
pacts than pacts without ideology.”33 Aside from an attachment to the organization
he had helped build, Chibás also believed the Auténticos were capable of winning the
presidency without coalitions if they chose the right candidate, namely himself, and
jettisoned the party’s crooked elements.34 Eight days later, on his radio show,

“El Gobierno y la denuncia de Chibás,” Carteles, January 19, 1947: 25.
Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 488.
31 en Cuba, “Política: Conflicto Emocional,” Bohemia, March 9, 1947: 40.
32 As part of the deal, Grau’s vice-president, Raúl de Cárdenas, was a Republican.
33 “En Cuba, Política: Conflicto Emocional,” 40.
34 On July 14, 1946, the provincial assembly of the Auténtico party in Oriente, the largest and most
populous of Cuba’s six provinces, proclaimed Chibás their choice for the presidential nomination in
1948. This had been arranged beforehand, with Chibás’ knowledge, by Emilio Ochoa, the Auténtico
party president of Oriente. That evening, Chibás addressed a grateful speech to his supporters via
29
30
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Chibás likened the Auténtico party to a warship lashed by a tempest, leaking water
and infiltrated by enemies. What, asked Chibás, are the responsibilities of loyal
crewmembers under such circumstances?

They must denounce traitors and

struggle to save the boat along with the ideals it represents regardless of the
consequences. Amused by this allegory, a Bohemia reporter noted that Chibás had
“turned himself into a mariner, whose love of the sea rivaled Sinbad.”35 In a less
metaphorical moment, Chibás announced that forming a new “political instrument”
and heading a coalition of the island’s other parties would almost surely guarantee
him the nation’s highest office in 1948. Even so, he declared, “I am unwilling to
exchange my historic position in Cuba’s revolutionary movement for the presidency
of the republic.”36 On the other hand, Chibás continued associating with the grupo
ortodoxo – whose leaders set a date for leaving the party.

Manuel Bisbé, a

congressman, professor of Greek and one of Chibás’ closest friends assured them
Eddy would join after resolving his “emotional conflict.”37
While Auténtico bigwigs viewed the man known as el loco (the crazy one)
with mistrust, the grupo ortodoxo wondered when Chibás would realize, as Bisbé
had said, “the impossibility of continuing in the party.”38

Hence, each new

development became a test of Chibás’ loyalties and intentions. On March 17, grupo
ortodoxo senators drew up a motion to interpellate Grau’s sleaziest cabinet
members: minister of education, José Manuel Alemán and minister of commerce,
radio in which he claimed his popularity coupled with that of the party would guarantee a “definitive
and crushing victory” without pacts or coalitions. See Conte Agüero, 445.
35 “En Cuba, “Política: Chibás el Marino,” Bohemia, March 16, 1947: 43.
36 Ibid.
37 “En Cuba, Política: Conflicto Emocional,” 40.
38 “En Cuba, Política: Conflicto Emocional,” 40.
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César Casas.

Asked whether he would add his name, Chibás agreed on two

conditions. First, the motion must not attack the Auténticos as a party and second,
no politicians from other parties would be asked to sign. If the grupo ortodoxo
hoped Chibás would see the futility of his situation, this was indeed a shrewd tactic.
In 1945, when Inocente Álvarez submitted to a seven-hour interpellation and Cuba’s
chamber of representatives subsequently voted “no confidence,” Grau was indignant
and resisted removing him.

When Álvarez did finally bow to calls for his

resignation, Grau flouted the island’s semi-parliamentary system by making him
foreign minister shortly thereafter. Zeroing in on Alemán and Casas would almost
certainly lead to similar contempt – especially as the president considered Alemán
his “best minister.”39 Though the grupo ortodoxo did not intend the motion as a ruse
to lure Chibás, its members surely realized the potential symbolism. After all,
Chibás and Alemán were nearly perfect foils.
Eddy joined the Auténticos in 1938, before the party was allowed to function
legally in Cuba and could offer members little aside from persecution. Alemán, on
the other hand, had been a Democrat and career civil servant in the ministry of
education who supported Grau’s opponent in 1944. Elevated to education minister
in 1946, the erstwhile chief of budgets and accounts quickly padded his briefcase.
When that was full, he employed a suitcase. With his ill-gotten gains, he acquired a
finca 12 miles south of Havana and prime Miami real estate for starters. 40 Alemán

“En Cuba, “Balance,” Bohemia, October 10, 1948: 125.
Alemán purchased the finca America, formerly the domain of ex president José Miguel Gómez
(1909-1913) – another distinguished figure in the annals of Cuban political corruption. Gómez,
affectionately known as el tiburón (the shark), was a general in the war of independence and
dominated the island’s Liberal party until his death in 1921. He entered the presidency with little
39
40
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was no garden-variety grafter, however. Besides lining his pockets, he used the
ministry’s funds to become a major power broker within the Auténtico party.41 In
this respect, the ministry of education proved an ideal plaything. Its budget was
swollen beyond that of other ministries by a nine-centavo tax on each bag of sugar
produced, the result of a law passed on April 5, 1943. Known as inciso K (clause K)
for the section of the law’s first article that mandated the tax, it was designed to
finance the hiring of new professors, teachers and other necessary personnel.
Alemán diverted a substantial portion of this money toward Auténtico candidates in
1946, helping the party gain a majority in congress and, fatefully, the mayoralty of
Havana. With an eye toward the presidential poll in 1948, Alemán launched an allpurpose political fund known as BAGA (Bloque Alemán-Grau Alsina) in conjunction
with Grau’s favorite nephew, Francisco Grau Alsina. Chibás, who had taken note of
these activities, taunted Alemán over the airwaves – accusing him on December 12,
1946 of stealing the breakfasts of schoolchildren. Being dressed down in this
manner before a nationwide audience was undoubtedly embarrassing for Alemán,
but the education minister inoculated himself against such attacks by charming the
president.
As a longtime bureaucrat, Alemán was adept at cultivating vastly different
masters. During Fulgencio Batista’s presidency (1940-1944), he served minister of
education Anselmo Alliegro – helping him pillage inciso K from its inception. Under
money and exited a millionaire, albeit one who takes care of his friends. This gave rise to a refrain
that played on his nickname, “El tiburón se baña pero salpica.” (The shark bathes but splashes).
41 Alemán’s rise within the party was nothing short of meteoric. Having joined the Auténticos only
after Grau’s victory in 1944, he had become the party’s president in Havana by December of 1947
and won a senate seat in 1948. In the sort of irony that abounds in Cuban politics, Chibás occupied
this seat two years later after Alemán’s death from Hodgkin’s disease.
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Grau, who loathed Batista for toppling his government of the “100 days” in 1934,
Alemán radically changed course. References to Batista’s civic-military schools
were scrapped. He demolished the Cangrejeras military barracks on the western
edge of Havana and replaced it with a polytechnic school named for Paulina Alsina,
Grau’s widowed sister in law, who was Cuba’s “First Lady.” Alemán also encouraged
Grau’s re-election hopes. This endeared him to the austere ex physiology professor
who eschewed cigarettes, alcohol and even snacks between meals but devoured
flattery with abandon. Alemán consolidated his position in the party by taking
indirect control of the armed action group known as Movimiento Socialista
Revolucionario (MSR). This outfit was one of numerous self-styled grupos de acción
with ties to the Autenticos.

After Grau won the presidency, these violent

organizations sought government positions and pursued deadly rivalries among
themselves. They also engaged in lucrative rackets, such as monopolizing the sale of
textbooks at the University of Havana.42 Alemán utilized the MSR as a private army
to bully detractors43 and forcibly shut down schools, especially out of the way rural
institutions. In this manner, he increased the available resources for his own
purposes.

Thomas, Cuba, 743. The University of Havana was an ideal place for the action groups as it was off
limits to the police. On the other hand, Cuba’s various police and security forces were themselves
often run by members of action groups during Grau’s presidency, so they flourished outside the
university as well. For example, the chief of Cuba’s Servicio de Investigaciones was Mario Salabarría, a
friend of Grau and member of MSR. Havana’s police chief, Fabio Ruiz, belonged to MSR’s bitter rival,
Acción Revolucionaria Guiteras (ARG). Ruiz was made police chief in exchange for ARG support in the
1944 elections.
43 On November 20. 1946, Senator Emilio Ochoa of the grupo ortodoxo submitted a motion to
investigate irregularities at the polytechnic school of Holguín, his hometown. Alemán responded by
sending “employees” of the education ministry to the Capitolio building armed with pistols and
machine guns. By a strange coincidence, the senate lacked a quorum on that day.
42
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On April 8, 1947, the senate voted to interpellate Alemán and Casas. Chibás
had prepared for this eventuality by asking listeners to send examples of
government corruption. One letter, signed by 31 parents and neighbors of two
nearby rural schools in Las Villas province, declaimed their children’s lack of paper,
pencils, books, desks and blackboards. As “one of the purest men of our republic,”
the authors begged Chibás to tell the education minister to “SPEND MONEY ON
SCHOOL MATERIALS” because local children “HUNGER FOR TEACHING.”44 Rolando
Roque of Guara in Havana province claimed the right to an education in his town
was a “sarcasm” given the absence of textbooks, seats, desks and water filters in the
school.45 Manuel Barruecos of Bayamo informed Chibás that the education minister
was closing the Rural Normal School in order to rob the money designated for its
upkeep. In addition, he described the recent visit of a group of MSR gangsters
“pantomiming” the role of school inspectors.46 In Calabazar de la Habana, the locale
of Alemán’s recently acquired finca, residents noticed that instead of finishing
construction on a nearby school, workers and supplies were now being transported
to the education minister’s property. The author of this letter closed by urging
Chibás to “fall with zeal upon the thieves.”47
César Casas, the minister of commerce, was a less sinister figure than Alemán
but his toleration of Cuba’s black market profoundly angered many citizens. The
intermittent scarcity of goods such as rice, lard, flour, meat and milk had originally
begun in 1942, when the United States entered World War II. Now, more than a
Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 35, Expediente 1097: 58, ANC.
Ibid., 56.
46 Ibid., 37.
47 Ibid., 26.
44
45
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year after the fight had ended, Cubans continued to endure shortages and black
market prices. Responding to complaints, ministry officials denied the existence of a
black market and, rather indelicately, grumbled that Cubans were “eating too
much.”48 Casas qualified these assertions, saying no “organized” black market was
in force.49 Everyday Cubans knew otherwise and eagerly detailed their experiences
for Chibás. One letter described how a treasury ministry employee bought 350
sacks of cement at the officially controlled price of 98 centavos and subsequently
sold them for three pesos each on the black market.50 The man, named Andrés
Plumas, was a recent hire and confessed to a friend that his longer serving
colleagues were entitled to far more than that.

Esther Pérez, a fervid Chibás

supporter from Carlos Rojas in Matanzas province, lamented the lack of rice in his51
town because of a common trick employed by wholesalers. This involved billing
shopkeepers for one quantity while delivering a much smaller amount. As a result,
local stores faced with a dilemma: break the law and sell items at higher than the
official price so as not to lose money or avoid vending them altogether. For good
measure, Pérez added that the town’s children did not receive their school
breakfasts nor did they have sufficient educational materials.52 Another missive
reported that the chief of Santa Clara’s office of commerce and his second in
command controlled supplies of the city’s basic items and sold them for exorbitant

Jacinto Torras, “¿Terminarán en 1947 la crisis de abastecimiento y la bolsa negra?,” Bohemia,
January 26, 1947: 29.
49 José Pardo Llada, “La bolsa negra.” Bohemia, January 19, 1947: 42.
50 Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 35, Expediente 1097: 72-73, ANC.
51 This is not a typographical error. Esther Pérez, who regularly corresponded with Chibás, reminded
him in a postscript not to forget that he was a “señor,” particularly as previous responses had been
addressed to Señorita Esther Pérez.
52 Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 35, Expediente 1097: 12-13, ANC.
48
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rates on the black market. As a result, both rice and soap were unavailable at official
prices.

Noting that the Grau administration had “turned out worse than we

thought,” the author deems himself a “Chibás Auténtico” and praised the grupo
ortodoxo.53
Worst of all, the sordidness of Cuba’a black market underbelly, teeming as it
was with dodgy functionaries and wholesalers, was only half the story.

The

government’s official policy of price controls for foodstuffs such as rice, lard and
flour, all of which were largely imported, amounted to subsidies for foreign
producers. Rather than assisting overseas farmers, a wiser tactic would have been
to stimulate domestic markets – particularly for rice, a Cuban staple suitable to the
island’s terrain. This was especially imperative now, while sugar prices were high,
so that Cuba would have other options when profits inevitably dropped. After all,
sugar growing rivals such as the Philippines, whose capacity had been largely
destroyed during World War II, would not stay down indefinitely. Many of these
points were outlined in a memo drawn up for Chibás on April 12; four days after the
interpellations were approved. The document also censured Alemán for sporadic
distribution of school breakfasts and the building of showcase schools next to Cuba’s
Carretera Central (Central Highway) while rural inhabitants languished in want.
Taking into account the gravity of these offenses and the vast resources at Alemán’s
disposal, it warned that the senate’s obligation to examine and analyze the
education ministry was “not to be delegated.”54 Chibás had no intention of shirking

Ibid., 81.
Ibid., 50. Entitled “Memorandum para el Sr. Chibás,” this document contains minor editorial
changes in Chibás’ handwriting, suggesting he read it carefully.
53
54

17

this responsibility, nor did many of his fellow legislators, especially those from other
parties who were placed at a disadvantage by Alemán’s campaign contributions.
At the same time, both ministers were determined to resist appearing before
the senate.

Prior to the vote, Alemán and Casas informed the president they

suffered from stage fright. Upon learning of the motion’s approval, Grau refused to
honor it but seemed far less concerned with protecting his ministers than ridding
himself of congress altogether.

Notified by senate president Miguelito Suárez

Fernández that the upper chamber was exercising a constitutionally sanctioned
prerogative, Grau, wearing his characteristic smile, responded with the following
anecdote:
Truly amigos, the constitution is charging me for more than the
amount on the bill. At this moment, I’m remembering something very
suggestive. A short while after assuming the presidency of the
republic, I passed through Luyanó [a working class Havana
neighborhood] on the way to Varadero [a beach resort 85 miles east
of the capital] and noted a horrible smell emanating from a tallow
factory. The next day, I called the minister of health and asked him to
close it but he told me he couldn’t do that because the factory was
functioning in accordance with the constitution and the laws. A short
time afterward, I again passed through Luyanó and the horrible odor
still bothered me. This time, I called Lieutenant Colonel Hernández
Nardo and instructed him to take some men along and close the
factory immediately without any further explanation. Acting with
great efficiency, he shut down the factory and said only that he was
acting on orders from above. Right now, the congress is bothering me
a great deal because it too smells horribly. It’s a center of foul
smells...55
The following Sunday, Chibás repeated this story on his radio show, spreading the
“tallow factory of Luyanó” to an even wider audience than those who read about it
in Bohemia. The island’s cartoonists happily joined the fray as well. For example, a
55
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sketch by Juan David portrayed Grau and the Republican senator Guillermo Alonso
Pujol speaking to each other behind gas masks.56
Tensions were exacerbated on April 21, when MSR gunmen loyal to Alemán
fired shots into the Capitolio during an evening senate session dedicated to
resolving the crisis with Grau. Two days later, as the senate awaited him, Casas sent
word that he would not attend his interpellation. In response, Chibás submitted a
motion of no confidence against Grau’s entire cabinet, which was duly approved, as
the only way to defend the senate’s “legislative sovereignty.”57 Even as this was
humiliating, Grau was favored by a provision in the constitution excusing his new
cabinet from interpellation for one year. Once again flouting the document he
helped draft, Grau elevated deputies in each ministry and made no secret of his
intention to restore the original cabinet when the senate recessed. On May 2, when
the no confidence vote became official, Prime Minister Carlos Prío Socarrás termed
Casas’ refusal to appear before the senate as “legal and legitimate.”58 For Prío, a
lawyer, senator and former delegate to the constituent assembly, this statement was
understandable only in the context of his own presidential aspirations. Even as
Grau had relinquished his re-election campaign, it was clear he (and not the party
assembly) would choose the next Auténtico presidential nominee.

Thus, the

prospect of Chibás rescuing the party from the likes of Grau and Alemán seemed
increasingly remote.

Ibid., 48. The following week, David produced a cartoon entitled “Precaution” in which Grau
sported a clothespin instead.
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58 “Senadores Auténticos estiman que tiene caracter transitorio el Gabinete recien designado,” Diario
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On the other hand, the president’s high-handedness was unpopular. As
Chibás had attempted to collect signatures for his no confidence motion, Eduardo
Suárez Rivas, a Liberal senator, exclaimed that those who refused would “look like
idiots” before the public.59

Grau, who once averred that his government

represented “the combat of virtue against vice,”60 now preferred to defy the
constitution rather than rendering two widely disliked and corrupt ministers.61
Two days after this crisis had been resolved, essentially by sidestepping the
legislative branch, Havana’s mayor shot himself in the heart. Supervielle, who had
been derided in the press and on the streets up to moment of his demise, instantly
became a martyr. During his broadcast that evening, Chibás characterized the
mayor’s death as a “desperate scream of alert in the midst of political confusion.”62
He also reminded listeners of the Auténtico congressman (and unconditional Grau
supporter) Segundo Curti’s attempt to pass a law that would place the aqueduct
under central government control because the mayor was a “failed, inept and
incapable public servant.”63 The next day a crowd of 4000 composed of all social
classes squeezed into Havana’s Colón cemetery to attend his burial. A reporter from
Diario de la Marina called the ceremony, “one of the most well attended in recent
memory.”64 A Bohemia correspondent noted that Supervielle’s suicide was “taken
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by the people in general as an act of protest in favor of honest politics against the
habit, too frequent among elected figures, of scorning the needs and necessities of
the community.”65 This was an obvious jab at Alemán and Casas, both of whom
treated the “community” with disdain, stole with impunity and enjoyed the
president’s favor. Although Grau delivered a glowing eulogy, Supervielle lacked the
president’s full support even in death. The national government, unlike that of the
city, did not declare an official day of mourning nor were the flags of the presidential
palace, the prime minister’s office66 or the foreign ministry flown at half-mast. The
administration’s most pressing concern was to keep the multitude’s palpable anger
from bubbling over. As such, a police cordon restricted access to the mausoleum
and the cemetery was lined with uniformed and plain-clothes officers.

The

government also cancelled eulogies slated to be given by figures representing the
mayor’s family and Havana’s city hall, alleging a shortage of time. However, this
decision smacked of nervousness and fear.
Chibás, who had zealously campaigned for Supervielle in 1946 and dubbed
him “Super-votes,” was ideally placed to understand the frayed relationship
between mayor and president. After all, Chibás had once coveted the mayoralty for
himself but yielded to Grau’s preference for Supervielle. The president purportedly
chose Supervielle because the post required an administrator rather than a

“En Cuba, Duelo: Un hombre de honor,” 43.
Shortly after Supervielle’s suicide, Chibás received a letter from someone who had been present at
the house of the new mayor, Nicolás Castellanos. According to this account, one of the guests
suggested that celebratory drinks were in order. However, Castellanos responded that, “this is a time
of pain rather than one of joy.” Moments later, Carlos Prío, the prime minister, appeared shouting
and applauding. He allegedly yelled, “There is no reason for sadness!” and addressing the new
mayor’s wife he cried, “Bring some champagne to celebrate as this is a great day for us!” See Fondo
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politician. Most likely, Supervielle’s middling popularity caught Grau’s eye more
than his efficiency or managerial skill as treasury minister. In terms of power, the
Havana mayoralty paled only before the presidency and Grau, who cherished the
idea of re-election, desired a weak candidate. Supervielle, who had twice run
unsuccessfully for a congressional seat, was ideal. Even so, the prospect of bringing
water to Havana aroused such passion that Supervielle became a sensation. He
defeated his two opponents in a landslide and immediately set to work on the
promised aqueduct. Supervielle also began mentioning himself as a presidential
candidate. If he succeeded in supplying the water habaneros so desperately yearned
for, his popularity would have skyrocketed, making him a formidable force and
natural contender for Cuba’s highest office. Hence, Grau effectively squashed the
financing for Supervielle’s aqueduct in late January 1947, a decision he refused to
reverse even after the mayor publicly supported the president’s re-election
campaign the next month. Nor was this the first time Grau had played politics with
the city’s water supply. In August 1944, as president elect, he rejected a scheme by
then Mayor Raúl García Menocal because the proposed aqueduct called for the use
of foreign capital.67 Supervielle was also not the first Auténtico to have his career
derailed for becoming too popular. Grau’s first education minister, Luis Pérez
Espinós, was forced to resign in 1945 because his success in adding new classrooms
and expanding the school breakfast program was considered threatening.68
Chibás, who was Grau’s chief propagandist at the time, framed opposition to Mayor Menocal’s
aqueduct in fiercely patriotic terms. During his broadcast of August 27, 1944, Chibás asserted that,
“Cubans must rid themselves of their colonial mentality, shake themselves free of defeatism, feel
proud of their country and march forward with their foreheads raised, toward the conquest of Cuba’s
economic independence.” See Conte Agüero, 322.
68 Charles D. Ameringer, The Cuban Democratic Experience, 33.
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When Chibás took to the microphones on Sunday evening of May 11, he was
ready to cast off what his friend Luis Conte Agüero called “the psychological
conflict.”69 He began his address by revisiting Supervielle’s death. The mayor’s
suicide note, he mused, was reminiscent of a “patrician from the legendary age of
Roman greatness.”70 He contrasted this document, which avoided accusation or
recrimination, with the “sordid meanness” of those responsible for his demise.71
Chibás also reminded his audience that the flag adorning the presidential palace
fluttered at the top of its mast, “challenging public opinion” and smirking at the man
whose poignant fate “destroyed thousands and thousands of hearts.”72 Following
this prelude, Chibás devoted the remainder of his 25-minute show to yet another
unfolding tragedy. The same underhanded characters, led by Grau, who had driven
Supervielle to end his life had also irreparably harmed the Auténtico party. This
damage could not be reversed because the party’s national, provincial and
municipal assemblies, which represented rank and file delegates, no longer
possessed any influence over the current government. Chibás pointed out that the
national assembly had not been convoked a single time since Grau had taken office
in October of 1944. Declaring that, “The crisis of the government produces a crisis
in the party, which in turn gives rise to a crisis in the Cuban revolution,” Chibás
signaled his readiness to found a new party based on the original Auténtico ideals of
economic independence, political liberty and social justice.73
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The following Thursday, grupo ortodoxo members and their sympathizers
met in the Auténtico Youth headquarters on the corner of Neptuno and Amistad in
the Centro Habana district. They represented an impressive display of Cuba’s
political elite, including six of the nation’s 54 senators, nine of its 127 congressman,
the governor of Matanzas province and the mayors of Bayamo, Holguín and Victoria
de las Tunas. Younger notables in attendance included 19-year-old Natasha Mella,74
daughter of Julio Antonio Mella, the magnetic student leader and founder of Cuba’s
Communist party.

His assassination in 1929 converted him into one of the

revolution’s first martyrs. Also present was 20-year-old Fidel Castro, then a law
student at the University of Havana. Chibás opened the proceedings saying, “We
can’t rebuild the party from within but don’t want to be accused of being impulsive
or acting out of personal ambitions.”75 He thus proposed that Grau be given 72
hours to convene the Auténtico national assembly, in front of which the grupo
ortodoxo would accuse him of betraying the party’s founding principles.

This

proposal was approved unanimously. Later on, Senator Millo Ochoa submitted a
motion, also approved unanimously, to name a committee charged with establishing
a “new political force.”76 On May 18, two hours after the deadline for a response
from Grau had passed, Chibás ascended his radio pulpit and launched the
organization. He described this entity, so freshly born it lacked a name, as a refuge

Far from being a bystander, Natasha Mella was named to the 10-member committee charged with
officially forming the new party. She was the youngest member of the group (although three others
were in their 20s) and the only woman. However, her surname was among the most recognizable in
Cuba and possessed undeniable power. She was also strikingly beautiful, a trait inherited from her
father – whose good looks were immortalized in the photos of his lover, the Italian photographer
Tina Modotti.
75 Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 508.
76 Ibid.
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for Cuba’s honorable politicians. “In a party,” Chibás proclaimed, “fundamental
ideas are very important but also essential are the men charged with putting them
into practice. The world’s most beautiful program, backed by empty speakers or a
group of delinquents will never be able to win over public opinion or the people’s
enthusiastic support.”77
Asked by a reporter for his opinion, Grau dismissed the new party as
ortofónicos or noisemakers. However, there was no denying this represented yet
another black eye for the man viewed as a messiah less than three years earlier. In
an article entitled “Unhappy Doctor,” Time magazine’s Cuba correspondent summed
up Grau’s abrupt fall from grace:
Despite good times and a boom in sugar, Cubans were griping last
week. From scrubby street gamins in Havana's Barrio de Colón to the
panama-hatted businessmen in the Manzana de Gómez, they panned
Grau for the high price of lard, the scarcity of beef, the roaring black
market. There were demands in the press for his resignation.
Habaneros tell the story of the Camagüey man who had been badly
beaten up for talking about Grau. "Did you say very bad things about
him?" asked a sympathetic cop. "No, I praised him, and then a mob
attacked me," said the victim. Currently the most popular Cuban is
Senator Eddy Chibás, ardent duelist and once Grau's close friend, who
fills the air every Sunday night with rasping radio attacks on "the
Government of dishonesty and indignity."
What had happened to Grau? Was he not the man who was going to
clean up Cuba after Batista? During his dramatic 127 days' presidency
in the 1933 revolution, many of Cuba's most progressive laws were
enacted. On taking office again in 1944, Grau said: "There is nothing
wrong with Cuba that an honest administration can't cure." To show
his good faith, he publicly declared the extent of his fortune ($231,512
in cash and securities, plus real estate). But graft did not stop—for in
Cuba no one man can stop it.

77
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In nearly three years of the Grau administration, 58 political murders
have been committed; just two men have been arrested and none
convicted…And Grau, the professed democrat, governs by decree just
like Batista. He has an alliance with the Communists that all but the
Commies deplore. His attempt to seize for the Government the
differential between the 1947 and 1946 sugar prices has alienated
50,000 sugar growers and a large part of his Auténtico Party. "Never
in the Republic's 45 years," said Sergio Carbó, another ex-Grau man,
"has a Government squandered so much, robbed so much, or deceived
the people so much."78
In addition to the above misdeeds, Grau had subverted his party’s rank and
file by ignoring Auténtico assemblies. Well meaning Auténticos who were horrified
by the depredations of José Manuel Alemán and César Casas thus had no recourse
for reforming the party. In addition, rather than allowing an open competition for
his successor, Grau first tried an illegal re-election campaign and subsequently
decided to handpick the party’s next presidential candidate. Such calculations had
condemned Supervielle to failure and suicide and Chibás, who was Cuba’s most
popular politician, to exile in a new outfit. This set the stage for something new in
the island’s political sphere. Chibás, whose new organization would not have the
time to place deep roots before the 1948 elections, would attempt to win office with
a new brand of politics based on his fantastically popular radio show and his intense
emotional bond with Cuba’s workaday citizens.

“Unhappy Doctor,” Time, June 9, 1947,
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Chapter 2
“Shoot Me in the Heart, the Ortodoxos Need a Martyr”

As a young revolutionary in early the 1930s, Eduardo Chibás often imagined
the possibility of martyrdom – dying nobly, after horrendous torture by Machado’s
agents. In 1935, after being apprehended for inciting streetcar operators to join
anti-government strikes, Chibás believed he would be murdered and told Batista’s
police, “if I’m going to die, I want my last words to be for the Cuban revolution.”1
Instead, he spent six months imprisoned in Havana’s Castillo del Príncipe. There,
Chibás learned that Antonio Guiteras had been killed by the military while
attempting to flee Cuba on May 8, 1935 – an act he called, “the worst of (Batista’s)
crimes.”2 Guiteras, like Chibás, had been a member of the 1927 Student Directorate
and also served as Grau’s interior minister during the “100 days” government. A
man of legendary incorruptibility and incandescent charisma, Guiteras founded the
violent anti-Batista group Joven Cuba in 1934. His foiled plan had been to raise and
train an army in Mexico capable of overthrowing Batista’s regime.3 Guiteras’ death
at the age of 28 provided the revolution with its most prominent martyr. Four and
a half years later, Chibás narrowly escaped the sacrificial pyre himself.

On

November 13, 1939, two days before elections to the constituent assembly that
would draft Cuba’s new constitution, an unknown man shot Chibás in the chest. As
Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 217.
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of Joven Cuba’s kidnapping of Eutimio Falla Bonet, heir to a wealthy Cuban family, in April of 1935.
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he was being taken to the hospital, Chibás told the driver, “If I die, it will be for the
revolution. Vote for Grau San Martín.”4
By the 1940s, Chibás also began to consider himself a potential savior. This
notion was reinforced by the effusive reactions of supporters, whose letters often
characterized him as the island’s salvation. Every week, Chibás received missives
from the likes of América González de Martínez, a Havana resident who asserted
that, “you are the only salvation of our fatherland and all the evils we suffer.” 5 Julián
Padrón, also of Havana, wrote, “I consider you the only pure one among all our
politicians.”6 Twenty-two year old Armando Hernández of Batista’s hometown of
Banes in Oriente province, revealed that, “I am ready to defend you under any
circumstances because you are the only defender of us Cubans.”7 In a sense, he
represented the hopes of Cubans frustrated by Grau. However, Chibás was a unique
politician who distinguished himself from contemporaries in two important
respects. First, he developed an easy and genuine rapport with the needy. As the
eldest child of an affluent family this did not come naturally. However, Chibás began
visiting poor neighborhoods and sounded out maniceros (peanut sellers), fruit
vendors and others he met on the street. Pastorita Núñez, who grew up in the
humble Pocitos section of Marianao (a Havana suburb) and later joined the new
party’s Women’s Wing, watched him course through the area on numerous
occasions. “While other politicians stopped by to purchase votes,” she said, “Chibás
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penetrated the masses and practiced the truth.”8 At the same time, practicing “the
truth” was not always initially appreciated and was occasionally met with
incredulous disbelief. Chibás’ secretary, Conchita Fernández, recalled that,
As many people were accustomed to appearing before politicians with
their identity cards in their hand, when they came to see Eddy they
asked for scholarships for their children, a hospital bed for a sick
relative, things like that, and they offered their identity cards in
exchange. When he said he wouldn’t accept them – and he did the
same thing when money was offered – people didn’t understand and it
was necessary to explain himself many times.9
Of course, Chibás tried to help whenever possible, often referring cases to his
personal physician and friend, Pedro Iglesias Betancourt or buying textbooks for
impoverished secondary school students. However, he did so without asking for
identity cards – which could later be converted into votes. This approach sought to
peck away at the edges of an ingrained and highly corrupt political culture. Just as
important, Chibás could not possibly assist every worthy petitioner but he offered
the defrauded and downtrodden a voice over the airwaves each Sunday. This gave
rise to the commonly repeated refrain, “I’m going to tell Chibás.”10
Hearing their hero denounce venal officials or injustice not only provided a
measure of solace but also raised hopes that better times lied ahead. This was the
second respect in which Chibás surpassed fellow politicians. His weekly broadcast
Interview with Pastora Núñez, June 3, 2007.
Pedro Prada, La secretaria de la República (La Habana: Ciencias Sociales, 2001), 118.
10 Those who “told” Chibás also included more privileged victims of injustice such as ex foreign
minister Inocente Alverez, who met with Chibás in February of 1947. Álvarez revealed that his
recent resignation was linked to his unwillingness to support Grau’s re-election campaign and
accused the current administration of being the “most corrupt in the history of the Republic.” Given
Álvarez’s well-publicized venality during his time as a public servant, this charge was nothing if not
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consistently garnered an audience several times greater than any other political
offering. A survey conducted by the Cuban Advertisers Association measuring
listeners in Havana and its outskirts recorded a 45 percent share for Chibás’ show in
June of 1947, the highest rating for any program in the island’s history with an
estimated 550,000 listeners throughout Cuba.11 This was more than double the
usual share, which Chibás took as a sign that, “the people are with the opposition.”12
However, the show soon returned to its previous levels, which were still among the
highest in Cuba. Between January 11 and January 31, 1948, Chibás’ show had a
22.22 share. The second most popular commentator was Salvador García Agüero of
the communist station Mil Diez with 9.75 percent.

The third place Auténtico

program mustered only a 3.41 share. A subsequent survey, taken between March 5
and March 18, 1948 favored Chibás by an even wider margin. This time, his 21.35
rating was slightly lower but far outpaced García Agüero’s 6.77 and the Auténticos’
5.65. Moreover, Chibás’ show was one of only three in Cuba that topped 20 percent
during this period – the other two being radionovelas (radio soap operas).13
In Cuba, Sunday evenings belonged to Chibás just as Sunday afternoons
pertained to baseball and Sunday mornings were in some quarters consecrated to
God. Well before his 8 p.m. broadcasts, throngs gathered to wait for Chibás at his
apartment in the art deco López Serrano building in Havana’s Vedado district.
When he appeared, the multitude would accompany him on foot to the studios of
radio station CMQ. Invariably dressed in a suit and with a cigarette tucked between
“Inician mañana trabajos para las adhesiones,” El Crisol, June 16, 1947. Aside from El Crisol, Alerta
usually published the entire transcript of Chibás’ radio transmissions.
12 Ibid.
13 “El Ultimo ‘Survey,” Bohemia, April 25, 1948: 56.
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his fingers, he would chat with the crowd, which included friends, fellow politicos
and admirers. At the end of the six-block journey, a cadre of close associates or
party members followed him inside and surrounded him as he addressed the
country. In cities across Cuba, those without radios flocked to hotels or the homes
of friends so they could listen. Those who inhabited rural areas sometimes walked
several miles to the nearest radio. Filiberto Porven of Cortés, a village in Pinar del
Río province, wrote Chibás to say that 800 people arrived at his house every Sunday
to hear him and confessed that those present would applaud, “as if you were there
in person.”14 After the 25-minute broadcast, Chibás would exit and once again
encounter a group lingering, eager to speak with him about the broadcast on the
way back to his apartment. Throughout Cuba, adherents addressed letters to Chibás
later that evening or the next day. Some opted for telegrams. Many of these
reflected the inchoate grammar of Cuba’s humblest citizens. For instance, José
Zamora of Manzanillo in Oriente province wrote, “estamos escuchando su oracion
todos los domingo donde nosotro i todo el pueblo cubano conose que es uste la unica
esperanza de esta nación,” (we listen to your speech every Sundays and wee and the
entire Cuban people no that yoo are the only hope of this nation).15
These dedicated Chibás supporters, who expected him to one day save Cuba
as its president, now had a new political home. On May 19, 1947 the fledgling
party’s national committee voted Chibás its president and 23-year-old Luis Conte
Agüero as secretary. The next order of business involved a name. Chibás sought the
advice of Fernando Ortiz, Cuba’s most renowned scholar and a friend of his late
14
15
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father. He had also hoped the 66-year-old Ortiz would join the party, adding a
patina of experience and wisdom to a group drenched in youth. Ortiz respectfully
declined to sign up, claiming he was too elderly, but gladly offered his opinion. He
counseled that the words Ortodoxo and revolución should be avoided as the former
lacked “emotional resonance” and the latter had been so abused by current
politicians as to sound like a “synonym for criminality and impudence” to most
Cubans.16 In the end, these words were heeded but only partially. Leonardo
Fernández Sánchez, a former student leader and friend of Julio Antonio Mella,17
proposed the new organization’s name – Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxos) or
PPC (O). The freshly minted Cuban People’s Party also required an insignia. This
need was resolved through a nationwide contest launched by Chibás during his
radio show, which promised 100 pesos to the winner. Eventually, the party opted
for a convoluted design incorporating a palm tree, a peasant’s hat and a wheel with
20 gears on the outside (one for each year of revolutionary struggle, beginning in
1927) and six spokes on the inside (for each province in Cuba). However, the PPC
quickly became known for its unofficial emblem, a broom, symbolizing its
determination to sweep away graft.
Aside from Ortiz, Chibás courted other influential figures that could help
swell PPC ranks. These included the popular Afro-Cuban pugilist Eligio Sardiñas,
known as Kid Chocolate. A former junior lightweight, Sardiñas gained acclaim as the
Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 34, Expediente 1089: 174, ANC.
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first Cuban to win a world boxing championship in 1931. In a shrewd public
relations gesture, the Ortodoxos renovated his old gym and utilized it as their
headquarters.

Sardiñas demonstrated his approval by attending the inaugural

ceremony on June 2. The Ortodoxo chief noted that the venue would be used to train
“our revolutionary muscles in order to knockout corruption and sleazy
politicking.”18 In addition, Chibás enlisted Jorge Mañach, a founder of the antiMachado ABC party and Batista’s foreign minister in 1944. A Harvard graduate,
professor of philosophy, leading literary critic and regular contributor to Diario de la
Marina and Bohemia, Mañach was an intellectual heavyweight second only to Ortiz.
In an open letter to Chibás, Mañach argued for unified opposition to the Auténticos
along with a specific program, writing, “Denouncing the present is not sufficient;
what’s needed is a vision of the future.”19 He then listed the aspirations of Cubans in
minute detail and urged Chibás to devise a plan to satisfy them.
They want an end to incompetence and greedy public servants; they
want the rule of law, that courts are respected and respectable, that
some day a dishonest “big fish” goes to jail; they want indispensable
public services which they’ve been asking for since the Republic was
founded: buses, schools, houses, land, hospitals, water; they want the
education and health ministries to be administered transparently;
they want a national bank and if possible a merchant marine; that our
diplomats serve well and are well paid; that the state uses modern
technology; they want true social justice rendered by the courts and
commissions interested in equality and not a bribed oligarchy on one
side and demagogic class warriors on the other; they want the
political bureaucracy and useless army reduced to a minimum as both
eat up too much of the national budget and decrease the State’s ability
to invest and each individual Cuban’s ability to work for his own
financial independence; they want the salaries of some public
servants reduced so that such work is no longer an avenue to riches
and that other state employees, conversely, be paid more as their
18
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services are essential and their earnings an embarrassment; they
want a revision of the tax system; they want an honest police force
that can put an end to gangsters and drugs; they want to modify the
electoral system so that those who represent the people in office are
effective rather than mercenary. 20
“All this and a bit more,” concluded Mañach “is what you need to clearly say…”21
Despite the difficult task at hand, he was optimistic.
Chibás also lured Federico Fernández Casas, a Republican senator and sugar
magnate. He represented a sensible but potentially risky catch. For a party starting
from scratch with limited funds, Fernández Casas offered credibility and deep
pockets. In addition, his defection dealt a blow to the Auténticos, given their alliance
with the Republicans. On the other hand, Fernández Casas possessed a reputation,
like many landowners, for using shady means to evict peasants from their property
and acquire it themselves. Specifically, Fernández Casas had ousted Eusebio Maceo,
a descendant of Cuba’s most revered general from its wars of independence. Chibás
himself had exploded with indignation over this fact during his broadcast of May 21,
1946. Adding Fernández Casas to the party could potentially damage its image
among small farmers or rural dwellers. At the same time, Fernández Casas had
committed himself to agrarian reform – advocating small landownership. Chibás
allowed that while he and Fernández Casas had strongly disagreed in the past, the
Republican senator’s political behavior had always been “transparent and honest.”22
More importantly, Fernández Casas conducted a straw poll among the workers at
his sugar mill and 868 out of 991 expressed a preference for Chibás. Sensing the
Ibid.
Ibid.
22 “En Cuba, Un Republicano Menos,” Bohemia, June 15, 1947: 46.
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Republicans would reap a popular backlash for supporting their coalition partners,
Fernández Casas followed the prevailing winds.
The Ortodoxos’ momentum was further boosted on July 12, 1947, when the
ABC party voted to dissolve itself and join Chibás. As the smallest of Cuba’s political
entities, the ABC would not deliver a mother lode of votes – having gained a mere
66,607 in the 1944 elections.23 Still, the group possessed bona fide revolutionary
credentials from its days as a clandestine, anti-Machado terrorist society.24 Its
incorporation was very much a feather in the Ortodoxo leader’s cap. Chibás almost
surely saw a parallel between the present and the late 1930s when the Auténticos
absorbed various revolutionary organizations such as Joven Cuba. Then again, the
persistent roll call of individuals, committees and now parties that switched to the
PPC, which by now had become a staple of Chibás’ weekly broadcasts, created its
own dilemma. The growing and ever more varied Ortodoxo constituency was a
testament to Chibás’ popularity but also a potential stumbling block. Shortly after
the ABC party was brought on board, Chibás received a call from his longtime friend
Ramón Miyar.25 Miyar, who was secretary general of the University of Havana and a
member of the Ortodoxo National Directorate, expressed alarm at the influence of
Diario de la Marina, July 18, 1944.
According to Luis Aguilar, “by the end of 1932 every important functionary of the government was
forced to live in fear and seclusion” as result of terrorist actions perpetrated by the ABC and Student
Directorate. See Luis Aguilar, Cuba 1933, 126. Among those students involved in violent antiMachado activities was young Eddy Chibás, who once stored 245 packets of dynamite and nine
bombs in his father’s Ford.
25 Miyar served as one of Chibás’ seconds during his first ever duel, in 1937, against Carlos Font – a
medical student and member of the communist leaning Ala Izquierda. Font had published attacks
against Chibás in Línea, the organization’s mouthpiece. The duel was fought with pistols at a distance
of 25 paces in a secluded area of Havana’s posh Miramar neighborhood. When Chibás, whose poor
eyesight was legendary, opened fire, the bullet nearly hit his other second, Justo Carrillo, in the head.
Carrillo, the future chief of Cuba’s Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank, was
understandably unnerved and promptly declared the duel over despite Chibás’ objections. See Conte
Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 236-240.
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the ABC’s ex president Joaquín Martínez Sáenz. Chibás quickly reassured him but
this was by no means an isolated incident. In fact, the deepest fissure existed within
the original grupo ortodoxo. Many of its leading figures, including Pelayo Cuervo,
Agustín Cruz and Millo Ochoa, favored political pacts. Chibás, along with Leonardo
Fernández Sánchez, Luis Orlando Rodríguez and Manuel Bisbé among others,
adamantly opposed them.26 He believed the Auténtico program had been watered
down by its alliance with the Republicans. Further, Chibás held Cuba’s “traditional”
parties, the Liberals and Democrats, in contempt. Machado, after all, had been a
Liberal and the Democrats, heirs to the pre-1933 Conservative party, had
collaborated with him.27
Regardless of the aversion felt by Chibás, pacts were a basic element of
Cuban politics.28 Had Grau’s tenure been less disappointing, the Auténticos could
reasonably have stood alone in during the elections of 1948. However, Chibás had
been the only high ranking party member to advocate this option. For the grupo
ortodoxo, shunning pacts would essentially mean renouncing legislative power.
According to a 1943 electoral law, the nine senate seats allotted to each Cuban
province were apportioned by coalition – with the winner gaining six and the
second place finisher taking three. Between March and May of 1947, while Chibás

Among those who backed Chibás on this issue were Manuel Bisbé, Luis Orlando Rodríguez and
Leonardo Fernández Sánchez along with the party’s youth leaders Luis Conte Agüero and Orlando
Castro.
27 Aguilar, Cuba 1933, 58. In 1926, all of Cuba’s political parties decided to work together in support
of Machado. This was known as cooperativismo. The effect, notes Aguilar, is that “for all practical
purposes, Machado had no political opposition.”
28
In 1940, Fulgencio Batista won the presidency heading a seven member coalition even as the
Auténticos obtained 20,000 more votes than any single party. Four years later the Auténticos were an
electoral juggernaut, more than doubling the vote count of their nearest rival. Even so, they would
have fallen short without Republican backing.
26
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stood apart from the grupo ortodoxo, Cuervo plotted a pragmatic course for the
renegades. On March 23, 1947, Bohemia reported that he hoped to capture the
grupo ortodoxo’s leadership, to formalize it as a new party and “immediately”
negotiate an alliance.29 The benefit of this strategy was indisputable. Without
Chibás, the grupo ortodoxo would lose substantial popularity. However, it could still
attract sufficient voters to play a decisive role in 1948.

Ochoa controlled the

Auténtico party machinery in Oriente province and his brother, Guarro Ochoa, was
mayor of Holguín – a mid sized town the region. Cuervo was widely admired in his
native Havana and would win plenty of votes there.30 Given these circumstances,
the new party could strike a deal guaranteeing spots on the opposition ticket for
many of its prominent figures. Indeed, maintaining a senatorial contingent was a
practical way to ensure the grupo ortodoxo could continue promoting a more ethical
and constitutional brand of Cuban politics.31

“En Cuba, Política: No me Preocupan las Posiciones,” Bohemia, March 23, 1947: 47.
In 1946, the Mexican daily Siempre published a comparison of the senatorial vote two years earlier.
Chibás received 126,381 votes, more than any other Auténtico senatorial candidate. However,
Pelayo Cuervo was close behind with 123,905. Both men also appeared on the Republican ballot as
well, and if these votes are added, Cuervo actually attracted more votes than Chibás. See Conte
Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 415.
31
Unquestionably, Cuervo’s plan also accommodated his personal ambition. Nor was he the only
grupo ortodoxo member who was loath to voluntarily pass four years on the sidelines. Even so, he
was more immune to accusations of opportunism than any of his pact friendly peers. Cuervo began
his public career in 1935, at the age of 32, when he served as education minister in the cabinet of
President Carlos Mendieta. A lawyer by training and Democrat by affiliation, he ran unsuccessfully
for mayor of Havana in 1936 but was elected to Cuba’s 1939 constitutional convention on the party
slate. The next year, Democratic chief Mario García Menocal struck a deal with Batista before the
1940 polls.31 In exchange for his support, Menocal would choose the coalition’s candidates for vicepresident, mayor of Havana, three provincial governorships and 12 senate seats. After an avalanche
of protests by rank and file adherents, the party leadership vacillated over whether to accept
Batista’s terms, to consider a counteroffer from Grau or to enter the elections solo. Many objected to
Batista’s embrace of the communists and his insistence that they remain part of the alliance. Cuervo
was heavily invested in this decision, as the party’s municipal assembly had once again nominated
him for mayor of Havana. Backing the pact with Batista would all but ensure him the post and he
thus initially endorsed the ex general. However, he subsequently changed his mind and resigned
from the party on March 20, 1940. Another prominent Democrat who bolted over this issue was
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When Chibás decided to leave the Auténtico fold in May of 1947, this boosted
both the new party’s prospects and its isolationist faction. The doubling of Chibás’
radio show rating and seemingly limitless possibilities of the Ortodoxos as they
added prestigious figures from all walks of Cuban society soothed but did not
eliminate friction between the two camps.

Chibás himself maintained cordial

relations with Cuervo, who regularly spoke as a guest during his broadcasts and
other likeminded Ortodoxos such as Agustín Cruz. The same did not always hold
among the party faithful, especially those ardently devoted to Chibás.

Hence,

Pastora Núñez remembered Millo Ochoa with contempt as belonging to the PPC’s
“political portion” and Cruz as someone who “was mainly interested in winning.”32
In the same vein, during a meeting of the Ortodoxo organizing committee, Pelayo
Cuervo chastised an overzealous young devotee saying, “We are building a political
party, not a Jacobin sect.” Another of the youthful attendees replied that if they
were interested in “moderate language” they could join the Democrats or Liberals.33
Nevertheless, Ortodoxo unity was buoyed by the party’s momentum along with
continued Auténtico mismanagement and scandals.
On May 18, 1947, the archbishop of Havana, Cardinal Manuel Arteaga,
condemned Cuba’s black market during his homily and deemed those who
monopolized or speculated in basic goods to be “doubly criminal.”34 In doing so he
served as an unwitting warm-up act to Chibás, who inaugurated the Ortodoxo party
then president of the Havana Bar Association, Manuel Fernández Supervielle – who told the press
that supporting Batista would betray his principles and political values. In forsaking the Havana
mayoralty in 1940, Cuervo cemented his reputation as a politician of conscience.
32 Interview with Pastora Núñez, June 3, 2007.
33 “En Cuba, Política: Secta de Jacobinos,” Bohemia, July 27, 1947: 53.
34 “En Cuba, Pastoral: La Bolsa Negra Excomulgada,” Bohemia, May 25, 1947: 42.
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later that evening and proclaimed it a bulwark against this sort of tawdry
profiteering.

The cardinal’s rebuke also stung administration officials who

continued to deny the black market’s existence and dismissed protests against price
gouging organized by leftist figures as Marxist shenanigans.

Another

embarrassment arrived in early June, when the so-called “Capitolio diamond”
mysteriously appeared on President Grau’s desk more than 14 months after having
been stolen. The jewel had originally been set in the floor of the Capitol’s Salon de
Pasos Perdidos (Hall of Lost Steps) and marked point zero for determining distances
to all parts of Cuba. Since vanishing on March 25, 1946, it had simultaneously
caused a sensation and vexed Havana’s notoriously incompetent police.

The

diamond’s sudden resurfacing, without apparent explanation, incubated all manner
of conspiracy theories. A persistent rumor was that José Manuel Alemán paid 5000
pesos for the gem and stealthily placed it in Grau’s office.35 On the other hand, the
cartoonist José Roseñada forsook hearsay in favor of outright mockery. His drawing
showed a man reading the headline “Capitolio Diamond Returned to Grau” and
laughing uncontrollably.36
During his June 8 radio show, Chibás noted that, “Other stolen objects…may
appear on Grau’s desk but what will not return is the faith of the Cuban people.”37
He also accused César Casas of “clandestinely” running the commerce ministry

Enrique de la Osa, “El robo del brillante del Capitolio,” Bohemia, June 8, 1947, reproduced in
Bohemia Digital,
http://www.bohemia.cubasi.cu/2006/mar/03/sumarios/historia/brillante-capitolio.html.
36 José Roseñada, Diario de la Marina, June 3, 1947: 4.
37 “Me injurían por dinero, dice Chibás,” Alerta, June 9, 1947, Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 6,
Expediente 198: 13, ANC.
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despite the senate’s no confidence vote.38 Chibás’ foremost concern, however, was
the increasingly acrimonious relationship between himself and his former mentor.
He began by revisiting his long years of devotion to Grau and how he had often
risked his life to defend him. Believing Grau embodied the “ethical principles” of
Cuba’s 1933 revolution, he had spared no effort to make him president and once
Grau had gained the nation’s highest office, Chibás asked for nothing in return.
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“Never,” he told his audience, “has any political leader in our country had such a
loyal and disinterested supporter as I was for Dr. Grau San Martín. All Cuba has
been a witness to this.”40 Even so, continued Chibás,
Little by little, day by day, he who for 20 years was the living symbol
of our ideals was becoming converted before my very eyes into an idol
of mud. What a profound tragedy I’ve had to live through during the
past few months! Long sleepless nights assaulted by doubts in which
my conscience struggled with the factual evidence! Nevertheless,
faced with illegal dealings of all kinds perpetrated by the government,
faced with the re-election campaign, faced with the gigantic fraud that
Grau has represented both for the revolution and the Cuban people, I
felt an enormous disappointment that easily overshadowed my
original devotion.41
Certainly, none of this was news. The wrinkle was that Grau had decided to retaliate
against Chibás’ accusations by resorting to dirty tricks. In particular, a man came
forward alleging he had a letter in Chibás’ handwriting inciting him and others to
throw stones in Cuba’s chamber of representatives in 1945. This story, which
appeared in many Havana dailies, represented an attempt to remind Cubans why
Chibás was unfit for high office. He was el loco, an impulsive firebrand who could
Ibid.
Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
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not be trusted. Chibás assured his listeners he had never corresponded with the
man and dared the president to make the letter public.

He also deemed the

campaign against him “the vilest ever waged against someone in our country in its
forty years as a republic.”42 Rhetoric of this sort energized Chibás’ unconditional
supporters, who allowed their leader was crazy but only as an honest politician
among thieves and a truth teller among slanderers.
In mid June, Grau reappointed José Manuel Alemán as education minister.
Writing for Bohemia, Enrique de la Osa noted the “all powerful” Alemán was also
sure to emerge as a top Auténtico leader during party reorganizations in October
and might even snatch the presidential nomination.43 In any event, Grau’s decision
surprised no one, least of all Chibás, who opined during his June 22 broadcast that
such “arbitrary conduct” was now typical.44 For instance, Grau’s habit of replacing
congressional laws with presidential decrees debilitated the very institutions he had
helped create seven years earlier. Moving on, Chibás warned, “the most gigantic
‘affaire’ ever realized in Cuba’s 45 years as a republic” was afoot and must be
stopped.45 This involved a reputed price manipulation on the 300,000 tons of sugar
Cuba was annually authorized to sell outside the United States market.
Theoretically, the difference between the price paid by the Cuban government for
homegrown sugar and the amount it earned on the open market was allotted for
socially useful projects such as roads or rural schools. In an echo of the barter deal
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45 Ibid., 29.
42
43

41

scandal of 1945, Chibás charged that Carlos Prío, Alberto Inocente Álvarez and José
Manuel Casanova were planning to inflate the price of refining 100,000 tons of sugar
destined for Latin America and pocket a hefty profit. The remaining 200,000 tons
would be sold to a firm in New York with ties to the government. This company
intended to sell its sugar on the black market at a fabulous gain. In all, Chibás
estimated the Cuban people would be cheated out of 22 million pesos. The basis for
this accusation was a piece in the June 22 edition of Bohemia outlining the scheme
and how it could be prevented. However, the article made no mention of specific
ringleaders. This was Chibás’ doing. Álvarez and Casanova were logical suspects as
both had been implicated in the 1945 brouhaha involving overseas sugar sales.
Chibás’ judgment was also skewed by his personal dislike for Casanova, a Liberal
senator and sugar tycoon who headed the Cuban Sugar Stabilization Institute.
Conversely, Carlos Prío had once been a friend and fellow revolutionary,
lending a particular bitterness to their falling out. As a member of the 1930 Student
Directorate, Prío had engaged in terrorist activities against Machado’s regime and
was repeatedly jailed. In 1932, he and Chibás stood trial together for throwing a
bomb at a Havana streetcar. Prío was a founder of the Partido Revolucionario
Cubano (Auténtico) in 1934 and even coined the party’s name. After the mass
strikes against Batista failed a year later, Prío directed the party’s armed wing,
known as the Organización Auténtica, until 1938.

By any indication, Prío’s

revolutionary credentials were impeccable. As a two-term senator from Pinar del
Río who served as Grau’s prime minister and labor secretary, Prío was also a leading
candidate for the Auténtico nomination. Like Chibás, Prío had been dismayed by
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Alemán’s influence in the party. In 1946, he attended a meeting with other party
leaders in which they confronted Grau over his allegiance to the education
minister.46 Usually, however, Prío opted for toadyism as the surest way to maintain
Grau’s good will and thus secure the nomination.

Hence, Prío defended the

indefensible César Casas. Needless to say, this did not endear him to Chibás. At the
same time, Chibás often forgave political differences (as he had with Federico
Fernández Casas and Jorge Mañach47) but could not abide those who enriched
themselves in public office. Chibás knew Prío had become affluent since entering
politics. Skimming cash off the sugar differential was one of many lucrative avenues
open to him.48
The day after Chibás’ broadcast, Prío accused him of slander and demanded a
duel to satisfy his honor. Casanova also chimed in, calling him “the clown of
scandal.”49 Chibás responded to the former in a four-page letter typed on senate
stationary. He pronounced himself satisfied at having “rendered a service to my
country” and asked Prío why he had “systematically opposed” efforts in the senate

Ameringer, The Cuban Democratic Experience, 36. The meeting was hosted by Alberto Inocente
Álvarez and attended by Prío, Miguelito Suárez Fernández, Segundo Curti, Lincoln Rodón and other
party notables. According to Álvarez, they told Grau, “it was either them or Alemán” and the
president chose his education minister. Álvarez, who was foreign minister, resigned his post in
protest.
47 When Chibás was named to the Cuban delegation of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of
War in Peace in 1945, Mañach had argued against his appointment. This was because Chibás wanted
to keep Argentina from participating in the upcoming San Francisco conference in April of that year
that would establish the UN. While Chibás despised President Juan Domingo Perón as a dictator,
Mañach believed Latin American unity should be the most important concern.
48 Chibás was acutely aware of the constant financial temptations faced by public officeholders. In
1944, two Chinese Cubans approached his secretary, Conchita Fernández, and told her to let Chibás
know he could take $300 per day if he would allow them set up an illegal gambling den. He was
indignant when he learned of the offer but knew such proposals were common.
49 Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 515.
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to investigate “irregularities” in the government’s overseas sugar sales.

50

Chibás

found it “strange” that every time the matter was raised in the upper chamber, Prío
withdrew Auténtico senators loyal to the administration – thereby ensuring the lack
of a quorum.51

He further challenged Prío to demand an inquiry into their

respective finances. Chibás claimed it would prove “very interesting,” especially as
Prío had neglected to declare the extent of his wealth upon accepting a position in
Grau’s cabinet as all Auténticos had promised.52 In any event, this was no mere
political disagreement, but rather a very personal and rancorous quarrel. Moreover,
the feud was part of a wider battle encompassing Prío’s older brother Paco as well,
who was also a senator from Pinar del Río province. On April 19, Paco Prío had
snuck up behind Chibás in the Capitolio and punched him in the neck. This led to a
brawl shortly thereafter in the senate and a saber duel on April 27 in the Capitolio’s
Hall of Arms (Sala de Armas). Chibás, who prepared for the encounter by practicing
with a swordsman in the University of Havana, wounded his foe twice before an
audience of Cuban legislators, after which a doctor stopped the duel.53 As with
Carlos Prío, the crux of their dispute involved venality. Specifically, Chibás accused
Paco Prío of links to the Italian American mobster Lucky Luciano, who had lived in
Cuba between September 29, 1946 and March 19, 1947. In fact, when Paco had hit
Chibás, he shouted, “Lucky Luciano sends you this!”54

As for Carlos Prío, his

Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 3, Expediente 99: 148-149, ANC.
Ibid., 148.
52 Ibid., 150.
53 Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 494. Chibás’ choice of seconds was telling at this delicate moment
in his political career. At a time when he was insisting he was and always would be an Auténtico,
Chibás chose the two most prominent leaders of the grupo ortodoxo, Pelayo Cuervo and Emilio
Ochoa.
54 Ibid., 491.
50
51

44

previous friendship with Chibás ensured their exchanges would drip with bile.
Responding to the Ortodoxo leader’s missive, Prío referred to him as “vermin” and
informed Chibás that, “I value my honor above my life and will risk the latter with
you.”55 On July 13, a day after the ABC party fused with the Ortodoxos, Chibás and
Prío touched swords in the Sala de Armas. The minister of labor avenged his
brother by wounding Chibás on the right elbow and cheekbone, perhaps because
Eddy could not find the time to train beforehand.
As Chibás persisted with his strategy of needling Auténtico leaders, the PPC
welcomed two more high profile defections. Roberto Agramonte, Chibás’ cousin and
Cuba’s ambassador to Mexico, resigned his post in late July and enrolled the
following month. He was joined by Aurelio Álvarez de la Vega, a senator from
Camagüey province, veteran of the island’s independence war and erstwhile
member of the grupo ortodoxo. Meanwhile, Chibás and Pelayo Cuervo supervised
the final stages of the party’s legal certification process with the Superior Electoral
Tribunal.56

With official status looming, Chibás planned a grand ceremony in

Havana’s Parque Central to formally inaugurate the party. The Ortodoxo leader, who
possessed a keen eye for symbolism, initially chose August 12 – the anniversary of
Machado’s resignation. However, a torrential downpour foiled this design. August
30 was then agreed upon until the Ortodoxos realized this was the feast day of Saint
Raymond, the president’s namesake. To celebrate the event then would obviously

Ibid., 515.
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bode poorly. Thus, the occasion was slated for Sunday, September 7. When the date
arrived, Chibás telephoned the National Observatory and inquired whether rain was
in the forecast. He was informed that a squall could never be ruled out during the
island’s rainy season. Chibás, who saw the handiwork of Grau or inciso K in every
crack and crevice, wondered if they were trying to addle him with a phony weather
advisory. In the end, there was no thunderstorm but rather a constant drizzle that
desisted just before the gathering started at 9 p.m. Chibás told the crowd he always
knew the Virgin de la Caridad, Cuba’s patron saint, would clear the skies on behalf of
the PPC, Cuba’s peoples’ party. The meeting, which lasted five hours, featured a
parade of speakers – including the party’s newest catch, Aurelio Álvarez. The
senator quickly established his Ortodoxo bona fides, saying he hoped the nation’s
gangsters would not be offended by his references to “government gangsters”
because even among the former a few “decent people” could be found. 57 Not to be
outdone, Chibás, speaking in the wee hours of the morning, offered to renounce his
aspiration for the presidency if Grau would accuse his “delinquent functionaries”
before Cuba’s courts.”58
Eight days later, serendipity bestowed a timely and unexpected bounty. At 3
p.m. on September 15, a massive gunfight broke out in the Havana suburb of
Marianao. The point of contention was an arrest warrant, delivered by Mario
Salabarría, head of the Bureau of Special Investigations and meant for Emilio Tro,
director of the National Police Academy. Tro was wanted for the murder three days
earlier of Raúl Avila, the chief of police for the health ministry. Even more so than
57
58
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Cuban politics, the island’s myriad police forces were a repository of enmities and
violent rivalries. This was because Grau had filled their ranks with members of the
island’s thuggish action groups as a reward for their help during his election
campaign. Salabarría and Avila, for example, were members of the Movimiento
Socialista Revolucionario (MSR), which doubled as the personal army of Grau’s pal
Alemán. Tro, on the other hand, founded the Unión Insurreccional Revolucionaria
(UIR) in 1946 after serving in the United States military during World War II –
where he earned a Purple Heart. While Salabarría and Tro were friends of the
president, they detested each other. Tro accused Salabarría of profiting from the
black market. Salabarría viewed Tro as an upstart. On September 5, assailants had
fired 60 bullets into Tro’s automobile. The UIR leader was unhurt, as he had not
been inside.

Shortly thereafter, Avila was shot to death in a Vedado bodega.

Afterward, Avila’s widow testified that Tro and Luis Padierne, another UIR member,
had appeared armed and on her doorstep in search of her husband. As a result, an
arrest warrant for Tro was issued on September 13.
Two days later, Salabarría crammed a pair of cars with his men and headed
toward the home of Antonio Morín Dopico, the Marianao police chief – who lived in
a prosperous district known as Orfila, after a nearby store of that name. Tro,
Padierne and a few other UIR deputies had arrived there earlier to eat lunch. As
Salabarría’s group approached, one of the cars crossed in front of the house and
began firing.

Thus began a pitched battle in which Salabarría’s men buffeted

Dopico’s residence with machine gun fire and those inside responded with their
own weapons, hoping to buy time until help could be located. The Cuban public was
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aware of this ghastly incident from the beginning thanks to Germán Pinelli, a wellknown reporter and radio announcer, who provided listeners with a live blow-byblow account from the scene. In addition, the cameraman Guayo Hernández of
Cuba’s Noticiero Nacional (National News) recorded everything on film. Two hours
into the clash, a UIR contingent secured an audience with Paulina Alsina, Grau’s
highly influential sister-in-law, who told them the president had ordered the army
to intervene. Grau himself was not receiving visitors owing to an illness that had left
him feverish and 20 pounds lighter than usual. Tro also telephoned another UIR
lieutenant, instructing him to visit the Columbia military barracks on Havana’s
outskirts and request assistance. This led to the dispatch of a mechanized troop unit
to the area. General Ruperto Cabrera promptly gave those inside 10 minutes to
hand themselves over and pledged to safeguard their lives. Tro and his comrades
rejected the offer, probably because Salabarría and his men remained present. After
the house was bombarded with tear gas, figures appeared in the windows waving
white cloths and shouting for the police to hold fire as women and children would
be exiting. Morín Dopico was the first to emerge, carrying his injured 10-month-old
daughter. They were immediately whisked away to the military hospital. It was
now approaching 6 p.m. and Cubans were riveted by this ongoing spectacle as they
returned home from work or milled about their living rooms. The next to appear
was Morín Dopico’s pregnant wife, Aurora Soler Amor, accompanied by Tro. As
hundreds of thousands listened intently, expecting a reasonable finale to an
unreasonable situation, they were shocked to find the police had murdered first
Mrs. Morín and then Tro, whose body was riddled with 18 bullets. Hence, the man
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who was fond of boasting, “I don’t ask any quarter because I don’t give any quarter,”
ultimately received none. By day’s end, Salabarría was under arrest, the military
was in control of the police and the Auténtico party’s reputation was in tatters.
The following week, Grau was universally berated. Every major publication
denounced the government and graphic photos of the dead were splashed across
Cuba’s newspapers and magazines. El Mundo,59 one of Havana’s most respected
dailies wrote:
What has the president of the republic reaped with his ineffective
behavior? Three years ago he was the popular idol, the smiling hope
of a nation anxious for administrative honesty, a civilian government,
the realization of the incomplete program genuinely drawn up in (the
constitution of) 1940. Today, he contemplates unpopularity, he looks
on as his powerful party has split, he must ponder the vibrant,
admonitory voices raised against him in congress without a single
member coming to his defense, he must confront how badly people
react when they see his image during newsreels at the cinema and
(ever since the events at Orfila) he should perceive how other forces
are gaining popularity, ones in which the Cuban people previously
never would have placed their faith.60
In the senate, Auténticos attempted to avoid a session devoted to Orfila by staying
away en masse and hoping a quorum would not be reached. This strategy was
thwarted by the party’s coalition partner, the Republicans, who appeared in
deference to public opinion. The first to speak was Pelayo Cuervo, the Ortodoxo
senate delegation’s recently designated leader.

He claimed the previous day’s

events had “filled our society with panic” and underlined that Morín Dopico’s wife,
Tro and the other four who lost their lives had been killed after handing themselves
El Mundo, for example, was honored in 1943 with the Maria Moors Cabot Prize for outstanding
journalism in Latin America and the Caribbean. This prize, which has been offered since 1938, is the
oldest international award in journalism. Within Cuba, El Mundo, Diario de la Marina (another Cabot
prize winner) and Alerta were considered the nation’s most prestigious newspapers.
60 “Ineludible Rectificación,” El Mundo, September 19, 1947, reprinted in “Comentando la Actualidad,”
Carteles, September 28, 1947: 55.
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over.
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At this point Chibás interrupted, waving a copy of Información with its

pictures of the slain Mrs. Morín and her injured 10-month-old daughter, Miriam. He
reiterated that the government was incapable of guaranteeing the safety of women
and young children – both of whom had been respected “even during the worst
epochs of terror in Cuba.”62 He also accused Grau of fomenting chaos as a pretext
for a coup that would perpetuate him in power. The Liberal senator Eduardo Suárez
Rivas drew a round of applause among his peers and also in the visitor’s gallery
after declaring his party would never enter a pact promoted by the erstwhile doctor
of physiology. In the chamber of representatives, the Auténticos were dismayed to
learn that one of their own was preparing to embarrass the party. Guillermo Ara, an
Auténtico congressman from Manzanillo told all who would listen that, “I was there
and saw everything. Those people were massacred after surrendering. They left
with their hands in the air and were shot repeatedly.”63 In this case, however, the
Auténticos achieved the dubious victory of preventing a quorum even as Ara’s words
were reprinted in the press.
On September 17, General Genovevo Pérez Dámera invited Havana’s
newspaper directors to view footage taken by Guayo Hernández – the National
News cameraman who was present at Orfila. In doing so, the army chief known as el
gordo (fatso) was making some calculated mischief.

The day before, Interior

Minister Alejo Cossío del Pino had issued a decree banning the film, which he

Enrique de la Osa, “En Cuba, Policía: El drama en el Senado,” Bohemia, September 21, 1947.
Reprinted in de la Osa, En Cuba Primer Tiempo, 176.
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deemed “a not very edifying spectacle.”64 Nonetheless, two Havana cinemas had
briefly shown the movie before it was suppressed. With an eye toward his Sunday
broadcast, Chibás had wangled a screening in the Columbia military barracks as a
guest of Colonel Oscar Díaz, the military official investigating the affair. By the time
Pérez Dámera convoked his audience of journalistic honchos, the film had ostensibly
been prohibited.

Nonetheless, he explained that he wanted them to see for

themselves that Orfila had been an “assassination.”65 He judged Salabarría the
prime culprit and revealed the purportedly honest police chief was hiding $14,000
in his shoes when he was arrested. Unlike the press or opposition politicians, Pérez
Dámera did not believe the ordeal reflected poorly on the president. The 37-yearold general owed his spectacular rise to Grau and bore him no grudges. 66 On the
other hand, he abhorred José Manuel Alemán and Orfila provided an exquisite
pretext to move against him. The education minister’s links to MSR rendered his
country estate fair game and on September 20, troops arrived for a surprise
inspection.

Later on, Pérez Dámera invited reporters to examine the colossal

stockpile of arms found there, which included enough bombs, machine guns and 50caliber bullets to fill 13 trucks.

Viewing this impressive stash, an irreverent

correspondent wondered whether “a single book or modest coloring pencil” had
turned up.67

In fact, Alemán had been collecting weapons for a clandestine
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66 When Grau was inaugurated in October of 1944, Pérez Dámera held the rank of major. During the
following six months he was promoted five times. In choosing to elevate a young officer Grau sought
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expedition against the Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo. Entrusted by Grau with
planning and financing the venture, this represented yet another repository of the
funds meant for Cuba’s schoolchildren. In response to this newest outrage, the
senate voted no confidence against Alemán on October 1 – after which Grau named
him minister without portfolio.
By then, Chibás had publicized the most gruesome portions of the proscribed
Orfila tapes.

He related that Tro had been murdered while trying to carry a

wounded and very pregnant Mrs. Morín back into her house. He then described
how one of Salabarría’s “jackals” approached the injured Mrs. Morín, placed his
machinegun against her swollen belly and pulled the trigger.68 Chibás also seized
upon the money hidden in Salabarría’s footwear and asked, “How many pairs of
shoes are needed to hide the millions of pesos robbed by functionaries of the
present government, beginning with the president of the republic himself?”69 This
statement echoed a supporter from Camagüey who wrote Chibás to express outrage
at “police chiefs that carry the people’s money in the soles of their shoes like
delinquents.”70 These wanton bits garnished the Ortodoxo leader’s argument that
Grau had always tolerated abuses by the army and police. Chibás recounted that he
had broken with Grau in 1933 shortly after it became clear the military would not
be held responsible for killing the student Mario Cadena. For good measure, he
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added that Carlos Prío maintained close ties to MSR chieftain Orlando León Lemus –
who had offered to make Prío senator in exchange for his “services.”71
Two days after the broadcast, Eddy’s friend Ignacio Mendoza typed him a
letter. Mendoza had been a bomb making student revolutionary during the early
1930s like Chibás and Carlos Prío. In 1932, he devised a parcel bomb that killed the
police chief of Artemisa – a town 33 miles southwest of Havana.72 Mendoza planned
to blow up Machado as well but the plot was foiled and he landed in jail. Currently,
he was a broker specializing in the Cuban stock market and the New York Coffee and
Sugar Exchange. He was also an Ortodoxo. As Chibás and the party reveled in its
largest public relations victory to date, Mendoza warned against relying too heavily
on scandal mongering.

“You were perhaps the one who contributed most to

clarifying the facts (regarding Orfila),” he wrote, “but that won’t be enough in the
future as your principal theme.” He reminded Chibás that, “sympathy for you is
incalculable and the people consider you honorable, valiant and civic-minded but
there are many doubts about your ability to govern and many point out that you
have never occupied an executive post either in private business or public office.”
He thus urged Chibás to “demonstrate that you can organize a government.” 73
The Ortodoxo leader’s most immediate challenge, however, would be the
upcoming party reorganizations, scheduled between October 5 and October 19. By
law, Cuba’s political entities were required to hold a registration drive every two
Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 9, Expediante 198: 63, ANC.
The town of Artemisa was of great symbolic value to the revolutionaries as it was the scene of a
massacre by Machado’s soldiers on May 19, 1930. On that day, members of the opposition Unión
Nacional held a meeting there – an act the government considered illegal. An army lieutenant
attempting to close down the proceedings was shot and afterwards troops opened fire on those
assembled, killing eight and injuring several dozen.
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years and enlist a minimum of 50,000 members. In practice, the ritual represented
a zealous competition to induct the largest possible number of supporters.
Incumbency allowed the Auténticos to buy affiliations with government largesse or
to enforce them among federal employees, who could be laid off for placing their lot
with rivals. For this reason, they were expected to lead the field. At the same time,
hopes were high among Ortodoxos for a strong showing. Many were encouraged by
Bohemia’s projection that they would dispute second place with the Liberals. The
Liberal senator Eduardo Suárez Rivas believed Chibás to be in such an enviable
position that he confessed, “You know where I’d like to be right now? With the
Ortodoxos.”74

Nevertheless, the PPC’s rudimentary political network suggested

impending disappointment. The Ortodoxos had little or no presence in many parts
of the island – especially rural areas. They were also periodically short of campaign
materials. Thus, an Ortodoxo from Cienfuegos who wanted to publish Chibás’ photo
in a local magazine was informed that none were available. An adherent from Punta
Alegre in Oriente province who requested party propaganda was similarly denied.
Hence, Chibás could hardly have been shocked when a town councilman from
Camagüey province conveyed that the local Ortodoxo effort was “in a state of
disorganization” and that “our adversaries are taking advantage of the situation.”75
He added that Miguelito Suárez Fernández, the Auténtico senate president, had paid
Ortodoxos in Santa Cruz del Sur to switch sides. In the town of Florida, the Auténtico
mayor and congressmen were spending “immense quantities” of money and offering
“hundreds” of education ministry jobs as inducements to join them. Chibás received
74
75
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similar reports from other areas. Two Ortodoxos from the sugar mill town of Coliseo
in Matanzas province related that Chibás boasted “an extraordinary majority of
sympathizers” in the area but the party lacked a “natural organizer.”76 Blanca and
María Rodríguez of Paradero Lugareño in Camagüey province wrote, “Many here in
our town who sympathize with you and your candidacy have signed up with the
Auténticos only because they are government employees and otherwise they would
be fired.”77 In a similar vein, an Ortodoxo from the town of Manaquitas in Las Villas
province disclosed that workers seeking jobs on a local highway construction
project had to first hand over their identification cards.
As the affiliation period drew to a close, the Ortodoxos finished fifth among
Cuba’s political parties with 164,705.

Only the Communists signed up fewer

members. Although Chibás was not at fault for the party’s rudimentary organization
or Auténtico chicanery, his nonchalance about the process raised eyebrows. In a
letter of October 6, Federico Fernández Casas expressed surprise that Chibás did not
mention the registration drive during the previous day’s broadcast. “I don’t know
how much importance you concede to the event,” he stated, “but undoubtedly this is
our first great test and we should render a supreme effort to prove before public
opinion, even those who doubt us, our enormous popular backing.”78 Three weeks
later, Chibás told listeners the registration drive was a “mere formality”79 The goal
had not been to compete for the most adherents but to engage the minimum 50,000
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as the rules demanded. An all out attempt would have diverted the party’s energies
from other objectives. He had insisted that Ortodoxo legislators remain in Havana
and attend congressional sessions, thereby demonstrating commitment to
constituents unlike the chronically absent politicians of other parties.80 Chibás also
believed the PPC’s internal structures required further refinement and attention,
which could not be accomplished if its leading figures were scattered throughout
the island in pursuit of memberships.
The registration drive galvanized the opposing Ortodoxo camps as never
before. Rumors swirled about possible defections – including Pelayo Cuervo. Millo
Ochoa informed the press that prospective coalition partners must back Chibás for
president. However, this was impractical given the party’s unimpressive numbers.
Factional tempers flared during a conference of the PPC National Directorate on
October 29 when Aurelio Álvarez urged the party to join a unified opposition and
Rafael García Bárcena, the philosopher and University of Havana professor, pushed
for autonomy.

Chibás attempted to soothe the party’s divisions.

During his

broadcast of November 9, references to Ortodoxo independence were conspicuously
absent. In their stead, Chibás repeatedly stressed “unity.”81 However, anti pact
zealots quickly ignited another furor. Believing a commission of PPC lawmakers

During 1947, Cuba’s senate only managed to celebrate 15 of 34 regular sessions and 3 of 6
extraordinary sessions due to a lack of quorum. During this time a total of 10 laws were approved.
Of these, five eventually landed on the president’s desk. Grau, who preferred to rule by decree,
vetoed all of them. Cuba’s chamber of representatives fared even worse. Seven ordinary sessions
and 2 extraordinary sessions took place out of a proposed 32. The result was six laws passed.
Enrique de la Osa noted that Grau, like Batista before him preferred to keep Cuba’s representatives
sidelined because they were theoretically in charge of Cuba’s budget. See “En Cuba, Congreso: Una
Legislatura Fracasada,” Bohemia, December 28, 1947: 64.
81 “Habló Anoche por Radio el Senador Eduardo R. Chibás,” El Crisol, November 10, 1947, from Fondo
Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 6, Expediente 198: 116, ANC.
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charged with resolving internal disagreements was a vehicle for deal making, they
sent a letter to Chibás accusing him (and them) of behaving like traditional
politicians and violating the party’s constitution. Shortly thereafter, the commission
directed a letter to Chibás signaling its intent to resign in the face of what they
considered unfair attacks. Yet again, an effort was devised to bring the two sides
together. Represented by Cuervo, Ochoa and Agustín Cruz, among others, the pact
friendly group met with so-called “activists,” including Leonardo Fernández
Sánchez, Luis Orlando Rodríguez and Rafael García Bárcena on November 21. They
were set to gather the next day but Chibás asked them to cancel, as he was busy
composing his radio address.82 This turned out to be an appeal for independence, in
which Chibás argued that necessary “reforms” would be diluted by pact inspired
“transactions.” He deemed the PPC’s internal squabbles “very natural” for a party
that was democratic by nature and counted a wide base of support. These words
had barely left his lips when he undermined them with a strident rallying call. “Let
the sell outs and weak spirits go!” he shouted. “The strong will stay and continue to
fight!”83 Understandably, the Ortodoxo lawmakers were rankled by the name-calling
and irked by their leader’s failure to consult with them beforehand. Some also
wondered whether he was fit to be party president.
On December 4, Chibás convened the Ortodoxo legislators and pleaded his
case behind closed doors. If the party stood apart, he claimed it could “capitalize on
the neutral masses” frustrated by the Auténticos and pessimistic regarding the
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opposition.

In a three-way race those who were most deserving of public

confidence would be victorious.84 This reasoning convinced no one. Chibás was
reminded that on other occasions he had agreed to discuss deals with certain
opposition parties. He allowed this was true but said he had done so only to please
party members whom he respected and considered friends.

“At bottom,” he

confessed, “I never agreed with it.”85 Two days later, Cuervo and Joaquín Martínez
Sáenz published a public response on behalf of the PPC’s senators and congressmen.
One section advanced their view that independence played into the government’s
hands. Hence, “Without an integrated national force capable of defeating Grauism at
the ballot box, all the eagerness for renewal demanded by public opinion would be
frustrated and the present chaotic situation accentuated with tragic consequences
for the country.”86 Another portion was directed toward Chibás. Specifically, “We
oppose all personalist or dogmatic postures and maintain, with a profoundly
democratic spirit, that only the party’s national assemblies, elected with the votes of
its members, can determine the political line in accordance with majority opinion.”87
Moreover, all signs indicated that more was at stake than a mere political
discrepancy. In a conversation with friends, Agustín Cruz expressed exasperation
with Chibás’ “complete absence of political tact.”88 He was referring to the recent
suggestion that Ortodoxo legislators were open to an agreement with Batista but
could just as easily have been responding to Chibás’ allusion to sell outs and weak
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spirits. Cruz, who had put himself at risk in 1936 by opposing Batista’s ouster of
President Miguel Mariano Gómez, was particularly annoyed by the implication. On
December 9, while waiting in the airport for a flight to New Orleans, Cruz joked with
a hint of malice that he chose that destination rather than Florida so as to avoid
whispers of a meeting with Batista, who maintained a residence in Daytona Beach.
The atmosphere was further poisoned as delegates to the municipal
assemblies weighed competing party platforms.

In Havana, the epicenter of

Ortodoxo popularity and home turf to Cuervo and Chibás, allegations of dirty tricks
and bribery were bandied on both sides. The final vote, taken on December 14,
favored independence but Cuervo vowed to contest the outcome in court. He also
offered an exceedingly bitter statement to the press saying, “If Chibás were a
statesman, it would be worthwhile to defend the idea of political independence to
the end. But he is nothing more than a rabble-rouser, a demagogue incapable of
realizing anything constructive. I would never dare propose him as the opposition
candidate for president.”89 The following week, Cuervo accused Chibás of hypocrisy.
Speaking to a Bohemia reporter, he divulged that the Ortodoxo leader’s
stubbornness on the issue of pacts was of recent vintage. When the first party
documents were drafted, the original PPC position called for “no pacts of any type.”
According to Cuervo, he brought this to Chibás’ attention and they discussed its
potential ramifications. He then claimed the Ortodxo chief and his staunch ally
Manuel Bisbé agreed to modify the statement to “pacts lacking in ideology.” 90 In
reality, this was hardly a smoking gun. As Cuervo knew, the phrase had long been a
89
90
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Chibás favorite. Moreover, Chibás had always spoken of “pacts lacking in ideology”
to denigrate so-called electoral “understandings” rather than to leave the door open
for them. The salient aspect of Cuervo’s interview had less to do with the charges
leveled than the very public and highly spiteful manner in which he and Chibás had
fallen out. A month earlier, Cuervo had signed a letter to Chibás, “your affectionate
companion and friend.”91 Now, Chibás hurled barbs at him on the radio and he
replied with insults in the press.
While this carried on, Chibás attended the provincial assembly in Camagüey
province on December 28. The event took place in the home of Ramón Pereda
Pulgares, the popular doctor and Chibás ally who had died in a tragic automobile
accident seven months earlier.92 Almost immediately, Eddy clashed with the pact
friendly Aurelio Álvarez. Early on, Chibás asked permission to speak about the
party’s “internal situation.”93 Álvarez, whose stentorian voice was amplified by a
megaphone, interrupted him, saying, “I would like to remind Senator Chibás that the
purpose of this meeting is only to elect the local executive committee and designate
delegates to the National Assembly.”
“Don’t forget,” responded Chibás, “that I’m president of the party and you are
my delegate.”
“Right now, I’m not your delegate,” snapped Álvarez, “I’m the master of
ceremonies.”94
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Chibás relented after this exchange but only temporarily. He asked a sympathetic
delegate to request a one-hour recess, which was eventually granted.

As the

proceedings paused, Chibás attempted to address the delegates. Once again, Álvarez
objected. Ignoring him, Chibás stood on a chair and began pontificating. This
ignited a fistfight among the opposing factions. During the ensuing melee, gunshots
were fired – one of which nearly hit Chibás in the head. The Ortodoxo leader
promptly jumped on a nearby table, pointed to his chest and exclaimed, “Shoot me
in the heart, the Ortodoxos need a martyr!”95 Having shocked the crowd into silence,
Chibás finished orating even as the smell of gunpowder wafted through the air.
Afterward, the Camagüey senator José Enrique Bringuier addressed the crowd.
Asserting that, “the Ortodoxos without Chibás are a fortress without a flag,” he
offered his ten delegates in favor of the independent line.96 These votes would have
ensured victory for the pro Chibás side but the Ortodoxo leader rejected them, much
to the astonishment of Aurelio Álvarez and his supporters. Admitting to “moral
scruples,” Chibás claimed he preferred to lose the province to dealmakers within the
PPC rather than relying on a deal himself. The Bohemia reporter covering the event
noted that Chibás had repudiated a “pact lacking in ideology” even within his own
party.”97 The Ortodoxo leader also said that Álvarez, “in spite of his reactionary
tendencies, his strident nature and involvement with old politics, is a respectable
elder, a veteran of the independence war, an old combatant in the struggle against
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Machado and Batista and an honorable man at bottom.”98 According to Luis Conte
Agüero, Chibás also distrusted Bringuier and had no desire to see him lead the
delegation. As an ex Democrat whose uncle, Federico Laredo Brú, had been Batista’s
presidential front man between 1936 and 1940, Bringuier stirred Chibás’ suspicions
about so-called traditional politicians. 99 On the other hand, Havana was now the
only province with a pro Chibás majority.
Chibás was now in the awkward position of being marginalized within the
party he had recently founded. Nearly every Ortodoxo who held elective office
opposed him and his momentum, which had crested following the Orfila massacre,
had all but dissipated. Unable to sidestep Cuba’s established political rules, Chibás
had instead endangered his position as Ortodoxo president. In the coming months,
he would continue to build his popularity by capitalizing on Auténtico missteps and
inciting his supporters over the radio.

Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 546-547.
Chibás was right to question Bringuier’s commitment to the party. Just over a month after the
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Chapter 3
“Chibás Will Always Win. You Will See Why.”

On January 4, 1948, Bohemia published an opinion poll regarding the
attitudes of Cubans toward past and present leaders. One query asked residents of
Las Villas province to name the best and worst president in the island’s history.
Ramón Grau San Martín topped the list as Cuba’s greatest chief executive, with 36
percent. However, many factors tempered this seeming endorsement of the ex
physiology professor. For one thing, 17 percent fingered him as the nation’s poorest
president, more than Fulgencio Batista and second only to Gerardo Machado. In
addition, among Cubans in their 20s and 30s, Grau was the only president they had
known who never ruled as a dictator, strongman or figurehead. Another possible
indictment of Grau was the fact that Tomás Estrada Palma, elected as Cuba’s first
president in 1902, was deemed the best ever by 13 percent of respondents.
Obviously, few Cubans remembered Estrada Palma’s term in office but his
reputation for probity emphasized the desire of many for honesty. Grau’s tenure
was also impugned by a question asked in four of the island’s six provinces, namely
whether Cubans intended to vote for the Auténtico coalition or an opposition
candidate in the June elections. Respondents chose the latter in Havana, Oriente and
Las Villas – the country’s three most populous provinces. Furthermore, in Havana
36 percent said they would vote for the opposition against only 19 percent for the
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government. At the same time, between 18 and 20 percent of the respondents
confessed to being undecided.1
Bohemia was owned by Eddy’s former schoolmate, Miguel Ángel Quevedo.2
He received an advance copy every Thursday, a day before the magazine reached
subscribers or newsstands. Chibás assuredly perused these figures with interest as
they suggested a united opposition could defeat the government. They may have
inspired his self-described “master stroke” three days later in which he proposed,
during his broadcast, to back a candidate without links to traditional parties (i.e. the
Liberals or Democrats) if that person counted the support of Cuba’s “neutral
masses.”3 The man Chibás had in mind was Miguel Coyula, a respected veteran of
Cuba’s independence war who was free of party ties and served as editor of the
Havana daily El Mundo. Chibás’ timing was also influenced by knowledge of a
seeming agreement between the Liberals and Ortodoxo legislators. Now that Chibás
lacked the delegates for independence at the upcoming PPC National Assembly, his
primary goal was to ensure no bargains were struck with Liberals or Democrats.
Regardless, PPC lawmakers pursued contacts with members of the opposition.
Prior to the National Assembly, Millo Ochoa, José Manuel Gutiérrez and Emeterio
Santovenia met traditional party representatives in the home of Liberal senator
Eduardo Suárez Rivas. As they gathered, Gutiérrez (an ex Liberal himself) argued
that any alliance must offer a detailed plan including guarantees that Cuba’s
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legislature be allowed to function as envisioned under the 1940 constitution. Later
on, Gutiérrez mused before a group of friends from his home province of Matanzas
that the PPC’s “great tragedy” involved having a leader capable of uniting the
opposition but who resolutely eschewed “reasonable conduct.” “It’s almost as if
(Chibás) were under the influence of a pernicious being!” he exclaimed.4 Jorge
Mañach, in his weekly Bohemia column, offered a more nuanced critique. “The grace
and difficulty of politics,” he counseled, “consists in knowing how to use impure
elements of reality for the purest ends possible.” He also asked acerbically if Chibás
meant to “irradiate” his politics, whether all those who followed him would be
“angels.”5
On January 22, the Ortodoxo National Assembly was convoked in the old ABC
party headquarters in Havana.6 Chibás entered the event serenely despite being
outnumbered. Two days earlier, he had been given a powerful trump card when the
PPC assembly from Havana ratified the independent line.

This limited the

possibilities of dealmakers because, according to the Electoral Code of 1943,
alliances required unanimous assent among a party’s provincial assemblies. The
pact friendly faction nonetheless asserted itself, choosing Millo Ochoa to supplant
Chibás as party president. During his address, Chibás urged followers not to be
resentful. He also cautioned against interfering with the assembly, especially as
nothing of substance had been decided yet. On the other hand, Chibás warned that if
“En Cuba, Política: La Gran Tragedia,” Bohemia, January 25, 1948: 49.
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date was moved forward due to objections from those who wanted to resolve the party’s business
sooner.
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the PPC attempted to reach an understanding with traditional parties, he and his
adherents would “denounce the traitors.”7 Predictably, news of Chibás’ diminished
position was the subject of much speculation among Cuba’s politicians. Alejo Cossío
del Pino, the Auténtico legislator and former interior minister deemed him “alone”
and “defeated.”8 His Communist colleague Blas Roca thought otherwise. He replied:
Chibás will always win. You will see why. ‘Eddy’ is popular for two
reasons: his invariable attack against administrative immorality and
his disgust, no less constant, with political crimes. He can never resort
to old politics in order to retain his senate seat, something he doesn’t
really need anyway. Were he to do such a thing, he would lose his
place in history. Whether the government or the opposition triumphs
in the next elections, Chibás’ position remains the same. Regardless of
which Auténtico candidate claims the legacy of shady deals and errors
of the present regime, he will have ‘Eddy’ as an incorruptible critic. If
Núñez Portuondo (the Liberal party candidate) is elected at the head
of a coalition, the same thing will happen because they are parties
based on money and compromises directed not by the men who lead
them but by the system that keeps them in line. Embezzlement will
continue and Chibás will fight it. He is, definitively, the inheritor of
the mystique the people created for Grau and he will keep growing
politically even though he won’t return to the senate for its next term.
Grau was never a senator and his popularity increased every year
because he remained the living reserve of his opponents’ errors.9
Cossío and Roca were speaking in the Capitolio’s marble encrusted Hall of Lost
Steps. Aside from being fellow members of Cuba’s chamber of representatives, they
knew each other from the time when their parties were coalition partners. The
Communists formed part of the Auténtico-Republican congressional alliance
between November 1945 and September 1947.10 This had been a quintessential
Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 550.
“En Cuba, Política: El Permanente Chibás,” Bohemia, February 1, 1947: 47.
9 Ibid.
10 The Republicans were a conservative party that extolled traditional values, the family, social order
and Christian morality among other things. Needless to say, they were very much an anti-Communist
outfit. When Grau brought the Communists into his government, party president Gustavo Cuervo
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“pact lacking in ideology” meant to build a legislative majority. When the deal no
longer served Grau’s interests, he authorized a campaign to purge the Communists
from positions of influence.11 Thus, Carlos Prío, his red baiting labor secretary
helped the Auténticos seize control of the Confederación de Trabajadores Cubanos
(Confederation of Cuban Workers).

This umbrella organization of the island’s

unions had been Communist led since its inception in 1939.12

The loss was

compounded when Prío briefly shut down the Communist newspaper Hoy and its
radio station Mil Diez in response to the party’s calls for strikes and protests.
Arguably, the worst was yet to come. On the same afternoon Chibás was dethroned
in Havana, the Communist legislator Jesús Menéndez had been shot to death by an
army captain in Manzanillo. This incident had been the initial focus of Cossío and
Roca’s conversation in the Capitolio – where the deceased’s coffin was publicly
displayed on January 25.
In addition to being a congressman, the 36-year-old Menéndez had also
directed the National Federation of Sugar Workers.

This union competed for

membership and prestige with Auténtico sugar worker unions run by Emilio Surí

Rubio resigned but his successor, Guillermo Alonso Pujol, maintained the alliance. Even so, the
Republicans were ambivalent partners throughout Grau’s term and many figures, such as Federico
Fernández Casas, expressed strong doubts. For the most part, Alonso Pujol tried to quell such
discontent by demanding a larger share of government patronage.
11 Auténtico antagonism toward communism was longstanding and characterized many former
members of the Student Directorate, including Carlos Prío and Tony Varona. This hostility was
aggravated in 1938, when the Communists struck a deal with Batista to legalize themselves while the
Auténticos remained outlawed and persecuted. At the same time, as the Auténticos gained power and
popularity, their ranks were swelled by ex communists such as Eusebio Mujal and Angel Cofiño.
12 On July 16, 1947, Chibás addressed a letter to Diario de la Marina director José Ignacio Rivero to
dispel rumors that his party was going to pact with the Communists. However, he also addressed the
recent Auténtico takeover of the Confederation of Cuban Workers, writing, “We don’t want the
Communists to control the CTC but neither do we desire this control to fall into the hands of a group
of unscrupulous politicians who are unconditionally loyal to the government and largely
unconnected to the working class.” See: Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 9, Expediente 285: 5, ANC.
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Castillo. Before being killed, Menéndez had been coursing through Oriente province
and negotiating on behalf of laborers at various sugar mills – a task of particular
importance as January was the month when harvesting began. Menéndez had been
joined in this effort by two companions, Paquito Rosales, a Communist member of
Cuba’s lower house and Manuel Quesada, a union organizer. According to these two,
they had been headed toward Bayamo where they hoped to convince a mill
administrator to accept collective bargaining. The first leg of their journey involved
an excursion to Manzanillo, during which they were approached by Captain Joaquín
Casillas Dupuy. As the train neared the station, Casillas informed Menéndez and
Quesada of his intent to detain them pending an investigation over whether they
had broken the law. When Menéndez reminded him that he enjoyed parliamentary
immunity as guaranteed by the constitution, the captain shouted, “Let the chamber
protest if I violate your parliamentary immunity and if I violate the constitution, I do
so under my responsibility! Regardless, I’m taking you in dead or alive!”13 Shortly
thereafter, the train halted. Before exiting, Menéndez reiterated that he was not
subject to arrest and would thus not accompany Casillas to the military barracks.
When Menéndez reached the platform, Casillas withdrew his pistol and shot him in
the back. This version was strenuously denied by army chief Genovevo Pérez
Dámera. Appearing before the press, he declared that Captain Casillas had been
assaulted and opened fire in self-defense.14 The general added that:

“En Cuba, Crímen: ‘Yo te Dije Que Ibas Vivo o Muerto,’” Bohemia, February 1, 1947: 43.
An official investigator sent by Grau concluded that Menéndez fired at Casillas before being killed.
However, this assertion is dubious given that the train carriage behind Casillas showed no evidence
of wayward bullet holes.
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Mr. Menéndez, taking advantage of his congressional immunity and
abusing it, both as a legislator and as a communist, was not only
inciting sugar workers to strike in order to paralyze the harvest but
was also encouraging the army and the police to rebel, arguing that
they too were poorly paid. 15
Despite such protestations, the weekly magazine Carteles reported that nearly every
media outlet and political leader characterized Menéndez’s death as an
“assassination.”16 In his January 25 broadcast, Chibás denounced the killing as “an
outrageous crime” and “a brutal and deliberate attack by the government against
the working class, parliamentary immunity, the congress and constitutional
order.”17
At a minimum, the Menéndez killing represented yet another affront against
Cuba’s beleaguered rule of law, especially as Grau refused to discipline his army
chief and Captain Casillas remained an officer in good standing. 18 Nor was this an
isolated incident of the military overstepping its authority.

Five days before

Menéndez was shot, General Pérez Dámera issued a statement criticizing two recent
rulings of the island’s Superior Electoral Tribunal. These allowed the results of a
political party’s provincial and municipal assemblies to be appealed. Pérez Dámera
claimed the process could result in public disorder and warned the military would
“Comentando la Actualidad,” Carteles, February 1, 1948: 20. Pérez Dámera’s original statement
appeared in the Havana daily Información.
16 Ibid.
17 Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 550-551.
18 The day after Menéndez was killed, the Communist lawmakers Juan Marinello, Blas Roca and
Joaquín Ordoqui were received in the presidential palace. Roca asked Grau to dismiss General Pérez
Dámera and to remove Captain Casillas from his post so he could be tried in a civilian court. Grau
repeated the military argument that Casillas was an exemplary soldier and warmly defended his
army chief. Nonetheless, he promised the legislators that justice would be pursued. However,
neither Pérez Dámera nor Casillas suffered any consequences during his administration. Casillas
would eventually be executed for Menéndez’s death in 1959 during the revolutionary government of
Fidel Castro.
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remain alert against anyone who “tries to mock the people’s free expression.”19 To
this, the Havana daily El Siglo issued a wry response in keeping with the views of
many journalists.
In our judgment, we believe the army chief has addressed something
that is none of his business. It is said that General Pérez Dámera has
given himself the airs of a referee and savior. He has built himself up
as the supreme judge of the electoral process and has romantically
taken on his shoulders the generous task of saving us in case someone
plots our political ruin. To this we reply, ‘Dear Lord, save us from the
saviors.’20
Sergio Carbó, director of the newspaper Prensa Libre, asserted that Pérez Dámera’s
remarks were aimed at Miguelito Suárez Fernández – the Auténtico presidential
aspirant who was disputing the party’s provincial assembly result in Camagüey. 21
Although Suárez Fernández had won the delegations in his native province of Las
Villas and in Matanzas, Grau resented his periodic insubordination and opposed his
efforts to win the party’s nomination. Unlike Carlos Prío, who supported Grau’s
refusal to present the education and commerce ministers for interpellation in April
of 1947, Suárez Fernández had resigned as senate president in protest. Grau had
scant tolerance for those who defied him, preferring instead the sycophancy of Prío

“En Cuba, Ejército,” Bohemia, January 25, 1948: 44.
“Incoherencias y Genovevancias,” El Siglo, January 28, 1948, reprinted in “Cómo Opina Nuestra
Prensa,” Carteles, February 8, 1948: 40.
21 The Auténtico provincial assembly of Camagüey is a useful primer on rough and tumble nature of
Cuban politics during this period. Although the pro Grau faction narrowly outnumbered that of
Suárez Fernández, the latter held his representatives back to avoid a quorum. Needing only one
delegate to validate the vote, a Suárez Fernández supporter was persuaded to attend by his Grauista
brother-in-law. Before being able to do so, he was kidnapped – forcing the assembly to be
rescheduled for December 30. For the second session, an official vote would require only a majority
of delegates rather than 60 percent. Even with a victory seemingly assured, Grau’s adherents, led by
Senator Tony Varona, left nothing to chance. The new assembly’s location was sent to each
representative via special delivery mail. However, only Grau supporters received the correct
address. This ensured a unanimous albeit dubious result and led Suárez Fernández to file an appeal
with Cuba’s superior electoral tribunal.
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and José Manuel Alemán. Given Grau’s opposition and his control of the party
machinery, Suárez Fernández hoped to rely, as Chibás once had, on his popularity
among the Auténtico rank and file. This was a remote prospect, as the Auténticos
were no more respectful of their own party’s constitutional structures than those of
the nation. On January 25, the political comic strip, El Reyecito Criollo (The Little
Cuban King) deftly lampooned the rivalry between Grau and Suárez Fernández.
This serial appeared every week Bohemia and satirized the president, who always
appeared in regal garb. In the first frame, Suárez Fernández sneaks up behind Grau
and yells “Uh!” startling him. However, the president responds by brandishing a
pole topped by a life-sized head of General Pérez Dámera and shouting “Uh!” back at
Suárez Fernández, causing him to flee in fear.22
Celebrated in late January, the Auténtico national assembly was a tightly
scripted affair. Representatives from the pro Suárez Fernández provinces of Las
Villas and Matanzas were excluded.

As the outcome was known in advance,

delegates sipped liquor or soft drinks in a bodega across the street instead of
showing their faces inside party headquarters – located on Fifth Street and Avenue
A in Vedado. When their presence was required, they appeared briefly, signed any
necessary documents and returned to their half filled glasses. After the proceedings
concluded, a group was sent to the presidential palace to inform Grau he had been
re-elected as party president. While this result had no immediate consequences for
the Auténtico hopefuls, Carlos Prío and Pepe San Martín were the obvious
beneficiaries. San Martín, the minister of public works was widely considered the
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“El Reyecito Criollo,” Bohemia, January 25, 1948: 44.

71

star of Grau’s cabinet. Known affectionately by the masses as “Pepe Plazoleta” (Pepe
Town Square) for the construction projects he had distributed evenly throughout
Cuba, he also was lauded for being an honest public servant.
considered him a “good functionary.”23

Even Chibás

San Martín also happened to be the

president’s cousin. This was a potentially decisive advantage in a country whose
politics oozed with nepotism. After all, Batista’s younger brother Panchín was
mayor of Marianao and would win Havana’s governorship in 1948. Raúl García
Menocal, whose father Mario had ruled the Democrats, was Havana’s mayor
between 1940 and 1946.

Ricardo Núñez Portuondo, the Liberal presidential

nominee did not owe his position directly to relatives but his surname was certainly
a factor. His father, Emilio Núñez Rodríguez was Cuba’s vice president during the
years 1917-1921 and a famous general from the island’s independence wars. Even
the Ortodoxos were not immune. Chibás would eventually opt for a running mate
with blood ties, tapping his cousin Roberto Agramonte. In this climate, many
politicians and commentators therefore assumed San Martín would represent the
Auténticos.
José Manuel Alemán may have lacked the glittering record of San Martín, the
revolutionary credentials of Prío and the charisma of Suárez Fernández but was
nonetheless briefly convinced he could maneuver himself into Cuba’s presidency.
The Auténtico slush fund maven and current minister without portfolio was hardly
an ideal candidate due to his fear of public speaking and scandalous management of
Cuba’s school system. On the other hand, within the last two years he had risen
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from an obscure government employee to become a dominant figure in Cuba’s
largest political party.

The distance between his present situation and the

presidency must have seemed far shorter than the one he had already traveled. He
thus summoned Republican senator Guillermo Alonso Pujol to one of his country
estates for advice. Alemán confessed to his closest political ally a desire to “win the
elections in any way possible, including with military backing.” 24 However, army
assistance was doubtful given the hostility of General Pérez Dámera. Further, the
“monarch of inciso K” was hampered by an opinion poll that appeared on January 18
in which he finished a distant third as the hypothetical Auténtico candidate – trailing
Núñez Portuondo by nearly 22 points and Chibás by six.25 The same query showed
San Martín, Prío and Suárez Fernández to be far more competitive against the
opposition.

Alonso Pujol thus listened politely but without encouragement.

Following a three-hour discussion with Grau, Alemán withdrew his bid and declared
himself for Prío.
While this development appeared to indicate a preference on Grau’s part,
the president continued to withhold his endorsement. Even as his term wound
down, Grau seemed loath to step aside and reluctant to anoint a successor until the
last possible moment. While the president’s attitude vexed his party, Chibás was
convinced something sinister was afoot. In a conversation with Raúl García Menocal

“En Cuba, Política: Crucigrama,” Bohemia, February 1, 1948: 48.
The sobriquet was a favorite of Enrique de la Osa, who also referred to Alemán as “el cacique de
BAGA” (the chief of BAGA), after the acronym for his ill-gotten political fund and the “ex minister of
school hunger” in reference to his practice of embezzling funds meant for school breakfasts. While
de la Osa was obviously biased, his views agree with Cuban public opinion. The combination of
Alemán’s dismal performance as a public servant and Chibás’ relentless focus on his corruption
greatly damaged his image. For the opinion poll, see Raúl Gutiérrez, “En Camagüey y Las Villas
Ganará el Gobierno Según Sea Su Candidato Presidencial,” Bohemia, January 18, 1948: 53.
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on February 9 he said, “It seems to me there won’t be any elections. All the running
around and discussions about pacts are a waste of time as Grau seems more inclined
each day to remain in power through a golpe de Estado. I’ve been convinced of this
for a year now.”
“No!” replied the Democratic leader, “Interrupting the constitutional rhythm
would be terrible for the country!”
“Raúl, this doesn’t alarm me,” responded Chibás, his voice rising. “Not very
long ago there was no constitutional rhythm in Cuba.

No one respects the

constitution. Grau violates it at every opportunity. I don’t see why we fear such a
false rhythm being broken. Let’s not forget that our current government is merely
disguised as a constitutional regime. The preferable thing would be for Grau to
unmask himself finally.”26
Menocal had originally called on Chibás to enlist his help in rallying the PPC
behind Ricardo Núñez Portuondo. Ortodoxo pactistas had expressed doubts about
the Liberal nominee, a noted surgeon and man of probity whose dour personality
inspired scant popular enthusiasm. As a compromise, Millo Ochoa proposed a socalled “equidistant candidate” from outside the major opposition parties.

The

Liberals, however, were adamant in their backing of Núñez. They had registered
357,469 supporters during the party registration drive, first among all opposition
parties, and claimed the right to head any coalition.

Menocal repeated this

argument, adding that Núñez was, “a good person.”27 Chibás, who always possessed
an exquisite sense of the national mood, said, “I believe the Cuban people are
26
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discontented,” he said, “but if forced to choose between Núñez and the government’s
candidate they will elect the latter, whomever it ends up being, because voters want
to overcome the present rather than returning to the past.”28 Menocal chided Eddy
for continuing to associate the Liberals with Machado’s bygone era. However,
Núñez had been the tyrant’s personal physician and represented an indisputable
link to that epoch. Although he had never been implicated in any wrongdoing, his
personal ties to Machado and the party’s retention of some machadista elements
would undoubtedly be an issue if he remained a candidate.29
The opposition’s inability to settle on a contender gratified Miguelito Suárez
Fernández, who founded the semi-independent Auténtico Reaffirmation Movement
and offered to lead a so-called “third front” against the government. Despite fears
that Suárez Fernández intended only to gain leverage within his own party, the
Democrats and Ortodoxos were willing to listen.30 Conversely, the Liberals held fast
behind Núñez and threatened to face Cuba’s voters alone rather than abandoning
their leader.31 This posture was almost certainly a bluff, as the Liberals were
consummate pragmatists.

They could gain nothing and would lose much by

entering the election solo. With his enhanced bargaining power, Suárez Fernández

Ibid, 63.
Prominent among these were Viriato Gutiérrez, former vice president of Cuba’s chamber of
representatives, Rafael Guas Inclán, the current governor of Havana province and Juan Antonio
Vázquez Bello, the former Liberal party boss in Santa Clara. All three were millionaires with money
they had stolen during Machado’s presidency.
30 Stokes,“The ‘Cuban Revolution,’” 52.
31 This position was partly rooted in the Liberals’ experience in 1944. Before that year’s election,
President Batista forced them to support his handpicked successor, the Democratic leader Carlos
Saladrigas, as head of the Social Democratic Coalition. The Liberals yielded reluctantly as they had
registered more adherents than any other party in Cuba. One wing briefly declared the Liberals
would renounce the pact unless one of their own headed the ticket. Eventually, they settled for the
vice presidential candidate and an allotment of three senators per province (as opposed to two for
the Democrats).
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visited Guillermo Alonso Pujol and José Manuel Alemán at the latter’s residence in
Alturas de Miramar – one of Havana’s plushest neighborhoods.

In a show of

confident informality, the Republican leader and former education minister received
their guest clad in pajamas. The portly Alonso Pujol went a step further, displaying
his massive belly. Alemán informed the senate president he would soon issue a
statement reiterating his support for Prío.32

He would also urge Auténtico

candidates aside from Prío and Suárez Fernández to withdraw, as these were the
only two with delegates in the party’s national assembly. Alemán was especially
anxious to eliminate Pepe San Martín, who he personally detested.33

Suárez

Fernández was fond of San Martín but disliked Prío and saw no reason why anyone
should be “vetoed.”34 Further, Suárez Fernández boasted more delegates than any
other Auténtico and concluded that such a strategy would only ensure his
nomination. After an uncomfortable silence, Pujol asked the senate president to
recommend a solution. “[T]here are many solutions you two can try,” he said. “For
example, a military coup. Against this I couldn’t do anything as I wouldn’t have time
to flee once the soldiers marched across the Almendares River. I swear if they gave
me half an hour, I would disappear!”35
Alemán and Pujol objected, saying they had no such plans. Suárez Fernández
speculated they might conspire to suspend the elections. Failing that, he dared them
to run Prío on the Republican ticket and announced, “I would then look for another
This was done via interview with Alfonso Gonsé, director of the Havana daily Alerta.
When Alonso Pujol mentioned San Martín, Alemán “jumped as if he had been stung by a wasp.” He
then dubbed San Martín “the worst candidate” and declared he would leave Cuba if Grau’s cousin
were elected. See “En Cuba, Política: Más Barato Te Costaría Un Viaje a Miami,” Bohemia, February
22, 1948: 51.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
32
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organization to nominate me and we would see who triumphs.”36 Alemán nervously
wiped his hands on his pajama pants while Pujol removed his glasses and began
wiping the lenses. Before either could reply, Suárez Fernández pointed out yet
another option. The Superior Electoral Tribunal was due to rule shortly on the
Auténtico provincial assembly’s disputed result in Camagüey. The senate president
was confident he would win this appeal unless, of course, Alemán and Pujol exerted
“very strong and very violent” pressure on the judges.37 Once again, his hosts
denied thinking anything of the sort. As the nearly five-hour meeting drew to a
close, Suárez Fernández asked how Alemán planned to avoid prosecution for
embezzlement in the event of a third front victory. “I have a million pesos to spend
on a senate campaign,” said the minister without portfolio.

“José Manuel,”

countered his guest. “A flight to Miami would be much cheaper.”38
While the Auténticos threatened each other in private, Ortodoxo factions
feuded before Cuba’s judges. On February 14, the Superior Electoral Tribunal
annulled the PPC provincial assembly result in Havana. Pelayo Cuervo had brought
this case before the court to dispute the victory of PPC isolationists in December.
Citing a legal technicality, Cuervo argued the assembly was illegal because eight
delegates had not been convoked.39 However, as PPC party chief in Havana, Cuervo

Ibid.
Ibid.
38 Ibid, 52.
39 This was clearly a ploy orchestrated by Cuervo, who neither embezzled nor stole but indulged in
lawyerly skullduggery when necessary. During the hearing, Joaquín Martínez Sáenz, who was among
the truant delegates, claimed he was unaware of when the assembly would meet. The lawyer
representing Chibás found this strange given that the date was advertised in the press. Martínez
Sáenz averred he “was not reading the papers that much.” Reminded that he and Cuervo often saw
each other and the latter would have been likely to remind him about the assembly, Martínez Sáenz
said, “during those days, I didn’t talk to Pelayo.” Confronted with press reports indicating he had
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himself had been responsible for summoning them. Enrique de la Osa noted dryly
that, “Pelayo had appealed a result tampered with by Pelayo.” 40 Seizing on this
contradiction, Chibás subsequently filed a motion to remove Cuervo from his post
for “negligence.”41 This request was unanimously approved, allowing Chibás to
replace him with Manuel Bisbé. He thus gained a trusted friend and ideological ally
in the party’s upper reaches. Chibás, who was restless in both victory and defeat,
did not savor this development for long. His attention was diverted forthwith by a
column in Prensa Libre criticizing his juridical good fortune. Chibás spent hours
every day combing through newspapers and magazines in search of material for his
radio show. As one of Cuba’s thinnest skinned politicians, Chibás was also on the
lookout for attacks so that he might reproach the director or retort with a letter to
the editor. Prensa Libre was an unlikely source of disappointment as it was run by
his friend Sergio Carbó and usually provided the most favorable coverage of any
Havana daily. On February 20, Chibás composed a missive to Carbó conveying his
dismay but also stating he was certain the article had appeared “without your
consent.”42 Chibás duly defended his dismissal of Cuervo, claiming the move was
necessary to “fulfill my responsibility” and ensure the assembly functioned
properly.43 Given his well-known grudge with Cuervo, many were likely to view the

appeared in Cuervo’s law office shortly before the assembly, Martínez Sáenz said, “during those
meetings we didn’t talk about provincial politics.” “How strange!” retorted the exasperated lawyer.
“Politicians who meet in order to not talk about politics!” See “En Cuba, Política: Pelayo y Joaquín,”
Bohemia, February 22, 1948: 54.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 9, Expediente 285: 18, ANC.
43 Ibid, 19.
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move as tit for tat although by the standards of Cuban politics this was gentle
indeed.
Aware that he was addressing a sympathetic audience, Chibás also revealed
his latest thinking and offered a preview of his Sunday broadcast. Lately, Chibás had
become intrigued by the third party candidacy of Henry Wallace in the United
States.44 He saw a parallel between the Progressives and Ortodoxos both of which
stood against “traditional and decrepit” parties in their respective countries.45
Chibás was particularly encouraged by the recent triumph of a candidate supported
by Wallace in a special election for a Bronx congressional seat. That this event
confounded U.S. political pundits delighted Chibás to no end. He also noted that
Wallace was being accused of dividing the Democrats much as he had been reproved
for splitting the Auténticos.46 Chibás drew two seemingly contradictory conclusions
from this state of affairs. First, he asserted that “Wallace’s victory” confirmed the
need for a third front against Cuba’s “old and corrupt politics.”47 Next, he pointed
out that,
Wallace’s party is the smallest in the United States and scarcely has
any members but has won the election carrying more than 50 percent
of the vote. The candidate of this party has obtained, by himself, more
votes than all the others combined. The same will occur, in Cuba, with
the PPC candidate.48
Henry Wallace (1888-1965) ran for president in 1948 on the Progressive party ticket. He served
under President Franklin Delano Roosevelt as vice president (1941-1945) and secretary of
agriculture (1933-1940). He was also President Harry Truman’s secretary of commerce (19451946).
45 Ibid, 20.
46 Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 9, Expediente 285: 20, ANC.
47 Ibid, 21.
48 Ibid. The candidate, Leo Isacson, was actually a member of the American Labor Party. He won the
seat in New York’s 24th District after the incumbent accepted a judgeship. In the snap election of
February 17, 1948 Isacson received 22,697 votes, his Democratic opponent obtained 12,598, the
Liberal candidate counted 3800 and the Republican nominee boasted a mere 1500.
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Chibás was clearly extrapolating a great deal from a single congressional race in a
foreign country.49 During his February 22 broadcast, he repeated this argument –
leading the jilted Pelayo Cuervo to brand him a hypocrite. Luis Conte Agüero held
that Chibás stood “at the most difficult crossroads of his life” after being supplanted
as PPC president and realizing his faction was a minority within the party.50 These
were unwelcome setbacks but neither was particularly devastating.

Although

Chibás no longer ruled the Ortodoxos, he remained the party’s most prominent
figure. As for his pact-shunning followers, their ranks would swell when frustration
with the usual politics mounted. This pointed to the real dilemma facing Chibás.
Nothing would boost his popularity more than another mistake-ridden, scandal
prone or dishonest administration. At 40 years old, Chibás was already a budding
superstar. His greatest weakness was the lack of a political machine but this could
be remedied with time. On the other hand, he rued Cuba’s likely presidential
contenders. Similar to Grau, Carlos Prío had not respected the constitution, he was
corrupt and maintained links with gangsters. Ricardo Núñez represented an even
more distasteful Liberal restoration. Chibás, who was constantly aware of his “duty
before history”51 to advance Cuba’s revolution, felt the electorate deserved better.
He was also hedging his bets. If a third front were agreed upon and headed by a
candidate without links to Grau or traditional parties, it would potentially be very
popular. Chibás, who closely tracked his own poll ratings, was almost certainly

Moreover, the “traditional and decrepit” political parties of the United States would be vindicated
in November of 1948 when the Democrats recaptured the presidency and won back the 24 th
congressional district in New York. Wallace did not win a single electoral vote.
50 Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 555.
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loath to oppose such a venture. He could brush off the inevitable charges of flipflopping from fellow politicos, as he knew the public would applaud.
Later that evening, the familiar sounds of Havana’s three-week carnival were
supplemented by more ominous but equally recognizable noises. Just after 11 p.m.
as the last echoes of floats and merrymaking faded from the streets, UIR militants
gunned down Manolo Castro and two companions. The 37-year-old Castro was
Cuba’s national sports director52 and an MSR member who was close to the now
infamous Mario Salabarría.

Castro had infuriated UIR leaders for allegedly

investigating whether his friend might be freed from prison. Informed that he had
been targeted for assassination, Castro visited the presidential palace and appealed
for help to Grau’s sister-in-law Paulina Alsina and Cuba’s police chief Hernández
Nardo, who was a fellow MSR man. However, the latter was reluctant to become
involved – perhaps due to the Orfila fiasco. Ironically, the one assailant captured by
the authorities turned out to be Grau’s godson; a 20-year-old agronomy student
named Gustavo Ortiz Fáez. He belonged to a UIR “tendency” at the University of
Havana led by Fidel Castro and Justo Fuentes whose fierce rivals were devotees of
Manolo Castro.53 At the burial, the Auténtico politician René Moreno poignantly
summed up the killing saying, “We ourselves are responsible for this deed. We
haven’t learned how to unite in order to overcome, as good revolutionaries should.
We are responsible for Manolo’s death…”54
Castro owed his position as Cuba’s national sports director to José Manuel Alemán, the MSR’s chief
patron. Before that, Castro had been the leading MSR representative at the University of Havana –
where he was president of the University Student Federation (Federación Estudiantil Universitario).
53 Enrique de la Osa. “En Cuba, Atentado: ‘Nosotros Mismos Somos Culpables...,’” Bohemia, February
29, 1948, reprinted in de la Osa, Primer Tiempo 1947-1948, 365.
54 Ibid, 366.
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Gang violence was a reminder of Auténtico mismanagement but offered no
guarantee of an opposition victory. Millo Ochoa, the new PPC president, thus
remained in pursuit of his elusive quarry – someone who could unite Cuba’s socalled “progressive forces.”

Among those he considered was Carlos Hevia, an

Auténtico founder, respected engineer and the first Cuban graduate of the United
States Naval Academy. An industrious man and able administrator, Hevia also
possessed first-rate revolutionary credentials.

In 1931, he was among 40

volunteers who stormed the city of Gibara in an ill-fated attempt to overthrow
Machado. Hevia told Ochoa he would accept the third front nomination but urged
him to speak first with Miguelito Súarez Fernández, whom he called the “operative
factor” in Cuban politics.55 Ochoa then revealed his plan to isolate the Liberals until
they dropped Ricardo Núñez. If their intransigence persisted, he claimed many
Liberal senators would “peel away” toward the third front in order to save their
seats.56
Hovering above these negotiations was yet another case pending before the
Superior Electoral Tribunal. By a 4-1 vote the court had overturned a ruling from
1944 requiring a party’s provincial assemblies to approve national coalition deals.
On February 23, politicians of every stripe packed the Tribunal’s O’Reilly Street
headquarters in Old Havana.57 Much to their disappointment, nothing was decided
and a further delay was incurred when one of the judges fell ill for three days.
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Although the verdict promised consequences for all of Cuba’s political parties, the
Auténticos and Ortodoxos were especially on edge.

A free hand for national

assemblies would greatly benefit Grau and his chosen successor, Carlos Prío. With
the provincial assemblies of Matanzas and Las Villas backing him, Suárez Fernández
had been able to hold up the Auténtico-Republican alliance. Deprived of this trump
card, he would lose a great deal of leverage within the party. Speculation was
rampant that a pro government ruling was forthcoming.

On February 26, a

pessimistic Suárez Fernández met with Chibás and broached the possibility of
another mass exodus toward the Ortodoxos.

Contemplating an unfavorable

outcome, the senate president’s chief lieutenant in Matanzas, Diego Vicente Tejera
believed the miguelistas would bolt, saying, “We have no choice but to scorch the
earth behind us.”58 Even as Chibás contemplated adding Suárez Fernández and his
legion of supporters, he too was preoccupied by the court’s impending decision. His
control of the Havana assembly had until now assured him of a veto against any pact
he considered unacceptable. Conversely, Pelayo Cuervo and Joaquín Martínez Sáenz
were eager to free themselves from their adversary’s oversight. On February 27, the
judges issued a pronouncement that confounded expectations.

The new

“instruction” pertaining to unresolved pacts, stated that if a coalition were stalled
due to objections from a party’s provincial assembly, the alliance’s presidential and
vice-presidential candidates would have to be substituted. Noting the revulsion of
Carlos Prío when the verdict was read aloud, a Bohemia correspondent wrote that,

58
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“A jar of cold water poured down the neck of ex Prime Minister Prío Socorrás and
his friends present with him wouldn’t have caused as much disgust on their part.”59
On February 29, Suárez Fernández met Chibás once again and confirmed his
group’s readiness to “consider” integrating a third front.60 That evening, Chibás
imbued the new project with his characteristic showmanship. After coining a catchy
slogan (“third front against third floor”), he told listeners the alliance also required a
“Cuban salute of victory.”61 This, he suggested, should entail an arm raised with
three fingers pointing toward the sky. Despite such enthusiasm, the third front
faced innumerable pitfalls.

Foremost among these was the ambivalence of all

parties involved. On March 7, Chibás and the Ortodoxo party chiefs of each province
signed a document declaring “total identification” with the third front. 62
Nevertheless, many who argued for independence were poised to bolt if the party
entered an alliance. Among the Democrats, a heated debate ensued over whether to
join Suárez Fernández and the Ortodoxos. Although a majority approved, many top
figures expressed reservations. Carlos Saladrigas, the party’s presidential nominee
in 1944, described Chibás and Suárez Fernández as demagogues who were “utterly
crazy.”63 Antonio Martínez Fraga, a party chief from Las Villas, also objected to
Suárez Fernández – citing his failure to officially abandon the Auténticos and past
praise for Grau, which he called “an immorality.”64 These leaders and others,
including ex treasury secretary Jorge García Montes, advocated a pact with the
Ibid, 50.
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61 Ibid. The “third floor” referred to the private quarters of Cuba’s presidential palace and was used
by politicians of all stripes to refer to Grau.
62 Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 8, Expediente 258, ANC.
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Liberals.

As for Suárez Fernández, his self-assured pose before Ortodoxo and

Democrat delegations was a façade. As senate president, he was all too familiar with
the potpourri of personalities that would need reconciling and perhaps this was the
basis for his qualms. Regardless of the reason, his discreet albeit noticeable contacts
with Auténtico bosses were a sign of wavering commitment. Needless to say, the
Democrats’ pro Liberal rumblings and Suárez Fernández’s political philandering
were embarrassing and potentially damaging to Chibás. His public endorsement of
the third front now appeared either naïve or expedient. Hence, he and Manuel Bisbé
issued a statement intended to bolster their reputations and serve warning to their
unscrupulous potential allies.
We absolutely disagree with any steps that will transform the original
idea of the third front into a horrible caricature of the beautiful
portrait we painted for the Cuban people in our previous radio
broadcasts. The third front is (and cannot be other than) the political
solution capable of liberating the Cuban people from robberies,
crimes and other shameless acts of the present without backsliding
toward the Machado era. For this reason we have passionately
defended the third front with an uplifted spirit, declining all personal
aspirations, but under no circumstances are we ready to renounce our
longstanding principles and revolutionary convictions.65
While Chibás fulminated, his pact friendly colleagues negotiated. On March 9, the
Democratic railroad magnate José Miguel Tarafa invited leaders from his own party
along with Ortodoxo and Liberal contingents to his country estate in Matanzas
province.

Addressing the Liberals, Senator Tarafa noted that Miguelito Suárez

Fernández had offered to withdraw his candidacy in the name of third front unity
and proposed Ricardo Núñez follow suit.

65

The Liberal chief responded with
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indignant disbelief. “Everyone here agrees I am a decent person; nevertheless, all of
you want to veto my candidacy. I have spent 54 years in Cuban society and no one
can accuse me of anything…I can’t understand this attitude.”66 Núñez, who did
nothing during the meeting to debunk his reputation as a stern, irascible sort,
proceeded to threaten those present that he would not tolerate being portrayed as
intransigent in newspapers sympathetic to the Ortodoxos or Democrats. He then
declared himself willing to stand down if everyone agreed that was best but warned
“not a single Liberal” would vote for the third front without him heading the ticket.67
Núñez then moderated his position slightly, saying his replacement might be
acceptable but only if the substitute were one of the provincial Liberal party bosses.
This idea was quickly dismissed by Millo Ochoa, who said everyone had been
gathered to discuss a “unified opposition” rather than “party questions.”68 To
everyone’s surprise, the Liberal congressman Prisciliano Piedra then suggested they
nominate a figure without ties to any of the three parties. This plan so agitated
Núñez that other members of the Liberal delegation whisked their leader to Tarafa’s
office, where he could calm down in private.

Shortly thereafter, the Liberals

abandoned their host’s sumptuous finca despite pleas to stay and smooth out a deal.
The political spotlight now shifted toward the Auténticos. On March 10,
Education Minister Carlos de Arazoza met with José Manuel Alemán at his home in
Miami Beach.

The scourge of Cuba’s schoolchildren, whose sudden exile had

inspired much speculation, ordered his surrogate to lend Carlos Prío “whatever help
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he needs” for the imminent national assembly meeting.69 This arrived around noon
the next day in the form of trucks and busloads full of armed men. Another group
that descended on Auténtico headquarters was Havana’s pickpockets, who took
advantage of the crowded conditions and constant jostling to relieve many a
delegate of their wallet. Among the victims was Arazoza himself, who shouted in
displeasure after discovering his billfold, containing more than 800 pesos, had been
filched. The assembly officially commenced at 3 p.m. with a so-called “functional
quorum” of 79 delegates. This number reflected the absence of representatives
from Matanzas and Las Villas, provinces controlled by Miguelito Suárez Fernández.
Even some of those nominally present were elsewhere. Alemán, the new Havana
party boss, was in Florida. Grau, the Auténtico chief, passed the afternoon in the
presidential palace. Apart from the petty thieves, no one had any reason to attend
the convention for everything had been decided in advance. Grau had not only
chosen the nominee, he had leaked word of his decision to the crowds waiting
outside the presidential palace before a vote had been taken across town. 70
Remarking on the farcical nature of the process, an Auténtico lawyer from Camagüey
ruefully predicted that, “whatever Miguelito loses here he’ll gain back later before
the Superior Electoral Tribunal.”71
In reaction to Prío’s nomination, third front negotiations were redoubled. On
March 12, Democratic provincial bosses exchanged views at the house of Raúl
García Menocal and provisionally agreed to join the Ortodoxos and Suárez
“En Cuba, Política: ‘Como Ciertos Insectos...’, Bohemia, March 21, 1948: 57.
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Fernández. That evening, the national assembly was convened and a rancorous
debate ensued between third front partisans and those aiming for a LiberalDemocratic pact. When Antonio Martínez Fraga, the Democratic boss of Las Villas,
told the convention he had tirelessly campaigned in his province for “this great
Cuban” Ricardo Núñez Portuondo, a delegate from Havana quipped, “It’s true then
what they say, that you have been promoting Liberal politics in Las Villas instead of
doing so for your own party!”72 Martínez Fraga was undeterred, and continued to
defend his position for three and a half hours until his exasperated opponents
submitted a motion limiting the amount of time for speeches to 20 minutes. A vote
was finally taken at around 4 a.m. and those favoring the third front prevailed 7131. That afternoon, the Ortodoxo national assembly voted 90-22 for the alliance –
although Chibás and nearly all the Havana representatives dissented. Explaining
this stance during subsequent negotiations with Democratic and miguelista
representatives, Manuel Bisbé assured them the Havana delegation, “with all due
respect for the Democrats” was signaling its loyalty to the independent line and
Chibás himself had been “enthusiastic” when the Democrats elected to join the third
front.73 Unfortunately, this latest round of talks was stalled over the issue of senate
candidacies.

Principally, the four Ortodoxo senators who were former ABC

members demanded places on the third front ticket. Their insolence shocked all
involved, but especially fellow Ortodoxos. Manuel Bisbé, the professor of Greek who
admired Plato wistfully told Chibás that, “Here in Cuba no one respects hierarchies.”
He then confessed, “I never imagined they would behave with such a lack of
72
73
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ethics.”74 Far less surprising but equally devastating was news that the implacable
Martínez Fraga formally vetoed the alliance after promising not to do so.75
After these hiccups, Suárez Fernández dispatched four acolytes to meet with
envoys of Carlos Prío. They promised a return to the Auténtico mainstream in
exchange for four senate seats in Matanzas and Las Villas and one each in the
island’s other four provinces. Prío was initially amenable, although Grau expressed
disapproval and warned him that Miguelito was “playing dirty.”76 Indeed, during a
meeting on March 15, the senate president upped the ante. Besides the senate
candidacies, he now requested assurances from Prío that key Auténtico figures
would support his presidential candidacy in 1952. 77 While Prío mulled these new
terms, Suárez Fernández abruptly changed course toward the third front once again.
By now, Miguelito’s flip-flopping had inspired a raft of satiric cartoons.

One,

entitled, “At Close Range,” portrayed a fence topped by an empty saddle. On the far
side stood Prío and Grau.

At the near side, Liborio, Cuba’s everyman, asked

Democratic party president Carlos Saladrigas, “Where’s Suárez Fernández?” “He
left,” was the reply, “but wait a moment. He said he’d return right away.” 78 On the
other hand, Cuba’s editorial pages were less inclined to mask their disgust with
humor. “Let it be said,” lamented Bohemia, “that politics in Cuba has ceased to be a
public service and a patriotic duty and has converted itself into the most cynical
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game imaginable of ambition and greed.”79

The magazine reserved special

condemnation for the dithering of Suárez Fernández, noting that a “decided, heroic
gesture” was required on his part to maintain popular enthusiasm for the third
front.80 Carteles added that, “In Cuba, politics is a veritable swamp and the majority
of politicians are vermin splashing around in their element.”81 “Where,” asked the
editor, “are the sincere revolutionaries who struggled and risked their lives to
overthrow the decadent regime of President Machado even as his innumerable
successors have behaved even worse than he?”82
Chibás, of course, was very much a revolutionary but he proved that sincerity
in politics was a complicated matter. After all, he truly felt pacts were harmful and
yet for the past month he had vigorously promoted the third front on his radio
show. Because of the former belief, he voted against the Ortodoxo-Democratic
alliance and refused all entreaties to run for a senate seat on the coalition ticket or
participate in any third front commissions. At the same time, despite occasional
hints to the contrary, Chibás never seriously threatened to undermine an agreement
– at least while an acceptable figure like Suárez Fernández was the probable leader.
When a reporter asked the senate president about Chibás, Miguelito replied, “Eddy
is a perfect gentleman!”83 This was because he, like his Ortodoxo colleague Roberto
García Ibáñez, was convinced the third front was “a solution to the dilemma facing
the people over whether to vote for Machado in the person of Núñez or Grau in the
“Editorial: Un Decepcionante Proceso Político,” Bohemia, March 21, 1947: 53.
Ibid. In fact, the editorial implied Suárez Fernández should follow the bold example of Hernán
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person of Prío.”84 Even so, Chibás was beset by serious qualms. On March 16, he
attended third front proceedings for the first time and Suárez Fernández promptly
begged his help in resolving “the Ortodoxo problem of Camagüey,” a euphemism for
Aurelio Álvarez. The tenacious veteran of Cuba’s independence war had been
pushing hard for the third front nomination of late. Álvarez had also not been shy
about attacking Suárez Fernández for his dalliances with the Auténticos. Rather
than refusing this appeal outright, Chibás fobbed it off onto Millo Ochoa. Later on, as
a group of Ortodoxos discussed the distribution of senate candidacies, Chibás
remarked to a friend that, “No one here is thinking of the revolution.”85
Nor was Chibás alone in this thought. Rafael García Bárcena, María Teresa
Freyre de Andrade, Regla Peraza and Pastora Núñez had recently abandoned the
PPC to protest its dealings with Suárez Fernández and the Democrats. All were
close to Chibás and considered the possibility of returning if the Ortodoxos adopted
an independent line. Like Chibás, García Bárcena had been a member of the 1927
Student Directorate and a militant Auténtico. He was also one of Cuba’s most
acclaimed public intellectuals. Aside from occasional contributions to Bohemia, he
founded the Revista Cubana de Filosofía (Cuban Philosophical Review) and was an
original member of the Cuban Philosophical Society.

Along with Leonardo

Fernández Sánchez, García Bárcena had been among the party’s most outspoken
critics of pacts. Freyre de Andrade and Peraza carried the surnames of well-known
martyrs, which imbued their opposition to coalitions with great moral standing.
Agents of Machado had murdered Freyre de Andrade’s three brothers in 1932, while
84
85
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Peraza’s father was a general in Cuba’s independence war who was accidentally
shot by one of his own men during an ambush. Pastora, now 27 years old, had
known Chibás since she was 14 and viewed him as a mentor much as he had once
been Grau’s protégé. Ironically, their decision to forsake the Ortodoxos coincided
with a stream of defections by the sort of pact friendly, office-seeking types they
despised. Federico Fernández Casas jumped to the Liberals and secured a place on
their party list in Oriente. Senator José Enrique Briguier, the ex Democrat from
Camagüey, followed suit after learning he would be left off the provincial ticket.
Adriano Galano, a former grupo ortodoxo member, also renounced the PPC.
Certainly, party-hopping politicians were nothing new in Cuba. Around this
time, in fact, the Liberals were also suffering losses. First, the senator and political
journalist Ramón Vasconcelos joined the Auténticos.86 In an interview with Bohemia
reporters, he blamed his switch on Alfredo Hornedo – a party bigwig and director of
the pro Liberal daily El País, who had continually undermined him.

Shortly

thereafter, the Liberals were tempted with a bold offer courtesy of Carlos Prío.
Although he was confident of winning the presidency, Prío worried a contentious
congress would tie his hands. He thus proposed an “understanding” between the
two parties that would ensure him a comfortable majority. In exchange, he was
willing to concede three senate candidacies per province, three provincial
governments, half his cabinet appointments and a million pesos to pay for the
electoral campaign. Emilio Núñez Portuondo, the Liberal nominee’s brother and a
senator from Las Villas, could barely contain his glee as he listened to Prío.
Aside from contributing to various publications including Bohemia and Prensa Libre, Vasconcelos
was also editor of Alerta.
86
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However, Ricardo Núñez still refused to retire his candidacy adding sarcastically,
“So what if they give us a million pesos? What am I going to do with that much
money? I’d be so worried about losing it I wouldn’t be able to sleep.”87 When Prío
was informed, he and Guillermo Alonso Pujol attempted to force Núñez to resign as
party president by poaching Liberal lawmakers. They succeeded in peeling away
Representative Prisciliano Piedra and Senator Ricardo Campanería, both of
Matanzas province, but Núñez retained control.
Despite their failure to lure the Liberals, Auténtico leaders remained
supremely confident. Earlier that month, Grau’s former interior minister Alejo
Cossío del Pino had reprised the party’s thinking, saying, “We’ll win the elections
even though we’ll have to inundate the island with millions of pesos.”88 Only a
single fear nagged Auténtico self-assuredness and this was the prospect of an
unfavorable ruling by the Superior Electoral Tribunal.89

Accordingly, Grau

summoned the court’s president, Francisco Llaca Argudín, for an interview on
March 16. Reluctant to face the erstwhile physiology professor alone, Llaca Argudín
brought along his four colleagues for what he presumed would be an intimidating
session. He was not mistaken, as shortly after arriving at the presidential palace
Grau’s obese justice minister, Evelio Álvarez del Real, read aloud a long and
menacing document. Specifically, the government charged that appeals before the
court regarding provincial assemblies were causing delays and leading toward a
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“dangerous crisis” that threatened electoral guarantees.90 More ominously, Álvarez
alluded to the dissenting opinion of Judge Delio Silva that would have removed the
veto of provincial assemblies and claimed, “today’s difficulties could have been
overcome” had it been approved.91 Unexpectedly, Grau then reminded the judges of
Decree 2665 issued in 1940 by Batista’s front man, President Federico Laredo Brú,
which effectively allowed him to nullify appeals before the court. At the time, this
decree had been aimed against the opposition Auténticos – who had styled
themselves as a party of virtue and legality before they lacked access to power. In
any event, the implication was unmistakable, although Grau assured the judges that,
“Of course, the situation nowadays is quite different.”92 On March 19, the court
received a letter from Carlos Prío and Guillermo Alonso Pujol. As luck would have it,
these two lawyers preferred not to dwell on actual laws but on the “chaos” that
would result from an “erroneous interpretation” by the Tribunal.93 This last bit of
hectoring came to naught, however. Later that day, Llaca Argudín upheld the
integrity of Cuba’s judicial branch – declaring the Tribunal would not limit the
“legitimate right” to appeal assembly results.94
Obviously, there would be no need for a court case if the Auténticos could
coax Miguelito Suárez Fernández and his followers back into the fold. At first, this
seemed improbable when the PPC and Democratic national assemblies approved
Suárez Fernández and Raúl Menocal as their presidential and vice-presidential
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candidates on March 17. Four days later, however, Menocal was in Las Villas
attempting to stave off a veto from the Democratic provincial assembly. During a
brief speech in which he implored delegates not to sink the coalition, many vacated
their seats and left. Bodyguards were sent to retrieve them but too many escaped to
reach a quorum. This ploy was attributed to the Liberal leaning Polo Figueroa, who
feared Menocal would unduly influence the assembly. When the assembly convened
again, the Las Villas party bosses Antonio Martínez Fraga and Jorge García Montes
ensured the Ortodoxo-Democratic alliance was nixed. Meanwhile, the Auténticos
courted wavering miguelista legislators with bribes of $20,000. Their first taker was
Salvador Acosta Casares, a congressman from Camagüey. During his March 28
broadcast, Chibás incited the outrage of workaday Cubans, whose average yearly
income was $341, asking “Government or opposition? Whoever gives the most
money!”95

Chibás told listeners that decent men were being “deliberately

irradiated” from Cuba’s politics.96 Nevertheless, he said, the third front offered a
chance to vote against the “ignominious present” and would persevere even if the
Ortodoxos were its sole support.97 By every indication, this scenario now seemed
likely. On April 1, Suárez Fernández was publicly mourning the third front –
reserving his harshest words for the Democratic provincial chiefs of Las Villas,
saying they had, “put their small-minded interests above the nation’s greater
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good.”98 The next day, he and Raúl Menocal officially withdrew their candidacies.
Confronted with limited options, a return to the Auténticos now seemed logical for
Suárez Fernández.

Grau’s former prime minister, Félix Lancís, established

preliminary contacts precisely for this reason. Nonetheless, the senate president
was too bitter to capitulate just yet.
Actually, there was plenty of animosity to go around.

In an “exclusive

declaration” to Bohemia, Chibás lambasted “false Ortodoxos” that ditched the party
and sought to maintain their positions elsewhere. Among these were Pelayo Cuervo
and Joaquín Martínez Sáenz, who obtained senate candidacies on the Liberal ticket.
Also, Pedro López Dorticós accepted a congressional bid with the AuténticoRepublican alliance. Chibás did not specify names, but when he reviled those who
had “stabbed me in the back” and deserted upon “seeing their petty personal
aspirations in danger” there could be no doubt as to whom he was referring. 99 On
the other hand, Chibás effusively praised María Teresa Freyre de Andrade and Regla
Peraza, who had rejoined the party now that the specter of pacts had receded.
Indeed, the tables had turned a great deal for independence-minded Ortodoxos. As
the third front’s collapse loomed, PPC leaders had convened a series of meetings to
decide their next step. Chibás argued they should enter the elections alone. Manuel
Bisbé, Agustín Cruz and José Manuel Gutiérrez concurred. Millo Ochoa initially
claimed this would be “suicide” and pushed for a deal with Prío.100 The future
turncoat Pedro López Dorticós deemed independence a “utopia,” as the party lacked
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“Declaraciones Exclusivas de ‘Eddy’ Chibás,” Bohemia, April 4, 1948: 41.
100 “En Cuba, Política: ‘Este es el Fin de la Aventura,” Bohemia, April 11, 1948: 64.
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both money and a political machine.101 Eventually, Ochoa agreed to support Chibás
and promised his delegates would support him.

The boss of Pinar del Río,

Dominador Pérez, followed suit. With the provincial chiefs behind him, Chibás was
assured of the PPC nomination.102 He subsequently recruited his cousin, Roberto
Agramonte, to run as vice-president.
During his April 4 broadcast, Chibás attempted to enhance this bit of
momentum for the independent line by providing a revisionist account of the
previous six weeks. Chibás told listeners he and Suárez Fernández had envisioned a
third front composed solely of the latter’s Auténtico Reaffirmation Movement
integrated within the PPC. The Democrats, he claimed, were invited to form a pact
at the behest of Suárez Fernández adherents in Camagüey.

Chibás reminded

everyone he had spoken and voted against their participation in the Ortodoxo
national assembly. However, this was a largely symbolic gesture. If Chibás had
verily abhorred the Ortodoxo-Democratic coalition, he could have sought a veto in
the isolationist-dominated Havana provincial assembly. Instead, he conducted a
series of pro third front radio appeals while conveniently ignoring that a traditional
party was involved. In fact, Chibás had met privately (albeit informally) with Raúl
Menocal on multiple occasions to discuss third front business. Exactly why Chibás
suddenly wanted to portray himself as a hardliner is unclear. Having recently been
stung by the resignations of fickle dealmakers, perhaps he felt independenceIbid. At first, López Dorticós endorsed a pact with the Liberals, asserting they were “not that bad”
adding, “the Machado era was a long time ago and we should forget about this page in our history.”
At a later meeting, he changed his mind and promoted a pact with the Auténticos, saying “Prío, even
with his errors, represents the revolution.”
102 At this time, the PPC provincial chiefs were as follows: Pinar del Río; Dominador Pérez, Havana;
Manuel Bisbé, Matanzas; José Manuel Gutiérrez, Las Villas; Agustín Cruz, Camagüey; Aurelio Álvarez
and Oriente; Millo Ochoa.
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oriented Ortodoxos would prove more steadfast. Chibás emphasized that his
advocacy of the third front had been “absolutely disinterested” but in some respects
he had been merely uninterested.103 He had refused any official role in negotiations,
avoided most meetings and rejected entreaties to accept a senate candidacy.
Although he had vigorously promoted the third front, Chibás seemed almost
relieved at its disintegration.
While the third front’s disintegration had cured Chibás of his vacillating,
plenty of Ortodoxos were alarmed. The party’s nominating convention was pegged
for April 5 and Chibás spent most of that afternoon receiving delegates in his
apartment. Many revealed their support would not extend beyond that evening.
“Just show up tonight,” Chibás told them, smiling, “After they nominate me you can
do what you want.”104 The proceedings began at 11:30 p.m. Accompanied by Millo
Ochoa, Chibás drove to PPC headquarters on the corner of Industria and Dragones in
Central Havana. A teeming crowd greeted them in the street, obligating the two
men to wade slowly toward the former boxing gym now known as “The People’s
Lyceum.” Once inside, Ochoa addressed the delegates. He openly acknowledged the
divisions between Ortodoxos, saying the party had engaged in a “sterile debate”
between isolationists and those like him who felt electoral coalitions were the surest
way to “triumph.”105 Undoubtedly, as the assembly followed its protocols, the PPC’s
mess of contradictions was on full display. When the roll call of delegates reached
Joaquín Martínez Sáenz, the traitor’s name was greeted chants of “Out!” and

Conte Agüero, El Adadlid de Cuba, 562.
“En Cuba, Política: ‘Este es el Fin de la Aventura,’” Bohemia, April 11, 1948: 65.
105 Ibid.
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“Guerrilla!”106 Subsequently, Agustín Cruz told Ochoa that the Las Villas delegation
poised to vote for Chibás was composed entirely of pactistas. The isolationists from
that province, who had lustily berated Cruz during the past months, followed the
example of their leader Joaquín Escribiano and joined the Auténtico-Republican
alliance. Finally, Chibás and Agramonte were proclaimed the nominees. While the
building shook with applause, José Manuel Gutiérrez commented that, “This is the
end of the adventure.”107 The Matanzas party chief was correct, at least with respect
to himself, as he would soon return to the Liberals.
As the clapping ebbed, Chibás prepared to close the ceremony with a speech.
He commenced on a conciliatory note, urging followers not to direct “bitter words”
at those unwilling to join them.108 Chibás recognized that numerous Ortodoxos
believed he was embarking on a “crazy mission.”109 He swiftly confirmed their fears
by describing the quixotic campaign he intended to wage. Chibás concluded that,
Campaign posters are masks that disguise a candidate’s intentions.
We won’t need them. In the public square we will raise our modest
soap box without requiring a grand stage. And we will carry it from
person to person. To get from here to there, my automobile, which is
very old but very good, shall suffice. All we have to do is lower the top
in order to convert it into a platform! I’m running for president to set
an example of sacrifice and disinterest. That’s why I’m accepting this
nomination even though many would prefer otherwise.110
This was the sort of homespun morality tale that had long ago established Chibás as
an idol of Cuba’s masses. That same day, a parish priest and Chibás aficionado

Ibid.
Ibid.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid., 66.
110 Ibid.
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named Jaime Genescá y Rovira typed a letter to his hero using similar rhetoric.
“Take inspiration and accept the idea that some journalists have labeled you a
ROMANTIC,” he wrote. All of us citizens will be romantics when we give you our
votes in the elections.”111 He then illuminated why Chibás’ quest might be less
dreamy than many supposed.
In my continual travels I hear many workers and employees
commenting on national politics and it’s always the same story – they
don’t know who to vote for because they consider all politicians
horrible and for this reason everyone is hoping to sell their vote and
make a little money. This is why I believe your party can offer a
dignified option for the citizenry of good conscience. The party you
direct only has to be slightly better or a little less bad than those we
are already familiar with and you will surely obtain the votes of the
good citizens who are thinking about Cuba rather than their
pockets.112
Previously, no serious presidential contender in Cuba had attempted to win office
without the backing of a strong party network.

Chibás would now have the

opportunity to test whether his overwhelming radio popularity and impassioned
followers could, largely by themselves, carry him to victory.

Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 36, Expediente 1103: 10, ANC. Genescá y Rovira’s parish
covered the towns of Cifuentes and Corralillo in Las Villas province. According to the 1943 census,
Cifuentes counted 9830 inhabitants while Corralillo had 11,781.
112 Ibid.
111
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Chapter 4
“We Are Not Satisfied, nor Are We Very Hopeful”

During the second week of April 1948, Cubans perusing the pages of Carteles
were treated to a sketch featuring a girl who approaches her father and asks, “Papá,
what’s a politician?” Unnerved, the man drops his cigar on the floor and bellows,
“Young lady! Where did you learn to say bad words?”1 The cartoon was entitled,
“It’s Come to This,” and eight years into the life of Cuba’s new constitution, all
indications were that it had. In the previous two elections, Cubans had been offered
something palpable and potentially breathtaking. Although the 1940 contest had
been skewed toward Batista, it promised an end to military rule and full
participation by each of Cuba’s political parties – ending years of illegality for the
Auténticos.2 In 1944, Grau represented the revolutionary ideal of his brief but
fondly remembered “100 days” administration.

The current mood was best

summed up by the political scientist Carlos González Palacios, who opined, “We are
convinced that our collective life, more than forty years after the Republic’s
inauguration, hasn’t reached the level we have the right to expect.” He added, “We
are not satisfied, nor are we very hopeful.”3

Ozón, “¡A lo que hemos llegado!,” Carteles, April 11, 1948: 12.
Although the election of 1940 was generally considered fair, Batista used every means at this
disposal to ensure victory. In response, opposition parties produced a 14 page report detailing a
range of abuses. For example, their supporters were routinely beaten, threatened or incarcerated.
Some radio stations critical of Batista were closed. Moreover, transportation to the polls was
reserved first for Batista supporters. Frank Argote-Freyre, a Batista biographer noted that such
tactics were probably unnecessary but, “Losing was not something he would permit.” See: ArgoteFreyre, Fulgencio Batista, 273.
3 Carlos González Palacios, “Cinismo Político en Cuba,” Bohemia, April 18, 1948: 27.
1
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This was because the Auténtico presidential nominee, Carlos Prío, inspired
muted enthusiasm among party members, most of whom preferred Miguelito
Suárez Fernández. Grau’s imposition would have seemed less heavy handed had he
elevated a popular Auténtico with a reputation for probity such as Pepe San Martín.
But how could Cubans expect land reform, respect for the constitution, better
schools, honest administration or an end to the black market when Prío had done
nothing but praise Grau over the past four years? Besides, everyone knew Prío had
grown rich in office. Dyed in the wool Auténticos would vote for him as would public
employees anxious about losing their jobs in an opposition administration. The
party machine, Cuba’s largest, would entice other voters in exchange for money or
positions. In short, few of the island’s citizens would choose Prío out of real
conviction. As for Ricardo Núñez, he counted the support of Liberal party bosses
and was free from the taint of corruption but had few natural gifts as a politician. He
lacked charisma or a genuine connection with Cuba’s masses.

A majority of

Democrats, his coalition partner, had desired a different candidate. He seemed
upright but few had faith in his ability to address the country’s myriad needs.
Chibás was the one novelty, the only candidate who inspired a passionate
following and oozed popularity. He possessed the revolutionary heroism of Prío, the
integrity of Núñez and a reserve of magnetism neither could match. Nevertheless,
Chibás eschewed every bit of common sense electoral wisdom in the island’s recent
history. He ran alone where alliances were the rule and was essentially trying to
win an election through a radio campaign rather than a political party. Quite simply,
Cubans had never seen anything like this before. Quite a few enjoyed Chibás’
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denunciations of government malfeasance but many a sober soul wondered
whether this shouting, accusing presence could be trusted with the nation’s highest
office. Cubans were obviously dissatisfied. The only question was whether they
would be hopeful enough to test the unknown.

BATISTA
After his presidential term concluded in October of 1944, Fulgencio Batista
had settled in Daytona Beach, Florida. This was scarcely the “hard bread of exile”
often rued by Cubans, especially as Batista had accumulated an estimated $50
million during his years in power.4 As a private citizen, Batista tended to the
delicate matter of divorcing his wife of 18 years and marrying his mistress for the
past seven.5 The former general also oversaw his extensive real estate holdings,
including several Miami Beach hotels, and stayed fit by rowing in the nearby Halifax
River. In April of 1948, a new crinkle was added to his routine when he agreed to
run for senate on the Liberal ticket. This was an unexpected development, not least
of all for Batista himself – who had rejected the offer at first glance, claiming the
government would respond by “unleashing a wave of unspeakable aggression
against my friends.”6 The idea had initially been floated by Salvador García Ramos, a
Liberal representative from Las Villas, who believed Batista’s name would draw
substantial votes in that province. Batista relented after personal appeals from
Unlike like other Cuban millionaires, Batista claimed to be “special” because of his “preoccupation”
with the island’s workers. See “En Cuba, Política: Batista y el Nuevo Partido,” Bohemia, August 1,
1948: 56.
5 Time magazine reported that Batista attempted to mollify his ex wife by giving her valuable real
estate, including a 12-story apartment house and $8,000,000 in cash. See: “Dictator with the People,”
Time, April 21, 1952: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,889465-4,00.html
6 “En Cuba, Política: Un Cable de Daytona Beach,” Bohemia, April 4, 1948: 41.
4
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Ricardo Núñez and the Las Villas party chief Eduardo Suárez Rivas.

Shortly

thereafter, the columnist Francisco Ichaso reported that Batista was receiving daily
visits from American and Cuban journalists. He was also in “almost permanent”
contact with Havana via telephone.7
Batista ruled out any campaign trips to Las Villas, however, as he feared his
lack of immunity left him at the mercy of a hostile government. In fact, there was a
corruption case pending against him in the courts. Lawsuit number 30 dated back
to October 20, 1942, when Batista’s public works minister, Evelio Govantes,
announced he was laying off a number of ghost workers, or botelleros, who had been
assigned to dredge two of Cuba’s harbors and clean Varadero beach. Govantes
declared that the money allocated for these tasks was being devoted entirely to
salaries with “not a single centavo” invested in actually improving the ports or the
beach.8 In the senate, José Manuel Gutiérrez, then an Auténtico senator, submitted a
motion to interpellate Govantes. The public works minister subsequently revealed
that a total of $1,877,632 had been allotted for the three projects but only $1623
spent on materials necessary to complete them. Govantes ended his testimony with
a flourish, saying, “In Cuba, we confront the horrific and disconcerting reality
whereby someone who steals a stale piece of bread for his hungry children is sent to
prison but he who robs public funds is elevated to the rank of social and political
leader.”9 A tremendous public outcry followed and a special judge was designated
to oversee the prosecution of all those involved. In 1946, Cuba’s attorney general,

Francisco Ichaso, “Nuestras Sucursales de Miami y de Daytona Beach,” Bohemia, April 18, 1948: 64.
“En Cuba, Poder Judicial: Batista y la Causa Número 30 de 1943,” Bohemia, April 18, 1948: 54.
9 Ibid.
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Rafael Trejo Loredo, requested Batista’s extradition to face criminal charges. 10 To
be sure, an element of politics was also driving the process – particularly as Trejo
was a fanatical Grau devotee. In addition, Trejo actively pressured Cuba’s Supreme
Court to bring a formal indictment against Batista. That the case seemed to be
moving forward just as the ex general had been nominated was an unlikely
coincidence.
One reason Liberal higher-ups may have tabbed Batista was because the
Democrats looked poised to join the third front until late March. Accordingly, the
Liberals required a contingency plan to fill their senatorial tickets.

After the

Democratic assembly of Las Villas vetoed the third front, the party’s national
convention opted for a pact with the Liberals in exchange for 14 senate seats and
three provincial governments.

Although these parties had also been coalition

partners in 1940 and 1944, Raúl Menocal averred there was no “ideological affinity”
between them aside from a shared hostility toward Grau.11 He added that Genovevo
Pérez Dámera would have a greater impact on the elections than any party or
candidate, as he alone would decide whether to ensure a fair vote. Cuba’s army
chief was also pivotal in restoring a semblance of unity to the Auténticos. On April 3,
Pérez Dámera brokered a meeting between Miguelito Suárez Fernández and Carlos
Prío. The senate president offered to bury the hatchet in exchange for seven
senators along with the provincial governments of Las Villas and Matanzas. He also

Besides being Cuba’s attorney general, he was also father to one of the island’s most famous
revolutionary martyrs – also named Rafael Trejo, who was killed in 1930 during an anti-Machado
protest by University of Havana students. After his son’s death, Trejo brought a court case against
the policemen responsible for shooting his son. As a result, he was jailed for seven months.
11 “En Cuba, Política: El Destino Está en Manos de Genovevo,” Bohemia, April 11, 1948: 56.
10
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demanded that César Casas be removed from the Matanzas ticket despite Grau’s
dogged insistence that he remain. Prío was amenable but lacked the authority to
extract Cuba’s widely despised ex commerce minister or grant any other
concessions without consulting Grau, Guillermo Alonso Pujol or José Manuel
Alemán. Suárez Fernández had no chance of being received by the president and
preferred to avoid the rotund Republican boss so he flew to Miami to speak with
Alemán.12
The former education minister was living rather well in the “Magic City,”13
having installed himself in a swanky beachfront headquarters. Nonetheless, Alemán
was eager to avoid any scenario that would complicate his return to Cuba. He
especially feared the prospect of a coup backed by his foe Pérez Dámera or an
opposition president who would be tempted to levy corruption charges against him.
Alemán agreed with Suárez Fernández that a divided Auténtico party enhanced both
these possibilities and therefore accepted his conditions. Later that day, Alemán
telephoned his friend Alonso Pujol – who arrived on the next plane. Without the
slightest fuss, the Republican leader agreed to cede his party’s senate candidacies in
Las Villas and Matanzas to Suárez Fernández. In an even greater show of muscle,
Alemán subsequently permitted Prío to squash César Casas’ senate candidacy.
Suárez Fernández was thus placated, although his resentment at being mangled by
Prío was pleased to hear of this journey, telling Suárez Fernández he was “taking a step in the right
direction.” He urged the senate president to inform Alemán that a united Auténtico party would win
the elections. Suárez Fernández was not so sure. While allowing that party unity was imperative, he
also believed the Auténticos needed to address high prices spawned by the black market, the scarcity
of meat and lack of electricity in rural areas. Without such “rectifications” he warned, “we won’t
advance very far.” See “En Cuba, Política: ¡Al Fin…!,” Bohemia, April 18, 1948: 57.
13 Miami had been known as the “Magic City” since the early 20 th century because its rapid growth
inspired the impression that it appeared as a fully formed metropolis without ever having been a
town.
12
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the Auténtico party machinery continued to fester. Speaking to some associates
about the upcoming polls, the senate president confessed his unwillingness to
campaign for Prío or Alonso Pujol – adding that he would not share a stage with
them “even for 10 millions.”14

CHIBAS THE INSURGENT
The consolidation of the Auténtico-Republican alliance on one side and the
Liberal-Democratic coalition on the other underlined the formidable challenge
facing Chibás. On April 2, a Chibás supporter named Gonzalo Fernández penned a
letter to his idol. Fernández, who was from the working class Havana neighborhood
of Luyanó, invoked a famous anecdote from 1871, a low point in Cuba’s first
independence war. At that time, an official in the rebel army asked Major General
Ignacio Agramonte with what resources they would carry on the fight since there
appeared to be none left. According to legend, Agramonte passionately replied,
“With the shame of the Cuban people!” The writer proposed this phrase as the
Ortodoxo “combat motto” in the face of politicians “who lose their heads chasing
after senate seats and think neither of decorum nor the people.”15 After reading it,
Chibás scribbled the words “kind letter” in the upper left hand corner. However, he
was clearly intrigued.

Agramonte, who was killed two years after his famous

utterance by a stray bullet, was one of Cuba’s most revered martyrs and a
quintessential exemplar of self-sacrifice – a notion Chibás had always found
enormously attractive. Agramonte also happened to be a blood relative. As a boy,
14
15

“En Cuba, Política: Falleció sin Testar,” Bohemia, April 18, 1948: 57.
Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 36, Expediente 1103: 1, ANC.
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his maternal grandmother, Luisa Agramonte, had plied him with tales of the family’s
exploits during the independence struggle. These invariably ended in tragedy but
were also a source of tremendous pride.16 Although Chibás’ fight was of a different
nature, he delighted in the allegory.
Always a believer in the value of symbolism, Chibás appeared on the air with
Roberto Agramonte on April 11, thereby adding yet another descendant of the man
who would feature prominently in his broadcast. He told his audience that:
Some people ask me: With what resources are you counting on
for the electoral campaign in order to rescue Cuba from the hands of
so many bandits and frauds who have imprisoned her? Before this
question, I cannot but remember the response of Ignacio Agramonte
to the skeptics who also asked of him: With what resources are you
counting on for the campaign to rescue Julio Sanguily (a rebel general)
from the hands of the guerillas that have captured him? My answer is
the same….[W]e are alone, alone with the people but aim to win with
the most powerful of resources, the resource of Agramonte: The
shame of the Cuban people!
Thirty five horsemen armed only with machetes were enough
for Agramonte to rescue Sanguily, who was guarded by a thick column
of guerillas and Spanish soldiers armed with bayonets, rifles and
artillery. A handful of Ortodoxos of shame, like those thirty five
horsemen, will be sufficient to save the Republic from the ignoble
spectacle offered by the present political corruption.17

Among the casualties were Chibás’ grand uncle Eduardo Agramonte, who served as the rebel
government’s secretary of state and was a colonel in the army of liberation before falling in battle in
1872 at the age of 31. In terms of how such sacrifices were viewed, it is useful to excerpt a letter
from Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, president of the rebel government, to the mother of Ignacio
Agramonte. He wrote: “Nothing can console the pain of a mother. That her son is no longer alive is
reason for her to weep inconsolably forever. But, madam, you cannot be deprived of the most
justifiable pride…For (heroic) men, always persecution and death, for their family an eternal coat of
arms, for their patria the duty to build for them monuments of gratitude. This is the fate of those
whose acts will be recorded in the pages of history.” See Louis Pérez, To Die in Cuba: Suicide and
Society (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 101.
17 Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 564-565. Chibás first tried out this line of reasoning during an
interview on Union Radio three days earlier. He had been asked, “What resources are you counting
on to win the elections against the millions of BAGA, the syndicate of millionaires and the entrenched
interests.”
16
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Chibás expected this message to hearten Ortodoxo partisans but was overjoyed to
learn that it had also stirred some of the island’s “neutral masses.” Manuel Anca, a
Havana medical surgeon, confessed somewhat brusquely that, “I don’t belong to
your political party or any other and I don’t know you personally nor am I
interested in getting to know you.” Just the same, he praised Chibás and the
Ortodoxos for “being able to renew the confidence and faith in the future of our
beloved and hardworking Cuban people.”18
Although Chibás did not say so on the radio, his presidential campaign was,
in fact, counting on a resource besides the shame of the Cuban people. Specifically,
this was the 4300 square foot Italianate mansion built by his father in 1924.
Situated on 17th Street and Avenue H in Havana’s Vedado district, the edifice was an
architectural jewel with custom designed doors and windows. Eddy had moved
there shortly before his 17th birthday and had concealed guns and explosives in its
spacious interior during his years as a student revolutionary. Since his father’s
death in 1941, Chibás had lived there intermittently and in 1946 he and his brother
Raúl rented the building to the Peruvian government – which used it as its embassy.
By April of 1948, Chibás decided to sell the place and invested much of the 25,000
pesos he received in his campaign. In doing so, Chibás burnished his credibility even
further in a nation where politicians typically acquired houses rather than vending
them.19 Chibás also resorted to the timeworn method of accepting donations from
Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 36, Expediente 1103: 31, ANC.
Fulgencio Batista and José Manuel Alemán were two well known examples of politicians who
doubled as real estate tycoons. However, they were by no means unique. For example, Jaime Mariné,
Batista’s former minister of sport, purchased a string of hotels in Caracas, Venezuela. Carlos Prío
would eventually acquire three fincas in the Cuban countryside and his brother older brother Paco
bought a sumptuous manse in Havana’s exclusive Miramar neighborhood.
18
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individuals and businesses. For example, his friend Ignacio Mendoza, an erstwhile
revolutionary and current stockbroker contributed the substantial sum of 10,000
pesos. Alfredo Fernández Supervielle, brother of Havana’s deceased mayor and the
sugar magnate Jacobo Lobo chipped in 200 pesos apiece. Chibás also received
financial support from the posh El Encanto department store (1000 pesos), the
Tropical Brewery (1000 pesos), and National Concrete (1000 pesos) among others.20
Even as Chibás cultivated a high profile insurgent persona, he remained
pragmatic behind closed doors. On April 9, for example, he authorized an Ortodoxo
delegation to discuss a senatorial pact with the Communists.21 Both parties saw an
opportunity to gain second place in Havana and Oriente provinces, where both were
strong, if they joined forces. Such a result would have netted three senators for
each. Millo Ochoa, the Ortodoxo nominee for governor of Oriente, was another
potential beneficiary and he strongly advocated the deal. Initially, the proceedings
showed promise. However, when Manuel Bisbé insisted the Communists support
Chibás’ presidential candidacy as well, they demurred and suggested a nominee be
found who would be acceptable to all. Chibás, predictably, vetoed the idea. While
this was a setback for the party’s senatorial hopes, he felt there was still much to be
gained in Oriente – Cuba’s largest, poorest and most neglected province. On May 17,
Chibás and an Ortodoxo retinue set out on a nine day tour of the region to drum up

For a more complete list of contributors to the PPC see Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 1106,
Expediente 1106: 46-48, ANC.
21 The Ortodoxo delegation consisted of Millo Ochoa, Manuel Bisbé, Leonardo Fernández Sánchez and
Alberto Saumell, the mayor of Bayamo. The participation of Fernández Sánchez is interesting given
that he was among the most strident opponents of pacts in the PPC. At the same time, he was also a
former Communist.
20
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support for his presidential candidacy.22 In Santiago de Cuba, Chibás addressed a
wildly enthusiastic gathering of 60,000, many of whom waved the party’s signature
brooms. Among those who warmed up the audience beforehand was Fidel Castro.
Given his well known involvement in gangster politics at the University of Havana,
the 21 year old Oriente native was an anomalous presence among the straitlaced
Ortodoxos.

His rhetorical talent, however, was already an asset to the party.

Referring to Chibás, he declared,
This lunatic, out of sublime craziness for the sublime ideal of an
improved Cuba, values the recognition of his own people above all
else. He would be incapable of disappointing the devotion professed
by the masses, as that would deprive him of the very oxygen he
breathes. The day Chibás senses a reduction in citizens’ affection he
would put a bullet through his heart, not out of cowardice in the face
of failure, but so that his self-sacrifice ensures the victory of his
disciples. No uncertainties! We are in the presence of a great man!23
Shortly thereafter, Chibás mounted a truck top and from those modest heights
proceeded to whip the throng into frothy exuberance. Gloria Cuadras, a member of
the Ortodoxo Women’s Wing from the city, recalled that his speech was met with
“delirious acclaim and applause.”24 After Chibás finished, with the multitude’s roar
still echoing in the background, a group of supporters clamored for him to jump into
their arms. Without hesitation, Chibás dived headfirst into the giddy mass of hats

According to Luis Conte Agüero, the travelling Ortodoxo entourage in Oriente featured Chibás’
younger brother Raúl, Roberto Agramonte, Manuel Bisbé, Ventura Dellundé, Guillermo de Zéndegui
and the Ortodoxo Women’s Wing president María Esther Villoch. They were accompanied by the
journalists Tony de la Osa and Juan González Martínez. De la Osa, presumably was the prime source
for his brother Enrique’s account of the tour, which appeared in the May 30 issue of Bohemia.
23 Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 569.
24 Gloria Cuadras, Lo que yo vi, unpublished manuscript, private collection of Olga Portuondo Zuñiga,
Santiago de Cuba, 191.
22

111

and limbs while a local photographer recorded the act for the next day’s
newspapers.25
In short order, Chibás roused the province to such an extent that Enrique de
la Osa, claimed he had “destroyed all previous political calculations.”26 Before the
Ortodoxo leader’s arrival in Santiago de Cuba, a collection box had been placed on
the city’s main commercial thoroughfare, in order to raise funds for his reception. In
three days, nearly 4000 pesos were contributed in small donations. Nor did Chibás
limit his excursion to Oriente’s urban centers. His itinerary included stops in the
mid-sized towns of Victoria de las Tunas, Campechuela, Bayamo, Niquero, Puerto
Padre, Gibara, Holguín and Manzanillo – where he evoked tears of anger over the
murder of native son Jesús Menéndez. Chibás also stopped in the villages of Bocas,
Delicias, Jobabo, Media Luna and San Manuel – all of which had less than 8,000
inhabitants. Rather than speaking in an ample square, as he had in Santiago de
Cuba, he orated from the cane fields or under banana trees. Often, these remote
areas were accessible only by horse. In one instance, he traveled by motorboat in a
torrential downpour.

As Chibás improvised his modes of transportation, his

adherents did the same to spread the candidate’s message – especially as funds
were always in short supply. Ortodoxo aficionados lent their trucks, cars and buses

Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 568. The Ortodoxo leader was well accustomed to jumping from
truck tops into the arms of his admirers, a habit that simultaneously gratified supporters and
horrified rivals. Enrique de la Osa noted that, “Upon getting out of his famous automobile, Chibás
would appear in rural towns and mount an open truck from which he would throw himself
acrobatically into the multitude as if he wanted to bathe himself in the people of each location. The
leaders of the Liberal-Democratic coalition and the (Auténtico-Republican) alliance, habituated only
to the cold tactics of money, were scandalized by such demagoguery, as they called it. But Eddy
trusted his political instincts in the power of a more emotional contact with the impressionable
Cuban voter.” See Enrique de la Osa, En Cuba, Primer Tiempo: 1947,1948, 468.
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to the party in an effort to chauffeur fellow chibasistas to rallies, meetings or
receptions organized in his honor. The PPC’s publicity effort followed a similar
fashion. De la Osa explained that, “the banners of Chibás’ sympathizers were not
constructed from colorful or elegant materials but rather were modest leaflets or
home-made posters, usually of brooms and raised flag-like to signal that ‘they were
going to sweep the way clear for Chibás to enter the presidential palace.’”27
On the evening of May 30, Chibás devised a final parallel between his
candidacy and Cuba’s independence struggle. In 1895, the rebel plan had involved
an initial incursion in Oriente and gradual advances leading toward Havana. Having
just won many hearts in Cuba’s easternmost province, Chibás planned “The invasion
of Shame,” a motorized Ortodoxo caravan that would symbolically banish all
criminality from the capital. Unfortunately, the PPC horde was stalled at the village
of Arroyo Arenas on Havana’s outskirts by a group of squad cars from the National
Police. The officers explained that Cuban law forbade formal campaigning after May
25.

Instead of arguing, Chibás avoided a potentially violent confrontation by

requesting they wait a few minutes while he called General Pérez Dámera. The
army chief agreed with Chibás, suggesting only a change of route into the city to
avoid disturbing traffic. Hence, even as the danger of a coup seemed to be receding,
the army remained the final arbiter of Cuba’s statutes.

27
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EXODOUS
Several days before Chibás had been nominated for president, Bohemia
reported the Ortodoxos were in such disarray that “nobody knew anything.”28 This
was because they were increasingly unsure of who was in the party from one day
until the next. During a meeting prior to the PPC convention, Aurelio Álvarez spoke
of Pelayo Cuervo and Joaquín Martínez Sáenz as if they were still Ortodoxos before
Chibás informed him they had joined the Liberals. The Camagüey party chief, who
had stridently denounced “opportunists,” became one himself by joining the LiberalDemocratic ticket a few days later. Shortly thereafter, he was joined by José Manuel
Gutiérrez, the Matanzas boss. Pablo Carrera Jústiz, an ex revolutionary and wealthy
University of Havana professor also abandoned the party in favor of the Liberals. On
April 12, Natasha Mella addressed a letter to Chibás renouncing her candidacy for a
seat on the chamber of representatives.

Mella, who was only 21 years old,

expressed a willingness to remain a party member but preferred to reduce her
commitment. She had also been romantically involved with Chibás and this perhaps
influenced the situation as did the jealousy of older Ortodoxos who resented her
exalted status in the party.29
On April 25, Agustín Cruz, the party boss of Las Villas, published his
resignation in Bohemia. Cruz had been offered a spot on the Liberal-Democratic
ticket in that province but opted to withdraw from public life rather than appear
alongside Fulgencio Batista, who as army chief in 1936 had engineered the
“En Cuba, Política: ‘Este es el Fin de la Aventura,’” Bohemia, April 11, 1948: 65.
Conchita Fernández, Chibás’ secretary, noted that many men were jealous of Mella because of her
extraordinary beauty and her position as an Ortodoxo party delegate. See Prada, Secretaria de la
República, 122.
28
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impeachment of his friend, President Miguel Mariano Gómez. A keen proponent of
pacts, Cruz decried “dogmatic isolationism” as both “antidemocratic” and “lacking
political sense” under Cuba’s current electoral law.30 In facing the elections alone,
Cruz claimed the PPC “now finds it impossible to offer citizens congressional
candidates with a chance of winning” and thereby deprives the Cuban people of a
realistic option for change.31 Cruz thus became the third Ortodoxo provincial head
to quit within the space of one month.

In early May, Pastor Torres Sánchez

relinquished his candidacy for governor of Las Villas and Eduardo Díaz Ortega
forsook his campaign for representative from Pinar del Río. Both men joined the
Auténtico-Republican alliance.

Lower level defections were also common.

In

Camagüey province, the entire municipal assemblies of Guimaro and Esmeralda
switched to the Auténticos.

The Ortodoxo network, which had always been

rudimentary given the party’s newness, was devastated by an exodus of local
directors, councilmen and organizers. On a daily basis during this period, Chibás
received missives like that of Alberto Madrigal Valdes – who informed him that the
president of his neighborhood’s Ortodoxo organizing committee had jumped to the
Liberal-Democratic coalition. Madrigal described this development as lamentable
but affirmed, “the man who writes to you, who loves his patria, will know how to
rescue the flag and direction of our party just as Ignacio Agramonte with 35 men
rescued General Sanguily from enemy forces.”32 Undoubtedly, many of the new
Ortodoxo officers were devoted and competent. However, this was not always the
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case. Hence, Chibás was informed by a supporter in the town of La Maya in Oriente
province that, “no one here is campaigning for your candidacy or even mentioning
you.”33

The party was also damaged by Ortodoxos who devoted themselves

elsewhere while nominally remaining in the fold. Thus, an adherent from Placetas
in Las Villas province notified Chibás that, “I’m writing to let you know that
members of the executive committee in this city, some of whom sold themselves to
the Liberal-Democratic coalition and others to BAGA, but all of whom are using your
clean name to benefit their shady political campaigns and confusing public opinion
in this way.”34
Needless to say, loyal Ortodoxos were outraged by such duplicity and
responded with defiance. Hugo Mir, a director of the PPC Youth Section, confronted
the issue of defections in an article published in La Correspondencia, a newspaper
based in the city of Cienfuegos. He wrote that,
It’s extremely painful when such things happen, especially when we
are talking about compañeros with the best references and in whose
integrity of character we trusted. We don’t know what induced them
to desert the Ortodoxo cause and cross over to the government. The
public justification they have offered…is that for money, jobs or the
promise of one thing or another they have put themselves at the
service of Prío Socorrás and Alonso Pujol in their labor of defamation
against our maximum leader, Senator Eduardo Chibás and those by
his side who defend the continuity of the revolutionary movement, or
better said, hope to save it. In any case, these acts, this opportunism
doesn’t dishearten us; on the contrary it stimulates us to struggle with
more enthusiasm, certain that we have taken the correct political
stance, assisted by the truth, defending the noble ideology of the
Cuban revolution, for which many of our compañeros sacrificed their
young lives.35

Ibid., 123.
Ibid., 133.
35 Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 36, Expediente 1104: 34, ANC.
33
34

116

Taking a cue from Chibás, Mir averred that, “just as the desertion of General Blas
Masó did not discourage the rebels, who continued fighting until they gained their
independence at the point of their machetes, neither should these unfortunate
losses discourage good Cubans…”36
During his May 2 broadcast, Chibás himself allowed that “some known
Ortodoxo revolutionaries” had “sold themselves like pigs to Carlos Prío Socorrás,”
but he dwelled on more comforting news as well.37 Chibás explained that one
month earlier Ricardo Núñez had commissioned an expensive national survey paid
for by Federico Fernández Casas and administered by Raúl Gutiérrez Serrano,
Cuba’s most respected pollster.38 According to the results, leaked to Chibás by a
“credible source,” he had placed first with Núñez a close second and Prío trailing
well behind them both.39 Núñez and Fernández Casas were so shocked by Chibás’
unexpected popularity that they opted to keep their research private, ostensibly to
hide the truth from ordinary citizens. Chibás also cheered his followers by citing a
host of smaller more informal polls that yielded similar outcomes. For example,
employees of the public relations firm Guastella, the Sinclair Oil Company and the La
Corona Cigar Factory all favored Chibás in elections by secret ballot.40 Throughout
the month, the Ortodoxos bought advertisements in Diario de la Marina publicizing
victories by Chibás in straw poll elections at a number of well known entities
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including students from Cuba’s engineering school, Havana’s dockworkers, The
United States Rubber Company, Cubana Airlines, Bank of Nova Scotia, Insular
Underwriters, the Sarrá pharmacy and the department stores El Encanto and Fin del
Siglo. They also boasted that,
We have hundreds of surveys ratified by the signatures of thousands
of workers but it is impossible to publish every one. The details we
have cited are rigorously exact. Anyone who doubts them can
question the employees and workers of the factories and businesses
above. The result is the same everywhere. This is a reflection of
public opinion.41
Given his superior position, Chibás claimed he rather than Prío was the best hope of
averting a machadista restoration led by Núñez. Further, he reminded listeners that
the Ortodoxos were an official party in all six provinces and every Cuban who
wanted to would have the chance to vote for him. He thus urged them to heed his
new slogan, “Shame vs. Money.”

THE PARTY OF MACHADO
On April 11, Carteles ran an editorial weighing the merits of Prío and Núñez
entitled “Between a Rock and a Hard Place.”42 After expressing strong reservations
about both candidates, Alfredo Quilez, the magazine’s director, endorsed the Liberal
chief. Setting his own aspirations aside for a moment, Chibás opined that, “It would
be disastrous if the government thieves won the elections, but it would be even
more terrible if the bandits of the Liberal-Democratic coalition triumphed because

“¡Vergüenza contra Dinero!,” Diario de la Marina, May 18, 1948: 15. See also “¡Vergüenza contra
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the latter, in addition to robbing as much or more than those currently in power,
would inundate the country in blood.”43
Chibás bore two intractable grudges against the Liberals. First, they were
tainted as the party of Gerardo Machado, Cuba’s all purpose villain and bogeyman
par excellence.

Second, they were one of two “traditional” parties that had

mismanaged Cuba during the republic’s first three decades. On April 4, Chibás
dismissed Ricardo Núñez as a “fervent sympathizer” of Machado who remained
“deaf and mute” while the tyrant assassinated workers, journalists, professors,
students and veterans of Cuba’s independence war. In addition, Chibás charged
Núñez with maintaining a similar silence during the mass strikes of 1935 against
Batista’s military regime.44 Two weeks later, he revealed a new and damaging piece
of information. After offering a public roll call of Machado’s early victims, Chibás
revealed that Núñez had traduced the memories of these martyrs during a two hour
speech on February 24, 1930 in which he lauded the dictator for, “putting into
practice the revolutionary program of Martí.”45 Núñez, who had delivered the
address on behalf of the Cuban Medical Federation, had further deemed Machado
“an example of austerity and virtue” and “deserving of the eternal gratitude of his
people” even as he suspended the activity of opposition parties and illegally had
himself elected to a second presidential term.46 Moreover, Chibás pointed out that
Núñez maintained a close friendship with the porrista Clemente Carreras, a known
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assassin and torturer.47 Chibás also reminded his audience that Núñez remained
“surrounded by the flower of Machado-ism.”48
Indeed, the Liberal party was top heavy with Machado era figures including
Carlos Miguel de Céspedes, the tyrant’s erstwhile public works minister, Viriato
Gutiérrez, Machado’s ex secretary of the presidency, Rafael Guas Inclán, president of
the chamber of representatives during Machado’s rule, Juan Antonio Vázquez Bello,
the dictator’s erstwhile boss in Las Villas province, Núñez’s younger brother Emilito,
president of the Machado era Civil Service Commission and Salvador García Ramos,
who, on August 7, 1933 had stood on the Capitolio steps and fired into a crowd that
had assembled after an underground radio station falsely reported that Machado
had resigned.49 Chibás predicted that if the Liberal-Democratic coalition won the
elections, even more infamous characters from the 1930s would return to public
life. He estimated that the notorious Arsenio Ortiz would retake control of the
National Police and have prisoners murdered under the catchall excuse, “shot while
trying to escape” and Captain Crespo would return to his post as chief of the Atarés
fortress and resume his role as tormentor and executioner. Chibás also claimed a
reinstatement of machadista personnel would be followed by reverses of gains won
by the revolution, including the right to strike for urban workers and “semi-slavery”
for their rural counterparts – who would be exploited without mercy by the many

Among others, Carreras murdered a brother of Chibás’ friend María Teresa Freyre de Andrade.
After Machado was overthrown, Cuba’s Tribunal of Sanctions condemned Carreras to death for his
crimes but the sentence was never carried out.
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large landowners in the Liberal party running for senate.50 Alluding to recent
newspaper advertisements promising that Núñez would effect a “revolution of
honor” if elected, Chibás accused the Liberals of treating Cuba’s citizens like
“idiots.”51 In a voice saturated with irony and indignation, Chibás wondered how
Núñez planned to implement his planned revolution with such a compromised cast
of characters.
Batista’s decision to join the Liberal ticket afforded Chibás yet another
inviting target. On May 9, one day after the thirteenth anniversary of the martyr
Antonio Guiteras´ death, Chibás recalled that his fellow revolutionary had been
carrying only 83 centavos in his pocket when he was shot.

Guiteras, whose

incorruptibility had earned him the moniker “the man who owns only one suit,”
provided a pertinent contrast to the figure responsible for his demise, Fulgencio
Batista.

Chibás noted that the ex general, whose senate candidacy had been

supported “with great fanfare” by Ricardo Núñez, currently owned eleven buildings
in Havana alone.52 Of course, he also counted choice properties in Venezuela,
Mexico and the United States as well, including a 15-storey apartment building in
Miami.

“It would seem,” concluded Chibás, “that just as little boys delight in

collecting stamps, Batista takes pleasure in acquiring real estate.”53 Later on, Chibás
characterized the six years between 1934 and 1940, when Batista wielded behind
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the scenes power, as a “reign of terror” and warned Cubans if they united pro
Machado and pro Batista tendencies on their ballots, “God will hold us
responsible.”54
On May 31, the eve of elections, Chibás issued a final appeal over the
airwaves.

He bid his audience to respect the memories of Cuba’s fallen

revolutionaries by denying public office to machadistas.

Doing otherwise, he

asserted, would represent a “betrayal of our highest principles.”55 At the same time,
he was convinced that support for the Liberal-Democratic coalition had crumbled of
late and his chief rival would be Carlos Prío. Chibás thus attempted to court Liberals
and Democrats by asserting their votes for Núñez would be “wasted” and he
represented the only “practical and efficient way” to defeat the government.56

THE CASE AGAINST PRIO
Although his nominal opponent was Carlos Prío, Chibás fixed a suspicious
eye on Grau throughout the campaign season. He remained certain his former
mentor was planning something and saw plots behind every corner. For instance,
Chibás claimed Grau had sought to “provoke public disorder” during the annual May
Day parade at the presidential palace as a pretext for suspending the elections.57
This belief may also partly explain Chibás’ pains to portray himself as a latter day
mambí (who better to lead Cuba in the event of a coup?) and the weekly declarations
that he was leading the polls (who better than the people’s choice to lead the
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opposition until democracy is restored?). On the other hand, these tactics served
just as well for his conventional presidential run. On balance, Cubans held members
of the liberation army in high esteem. Drawing a parallel between his quest and
their exploits was a shrewd strategy. As for the public surveys, Chibás was anxious
to peel the Auténtico rank and file from its leaders and hoped evidence of his
popularity would sway them. At the same time, Chibás also hoped to elicit their
disgust by asking, “What type of government can we expect from Prío and Pujol?”
For starters, the venality that characterized Grau’s administration would
continue unabated. Prío had already “dirtied his hands” in murky deals involving
the island’s sugar differential, the U.S. owned Cuban Electric company and “other
foreign monopolies.”58 Chibás further pointed out that Guillermo Alonso Pujol,
while senate president in 1938, had fled to Europe having stolen millions of pesos in
public works bonds, an act constituting “the Republic’s greatest scandal to date.”59
Just as revolting was the fact that the Auténtico-Republican alliance had allotted
prominent roles for José Manuel Alemán and César Casas. The former was now
Auténtico party chief of Havana and a senate candidate from that province. More
importantly, BAGA, his political vehicle, was largely financing Prío’s campaign. In
characteristic fashion, Chibás averred that Alemán and his minions were capable of
selling anything and everything on the island, including its principal emblem –
Havana’s 16th century Morro fortress. Regarding César Casas, Chibás procured a
letter to the widely despised “black market boss” from Carlos Prío and read it over
the air on May 2. The missive essentially offered Casas a congressional candidacy on
58
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the Republican ticket as a sop for his “service” to the Auténticos.60 Prío also assured
the ex commerce minister that he would “fully retain” his “legitimately acquired
rights,” which Chibás interpreted as a promise to restore him to the cabinet after the
elections.61 Recalling yet another Auténtico scandal, he noted that the party had
nominated Luis Caíñas Milanés, a former senator, known murderer and fugitive
from justice, for the assembly seat in Oriente province of the man he killed.
Aside from shamelessness and sleaze, four years of Prío and Pujol would be
disastrous for urban workers, who could expect interference with their unions and a
government imposed leadership. Even worse, such an administration would also
subjugate workers’ interests to the whims of foreigners. As proof, Chibás alleged
that Prío, as Grau’s former labor secretary, had ousted the communist Lázaro Peña
as president of the Cuban Workers Confederation in accordance with “international
pressures.”62 Chibás charged that Prío’s anti-communism was more a matter of
convenience than conviction and suggested his rival was actually “anti-worker.”63
By contrast, Chibás promised never to meddle in “union matters” and supported the
right of workers to elect their chosen representatives regardless of whether they
were communist or not.64
Chibás contended the outlook for rural laborers would be equally dreary
under Prío.

He recalled that a group of guajiros from Oriente province had

organized a march in Havana the year before, demanding that Grau fulfill his
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promises of cement floors for their huts, sanitary latrines and new wells. 65 Rather
than receiving or addressing the protesters, the government violently dispersed the
crowd. “During those moments,” said Chibás, “now and forever, I was and always
will be on the side of the campesinos.”66 Chibás asserted that Prío would make no
effort to improve their lives but aimed merely to pacify them with sympathetic folk
tunes broadcast on the radio. He urged country dwellers to reject this “opium.”67
Chibás also assured them that the “fundamental motive” for his separation from the
Auténticos had been Grau’s “betrayal” of the campesinos.68
The Auténticos, in turn, considered Chibás’ run for the presidency an act of
perfidy against the revolution and were fond of using Ortodoxo recreants to deliver
this message – which often concluded with an appeal for Chibás to abandon his
campaign and support Prío. During his May 9 broadcast, Chibás disclosed that Grau
and Prío had requested an audience with him, ostensibly to discuss an agreement.69
Emissaries of the latter had already offered Chibás the prime ministry along with
the education, commerce and treasury portfolios if he agreed to join them. Chibás
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responded that he would much prefer to see criminals like José Manuel Alemán,
César Casas, Alberto Inocente Álvarez and Emilio Núñez brought before a judge.
“When all these men are in jail,” said Chibás, “then and only then will I receive
President Grau or Carlos Prío in my house.”70 Later on, Chibás, who never forgot a
martyr, recalled that the one year anniversary of Manuel Fernández Supervielle’s
death had just passed and decided he would only submit to an interview with Grau if
the government could bring the dead mayor back to life.

THE ORTODOXO PROGRAM
Journalists who interviewed Chibás often remarked upon the difference
between his rambunctious radio demeanor and the measured comportment he
demonstrated away from the studio. Arturo Alfonso Roselló, the editor-in-chief of
Carteles, represented one such case. After a four hour conversation with him, he
confessed that in “intimate settings” Chibás “speaks slowly, taking the time to sift
through ideas without hurrying and reiterates his points without gesticulation or
undue emphasis.”71 Gastón Baquero, the editor-in chief of Diario de la Marina,
concurred, stating that, “Silence and a conversation full of pauses, rather than
screams, marked the interview’s rhythm.”72 In this sense, such encounters provided
an ideal forum in which to debunk the notion, spread by detractors, that he was a
demagogue. They were also an excellent venue for disseminating the Ortodoxo
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platform, especially as Chibás devoted his broadcasts to spectacle and revelation
rather than the intricacies of party doctrine. Thus, during the last month before the
election, Chibás sat down with Bohemia, which usually offered flattering coverage,
Carteles, which viewed him warily, Diario de la Marina, which was mildly
sympathetic but preferred Núñez, and El Crisol, which considered Chibás’
broadcasts to be of such importance that it published complete transcripts every
Monday.73
In all these sessions, Chibás evinced a great concern for Cuba’s peasants.
This was logical in two respects. First, he regularly received correspondence from
the island’s rural dwellers detailing the heartbreaking circumstances of their lives.
Second, he was aware that his party had scant presence in Cuba’s villages and small
towns. If the inhabitants of these areas were going to resist the urge to sell their
votes, they required a compelling program. Hence, Chibás told Bohemia’s Antonio
Ortega that Cuba’s “fundamental” problem was in its countryside and campesinos
deserved the same “social benefits” enjoyed by industrial workers.74 At a minimum
rural Cubans were entitled to cement floors in their huts, sanitary latrines and
potable drinking water. Once these basic requirements were satisfied, Chibás a
proposed second stage of improvements including farming cooperatives, an
agricultural development bank, crop diversification and the creation of a scientific
institute to develop species and breeds best suited to Cuba’s climate. Asked about
In terms of the editorial leanings of these publications, Bohemia was slightly left of center but
offered a forum for a wide range of viewpoints from the Communist leader Juan Marinello to the
conservative Francisco Ichaso and everything in between. Carteles was rabidly anti-communist and
tilted conservative. Diario de la Marina was Cuba’s oldest and most right-wing daily. The newspaper
was pro-Catholic, pro-American, pro-Franco, pro-business and, of course an implacable foe of
communism. El Crisol was a well respected Cuban broadsheet of moderate persuasion.
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land distribution, Chibás recommended the establishment of a national registry to
catalogue vacant land and uncultivated private holdings. In addition to disbursing
the former he planned to impose a tax on the latter, which would stimulate the sale
of disused acreage. Chibás emphasized his respect for property rights but stated
that land also had a “social function” and Cuba’s priority was to help farmers own
the plots they worked.75 “The current administration,” said Chibás “turns Cubans
into state employees. The communists make them proletarians. The Cuban People’s
Party would like them to be proprietors.”76
During the Carteles interview, Chibás argued that rural rehabilitation was
central to the Ortodoxo slogan of “economic independence, political liberty and
social justice.” He proclaimed that, “the rural population suffers the prejudice of a
shameful stagnation, lives in the most primitive conditions, endures horrible neglect
and has lost all faith and enthusiasm, not only in the fatherland’s destiny but in its
own as well.77 Chibás planned to use the “millions” in revenues from Cuba’s sugar
differential to improve rural health and acquire land, tools, seeds, livestock and
technical advice for peasants.78 Freed from maladies such as typhus, malaria and
intestinal parasites, campesinos could increase their productivity. Putting the land
in fatherland would also imbue them with a real and defined sense of patriotism.
Hence, Chibás imagined economic opportunity would extend beyond Cuba’s cities
into its interior. This, in turn, would herald changes in the island’s political culture.
Chibás explained that rural desolation essentially transformed many runs for public
Ibid.
Ibid.
77 Roselló, “Chibás explica,” 30.
78 Ibid.
75
76
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office into financial transactions. After all, he said, “it is easy to seduce the guajiro
into selling his vote for a few pesos so at least he can feed his children.”79 As a result,
…the governor or legislator who arrives at his position in this way
does not feel obligated to the voter. He purchased his office or
executive position; he didn’t obtain it on merit or because of an
effective campaign. He owes his office to money rather than a
program. His interest and his end can be none other than
recuperating his investment. In this way, public opinion, which is
inherent to democracy and political liberty, disappears. In other
words, free expression of the will of the citizens becomes
prostituted.80
Nor were peasants the only ones deprived of the right to vote their conscience.
Government employees had an irresistible incentive to choose the ruling party as
otherwise their job would be given to a member of the opposition. For this reason,
Chibás proposed a professional bureaucracy chosen by competitive examinations
rather than party affiliation. Adopting this practice would also eliminate the botella
or government employee who collects a salary but performs no work.
Reminded by Roselló that political liberty was an “ambitious” term that could
not be reduced to “purity of the vote,” Chibás mentioned the importance of equality
before the law.81 “There will be political liberty,” he said, “when an anonymous
worker has the same guarantees in the courts of justice as a millionaire or politician.
Just the same,” he continued, “there can be no political liberty when the pickpocket
goes to jail while the corrupt functionary who robs millions gets to spend his money
abroad.”82 In this vein, Chibás expressed a need for the long delayed Tribunal of

Ibid.
Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
79
80
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Accounts that would audit government expenditures and passage of the General
Accounting Law for the State, Provinces and Municipalities to ensure public funds
were monitored at every level.83
Chibás described the third aspect of Ortodoxo doctrine, social justice, in
roughly the same vague terms as Cuba’s 1940 constitution – a document he knew
intimately. For instance, the “principle of social justice” is lionized in Title VI, Article
86. Further, he spoke of “betterment of the working classes” with the goal of
“conciliation between Capital and Labor.”84 Such conciliation is provided for in Title
VI, Article 84 – albeit more formally through special commissions of workers and
management. In a nod to the red-hating subscribers of Carteles, Chibás claimed
harmonious relations between the classes would eliminate the risk of “communist
penetration.”85

Chibás also sought the approval of Diario de la Marina’s

conservative readership by declaring, “I am the only national leader who has never
allied with the Communist party,” and added, “My opposition to them is neither
electoral nor political but comes from the bottom of my heart.”86 In fact, Chibás
presented his most thorough and highly detailed program during the conversation
with Baquero. His top priorities entailed agricultural diversification, a national
bank, nationalized public utilities, subsidized fuel and electricity, reduced foreign
concessions, lowered prices for basic goods, prosecution of black market
speculators, an ambitious public works program, an increased budget for the
The creation of a Tribunal of Accounts was one of the so-called “complimentary laws” of the 1940
constitution whose specifics were supposed to be ironed out by Cuba’s legislative branch. However,
neither Batista nor Grau was anxious to court oversight of their spending so the project languished.
84 Roselló, “Chibás explica,” 31.
85 Ibid.
86 Baquero, “Chibás considera necesario,” 23.
83
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ministry of agriculture and, of course, his package of reforms to revitalize Cuba’s
countryside.
Above all, the Ortodoxo agenda hinged on Chibás himself because most of its
policy recommendations could also be found in the Auténtico-Republican and
Liberal Democratic platforms. The rural poor could take comfort in Carlos Prío’s
announcement that agricultural reform deserved his “deepest and most sincere
interest.”87 Moreover, Prío promised to oversee creation of the Agricultural and
Industrial Development Bank and Tribunal of Accounts. He even called for a merit
system in the civil service. Ricardo Núñez favored land distribution, touting the
social and economic benefits of ownership for a peasantry that was “practically
nomadic.”88 For those outraged by illegality and graft, he trumpeted his so-called
“two revolutions” of constitutionality and honor. In advertisements, he and his
running mate Gustavo Cuervo Rubio, both of whom were medical doctors, sold
themselves as “University of Havana professors,” “notable professionals” and men of
“moral integrity.” As such, they would confront the “upsetting and demoralizing”
political climate and impose “administrative honesty.”89

A Carteles editorial

corroborated this image, noting that Núñez enjoyed “recognized prestige, a firm will
and good judgment.”90 Without jobs to distribute, money for votes or an organized

“Los candidatos presidenciales opinan sobre el grave problema de la electricidad,” Bohemia, May
23, 1948: 67.
88 “Responde al Dr. Núñez Portuondo al Cuestionario de Carteles,” Carteles, May 30, 1948: 32.
89 The language appeared in an advertisement entitled “Trinomio de Integridad Moral,” which
appeared on page 69 of the May 23, 1948 issue of Bohemia.
90 “Nuestro candidato,” Carteles, May 23, 1948: 49.
87
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political machine, Chibás could only rely on his charisma and the conviction that,
“The Cuban people know that if I am elected, these robberies will be punished.”91

91

Roselló, “Chibás explica,” 31.
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Chapter 5
“The Miracle of Chibás”

On Tuesday morning of June 1, a few minutes before the voting was to
commence, Eduardo Chibás was fast asleep. He had maintained his usual busy
schedule the previous evening, appearing before the Havana Bar Association, the
Commercial Street Business Owners Group and, of course, on the radio. Chibás had
arrived home at 2:30 a.m. and when a Bohemia reporter stopped by the next day, the
Ortodoxo leader was mired in slumber.

With some difficulty, the journalist

succeeded in stirring Chibás. The PPC chief banished the remnants of his grogginess
by playing a recording, composed for him in Santiago de Cuba, which was a parody
of the famous tune “Quizás, Quizás.” After hearing a few notes of the refitted jingle,
entitled “Chibás, Chibás,” which described him “sweeping” to victory in June, he was
once again his loquacious, energetic self.1

Before setting out to cast his ballot,

Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 8, Expediente 241, ANC. The song was arranged by Alberto Aloma
Echezarreta. The Spanish lyrics are as follows:
Siempre que te pregunto
Que quien es ese hombre
Tú siempre me respondes
CHIBAS, CHIBAS, CHIBAS
1

Cuando oigas en un radio
Que alguno está gritando
Ya puedes ir pensando
CHIBAS, CHIBAS, CHIBAS
Que digan que está loco
Hablando, hablando
Pero en Junio primero
Arrollando, arrollando
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Chibás gilded his cheerfulness with a layer of romanticism – hanging the following
proverb in front of his desk. It read:
Let the world think of us what it may. That’s its own affair. If it
doesn’t put everything in its rightful place by the time we die, or even
ever, that’s its own prerogative. Ours is to work as if the nation were
grateful, as if the world were righteous, as if public opinion were
shrewd, as if life were just and as if men were superior beings.2
That evening, after the polls closed, Chibás dined with Roberto Agramonte. The
Ortodoxo leader told his cousin that, “During the course of our travels, I have
observed a certain collective craziness that could potentially result in a surprise. I’m
convinced we will receive a great quantity of votes. The people have internalized
our slogan of ‘Shame vs. Money.’ And our campaign only began a few months ago. If
only we had more time!”3 Later on, Chibás visited the Columbia military barracks at
the invitation of Genovevo Pérez Dámera. The Cuban army, which supervised the
elections, was also the surest source of information regarding their result. There,
Chibás listened to the returns from all corners of the island and learned that Carlos
Prío would be Cuba’s next president.4

Verás el diez de Octubre
Al pueblo deliriando
Verás gobernando
Está CHIBAS, CHIBAS
2Ibid.
3 De la Osa, En Cuba, Primer Tiempo, 470.
4 Whereas Chibás merely lost his bid for Cuba’s highest office, others were deprived even more
tangibly. For example, the Democrat Carlos Manuel de la Cruz and ex commerce minister Alberto
Inocente Álvarez had bet 100,000 pesos on the election results. Both men had apparently met in the
Havana restaurant “El Caramelo,” whereupon the Democrat boasted to his Auténtico rival that he was
willing to bet 1000 or even 100,000 pesos on the triumph of Ricardo Núñez. Initially, Álvarez was
uninterested and left the restaurant. He subsequently changed his mind after examining an opinion
poll predicting Carlos Prío would win in all six provinces, after which he made a concerted effort to
locate de la Cruz in order to seal the terms. See De la Osa, En Cuba, Primer Tiempo, 472.
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The Auténtico candidate, who had emphasized his smiling, cordial nature
throughout the campaign, won all six of Cuba’s provinces. However, he gleaned only
45.83 percent of the popular vote even with nearly unlimited resources at his
disposal. Moreover, the Auténtico-Republican alliance obtained 145,823 fewer votes
than in 1944 – a worrying sign given the tremendous advantages of incumbency. In
a similar vein, the government parties captured majorities in the senate and
chamber of representatives but these results were less encouraging than would
appear at first glance. This is because many nominally Auténtico senators and
representatives were followers of Miguelito Suárez Fernández, who felt little or no
loyalty to the new president.5 On the other hand, José Manuel Alemán’s senate
victory proved lucre could still buy plenty of goodwill. With his immunity from
prosecution assured, he immediately returned to Havana.

While there were

scattered indications that Auténtico attempts to reduce elections to a mere financial
transaction had backfired, in general, the tactic was highly successful. A notable
exception was Enrique Rousseau, an Auténtico candidate for the chamber of
representatives who was heard lamenting the fact that he had paid 8000 pesos to socalled “political sergeants” in Havana’s Cayo Hueso neighborhood without receiving
the votes promised to him.6

Given his obvious advantages, Prío’s victory seemed

inevitable even before the polls had closed.

Sensing as much, foreign

correspondents gravitated to his residence during the afternoon of June 1. These

For example, the Auténtico-Republican alliance counted a 36-18 majority in the senate but 11 of
those 36 were supporters of Suárez Fernández. See Stokes, “The ‘Cuban Revolution,” 74-75.
6 De la Osa, En Cuba Primer Tiempo, 474.
5
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included representatives from Hollywood Reporter, Twentieth Century Fox and the
French magazine INS.
Ricardo Núñez finished second, with 30.42 percent of the vote and was
hardly a picture of grace in defeat. He chalked up the results to “betrayals by many
elements of the party.”7 When an advisor suggested a congratulatory phone call to
Prío was in order, Núñez responded that he would do so the next day and shortly
thereafter abandoned party headquarters in a huff.

Rather than condemning

traitors within the coalition, Raúl Menocal fingered Chibás as the “maximum cause”
of their defeat, saying the Ortodoxo leader preferred Prío over Núñez.8 Conveniently
ignoring the fact that members of his own Democratic party had undermined the
Third Front, Menocal told Enrique de la Osa, “You see? My thesis has been proved
correct. Without a united opposition, it was always going to be difficult to beat the
government.” He added, “We are like the children of a millionaire who believe we
will inherit a fortune when in reality there were fewer riches than we had
imagined.”9 Across the Florida Straits, Fulgencio Batista had awaited the elections
with barely contained brio. Claiming Núñez would win by 150,000 votes, the ex
general rented a luxury suite at the Hotel Martinique in Miami Beach and
summoned his expatriate military buddies to share in the expected merrymaking.
Although Batista ultimately won his senate race, once news of Núñez’s defeat
spread, those gathered were in no mood to celebrate.

Ibid., 472.
Ibid., 473.
9 Ibid.
7
8
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Such was not the case for Chibás, who placed third with 16.42 percent of the
electorate. Even as the surveys and straw polls he cited on the hustings proved
mistaken, Chibás collected 320,929 votes – nearly double his party’s total from the
registration period.

Unfortunately, the PPC did not win a single provincial

governorship or senate race and succeeded in placing just six party members in the
chamber of representatives – the most prominent of these being Manuel Bisbé.
Nevertheless, William Stokes, a political scientist from the United States who
chronicled the campaign, claimed Chibás “won a great moral victory at the expense
of the Auténtico-Republican alliance.”10 This was because most of those who chose
Chibás, apart from registered Ortodoxos, appeared to have been members of the
government parties.11 Chibás’ friends in the media saw his performance in far more
effusive terms. On June 6, Bohemia ran a piece entitled “The Miracle of Chibás,”
extolling the Ortodoxo chief’s “beautiful and exemplary” campaign.12 Later on, the
article opined that,
It can, without hyperbole, be affirmed that the disinterested pyramid
of votes bestowed upon Eduardo R. Chibás – whose combativeness
and immaculate conduct already anoint him as leader of the future
political opposition – has cemented the undeniable reality that the
Cuban people have left behind, forevermore, the slimy electoral
customs that have stunted its progress.13
Enrique de la Osa, writing in the magazine’s en Cuba section, stated that,
Neutral and enemy observers alike consider the votes obtained by the
Ortodoxo candidate to be an indicator of his political talents, especially
Stokes, “The ‘Cuban Revolution,’” 74.
Stokes points out that the Auténtico-Republican alliance received 176,482 fewer votes than it
registered while Chibás increased his total by 156,054. Most of the remainder seem to have chosen
the Liberal-Democratic coalition, which garnered 48,932 more votes than it registered. See: Ibid.
12 “El Milagro de Chibás,” Bohemia, June 6, 1948: 43.
13 Ibid, 95.
10
11
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as he struggled against the current against powerful parties, assisted
only by his personal prestige and independence from the mercenary
figures used by other politicians. The votes earned by the PPC chief,
who didn’t offer jobs, bribes or anything else of that sort, can be
utilized as a lever by which he can raise a great party, one that would
be the undisputed leader of the opposition in the coming years.14
Sergio Carbó, writing in Prensa Libre, added that “there is not the least bit of popular
enthusiasm for the victory of Prío.”15

Of course, not all journalists were so

accommodating. Francisco Ichaso, in his June 3 column for Diario de la Marina,
could not resist a jab when the opportunity presented itself. Noting that a survey
just before the elections had predicted Chibás would win more votes in Havana than
he actually garnered, Ichaso explained this was a consequence of the “frothy” yet
“ephemeral” emotions inspired by the Ortodoxo leader. 16 He estimated that if the
elections had been held immediately after his Sunday evening broadcast, the vote
totals and survey would have corresponded with more exactitude.

CRIES OF FRAUD
Chibás was fond of saying that his twenty years in public life were largely
free of contradictions. However, his take on the election was a zigzag writ large.
Initially, Chibás appeared satisfied with his performance and expressed both
optimism and magnanimity in a public statement released on June 2. He allowed
that the government’s “enormous financial resources” had ensured victory but

De la Osa, En Cuba Primer Tiempo, 481.
Sergio Carbó, “Aspectos turbios de la jornada,” Prensa Libre, June 4, 1948, reprinted in “Cómo opina
nuestra prensa,” Carteles, June 13.1948: 56.
16 Francisco Ichaso, “Divagacion Postcomicial,” Diario de la Marina, June 3, 1948:4.
14
15
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claimed its triumph would be fleeting.17 “Four years represents very little time in
the life of a people,” he said and recalling how quickly the tide had changed during
World War II, offered, “It’s the time between the Battle of Dunkerque and the Battle
of Berlin.”18 Chibás duly mentioned the “betrayal” of PPC bosses who “deserted to
the enemy” but emphasized the efforts of ordinary Cubans who replenished the
party’s ranks with “astonishing speed.”19 He also congratulated the armed forces on
their impartiality and the citizenry for voting in an orderly fashion. The Ortodoxo
leader even promised to be the “first to recognize it” if Carlos Prío presided over a
good government.20
During his June 6 radio show, however, Chibás spewed pure bile.

He

asserted that Prío owed his victory to a “giant fraud” and “the most corrupt electoral
process in the history of our republic.”21 This was an astonishing and reckless
charge, not least of all because of Cuba’s substantial record of ballot box
manipulation in years past. Even as the 1948 poll was less than perfect, especially
in terms of vote buying, there was no evidence of military intervention as in 1940.22
Moreover, the present irregularities, contemptible as they were, could hardly
compare to the election of 1916 in which Mario García Menocal (Raúl Menocal’s
father) maintained himself in office with the assistance of 300,000 ghost voters and

“Reconoceré el buen gobierno que haga Prío, dice Chibás,” Diario de la Marina, June 3, 1948: 14.
Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Archivo Nacional de Cuba, Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 6, Expediente 200: 59.
22 While the Cuban armed forces generally behaved well, Bohemia lamented that the military had
announced the final verdict rather than the Superior Electoral Tribunal. The magazine also scolded
Grau for celebrating his disciple’s victory on the balcony of the presidential palace well before the
official results were announced. See “En Cuba, El Escrutinio del Ejercito,” June 13, 1948: 51.
17
18
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the not so mysterious disappearance of masses of opposition ballots.23 Nor were
they a match for tightly managed 1936 contest, in which the Auténticos, Communists
ABC party refused to participate because their leaders were exiled or imprisoned for
the most part. Chibás, of course, knew better but his hatred of Prío overwhelmed
any logical considerations. The Ortodoxo chief’s loathing had been recently and
greatly inflamed when Prío had insulted his late father just before the elections. His
June 6 broadcast paid a lengthy tribute to Eduardo Justo Chibás y Guerra, a civicminded man and distinguished civil engineer who Eddy idolized. However, before
the homage began, Chibás gleefully proclaimed that Prío’s image was routinely
booed by cinemagoers when it appeared on newsreels while his own met with an
“ovation.”24 Chibás also attempted to back his allegation that the election had been
stolen from him. Aside from paying cash for votes, he accused the communications
ministry of retaining at least 50,000 registration cards which were converted to pro
government tallies on election day.

He also mentioned that the Auténtico-

Republican alliance distributed more than 20,000 government jobs in exchange for
votes. Some were obvious botellas. For example, 2,000 Havana residents were
named inspectors of coffee plantations although their closest connection to
agriculture involved the trees gracing the capital’s sidewalks.
Chibás was not alone in questioning the election results. Juan Marinello, the
Communist candidate who finished a distant forth, also wasted little time in
impugning Prío’s victory.25 During the second week of June, Ricardo Núñez piled on

For a full description see Thomas, Cuba, 527.
Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 6, Expediente 200: 58, ANC.
25 Marinello received 143,033 votes, a mere 7.33 percent of all those cast.
23
24
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as well. Speaking to reporters, he announced that the “apparently legal” AuténticoRepublican triumph was in fact “spurious.”26 Núñez recognized that the Superior
Electoral Tribunal, the military and provincial and municipal authorities had
performed their duties transparently. Nevertheless, the Liberal chief asserted that
“the government of President Grau San Martín shamelessly unleashed every facet of
the State’s machinery in order to falsify the results of the elections, which have
brought dishonor and ignominy to our democracy.”27 In a monologue reminiscent
of his Ortodoxo opponent, Núñez mused that a new, more subtle sort of tyranny had
taken shape and was vitiating the soul of his compatriots.
When the armed forces use violence to impede the exercise of voting
rights, it produces a reaction of indignation, of anger culminating in
gestures of gallant rebellion that, in the end, result in vindication and
reform. Such rebellions have, since Independence, achieved all the
political and social advancements of the Cuban people. However,
when part of the citizenry yields to bribes of the most varied forms,
ranging from party assemblies that offer their services for dozens or
hundreds of thousands of pesos to people in high positions who accept
botellas or “protection” or those who are complicit with the black
market, embezzlement, speculation, illegal dealings, unpunished
crimes and the exploitation of social evils; or purchasing votes freely
and openly without intervention from the authorities or its agents
because it is precisely they who have organized the entire corrupt
system, then one feels deep inside his spirit the immense pain of the
great moral tragedy shaking the Cuban people…28
This statement caused a predictable uproar and despite its poignancy, earned him
contempt as well as sympathy. For instance, a Bohemia correspondent remarked
that the tactics Núñez railed against had been employed by many Liberal and
Democratic bigwigs and were less successful only because they no longer controlled
“En Cuba, Política: Herencia,” Bohemia, June 20, 1948: 58.
Ibid.
28 Ibid.
26
27
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the levers of government power. Left unsaid but clear to all was the Liberal head’s
greatest failing, a flaw cited by sympathizers as well as foes, that he could never
claim to represent a “revolution of honor” while he presided over a party swollen
with Machado era peculators and murderers.

BUILDING THE PARTY
In many respects, the 1948 elections were a coming out party for Chibás.
Although he had long been one of Cuba’s most charismatic speakers and his gifts as
a showman were evident every Sunday evening, the presidential campaign marked
him as a rising star in the island’s political firmament – one that had exclusively
belonged, since 1933, to Grau and Batista. His unique style of politics, one that
demolished all formal barriers between candidate and voter, was clearly popular.
Flinging himself off truck beds and into the arms of admirers was merely the newest
and most sensational in a series of similar gestures. Chibás also liked to stuff some
close friends into his Packard every few weeks, drive to a barbershop and invite
people to discuss politics with them while his locks were trimmed. Of course, his
well attended walks to the CMQ studios on Sunday evenings always attracted
substantial crowds.
Given his undeniable acclaim among Cuba’s masses, the challenge now was
for Chibás was to build a party capable of securing the presidency in 1952. This
involved two immediate tasks. First, it was imperative to enroll most or all of the
156,054 citizens who had voted for him but did not belong to the PPC. Second, the
party required a bloodletting of traitors and the establishment of a loyal, competent
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hierarchy. Before Chibás could ponder these tasks, he needed to regain the PPC
presidency, currently held by Millo Ochoa. He did so formally on June 5, during a
meeting at Ortodoxo headquarters. Ochoa himself was under suspicion by party
hardliners, particularly as he had appeared in the Liberal-Democratic column during
the race for provincial governor of Oriente – which he lost. In late May, an Ortodoxo
official had written to Ochoa’s brother Guarro, the mayor of Holguín, requesting an
explanation. The scarcely believable reply was that Millo “had not agreed to a pact”
but rather had been “recommended” for the post in “disinterested” fashion by the
other parties because he had the best chance of winning.29 Chibás was aware of the
situation but turned a blind eye, having always shown more nuance and tolerance
than fanatical isolationists within the PPC.30 After Ochoa was replaced as party
president he maintained his position as Ortodoxo boss in Oriente with Chibás’
wholehearted support.
By contrast, Chibás was less sanguine about other deviators – especially in
the party’s lower rungs. During and after the campaign, letters detailing every sort
of duplicity arrived on his desk courtesy of livid Ortodoxo loyalists. In response,
Chibás published an article in El Crisol on June 10 outlining his plan to cleanse the
party of double-dealers. This gesture was received enthusiastically by the PPC rank
and file, including Manuel Mozo Toledo of Havana, who stated that, “One needs to

Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 36, Expediente 1105: 116, ANC.
The case of Millo Ochoa elicited a great deal of comment and speculation in Ortodoxo circles. On
June 11, Eddy’s friend Ignacio Mendoza wrote, “If (Ochoa) told the (Liberal-Democratic) coalition he
would campaign for you and they nominated him anyway, then they are imbeciles but if he didn’t tell
them he betrayed them and is unworthy of confidence even as he has been loyal to you up till now.”
At the same time, Mendoza deemed Ochoa a “hero who was sacrificed for you” because his
association with the PPC caused many Liberals and Democrats to vote for the Auténtico candidate,
who was, in fact, an ex Liberal. See Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 36, Expediente 1106: 30, ANC.
29
30
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come to our party willing to give everything for the good of Cuba without expecting
personal rewards; those who want something more can go to the other parties that
offer inciso K and sinecures or to the Liberal millionaires club; we offer only shame
and honor for the people of Cuba.”31 Ofilia Khouray, a PPC leader in Camagüey put
the matter more succinctly, informing Chibás that, “Just as you wish, all the traitors
will be eliminated.”32 During his August 1 broadcast, Chibás thundered, “To those
traitors who haven’t resigned already, we are warning you to do so immediately. In
this way, you will save us the trouble of expelling you.”33 He added, “We desire a
pure party, composed of men and women of proven honor, without opportunists or
sleazy politicians.”34 To drive his point home once and for all, Chibás referred to an
article in Bohemia regarding a meeting of Batista and other Cuban politicos in Miami
who were contemplating the formation of a new political party. Among other
things, the ex general told his guests that, “When I was president, many politicians
who today occupy elevated positions alongside Grau and now refer to me with
rancor, used to approach me in order to ask favors or for money. Chibás, on the
other hand, never asked me for anything.”35 The Ortodoxo leader retorted that,
“Batista is right to say that I never asked him for anything. But now, since he’s no
longer president of the republic, I would indeed like to request something: don’t
ever think of joining the Cuban People’s Party.”36

Ibid., 28.
Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 36, Expediente 1103: 109, ANC.
33 Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 6, Expediente 200: 138, ANC.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid. See also “En Cuba, Política: Batista y el Nuevo Partido,” Bohemia, August 1, 1948: 56.
36 Ibid.
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Running parallel to the fury directed toward renegade Ortodoxos was pride at
having contributed to a worthwhile endeavor. On June 2, a party member named
Carmen Hernández wrote Chibás a letter expressing her “profound sense of spiritual
satisfaction” with his campaign.37 She added that,
For me and the many others who surely think the same way, we
recognize that you have triumphed over thievery and pillage. The
eloquence of those votes toward your candidacy shows us that we can
still have faith in a people who know how to choose what’s best and
will be ready to do so in future opportunities. As a soldier in the
ranks, I am ready to receive your orders!38
Similarly, a supporter from Cárdenas with a literary bent declared, “The election
result has reaffirmed our belief that ‘not everything is rotten in the state of
Denmark.’”39 An Ortodoxo couple from Bauta, a town 25 miles southwest of Havana,
confirmed that chibasista fervor extended beyond Cuba’s adult population. They
recounted an anecdote involving their four year old son, Nivaldo, who was
accustomed to spending weekend afternoons in a nearby park. On June 16, while
his parents were lost in conversation, the boy walked across the playground toward
the local Auténtico party office, whereupon he opened the door and shouted “Long
live Chibás!” to the surprise of those assembled. This was hardly surprising as
Nivaldo apparently had acquired the habit of yelling “Vote for Chibás!” at anyone
who visited the family home.40

Chibás drew strength from these and other

unconditional confessions of support.

On his radio show, he reinforced the

enthusiasm of his followers by announcing that,
Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 36, Expediente 1105: 39, ANC.
Ibid.
39 Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 36, Expediente 1107: 53, ANC.
40 Ibid., 17-18.
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Our party, which is the party of the great masses, the Cuban People’s
Party, the only real opposition party, must demonstrate, both in its
platform and in actual practice to be against the vices of traditional
politics: personalismo, sleaze, squabbling factions, clans, elitism,
cabinet intrigues etc. This is not the party of no one but rather the
people’s party.41
As the Ortodoxos proceeded to rebuild, Chibás ruled out any possibility of joining the
government. This was a statement of principle but also indicated that Chibás was
now firmly in charge of the party and would remain so for the foreseeable future.
After all, most of the pact friendly faction had deserted or been expelled and those
who remained were in no position to challenge him. Nonetheless, this tactic flew in
the face of conventional Cuban politics and would be tested early and often. Shortly
after the election, rumors began circulating that Carlos Prío would offer Chibás the
commerce ministry – no doubt as a means of engendering faith in his new
administration. Speculation heightened on June 17, when Sergio Carbó endorsed his
friend for the position in a Prensa Libre editorial entitled, “Chibás Could Be the Man
of the Hour.” Four days later, however, Chibás sent an extensive private letter to
Carbó explaining why he could never accept such an offer. Chibás claimed, “In
moments of great crisis, be they social or economic, true leaders, in order to be
useful to their countries, must not compromise their moral authority by
accommodating themselves to shady politics.”42 As French history was something
of a hobby, Chibás cited Georges Clemenceau in 1914 and Charles de Gaulle in 1940
as examples of men who refused to join their nation’s government during difficult
times because it would have involved damaging ethical concessions. Instead, both
41
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jealously guarded their prestige and waited until their moral authority could affect a
greater impact. Of course, Chibás also employed these parables to defend himself
against two oft repeated charges. Namely, Ortodoxo dealmakers had accused him of
forsaking attainable albeit incremental improvements in the name of an unrealistic
ideal. The Auténticos, for their part, continually reprimanded him for dividing the
country’s revolutionaries. In any case, Chibás emphasized that Carlos Prío could
create much good will even without Ortodoxo assistance.

For example, if the

president elect appointed a universally respected figure like Miguel Coyula as prime
minister, Chibás pledged his party would support the government without asking
for anything in return. In this way, Chibás revealed his second objective as Ortodoxo
party chief. Besides constructing an organization capable of reaching power, he
would, in the meanwhile, pressure Cuba’s leaders into behaving more honorably.

ELECTORAL CODE ARTICLE 336
While Chibás believed the 320,929 votes he received were a potential cudgel,
he also knew the Ortodoxos would be hard pressed to alter government policy
without a single senator. This situation was all the more difficult to accept because
Manuel Gran, an Ortodoxo senate candidate and University of Havana physics
professor, had actually obtained more than double the votes of two Republicans
destined for the Capitolio. 43 However, he was denied because of a stipulation in the
1943 electoral code apportioning senators by coalition rather than strict popularity.
According to law, since the Ortodoxos finished third in Havana province they were
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not entitled to senate representation there. “Is this democracy?” Chibás asked
during his September 12 broadcast. “No. This is something else: shamelessness.”44
This was also the first time since 1940 that an election involved more than two
groupings of political parties. Given Chibás’ insistence on the independent line, it
behooved him to challenge this ruling which was both damaging and out of date in
the current circumstances. He thus encouraged Gran to lodge an appeal with Cuba’s
Supreme Tribunal. Chibás also provided his radio audience with a brief lecture on
the island’s constitution. He declared that the electoral provision contradicted
Article 98 and Article 103. The former guaranteed that votes for one candidate
could not accumulate toward another; in this case, ballots cast for the first place
Auténtico-Republican alliance had elected two nominees with inferior vote totals.
Chibás was even more interested in the latter, which stated, “The law will assure
representation for the minorities in the elective organisms of the state, provinces
and municipalities.”45 The Ortodoxo leader interpreted this to mean that all parties
should have a minimum of at least one senator. Chibás also noted that this idea
counted the backing of Raúl Lorenzo, the normally pro Auténtico political editor of
Prensa Libre and also of Bohemia. Ironically, Manuel Gran was not the only victim of
Cuba’s undemocratic electoral code. The Communist Salvador García Agüero, whose
own radio show usually finished a distant second to Chibás in the ratings, received
more than 100,000 votes but since his party finished fourth in Havana, he too was
deprived. This benefited none other than Pelayo Cuervo, who as a member of the
second place Liberal-Democratic coalition snagged a senate seat with 30,000 fewer
44
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tallies. Even so, Chibás was almost certainly gratified that his erstwhile friend had
received half the amount of votes he obtained in 1944. Clearly, Cuervo’s expedience
had been punished by Havana’s electorate. 46
Chibás returned to the issue again during his September 19 broadcast,
especially as the judges were due to rule shortly. This time, he opined that the
electoral code also violated Article 120 of Cuba’s constitution – which mandated
equal suffrage. In his familiar voice of outrage, Chibás asked, “Do votes for the
government matter more than votes for the Ortodoxos in spite of Article 120 of the
constitution?”47 Exerting less than subtle pressure on the judges, Chibás reminded
his audience (and them) that Article 194 obligated the courts to resolve conflicts
between current laws and the constitution. He then inquired, “Can the Supreme
Tribunal permit an anti-democratic and anti-constitutional law to endure?”48 The
answer, of course, was yes.

THE NEW ADMINISTRATION
On September 26, two weeks before his inauguration, Carlos Prío announced
the composition of his cabinet.

Prío’s appointments were a mélange of good

intentions and backroom lobbying by his three patrons: Grau, Alonso Pujol and
Alemán. For example, Prío knew the treasury had been sacked during Grau’s term
and wished to place an honest man in charge of Cuba’s finances. His first choice for
the post was the universally respected Carlos Hevia. In short order, Hevia proposed
In his characteristically satirical manner, Enrique de la Osa described Cuervo as an “ex Democrat,
ex Auténtico, ex Ortodoxo and recently minted Liberal.” See: de la Osa, En Cuba Primer Tiempo, 486.
47 Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 6, Expediente 201: 15, ANC.
48 Ibid.
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a thorough audit and aimed to publish the results as a means of restoring public
confidence. Horrified, Grau summoned Prío to the presidential palace and told him,
“this cannot be.”49 He explained that,
This is just too dangerous! You know we have a small deficit and, in
addition, I’ve just been informed that Alemán asked Isauro (the
present treasury secretary Isauro Valdés) for certain sums of money,
at your request, in order to pay for your electoral campaign…I ignored
that such things were going on in the treasury and I’m not ready for
these errors to be publicly pinned on my administration. It seems to
me that the best thing would be to leave Isauro in his place. This way
we can all rest easy.50
Prío left the palace without contradicting Grau, but he was obviously troubled by the
president’s suggestion. Valdés was a devotee of Alemán and much as Prío had
welcomed the support of BAGA during the electoral season, he was now anxious to
free himself of the ex education minister’s hirelings. Forced to surrender Hevia, he
decided to name someone who would agree to cover up the treasury’s shortfall but
whose loyalty would not be in doubt. Hence, Prío tapped his younger brother
Antonio.
The foreign ministry presented a different sort of dilemma. As Prío had no
specific candidate in mind he was besieged by solicitations. Diego Vicente Tejera,
the Auténtico boss of Matanzas and chief lieutenant of Miguelito Suárez Fernández,
applied for the job but was vetoed by Grau. Ramón Corona, a protégé of Alonso
Pujol also threw his hat in the ring.51 Alonso Pujol, who was presently in Brussels
and always on the lookout for mammon, had recently hatched a scheme requiring a
De la Osa, En Cuba Primer Tiempo, 586.
Ibid.
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sympathetic figure in the foreign ministry. This involved hawking Cuban visas to an
estimated 25,000 Jews in war torn Europe for 500 pesos apiece. Prío was less than
enamored by this prospect and decided to place Corona in charge of the justice
ministry instead. At the same time, he remained eager to find a position for Hevia
and thus settled the contest for the foreign ministry by selecting him.
Expectations ran particularly high for the education and commerce
ministries, given how brazenly they had been abused under Grau. Prío evinced his
concern for Cuba’s schoolchildren by entrusting them to Aureliano Sánchez Arango,
one of his closest political confidants.

Sánchez Arango boasted outstanding

revolutionary credentials, having been a member of the 1927 Student Directorate
and later on joining the violent, anti-Batista outfit Joven Cuba. More importantly, he
was competent and honest. Sánchez Arango also possessed a brash temperament
that reveled in controversy, which seemed ideal for the task of eradicating the
assortment of grafters and gangsters inhabiting Cuba’s education ministry. As for
the black market, long a source of ill feelings, Prío designated José Andreu to tame
the island’s hodgepodge of scarce items. Andreu was a Republican and a medical
doctor who had served in Grau’s cabinet as health minister. Although he was an
able man, his appointment mainly requited a campaign debt to the Auténticos’
electoral partner. In fact, this trend was evident in most of Prío’s choices. To
placate Grau and Alemán, he chose Francisco Grau Alsina as agriculture minister.
Aside from being one of the president’s favorite nephews, “Pancho” was so closely
linked with the former education minister that his surname’s initials formed the GA
in BAGA. Prío further appeased Grau by naming Primitivo Rodríguez minister

151

without portfolio. Rodríguez was an Auténtico congressman whose exaggerated
sycophancy toward the president was the subject of many a political cartoon.52 Not
surprisingly, he had been among the most ardent advocates of Grau’s re-election
bid.
Chibás, who touted himself as the leader of Cuba’s “real” opposition, scoffed
that Prío had, “announced the birth of a giant but a dwarf came out instead.”53 The
Ortodoxo leader acknowledged that some future ministers, principally Hevia, were
“figures of undoubted prestige” but on the whole, dubbed Prío’s appointees, “the
council of mockery.”54

With an unrivaled memory for political foibles, Chibás

recounted a host of embarrassing anecdotes about the cabinet members to be. For
example, he reminded his radio audience that Interior Minister Rubén León and
minister without portfolio Ramón Vasconcelos had both served together before,
under Batista, but with less than stellar results. In fact, León had been tried for
misconduct because Vasconcelos had accused him of removing a marble staircase
from the education ministry and installing it in his home. Chibás recalled that
Virgilio Pérez, the communications minister, had been a member of the judicial
police during Machado’s regime and was director of the National Institute of Coffee
under Grau, where he had engaged in various “scandalous dealings.”55 Edgardo
Buttari, the labor minister, had been commerce minister under Batista where he had
allegedly used scarce supplies of condensed milk to buy the support of Liberal party
Satirical sketches involving Primitvo Rodríguez invariably portrayed him holding a hoe, as the
term guataca in Cuban Spanish refers not only to the farm instrument but also to those who curry
favor.
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delegates. Chibás reserved his harshest words for Francisco Grau Alsina, who he
accused of stealing two million pesos destined for Cuba’s peasants while serving his
uncle as assistant minister of agriculture.

Following the cue of his BAGA co-

conspirator, “Pancho” invested the embezzled funds in two country estates and
commandeered agriculture ministry equipment to work the lands. Lastly, Chibás
pointed out that the cabinet violated Article 126 requiring that half the ministers be
non-legislators. A week later, he proudly announced that Prío had recognized the
error and rectified it.
The day before Prío´s swearing in, Chibás delivered a special Saturday
evening radio address. Certainly, the man who usually commanded Cuba’s attention
must have dreaded his rival’s impending moment in the sun. He also realized a
sense of optimism would likely flow from an event laden with promises and Chibás
wanted his listeners to keep their wits about them. Hence, the Ortodoxo leader
emphasized that his foe was a “laboratory product” who owed his victory to the
“laborious process of political chemistry” rather than a “spontaneous and direct
expression of public opinion.”56 He added that, “the government invested millions
of pesos in Carlos Prío in the same cold-blooded manner that a business enterprise
finances a project, its calculations determined with almost mathematical
precision.”57 Chibás innately understood his fellow countrymen and knew them to
be a passionate people. He thus fomented the belief that Prío needed to purchase
even the applause he would receive as he took the oath of office. For Chibás, his
opponent essentially represented Grau’s venality without his popularity.
56
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Expectations for the new president were modest and Chibás sought to diminish
them even further, concluding in his speech that Prío’s chances for success were but
“one in a hundred.”58
*

*

*

October 10 was Cuba’s most sacred national holiday. On that date in 1868,
Carlos Manuel de Céspedes declared the country’s independence and initiated the
struggle for liberation from Spain with a modest army of 147 men, 30 of which were
freed slaves from his plantation – the “Demajagua.”

In choosing October 10 as

inauguration day, the framers of Cuba’s 1940 constitution laid a symbolic burden on
the presidency that both Batista and Grau had shirked; namely, to honor the
example of Cuba’s founding father.59 During his address, the congenial, handsome
Prío said all the right things. He spoke of a national renewal headlined by land
reform, an anti-gangster law and creation of a national bank. However, even as Prío
attempted to set a new tone, José Manuel Alemán struck a devastating final blow on
behalf of the previous regime. While Cubans sized up their new president, Alemán,
now a senator from Havana, matter-of-factly looted the island’s currency reserves.
Accompanied by a group of suitcase bearing sidekicks, Alemán headed a
convoy of four education ministry trucks destined for the treasury building.
Walking breezily past the guards, they scooped up millions of United States dollars,
Italian lire, British pounds, French francs, Portuguese escudos, Soviet rubles and, of
course, Cuban pesos. Their baggage swollen with booty, they proceeded to Havana’s
Ibid.
Before the 1933 revolution, presidents were inaugurated on May 20, the anniversary of Cuba’s
official independence in 1902. However, this date was tainted by the United States’ imposition of the
Platt Amendment – which guaranteed it the right to intervene in Cuba’s affairs almost at will.
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airfield, where a chartered DC-3 awaited. Alemán and three cronies lugged the U.S.
cash aboard and took off for Florida. This portion of the stash, estimated at $19
million, was transferred to Alemán’s business headquarters in Miami Beach. An
employee was later quoted as saying that on the day the money arrived, “bundles of
$1000 dollar bills were tossed around like wrapped packages of pennies.”60 As for
the remaining treasure, Alemán’s henchmen were instructed to exchange it in local
banks. Two weeks later, details of the heist began trickling out. On October 25,
Raoul Alfonso Gonsé, director of Alerta, censured the previous regime’s “last raid”
against the treasury and lamented that the new administration had no alternative
but to “tighten its belt” in order to meet its financial obligations.61 Urging Prío not to
be an “accomplice” to this crime he concluded with a favorite phrase of Chibás,
namely, “to jail with the thieves.”62 For his part, the Ortodoxo leader was curiously
silent although supporters sent newspaper clippings and any other information they
found about the robbery to his office. One aficionado passed along the Alerta
editorial but also informed Chibás that his daughter had recently given birth to a
son, which they intended to name Eduardo in his honor.
Instead of focusing on this issue, Chibás had become obsessed with the
“fascist penetration” of Argentine president Juan Domingo Perón into Latin America
generally and Cuba specifically.63 In fact, he spent a considerable amount of time
collecting documents on Argentine agents in Cuba, their code names and supposed
“Dictator with the People,” Time, April 21, 1952:
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,889465-6,00.html
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Chibás. Legajo 36, Expediente 1109: 21, ANC.
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objectives. During his October 24 broadcast, Chibás noted that the Havana radio
station RHC Cadena Azul, one of the capital’s largest and most prominent, had
recently begun spouting pro Perón propaganda. Chibás stated that a secret deal was
in place between the station’s Cuban owner, Amado Trinidad, and Argentina’s
government controlled Radio Belgrano. In exchange for favorable coverage, the
latter had agreed to pay a million pesos over a four year period. “It is grave,” said
Chibás, “when a Cuban broadcaster with the public influence of RHC Cadena Azul,
which has listeners throughout Central America, is controlled by a foreign dictator
with the fascist characteristics of Perón.”64 Chibás pointed out that Perón had
already purchased the allegiance of radio stations in Peru, Bolivia, Chile and
Paraguay. He also maintained cozy relations with authoritarian regimes in the
Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Honduras. Just as damaging, “General Perón”
suppressed free speech in his native land and employed his surrogates to do the
same abroad.
The following week, Chibás devoted nearly his entire show to Perón’s
overarching shadow.

He was spurred partly by a military coup in Peru that

overthrew the elected president, José Luis Bustamante, on October 29. Chibás
believed it was no coincidence the plot originated in southern Peru, which was
suspiciously close to Argentina’s border. Styling himself something of a prophet,
Chibás declared, “What do they say now, those who last Sunday called me crazy for
my accusations against Perón?”65 Within Cuba, the Ortodoxo chief accused Perón of
co-opting labor leaders such as Ángel Cofiño, president of the Cuban Federation of
64
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Labor and Vicente Rubiera, who headed the Union of Cuban Telephone Workers.
Both men, he claimed were regular guests at the Argentine embassy. Chibás also
returned to presumed deal between RHC Cadena Azul and Radio Belgrano, which he
considered the most pressing threat. He cited a statement by Manuel Fernández,
president of the Cuban Radio Broadcasters Federation, who expressed “serious
worry” that Amado Trinidad “has converted himself into a propagandist for Perón,
who is an opponent of free speech in Argentina.”66 Given Trinidad’s sudden affinity
for all things Argentine, Chibás mused that he should refer to himself as a gaucho
rather a guajiro.67

More ominously, this affaire confirmed Chibás’ view that

constitutionalism remained fragile in Cuba and was under siege from both external
and internal sources.
In this sense, RHC Cadena Azul represented an ideal bogeyman because the
station also towed a pro-government line.68 Even as Chibás baited Amado Trinidad,
he never lost sight of his primary opponent – Carlos Prío. The new president was off
to a fairly auspicious beginning, having collaborated more closely with Cuba’s
legislators during his first two months than either Grau or Batista in their entire
terms. For the first time, the semi-parliamentary system envisioned by Cuba’s 1940
constitution seemed to be taking shape. Prío’s first initiative, the so-called Law
against Gangsterism, was approved in the senate with wide bipartisan support on
November 10. The measure created a special court for prosecuting gangster related
Ibid., 74-75.
Trinidad threatened to bring charges of libel against Chibás now that he no longer enjoyed
parliamentary immunity. However, he refrained from doing so – most likely realizing that a trial
would offer Chibás an even broader forum for his accusations.
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crimes with the understanding that they would be severely punished. Moreover, it
required clubs and associations to register with the government and obligated guntoting citizens to obtain a license. Explaining his vote, the Liberal senator Eduardo
Suárez Rivas declared that, “When the government proclaims that it would like to
rid the country of gangsters, the opposition parties have an obligation to provide the
president with the necessary instruments.”69 On the other hand, Chibás mocked the
statute as a “lie and deception,” alleging it would deprive law-abiding Cubans of
weapons and leave them at mercy of pistoleros.70 For emphasis he added that, “The
gangsters with ties to the presidential palace have received the law with happiness
and enthusiasm.”71 Cuba’s gangster problem, continued Chibás, was not due to a
lack of laws but the fact that gunmen never seemed to remain very long in prison –
usually because they had friends in high places. Indeed, much of Prío’s anti-gangster
rhetoric was undermined by the fact that he, like Grau, had filled the nation’s
security services with pseudo-revolutionary triggermen.

For example, Eufemio

Fernández, the new Bureau of Special Investigations chief, was a member of Acción
Revolucionaria Guiteras (ARG).
Prío attained less ambiguous success when the chamber of representatives
unanimously approved a law to establish the National Bank of Cuba on December
21. During negotiations in the senate, Prime Minister Tony Varona stressed the
administration’s desire for a “common effort” including opposition lawmakers that
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would produce the “most technocratic national bank in the world.”72 Even so,
minority leaders such as Eduardo Suárez Rivas and his fellow Liberal Ramón Zaydín
stalled the national bank statute, believing it would be useless without budgetary
and accounting reforms.

Chibás, who was no longer a senator, echoed their

concerns. Without the necessary safeguards, he declared the national bank may as
well feature a “roulette wheel, baccarat, poker and Paco Prío.”73 In the event,
creation of Cuba’s National Bank was closely followed by the Organic Budgetary
Law, which mandated transparent accounting practices. As a gesture of good will,
Prío provided an itemized budget to Congress even before the law took effect –
becoming the first president to do so in eleven years. Both the Organic Budgetary
Law and National Bank fulfilled directives of the 1940 constitution that had been
ignored by the previous two presidents. Moreover, Prío delivered on his promise to
oversee a “technocratic” bank by appointing Felipe Pazos, a promising 36-year-old
economist, as its director. Pazos had been a member of the Cuban delegation to the
Bretton Woods conference in 1944 and had just completed a three year stint at the
International Monetary Fund when he was nominated.
The education ministry seemed another preliminary triumph. During the
interim between Prío’s election and his inauguration, José Manuel Alemán had paid
off some favors by handing out a “mountain” of education ministry jobs. 74 Aureliano
Sánchez Arango, the new chief, refused to let them take effect – antagonizing
Alemán but demonstrating his seriousness in the process. Sánchez Arango also
“La semana parlamentaria,” Carteles, November 14, 1948: 56. As Varona was also a senator from
Camagüey, he was the administration’s natural advocate in Cuba’s upper chamber.
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cultivated a swashbuckling image by piloting his own plane to all parts of the island,
showing up unannounced and conducting on spot school inspections. Within two
months, he fired a plethora of teachers who did not meet certification requirements.
In a shocking move, Sánchez Arango even renounced the right to name teachers or
school inspectors. Henceforth, they would be hired according to an objective set of
guidelines issued, ironically, by Alemán in 1946. Chibás personally hated Sánchez
Arango but nonetheless applauded this act as a “commendable rectification.”75
However, this compliment was not allowed to linger in the minds of his listeners.
Moments later, Chibás confessed sarcastic surprise that Prío or his education
minister had been offended by inciso K or BAGA fueled appointments in the first
place. After all, Prío had used them to win the presidency just as Alemán’s designees
had hoped to net an easy paycheck. “In other words,” concluded Chibás, “from this
mud hole and from such corruption the present government was born.”76 Heeding
the advice of his friend Ignacio Mendoza, Chibás supplemented his criticism with a
series of countermeasures. Specifically, he believed the massive teacher layoffs
violated the principle of tenure and replaced the problem of indiscriminate hiring
with the equally unsavory prospect of arbitrary dismissals. He also drew attention
to the many teachers who had purchased their positions because, given the
education ministry’s venality, there was no other way to practice their profession.
Rather than persecuting such figures, he urged Sánchez Arango to jail the high level
officials who profited from this practice.
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Above all, the thousands of newly unemployed teachers were less interested
in what was best for Cuba’s education ministry than they were in recovering their
jobs.

Six weeks into Sánchez Arango’s term, their growing clamor led Eduardo

Suárez Rivas to submit a motion of interpellation. Sánchez Arango appeared before
the senate on December 15 and connived, with the blessing of Senate President
Miguelito Suárez Fernández, to fill the visitor’s gallery with sympathizers. This was
more a matter of comfort than necessity, as the education minister advanced his
case for reform by ruthlessly detailing the abuses of his predecessors. Special
attention was reserved for the schemes of José Manuel Alemán, which included
manipulating tax collections, the employment of ghost workers and outright theft of
ministry funds. The onetime “monarch of Inciso K,” who had pulled out all the stops
to avoid appearing before the senate in April of 1947, was now brutally exposed in
absentia by a barrage of incriminating documents. While Sánchez Arango emerged
unbowed from these proceedings, they stirred the displeasure of Grau, who believed
Alemán had been his best minister.
Grau’s fury was also aroused by an investigation into administrative
corruption during his term, announced by Pelayo Cuervo on November 8. That
afternoon, at around 4:30 p.m., Cuervo requested that Finance Minister Antonio Prío
appear before the senate and explain why more than 100 million pesos were missing
from the national treasury.

Speaking in the Capitolio to a rapt audience of

journalists, members of the public and fellow senators, Cuervo revealed a wealth of
scandalous tidbits. Chief among these were the disappearance of one million pesos
from customs service coffers the day before Prío’s inauguration and indications that
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Grau had daily stowed away 60,000 pesos from illicit sources during his years in
power. A Carteles correspondent reminded readers that, “This is not the rumor of a
mosquito.”77 Rather, it was Pelayo Cuervo, one of Cuba’s most honest men, pointing
the finger. Determined to avoid a potentially embarrassing scenario, the Auténtico
senator Lomberto Díaz and his Republican counterpart Santiago Rey lamely
asserted that the finance minister was working long days and could not spare even a
moment of his time. When pressed, they were blunter – informing Cuervo that his
motion of interpellation would never gain majority approval. Despite this setback,
Cuervo doggedly continued his inquiry and revised the amount of stolen funds
upwards as he gained possession of new documents. In effect, the former Ortodoxo
and current Liberal senator’s crusade was an advertisement for the benefits of
pragmatism. Contrary to PPC isolationists who cherished the prospect of an ideal
government sometime in the future, Cuervo argued for the best possible one
immediately.

His abandonment of the Ortodoxos had disgusted many party

members, Chibás foremost among them, but Cuervo’s activities presently
represented the best chance of achieving something his old companions only talked
about: putting government thieves on trial and delivering the guilty behind bars.
While a potential exposé of Grau’s administration could prove awkward,
especially as Prío had also pocketed significant sums, the new president’s direst
challenge involved the military. After eight years of civilian rule, Cuba’s soldiers
were as liable to violate the island’s laws as they were to defend them. Genovevo
Pérez Dámera, Grau’s army chief, set the tone for his subordinates by periodically
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ignoring elected officials or judges. For example, he offered a public showing of the
Orfila footage, gleefully overriding the interior minister’s ban. Further, he had no
qualms about contradicting Cuba’s Superior Electoral Tribunal or defending the
captain who murdered Jesús Menéndez in extrajudicial fashion. At the same time,
he comported himself flawlessly during the presidential election. In opting to retain
him, while dismissing all of Grau’s cabinet ministers, Prío was most likely moved by
two key factors. First, Pérez Dámera had been instrumental in coaxing Miguelito
Suárez Fernández back into the Auténtico fold. In doing so, he had cleared the last
hurdle facing Prío’s presidential bid.78 Moreover, he was a sincere enemy of Cuba’s
pistoleros and a useful counterweight to the gangster infested police forces.
If Cubans were curious as to whether the irresponsible or prudent Pérez
Dámera would show up first, they did not have to wait long to find out. Shortly after
Prío’s term began, a retired general named Abelardo Gómez who lived in Miami
accused Pérez Dámera of embezzling two million pesos from the military retirement
fund. On November 13, Pérez Dámera responded with a bizarre and disturbing
obloquy against the island’s media outlets.
I urge, emphatically, from now on that those in the national press who
assume such cowardly attitudes, for God knows what reasons, to limit
themselves to topics that rightfully correspond to publicity organs.
They must understand that the obligation to nobly and disinterestedly
serve the republic is more important than chasing after a few extra
coins! We have had to make great efforts in order to contain the
spontaneous impulses of the soldiers, who without exception have
demonstrated their anger and a desire to go beyond the military
barracks to attack those responsible for the insult. If mercenaries
without conscience were to reach the Cuban public and commit
imprudent or evil deeds, the responsibility would rest squarely with
Suárez Fernández controlled the Matanzas and Las Villas provincial assemblies and could have,
under Cuba’s electoral law, rejected the Auténtico-Republican alliance.
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the press. We would like to advertise, once and for all, to anyone who
would ignore our message, that we will not in any way tolerate those
who question our prestige and reputation based on lies, because in
that case we will know how, in a virile manner, to demand the respect
we deserve without worrying about any consequences that may
result.79
Needless to say, the island’s journalists were horrified. Yet again, Pérez Dámera had
disdained Cuba’s laws and declared himself the ultimate arbiter of its public life. In
the senate, Antonio Martínez Fraga demanded that the defense minister appear and
personally explain the army chief’s declaration. However, no official quorum took
place the whole week because Auténtico and Republican legislators stayed away.
During his radio show, Chibás read aloud Article 33 of the constitution, which
provided for complete freedom of speech and confirmed that the judiciary alone had
the power to determine whether charges were libelous. By now, however, the
scandal centered less on Pérez Dámera’s threats than Prío’s reaction to them. On
November 15, the president notified his cabinet that he had authorized the general’s
screed – adding that he personally had no intention of permitting the press to
criticize his family. Chibás noted that many of Prío’s relations were also public
figures including his older brother Paco, a senator from Pinar del Río, his younger
sibling Antonio, the treasury minister, his brother-in –law Enrique Cotú Henríquez,
a member of the chamber of representatives and his father-in-law Gerardo Tarrero,
the director of Cuba’s lottery. “According to this theory,” said Chibás, “the day that
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all the president’s ministries are occupied by relatives there won’t be any opposition
in Cuba because the sacred family of his majesty, Carlos I, is taboo.”80
That same day, Prío exacerbated the situation by deciding to temporarily
shut down the radio shows of Chibás and Salvador García Agüero, his two most
popular critics, ostensibly because of “verbal excesses.”81

Suddenly, the man

seeking to restore his party’s good name was verging on tyranny and faced with
mass protests. University and secondary school students joined ordinary citizens in
the streets. The Federation of Radio Broadcasters, the Professional Journalists
Association, the Cuban Press Bloc, the Federation of University Students, Prensa
Libre and Bohemia all weighed in with strong condemnations. Given the furor, Prío
reversed himself within 24 hours. The erudite Manuel Bisbé quipped that the
president was like Penelope, wife of Odysseus, who unwove at night what she sewed
during the day. Chibás called this the “politics of zigzag,” created by those who were
“inebriated.”82 With a glint in his eye, Chibás added, “One is no longer allowed to say
drunks because Virgilio (the communications minister) may deem it incorrect.”83

THE RETURN OF BATISTA
On Saturday, November 20, armed with parliamentary immunity and
personal guarantees from the president, Fulgencio Batista boarded a plane for
Havana. Upon arriving, the ex general was met by a throng of several thousand
Ibid., 90-91.
In an attempt to appear even-handed, Prío also placed two pro-government shows under ban but
their audiences were miniscule compared to Chibás and García Agüero. Only the president’s most
devoted partisans believed he was acting equitably.
82 Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 6, Expediente 201: 94-95, ANC.
83 Ibid., 95.
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supporters whose fervor was such that he was able to reach his automobile only
with the help of a military contingent. Ten days later, Batista penetrated the
Capitolio where a less sympathetic audience awaited. Strangely enough for a man
who had once ruled Cuba as military strongman and elected president he was,
according to a Carteles correspondent, “visibly embarrassed and suffering from
stage fright like any debutant.”84

Batista was helped through his initial

disorientation by the ex Ortodoxo and former Democrat José Enrique Bringuier, who
escorted him toward the Liberal delegation. Sensing everyone’s eyes upon him,
Batista rushed to sit down but the place he chose belonged to Rafael Guas Inclán. He
then settled into the adjoining seat, which was owned by Eduardo Suárez Rivas.
Moments later, Suárez Rivas appeared and Batista rose to greet him. Instead of
informing Batista that the bench was his, the mischievous Suárez Rivas dropped a
tie pin on it, causing the onetime military chief to jump up in pain and thereafter
stand awkwardly in the aisle. Finally, Bringuier reappeared and shepherded Batista
to safety in one of the back rows. However, he did not stay long. At his first
opportunity, Batista fled the chamber. The Carteles reporter estimated that he had
spent a mere 11 minutes among his fellow senators before leaving.
During his radio show, Chibás portrayed Batista in even more pathetic terms
– describing him as, “exhausted, bent under the weight of the millions he stole,
subjugated by the president, full of prudence and fear, after asking Prío’s
government, very docilely, for permission to return.”85

As with most Cuban

politicians, Chibás was a man of countless grudges.

Three unforgiveable
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transgressions in his mind were murder, venality and betrayal of the 1933
revolution. Usually, his enemies were guilty on one or two counts but Batista was a
rare figure who covered all the bases. On this occasion, Chibás wondered how the
ex military chief would assist Prío in undermining Cuba’s revolutionary ideals. He
noted that Batista, who had often commented on the island’s politics while in
Florida, was now mum “as if he had come from China or Siberia.”86

Chibás

speculated that the ex general had been allowed back as a ruse to divide the
opposition. Needless to say, he felt this was the wrong way for Prío to pursue
reforms, saying:
In order to preach, with moral authority, the value of honest
administration, the first thing that must be done, as a gesture of
sincerity, is to incarcerate those who have stolen from the National
Treasury beginning with Grau San Martín and Fulgencio Batista.
Anything else is hypocrisy or complicity. These two men belong in jail
not for political reasons but because they are thieves and that’s where
they would be if there were sufficient shame in this country. In the
United States, in England, in Switzerland, in the Scandinavian nations,
in any country where laws are respected, these two men would be in
prison even if they had only robbed and damaged their people half as
much as they actually have.87
Despite Batista’s hapless senate performance and initial deference, Prío was also
playing with fire. Batista commanded considerable respect among the island’s
soldiers, whose respect for civilian authority remained uncertain. As if to underline
the danger, a military junta in Venezuela toppled the democratically elected Rómulo
Gallegos on November 24. Cuba already counted uniformed dictatorships to its east
Ibid.
Ibid., 97-98. Chibás also admired the United States voting system. During his December 12 radio
show, Eddy told listeners he knew Harry Truman would defeat Thomas Dewey even as all the
commentators thought otherwise because his rallies were twice as large and “the elections over
there are honorable.” See Ibid., 141.
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in Nicaragua and its west in the Dominican Republic. Now there was one to the
south as well. Even worse, Cuba’s northern neighbor, the United States, seemed
perfectly inclined to recognize the new Venezuelan regime. During his December 5
broadcast, Chibás did not hesitate to sound the alarm. He accused Prío of “taking a
siesta” while Batista cultivated enlisted men and Grau recruited army and naval
officers in competing attempts to seize power. “What just occurred in Venezuela,”
warned Chibás, “and what happened in Peru can be repeated in Cuba. We are in
great danger.”88 As proof, he noted that Prío was having a difficult time standing up
to his overweight military chief. Recently, Pérez Dámera had replaced a respected
general loyal to the president with one of his own devotees over a trivial infraction.
Rather than protesting, Prío backed El Gordo. In an episode that inspired less
confidence, Pérez Dámera placed Abelardo Gómez, the general who accused him of
corruption, under summary arrest.

General Gómez had arrived in Havana to

challenge the acquittal of Pérez Dámera before a military court on charges of
embezzlement but only after receiving guarantees from Prío regarding his freedom
and well being. Pérez Dámera, obviously, had little use for such promises. Given
these circumstances and the fall of democratic governments throughout Latin
America, Chibás proclaimed: “Carlos Prío, remember the adage that says: ‘when you
see your neighbor’s beard on fire, soak your own in water.’”89
Chibás spent the next few weeks drumming up support for President
Gallegos, who had taken refuge in Havana along with many members of Acción
Democratica – his political party. In fact, Gallegos was lionized by Cuban leaders
88
89
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across the political spectrum. Carlos Prío received Acción Democratica exiles with
open arms and permitted them to engage in conspiratorial activities on Cuban soil.
Moreover, he withheld recognition to the military government. On December 18, a
motley collection of political leaders and intellectuals organized a pro Gallegos rally
in Havana’s Parque Central. The speakers included Fernando Ortiz, Manuel Bisbé
and Communist chief Juan Marinello, who blamed Gallegos’ overthrow on the
Truman administration.

Chibás, who was an enthusiast of the U.S. president,

believed the coup was backed by Wall Street moguls interested in Venezuela’s oil
but absolved Truman of any responsibility. Also, Chibás accused Cuban Communists
of “unprecedented cynicism,” for praising democracy during the gathering while
their Venezuelan comrades were busy accommodating the military regime.90 Above
all, Chibás felt there was a lesson that Cuba must not ignore. The Ortodoxo leader,
whose radio show reached the entire Caribbean basin, recalled that Venezuelan
listeners had ridiculed him when he first underlined the influence of Perón and the
threat of military dictatorship in late October. Weeks before Gallegos was ousted, a
Venezuelan newspaper accused Chibás of “seeing visions” and asserted that the
“epoch of military takeovers and dictatorship is gone forever.”91 Chibás worried
that Cubans were similarly smug about the prospect of a barracks revolt.
In 1948, Christmas fell on a Saturday, the day Chibás generally set aside to
write and research material for his radio show.

Normally, this would not have

altered his schedule much as Chibás was neither a regular churchgoer nor
particularly devout. Nevertheless, his brother Raúl’s wife had recently given birth to
90
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a son and Eddy, besides becoming an uncle for the first time, was tabbed as the
child’s godfather. He thus spent that morning in the Vedado Parrish Church at the
baptism of baby Eduardo Raúl Chibás Rovira. Even as he paused, Chibás was certain
Cuba’s internal and external enemies would remain steadfast. Hence, he found time
enough later on to prepare for his final broadcast of the year – which highlighted the
three imperialist threats facing Cuba. These were Wall Street financiers, whose
primary agent was Guillermo Alonso Pujol; Perón whose local representative was
Amado Trinidad; and the Soviet Union, whose lackeys were Juan Marinello and Blas
Roca.
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Chapter 6
“I Would Proudly Go to Prison to Defend the Cuban People”

On the evening of January 1, 1949 Aurelio Álvarez died in a Havana
Charitable Society hospital amidst a coterie of companions including Eduardo
Chibás, Liberal vice presidential candidate Gustavo Cuervo Rubio and others. Chibás
respected the 67 year old Álvarez despite his vociferous belief in pacts and
desertion of the Ortodoxos nearly eight months earlier. The PPC leader could forgive
these faults because, over a long career that spanned Cuba’s entire history as an
independent nation, Álvarez had behaved honorably at each major turning point.
He joined the island’s liberation army at the age of 16, where his mettle caught the
attention of Commander-in-Chief Máximo Gómez.

In 1926, as a senator and

president of the Conservative party, he rejected the policy of cooperativismo under
which Cuba’s political organizations agreed to slavishly follow Machado. After
Machado’s illegal re-election two years later, Álvarez and his son René actively
struggled against the regime. The boy was killed by Machado’s soldiers while the
father suffered prison and exile.

In 1933, Álvarez supported the “100 days”

government of Ramón Grau San Martín and the next year became a founding
member of the Auténticos. He was elected as a delegate to the constituent assembly
that devised the island’s constitution and as an Auténtico senator from Camagüey,
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Álvarez was among the first to denounce the venality of Grau’s administration.
Álvarez had also warmed Chibás’ heart by accusing Prío of betraying the revolution.1
As a former legislator, Álvarez’s body was displayed in the Capitolio. During
the wake, which attracted present and former lawmakers of every party, a pair of
elderly nabobs, Carlos Manuel de la Cruz and Carlos Miguel de Céspedes, discussed
the two most talked about figures in Cuban politics – Fulgencio Batista and Eddy
Chibás.2 De la Cruz, an erstwhile Democratic parliamentarian who in 1934 had been
a heartbeat away from Cuba’s presidency, spoke first.3 “Batista is finished,” he said.
“He will never again lift his head in triumph. He represents expedience. Those who
want money and who took advantage during his years in power will support him,
but no one else. If he didn’t have the millions he stole from the treasury, he would
be selling candy right now.”
Céspedes, the former public works minister under Machado and current
senator from Matanzas, replied, “You are mistaken. In my opinion, Batista is the
most interesting figure in Cuba since the war of independence.

He became

president after starting from nothing.”
“Don’t forget, Carlos Miguel, that the slogan ‘Shame against Money’ obtained
400,000 votes in the last elections. This is the seed that will flower one day!
Perhaps tomorrow, in 1950. A new generation is going to judge everything, from
the Batista dictatorship up to the present era of Prío.”
“En Cuba, Deceso: Una Vida Fecunda y Combativa,” Bohemia, January 9, 1949: 53.
Both men were also lawyers who had once been partners in the same firm.
3 Carlos Manuel de la Cruz was appointed president of Cuba’s State Council in 1934, which placed him
next in line for the island’s presidency – occupied at that moment by Carlos Mendieta. The State
Council was an appointed body of 50 men which advised the cabinet and served as a substitute for
the legislative branch until elections were organized in 1936. Another candidate for the job, Colonel
Roberto Méndez Peñate, was so distraught at being passed over that he shot himself.
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“When this day arrives,” answered the senator from Matanzas, “there will
once again be student martyrs and property belonging to government figures will be
sacked just as it was during Machado’s era. And everything will happen very rapidly
because today it’s possible to mobilize people by radio, which was impossible
during our time.” He paused for an instant and then added, “Batista will play his
part.

Remember that all the colonels enriched themselves while he governed

omnipotently and they won’t sit idly by. As for Chibás, don’t assume he will be able
to take advantage of the situation. History shows that all the apostles who light
bonfires are burned in them. He will be the instrument who shows the way but will
perish.”4

THE UNFAITHFUL DISCIPLE
While the death of Álvarez deprived Cuba’s political scene of a pugnacious
and upright pragmatist, another figure with comparable qualities kept his shoulder
to the grind. On January 18, Pelayo Cuervo presented a 33 page accusation to Cuba’s
Supreme Tribunal alleging 174,241,840 pesos and 14 centavos had been purloined
during Grau’s administration.5 The case was subsequently passed along, “like a hot
potato,” to the Court of Instruction – which was deemed a more appropriate forum
by reluctant Supreme Tribunal judges.6 Lawsuit 82, as Cuervo’s denunciation was
officially known, provoked a flurry of speculation. Francisco Ichaso believed it

“En Cuba, Política: Recordando el Pasado,” Bohemia, January 16, 1949: 55.
The exact size of the deficit was a matter of great debate. For example, Treasury Minister Antonio
Prío estimated it to be 85 million pesos.
6 Francisco Ichaso. “La Difícil Situación del Gobierno Actual Ante las Malversaciones del Anterior,”
Bohemia, January 31, 1949: 27.
4
5

173

contained “more than sufficient” evidence for criminal proceedings against Grau,
some of his ex ministers and numerous government functionaries.7 At the same
time, he was realistic, asserting that, “There is nothing more difficult in Cuba than
punishing administrative corruption,” especially as many citizens felt stealing from
the state was relatively harmless.8 On the other hand, workaday Cubans were
beginning to question whether the government would be able to fund basic services.
In a cartoon that encapsulated the fears of many, the satirist David portrayed a
doubtful man telling his friend that, “There will be a budget! But…will there be
money?”9 Prío guaranteed both while asserting the shortfall had “nothing to do”
with his administration.10 Chibás, however, begged to differ. On February 10, he
visited the Court of Instruction and urged the judge assigned to Lawsuit 82, Antonio
Vignier, not to spare Prío’s appointees, saying: “To exonerate the thieves who
occupy positions in the current government and throw all the blame on former
employees of the previous regime…would be a monstrous miscarriage of justice and
an example of incalculable cowardice.”11 For his part, Prío had followed Cuervo’s
relentless accumulation of evidence with dread since it began. The week before the
senator submitted his complaint, a treasury ministry official called to ask whether
he intended to denounce financial “irregularities” committed during the previous

Ibid.
Ibid.
9 David, “No es lo mismo,” Bohemia, January 16, 1949: 54.
10 “Grafoentrevisa exclusiva: Prío,” Bohemia, January 16, 1949: 60.
11 Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 589.
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administration.12 Cuervo, who responded affirmatively, saw this as evidence that
the palace was monitoring his “steps.”13
Specifically, Prío desired to know if he should brace for a scandal. Just as
Cuervo had been patiently amassing documents, Grau had been collecting a list of
grievances against his onetime prime minister. Above all, the former physiology
professor had explicitly told Prío of his wish to avoid embarrassment over the
treasury deficit – which he blamed on the 1948 election campaign and Prío’s need to
purchase the popularity he came by naturally. Prío had bent over backwards to
accommodate Grau, appointing a compliant finance minister and scuttling Cuervo’s
attempt at a senate hearing on the matter. However, he had been unwilling to
prevent Cuervo’s complaint from reaching the courts.

El Viejo extracted swift

revenge for this broken promise during a Bohemia interview published on January
31. To begin with, Grau dismissed Prío’s attentiveness to the semi-parliamentary
system – claiming his erstwhile disciple bought congressional support with stacks of
lottery tickets which were resold at a hefty profit. The former president, who had
never needed to bribe the legislative branch since he ruled by decree, boasted of
using lottery revenue for “superior objectives” such as hospitals.14 He cast further
aspersions on Cuba’s semi-parliamentary model by saying it was an “invention” of
Batista, who had charged Colonel Jaime Mariné with the task of cajoling
lawmakers.15 In general, Grau confessed, “If someone asked me now why I made

“En Cuba, Política: Diálogo Telefónico,” Bohemia, January 16, 1949: 55.
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Prío president, I would tell him I made a mistake.”16 Grau was also eager to chivvy
Aureliano Sánchez Arango. He accused the education minister of firing fellow
Auténticos to burnish his presidential credentials. Regarding this aspiration, Grau
recalled a malign piece of folk wisdom. “In a tiny village,” he said, “a man was dying
to be mayor so he approached a friend and told him of his ambition. The friend
responded by saying, ‘Sure, chico, why not, others more stupid than you have
tried.”17
Although Prío had expected a reproach, he was stunned by the rawness of
Grau’s comments. Shortly after reading the interview, he sat down for lunch with
his brothers Paco and Antonio along with members of his inner political circle such
as Tony Varona, Virgilio Pérez and the congressman Segundo Curti. Prío was livid
but eschewed a forceful public rejoinder, particularly as Grau remained Auténtico
party president and master of its machinery. Instead, he remonstrated among his
select but sympathetic audience in the presidential palace. In the first place, Prío
bristled at Grau’s charge that he was an “unfaithful disciple,” saying he had always
followed his “own impulses.”18

He reminded everyone that in 1936 he had

proposed Grau’s expulsion from the Auténticos for failing to comply with party
doctrine. More recently, as prime minister, he “had the guts” to oppose Grau’s reelection campaign.19 Further, Prío was irritated by the thefts from the treasury.
“We have,” he said, “shown extraordinary politeness in calling a deficit that which
was really embezzlement, much of it realized after my election and, more concretely,
Ibid., 65.
66.
18 “En Cuba, Controversia: ‘El más Peligroso de Todos…,’” Bohemia, February 6, 1949: 49.
19 Ibid.
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between September 9 and October 10.”20 Lastly, Prío sensed something untoward
in Grau’s remarks. Like many Cuban politicians, he was acutely sensitive to possible
signs of a coup. Grau, he opined, “thinks only of regaining power, but because he’s
old and must wait eight years in order to legally run for president, he’s willing to try
anything.”21 This sentiment was echoed by Miguelito Suárez Fernández, who told a
Bohemia reporter that, “Grau has been corroded by his ambition to re-conquer
power through any means, except legitimate popular election.”22 Unlike Prío, who
grumbled privately, the senate president was one of many Auténticos who spoke to
journalists with alacrity. Aureliano Sánchez Arango deviously suggested that Grau’s
comments were rooted in “senility,” and wondered whether this also explained the
“disaster” of his final months as president.23

Asked if he had read the Grau

interview, Diego Vicente Tejera explained that, “Nobody believes in (Grau) anymore.
The country has lost respect for him.”24 A survey commissioned by Bohemia seemed
to confirm this view. If faced with a choice between Prío and Grau, 64.09 percent of
Cubans preferred the current president while only 6.14 percent opted for his
predecessor.25 In many respects, this was a more devastating verdict than the
jeremiads of Auténtico leaders – many of whom wished him ill for their own
personal reasons. For example, Tejera resented Grau for firing him as education
minister in 1946 and later for blocking the presidential candidacy of his ally and

Ibid.
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22 Ibid., 52.
23 Ibid.
24Ibid.
25 Of the remaining subjects, 13.18 percent replied “I don’t know or I don’t want to answer” and 16.59
percent said, “Neither.” See Raúl Gutiérrez, “El Pueblo Opina Sobre Prío y Grau, Chibás y Batista,”
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patron, Suárez Fernández. Conversely, a year earlier many citizens still believed he
was the best president in the island’s history.
Of all Grau’s criticisms, the only one that remained unchallenged involved the
Law against Gangsterism, which he declared, “has only served to encourage the very
thing it seeks to avoid.”26 Grau, of course, had scarce moral authority in this case as
he set the stage for gangsterism during his own administration and had famously
taken ill during the Orfila massacre. Nevertheless, Prío’s law had done nothing to
stem a recent outbreak of violence. On the evening of January 12, Rubén Darío
González, a member of the National Police who also belonged to Union
Insurreccional Revolucionaria (UIR), was shot 17 times as he took a drink in
Havana’s seedy San Isidro district.

In typical fashion, the bar’s other patrons

cowered on the floor until the getaway car had removed to a safe distance. The
murderers were soon identified as Gustavo Massó and Juan Regueiro, both of whom
were university students tied to Movimiento Socialista Revolucionaria (MSR) leader
Rolando Masferrer. Masferrer’s newspaper, El Tiempo en Cuba, praised them for
eliminating the “assassin” González, who was implicated in the death of Manolo
Castro.27 Unfortunately, their celebration was short lived as their corpses turned up
on the Havana Country Club’s manicured grounds within 72 hours. During his
January 16 broadcast, Chibás pointed out that Massó and Regueiro had last been
seen entering police custody before their tortured and disfigured bodies were
found. “It was the same way during the Machado era!” he shouted, anxious to make
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hay from the scandal.28 Rather than pursuing justice in the courts, the National
Police, with its strong UIR contingent, had apparently resolved the case through
vigilantism.

Not only had Massó and Regueiro been killed, but the latter’s

stepfather, Nemesio Fernández, had been interrogated and beaten with such
ferocity that his wounds required treatment in the infirmary.

The Prensa Libre

columnist Néstor Piñango, who closely followed Cuba’s gangster scene, explained
that all National Policemen, even high-ranking figures, performed tasks for the UIR
even if they did not formally belong to the group. Hence, National Police chief José
Caramés, who was unaffiliated, involved himself in UIR business although the actual
killing tended to be done by members like Lieutenant Armando Correa.
Public outrage was compounded by the fact that another cadaver had already
been deposited in the Havana Country Club earlier in the week.

The victim,

identified as Rolando Vázquez Contreras, was a construction worker belonging to
Acción Revolucionaria Guiteras (ARG) – an outfit with close links to Carlos Prío.29
Vázquez had been fingered in the shooting of Gregorio Martínez, an employee of the
Havana Electric Company and UIR associate. By all indications, this was yet another
gruesome case of gangland tit for tat. Trying to make the best of a bad situation,
Prime Minister Tony Varona lauded the “zeal” of Havana’s policemen in elucidating
details of the Vázquez case.

A Bohemia reporter offered a less optimistic

assessment, noting that less than two weeks before, President Prío had announced

Ibid.
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that, “the ‘Law against Gangsterism’ has helped create the peaceful climate that
Cubans are now enjoying.”30

LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION
On February 3, 1949, Eduardo Chibás probably scanned his advance copy of
Bohemia with more than the usual anticipation.

Inside was a public survey

conducted among residents of Havana and its outlying suburbs, containing the
following question: “If the opposition were able to unite, who, in your opinion,
should be its natural leader, Chibás or Batista?” As it happened, a total of 42.73
percent of respondents preferred the Ortodoxo chief while 37.27 percent chose the
former strongman. Moreover, Chibás owed this modest lead to women – who
favored him by nearly 12 points (46.23 to 34.67). Among men, the two rivals were
in a dead heat.31 By any reasonable estimate, Chibás, whose popularity in Havana
was well known, should have been the clear choice. However, he may have lost
some support among pragmatists who looked askance at his distaste for pacts.
Francisco Ichaso implied as much, claiming the Ortodoxos represented the most
“sincere and vigorous” opposition to the current administration but their
possibilities were hindered by a “lack of political realism.”32 Batista, who had
imposed order during the turbulent years after 1934, may also have benefited from
the spike in gangster violence. Even as Chibás boasted the most unconditional

“En Cuba, Atentados: ‘Apártese todo el mundo,” 51.
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adherents in Cuba, the island’s largest radio audience for a political show and kudos
from its highest circulation magazine, his position as opposition leader was
precarious.33
As per custom, Chibás attempted to grab extra attention and prestige with his
unique brand of muckraking. For most of January, this involved an escalation of the
polemic with Amado Trinidad. The proprietor of RHC Cadena Azul and apologist for
Argentine president Juan Domingo Perón had lately begun publishing a series of
articles denouncing United States policy in Latin America.

Among those he

considered “lackeys of Yankee imperialism” was none other than the Ortodoxo
leader himself.34 For his part, Chibás revealed that Trinidad had maintained regular
contact with an Argentine spy named Guillermo Aikman. The two communicated
via messages whose code Chibás had mysteriously managed to crack. Eddy thus
treated his listeners to a detailed itinerary of the Argentine agent’s activities
including, including worldwide travels, flight numbers, telephone conversations,
hotel rooms and even slight changes of plans. An impressed Bohemia reporter
wrote that Chibás had turned himself into a “detective on a par with Sherlock
Holmes.”35

Other media outlets were less gracious.

Speculation abounded

regarding how Chibás had come upon such sensitive documents and who had
provided the key to encoded spy cables.

The Communist daily Hoy angrily

concluded that he was working for the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation

Later that month, Bohemia announced that its most recent issue had sold 190,000 copies. See “190
Mil Ejemplares,” Bohemia, February 20, 1949: supplement, 1.
34 “En Cuba, Polémica: Duelo Entre Micrófonos,” Bohemia, January 31, 1949: 55.
35 Ibid.
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and dubbed him, “second in charge of the G-Men in Cuba.”36 Unfortunately for
Chibás, the engrossing twists and turns of this case were overshadowed in the
public imagination by bullet filled gangster victims and Grau’s sensational
accusations.
The Ortodoxo leader would not play second fiddle for long, however. He, like
most Cubans, had watched with alarm as the National Economic Board approved an
increase in the country’s already inflated electricity rates. In response, Eddy’s friend
Ventura Dellundé, who was president of the island’s Consumers Association,
appealed the measure before the Supreme Tribunal. After that, things became a bit
murky. Eduardo Salazar, a Cuban Electric Company executive, offered Dellundé
200,000 pesos to drop the case but was rebuffed. He then turned to the judges, who
were importuned so relentlessly that one asked to be discharged from the case.
Nonetheless, public opinion was buoyed by the knowledge that three of the five
judges were known to oppose higher electricity prices. Cubans were thus “violently
surprised” to learn the Supreme Tribunal had rejected the appeal on February 19. 37
The last minute change of heart by Judge Francisco Torres Tomás, who had
previously been critical of the Cuban Electric Company, was endlessly scrutinized.
Chibás, whose radio show was scheduled for the next day, immediately realized he
had a magnificent opportunity on his hands. The Cuban Electric Company, scorned
by locals as the “electric octopus,” was a perfect example of what he considered Wall
Street imperialism. After all, its parent firm, Electric Bond and Share, was based in
the United States and gouging Cuban consumers had been company policy since
36
37
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1902.38 During Machado’s administration, the Cuban Electric Company had been
granted preferential tax rates and land rights superseding those of the state or
private citizens. In 1927, Cubans paid 17 cents per electric kilowatt even though
production costs were only one and a half cents per unit.39 Just over two decades
later the situation had improved but only somewhat. In January of 1948, citizens of
neighboring Puerto Rico were charged $9.85 per electric kilowatt as compared to
$16.45 for Havana residents.40 Four months later, Bohemia reported that the Cuban
Electric Company was using antiquated equipment requiring three times the
petroleum to produce a kilowatt as similar utilities in the United States. 41 Currently,
the “electric octopus” argued that more revenues were needed to offset higher
expenses. However, this was exposed as a ruse by the U.S. economist John Bauer
and representatives of the engineering firm A.S. Beck, whose investigation found
that the Cuban Electric Company’s costs had risen 61 percent since 1936 but net
income had doubled during that time.42
During

his

presidential

campaign,

Chibás

advocated

“immediate

nationalization” of the Cuban Electric Company, claiming this would benefit the
greater good rather than “egotistical money-making exploiters.”43 He also asserted
that exorbitant electricity rates precluded the all important project of agricultural
reform. While preparing for his broadcast, Chibás pondered these grievances and
Electric Bond and Share was actually a holding company created by General Electric in 1905.
In the chamber of representatives, Carlos Manuel de la Cruz complained in 1927 that firms such as
the Cuban Electric Company had been “bleeding” the population since 1902. See: Aguilar, 65.
40 J. Isern, “Refutan los Vecinos de La Habana a la Compañía Cubana de Electricidad,” Carteles,
February 1, 1948: 68.
41 “Ante la grave problema de la electricidad,” Bohemia, May 23, 1948: 66.
42 “En Cuba, Poder Judicial: Se Declaró Incompetente,” 62.
43“Los Candidatos Presidenciales Opinan Sobre el Grave Problema de la Electricidad,” Bohemia, May
23, 1948: 67, 74.
38
39

183

seethed at the latest insult perpetrated by the foreign owned monopoly. Speaking
into the microphones, he repeated the query ringing from every street corner.
“What happened? What powerful force pressured this judge into changing his
mind?”44 Chibás knew the answer his audience expected and did not disappoint
them.

According to his sources, Cuban Electric Company employees had paid

$300,000 to ensure an agreeable ruling. “Once again,” he said, “the Cuban people
have been disgraced because money has won out over shame. The ever growing
mud hole of corruption invading the country has now reached a place we never
thought possible: to some of the Supreme Tribunal judges.”45 Given the verdict’s
unpopularity, others also offered denunciations. In some cases, they used terms
that were strikingly similar to Chibás. The senate majority leader Lomberto Díaz
lamented that, “It’s not just politicians anymore. It seems some judges have also
entered into shady deals.”46 The Auténtico congressman Rogelio Regalado admitted,
“It would be very bad for the country if the mud hole reached the judiciary.”47
Santiago Rey, a Republican senator, proclaimed that, “It appears a lot of money must
have flowed” but added “some” of the judges were “responsible and honest.”48 On
the other hand, Ventura Dellundé allowed that the decision was “surprising” but
rejected suggestions that bribery had been a factor and expressed “absolute faith” in
the court system.49 As a practicing lawyer rather than an officeholder, this was
perhaps a wise tactic. He reiterated that under Law 5 of 1942 only the president
“En Cuba, Poder Judicial: Se Declaró Incompetente,” 63.
Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., 63-64.
44
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could raise or lower electricity prices and eventually a majority of judges would
recognize this fact.
Ultimately, Dellundé’s stoicism placated neither Chibás nor the impugned
judges. The latter merged their grudges into a single lawsuit and on February 25
Chibás was officially charged with defamation. After a brief hiatus, Chibás was once
again the national focal point and seemed altogether pleased. In an interview with
Luis Ortega, director of the Havana daily Pueblo, he claimed Carlos Prío had
“inspired” the proceedings in order to jail him and thereby silence the “truths” he
revealed every Sunday evening.50 Besides a maximum two year prison sentence, he
was also liable for a fine of up to 360 pesos. Calling attention to this possibility,
Chibás slyly said, “Since I never enriched myself in the government, nor did I rob,
deal in the black market or enter into business arrangements with Grau’s henchmen,
I don’t believe I’ll be able to pay the fine.”51 These remarks were merely an opening
salvo in a controversy he knew would play to his advantage regardless of the
outcome. On March 6, Chibás published an article in Bohemia entitled, “I Would
Proudly Go to Prison to Defend the Cuban People” in which he excoriated the judges,
the “Anti-Cuban Electric Company” and his favorite target, Carlos Prío. He noted
ironically that the same three judges who declared themselves “incapable” of
nullifying the recent increase in electricity prices had, in 1940, been quite “capable”

Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 591. Chibás was convinced the government meant to take him off
the air one way or another. First off, the attempt to close down his show in November of 1948 was
still fresh in his mind. The threat seemed even more concrete after Juan Manuel Márquez, an
Ortodoxo city councilman from Marianao, had been banned from the radio in January. Chibás had
inveighed against this decision, saying, “Only weak, unpopular and anti-democratic governments
who support themselves via fraud, embezzlement and crime fear the free expression of ideas and
clear exposition of the truth.” See: Ibid., 588.
51 Ibid., 591-592.
50
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of quashing a rebate some years earlier.52 Regarding the despised utility company,
Chibás railed against exorbitant fees that were the highest in Latin America and
accused Prío of pushing through a 70 percent rate hike in September of 1947 while
he was prime minister. Apart from this “embarrassing bit of graft,” Chibás repeated
his claim that a portion of the 174 million pesos missing from Cuba’s treasury could
be found in the bank accounts of Carlos and Antonio Prío.53 Chibás also could not
understand why he was the subject of a court case while the streets were thick with
so many gangsters and embezzlers. Nonetheless, if convicted, the Ortodoxo leader
promised to enter the hoosegow with “legitimate pride.”54 Curiously, the one thing
Chibás neglected to do was provide any proof that the judges had actually accepted
money in exchange for their votes.
Meanwhile, public ire against the Supreme Tribunal’s ruling showed no signs
of diminishing. The Federation of University Students “energetically condemned”
the verdict in a public statement and incited Cubans to “Fight against the oppressive
electric octopus!”55

Further, representatives from 68 civic organizations

representing the entire island addressed an open letter to President Prío urging him
to ensure “efficient, abundant and cheap electrical service.”56 The provincial council
of Oriente congratulated Ventura Dellundé and Chibás on their campaign against
higher electricity prices which, “deeply affect the country’s poor and its industry.”57

Eduardo R. Chibás, “Por Defender el Pueblo, Iría a la Cárcel Con Orgullo,” Bohemia, March 6, 1949:
75.
53 Ibid., 47.
54 Ibid.
55 “La FEU se Pronuncia Contra el Fallo del Supremo,” Bohemia, March 7, 1949: 57.
56 “Dos Documentos de Interés Público: El Comité Coordinador Nacional de Asociaciones Cívicas se
Dirige al Presidente de la República,” Bohemia, March 27, 1949: 63.
57“El Ejemplo de Oriente,” Bohemia, March 20, 1949: 71.
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Chibás, who by now fancied himself a modern day Galileo, stoked mass fervor at a
series of nighttime rallies illuminated by candles and kerosene lanterns. On March
11, Chibás upped the ante by appearing before the senate and submitting a motion
of impeachment against the three judges who had sided with the Cuban Electric
Company. This gesture, provided for by Article 208 of the 1940 constitution, formed
a symbolic contrast with the lawsuit against Chibás, which would be tried in the socalled Urgency Court created during Batista’s military regime.

The two cases

crisscrossed four days later when the Urgency Court temporarily suspended its
proceedings against Chibás in order to scrutinize the case pending before the senate.
Chibás, who relished the gathering whirlwind, was buoyed by still more good
fortune 24 hours later. Entering the studios of Unión Radio, Chibás enjoyed a chance
encounter with the beautiful actress Carmelina Bandera – who he found practicing
her lines for an episode of La Palabra de Mazorra. The Ortodoxo leader duly
confessed to being a fan of the show, demonstrating that stridence was a posture
reserved for political opponents.
*

*

*

During the month of April, Chibás learned that his family home, sold to pay
for campaign expenses in 1948, had been converted into a funeral parlor. However,
this inauspicious omen seemed more fitting for Carlos Prío – particularly as the Law
against Gangsterism seemed incapable of denting the brisk business of Havana’s
undertakers. On Saturday, April 2, a University of Havana student named Justo
Fuentes was killed in a drive-by shooting. He was cut down at 12:45 p.m. on a busy
Havana street near the studio of Radio COCO, where he had a daily show. Fuentes,
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who was vice-president of the Federation of University Students, had once been a
UIR member. More importantly, he had crossed a line by publicizing government
attempts to discreetly exile the jailed MSR leader Mario Salabarría. Salabarría
remained notorious for his role in the Orfila massacre and was one of the few
gangsters actually serving a long term prison sentence. Even so, his many contacts
among high-level Auténticos nearly guaranteed an amnesty once conditions were
right.

Fuentes, in a fit of Chibás-style journalism, had embarrassed the

administration by revealing a passport had lately been issued to Salabarría. Shortly
thereafter, friends began advising Fuentes to be careful because he was being
“checked out.”58 Fuentes paid no heed to these warnings and given his separation
from the UIR, there was little he could do to protect himself. The same hail of bullets
that ended Fuentes’ life also killed a nearby taxi driver. Interestingly, no policemen
arrived on the scene but a watchman did and he opened fire at the fleeing vehicle.
He then drove the wounded Fuentes to the hospital.

Unfortunately, he was

unwilling to identify the assailants. However, Fuentes confessed the names of his
attackers to Fidel Castro, an old UIR companion, before losing consciousness. They
included two of Cuba’s most notorious gangsters: Rolando Masferrer and Orlando
León Lemus. Aside from heading the MSR, Masferrer was an Auténtico congressman
from Holguín. Lemus, commonly referred to as El Colorado because of his red hair,
maintained close ties with the Prío brothers. In fact, during his final lucid moments,
Fuentes had repeated over and over that, “The red head killed me on the ground.”59
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Chibás had sat near Fuentes the day before his death when both attended a
rally against the Cuban Electric Company on the University of Havana staircase –
known as the escalinata. During his weekly broadcast, he accused the government
of “inciting and protecting the assassins” and congress of “keeping the gangsters
who reside among them from being prosecuted.”60

While Masferrer enjoyed

parliamentary immunity, Lemus had been a fugitive from justice since participating
in the Orfila killings and it was commonly believed he enjoyed official protection. In
this vein, the journalist Ernesto de la Fe wrote, “The friendship between the Prío
family and El Colorado is no secret.”61 A Bohemia reporter observed rising public
anger at administration officials and their “guilty tolerance” of Cuba’s triggermen. 62
By far, the bitterest expressions of outrage were those of Fuentes’ fellow classmates.
The Federation of University Students issued a three part declaration expressing a
readiness to seek revenge if the murderers were not punished, urging Cuba’s
congress to rescind the immunity of Masferrer so he could be tried and accusing
Paco Prío of personally sheltering El Colorado. Incensed students also intercepted
passing trams and adorned them with posters insulting Masferrer, El Colorado, Paco
Prío and Police Chief José Caramés.
Two days after Fuentes’ murder, the senate convened to discuss the accused
Supreme Tribunal judges, the Cuban Electric Company and electricity prices. The
judges’ fate initially rested with a five man committee, which recommended against
impeachment but backed a motion, proffered by Antonio Martínez Fraga to create a

Ibid.
Ibid.
62 Ibid.
60
61
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senate commission charged with investigating the unpopular “electric octopus.”63
During the debate, Manuel Capestany emotionally vouched for Pedro Cantero, one of
the indicted judges, who was also a childhood friend.

Taking a less sentimental

view, Varona opined that the motion for impeachment lacked “serious proof” and
confessed that the government preferred to halt “Chibás’ show.”64 Pelayo Cuervo,
who admitted two of the judges were friends and believed all three were innocent,
nonetheless felt a senate trial was the only means to exonerate them before public
opinion.

The Auténtico-Republican alliance, which held a majority, ultimately

agreed to vote against impeachment and reject the proposed senate commission.
Instead, they supported a project of the miguelista senator Porfirio Pendás – who
planned to introduce a bill requiring lower electricity prices. This sop for the
island’s citizens was hushed up on the insistence of Varona, who claimed
announcing it would “scare away” foreign investors.65 The prime minister may have
been feeling slightly fearful himself as a few days before he had received a visit from
the Cuban Electric Company’s American boss, known locally as “Mister” Wheeler.
Leaving nothing to chance, the firm had also extensively lobbied members of the
senate committee. Among other things, each man was provided with a 33 page legal
brief containing arguments in favor of the company.

At least one committee

member, the Republican Santiago Rey, mimicked these during the hearing. While
the hostility of pro government parties guaranteed the motion would fail, the
indifference of opposition lawmakers turned the session into a rout. In the end, only
The committee members were Lomberto Díaz (Auténtico), Santiago Rey (Republican), Manuel
Capestany (Liberal), Rafael Guas Inclán (Liberal) and Antonio Martínez Fraga (Democrat).
64 “En Cuba, Senado: ‘Nuestra Posición Quedará en Entredicho,’” Bohemia, April 10, 1949: 66-67.
65 “En Cuba, Senado: No quiere asustar a los Inversionistas,” Bohamia, April 10, 1949: 67.
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190

Pelayo Cuervo and Federico Fernández Casas voted for impeachment. The following
Sunday, Chibás blamed the senate’s decision on prime ministerial “pressure” and an
unduly cooperative opposition, which he compared to the cowed legislators of
Machado’s era.66 However, even as the price increase was unjust and the legal
reasoning behind them flawed, the Ortodoxo leader never offered concrete proof
that the judges had acted improperly.
On April 10, Chibás opened a new front against the administration. In a
Bohemia article, he commemorated Prío’s first “semester” in office by enumerating
all that was amiss. “Let’s take a look,” he wrote, “at the effect of his six months in
power.”
Businesses are faltering, factories are closing, workers are being laid
off, salaries are being cut, campesinos are being evicted from their
lands by the army, public services are a mess, public transport is in
chaos, telephone and electric bills are higher, there has been a notable
drop in government revenues, illegal payments of spurious debts to
United States citizens have taken place while Cubans are forced to
tighten their belts, a 100 million peso foreign loan is being negotiated
to replenish money embezzled from the treasury by figures who
served the Grau administration and currently hold positions in this
government (and lastly) student and union leaders have been serially
assassinated.67
For Chibás, the most disturbing of these ills was the prospect of a foreign loan. Since
January, rumors had been circulating that Prío would cover up Grau’s “deficit” with
borrowed money.

Chibás had been among those stoking the buzz.

He felt

vindicated when the island’s newspapers reported that President Prío and his
brother Antonio, the finance minister, had recently received three representatives
from Chase National Bank. As with the controversy over high electricity prices,
66
67
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Chibás was reenacting a drama from his years as a young revolutionary. Just as
Machado once extended preferential treatment to the Cuban Electric Company, he
had also relied on Chase National Bank for economic support.68

Nor did the

coincidences end there. One of the financiers who had visited Carlos and Antonio
Prío was Winthrop Aldrich, who had helped formulate the loans obtained by
President Machado.69 Given the sticky fingered members of Prío’s circle, especially
his brothers Antonio and Paco, Chibás pointed out the danger of yet another parallel
with the early 1930s – namely, that a foreign loan would enable graft of enormous
proportions.

In Machado’s era, Chase National Bank had underwritten the

construction of Cuba’s 750 mile long Central Highway, which spans the entire island
from east to west. Although this project proved indisputably valuable, it had been a
magnet for shady dealings such that each mile, at a cost of 160,000 pesos, was ten
times more expensive than reasonable estimates. “We will fight,” concluded Chibás
to keep the present government from mortgaging the Republic once again.”70
The following week, Chibás warned of an additional pending danger. On his
radio show of April 17, he accused Carlos Prío, José Manuel Casanova and the
“known speculator” Francisco Blanco Calás of plotting to reap fabulous profits by

Eschewing foreign loans had long been a staple of Cuban presidential campaigns, although such
promises were often broken. As a presidential candidate in 1924, Gerardo Machado had offered a ten
point program to the public. The last of his proposals involved paying off Cuba’s public debts and
avoiding new loans. During the 1948 campaign, Prío had also promised to steer clear of foreign
loans.
69 Winthrop Aldrich, a Harvard educated lawyer, was president of Chase Manhattan Bank between
1930 and 1934. At the time he visited Carlos and Antonio Prío he was Chairman of the Board, a
position he held during the years 1934-1953. After his banking career, Aldrich served as United
States ambassador to Great Britain (1953-1957).
70 Chibás, “¡Otro Empréstito con el Chase!,” 87.
68
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manipulating sugar prices.71 Casanova and Blanco had played comparable games in
1945, resulting in the infamous barter deal scandal. The feisty Liberal senator
responded by labeling him a “mental retard” in Prensa Libre.72 Chibás countered
with a Bohemia article that was equal parts wit and journalistic exposé.

He

irreverently compared the “Czar of Sugar” to his 18th century Venetian namesake,
contending that the latter, at least, had spent time in jail for his mischief while the
“tropical” Casanova remained free plague his fellow countrymen. 73 In this case,
Casanova and Blanco had “fictitiously” lowered sugar prices a few months earlier by
leaking “alarmist rumors” and utilizing their influence within the industry.74
Afterward, Blanco purchased 200,000 tons and promptly began lobbying the
government to prematurely end the sugar harvest in an effort to limit supplies.
President Prío had thus far resisted such a move knowing full well it would have
resulted in mass unrest in the countryside. However, in February and March he
issued decrees lowering the amount of sugar available for sale in Europe. According
to Chibás, speculators, many of whom had ties to the administration, would take
advantage of the momentary shortage to vend their sugar in Europe at a huge gain.75
Thereafter, the hoarded sugar would be released – flooding the market, fetching
ruinous prices and costing the Cuban treasury between 50 and 100 million pesos in
tax revenues. The 65 year old Casanova reacted indignantly to these allegations and

Eduardo R. Chibás, “Respondiendo al Senador Casanova,” Bohemia, April 24, 1949: 62.
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73 Chibás, “Respondiendo al Senador Casanova,” 62.
74 Ibid. Chibás’ source for this charge was a formal complaint lodged by Representative Lincoln
Rodón, president of Cuba’s chamber of representatives.
75 According to Chibás, administration officials with knowledge of the plan included ex Agriculture
Minister Ramón Nodal, current Agruculture Minister Virgilio Pérez and Teodoro Santiesteban,
secretary of the Cuban Tenant Farmers Association.
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demanded a duel. Chibás chose Manuel Bisbé and Eric Agüero, the Ortodoxo party
treasurer, as his seconds and dispatched them to negotiate terms with Casanova’s
representatives.
Carlos Prío had dueled with Chibás in 1947 after being similarly accused but
was too tangled up with the island’s gangster problem to respond. Six days after
Fuentes had been killed, he received a delegation from the Federation of University
Students in the presidential palace. The result was a 90 minute meeting laden with
palpable tension and uncomfortable questions. Speaking on the students’ behalf,
Pedro Mirassou told Prío that “everybody knows” who killed Justo Fuentes but
certain military and civilian authorities were “sabotaging” efforts to capture the
perpetrators.76 For instance, he found it “suspicious” that police and customs
officials in Havana’s airport had allowed Eustaquio Soto Carmenatti, one of those
implicated by Fuentes, to board a Pan American flight for Miami – particularly as the
suspected killer was using his own passport.77 Confronted with these details, the
cordial president attempted to win the students’ confidence by revealing hitherto
unknown information. Prío confessed that he had been notified “10 or 12 days”
after El Colorado had secretly returned to Cuba but immediately sent a message
urging him to leave so as not to “perturb” his government.78 Rather than being
placated, his audience was horrified. The medical student Orlando Bosch asked why
Lemus had not been arrested. Prío lamely answered that such “elements” usually

“En Cuba, Palacio: ‘Tienen que Meter en un Puño a la Universidad,’” Bohemia, April 17, 1949: 59.
Pedro Mirassou was also linked to UIR, which doubtless fed his desire to see the MSR triggermen
behind bars.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
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took refuge in the houses of senators, representatives or “influential friends.”79
Finally, Mirassou informed Prío that if no “effective” measures were taken to
prosecute the criminals, the students would “rise up in rebellion” after Easter.80
Despite this threat, Prío’s options were limited as Rolando Masferrer enjoyed
parliamentary immunity and Soto Carmenatti remained ensconced in Florida. El
Colorado’s whereabouts were uncertain, although murmurs on the street suggested
he had fled overseas. On April 19, however, the truth turned out to be otherwise.
That morning, in the working class Havana neighborhood of Cerro, another
university student with UIR ties was treated to a drive-by fusillade. The target, Luis
Felipe Salazar Callicó, known as Wichy, was severely wounded in the head and neck.
Upon arriving at the hospital, a commandant from the Bureau of Investigations
asked who was responsible but Salazar angrily replied, “Why should I tell you?
Everyone knows the police protect assassins.”81 Once again, Fidel Castro was on the
scene and extracted the information. He advised reporters that the car had been
driven by someone wearing a police uniform and the shooters were El Colorado and
Policarpo Soler. The latter was a Batista era police chief and present day mercenary.
In early 1948, Miguelito Suárez Fernández had publicly accused Soler of seeking to
kill him and his ally Diego Vicente Tejera. As a result, Suárez Fernández had
dispatched his UIR allies to neutralize the elusive Soler but to no avail. While Soler’s
reappearance was troubling, the continued presence of El Colorado posed a direct
challenge to Prío. During his April 24 broadcast, Chibás singled out Lemus as part of
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a “tragic panorama” of impunity whereby gunmen “ride in the official automobiles
of representatives, senators and ministers.”82
Chibás utilized that evening’s radio show for two other purposes. First, he
ceded the opening minutes to Pelayo Cuervo – allowing the self-styled
“independent” senator to address his audience for the first time since their
rancorous falling out. As luck would have it, Cuervo was also tangled up in Cuba’s
judicial system. The Havana Municipal Court had recently ordered him to pay a fine
of 150 pesos and submit testimony before the Urgency Court regarding possible
defamation of the justice ministry. Cuervo marveled at the “inconceivable paradox”
of being the only man punished thus far in the 174 million peso corruption case.83
Afterward, the Ortodoxo leader fulfilled a second goal: hyping his upcoming
appearance before the Urgency Court.

Having been denied an impeachment

spectacle in the senate, he had every intention of embarrassing the government
during this public forum, set for April 27. He urged listeners to attend if possible
and offered a preview of what they could expect, saying:
I reaffirm tonight each and every one of my accusations against the
Supreme Tribunal judges who ruled against the people, Gabriel
Pichardo, Pedro Cantero and Juan Francisco Torres Tomás, who have
shamelessly allied themselves with the Anti-Cuban Electric Company,
the foreign monopoly, the international octopus of Electric Bond and
Share. This is the truth. I proclaim it to the entire world. My sources
include a high-ranking employee of the Electric Company itself along
with four judges from the Supreme Tribunal and Havana Municipal
Court. They can sentence me to 20 years in prison or even death but I
Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 600. This statement is particularly interesting as Orlando León
Lemus had once been a familiar passenger in Chibás’ automobile, official or otherwise, while he was
an Auténtico senator. During a duel in January of 1945 against the journalist Joaquín López Montes,
Chibás, in fact, chose El Colorado as one of his seconds. After his split with the Auténticos, Chibás
denounced the party’s gangster links. In this sense, his condemnation of Lemus was sincere but he
was entitled to less self-righteousness than his tone assumed.
83 “En Cuba, Poder Judicial: El Deber Inexcusable,” Bohemia, May 1, 1949: 61.
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will continue proclaiming the truth…Only an idiot could believe three
judges of the Supreme Tribunal would dictate such an absurd and
illegal sentence in order to bestow millions of pesos on a foreign
monopoly and appease the magnates of Wall Street. The government
is determined to see me defeated in the Urgency Court. The
prosecutor will accuse me in the strongest terms. Nevertheless, if I
am ordered to pay a fine, I will refuse. Nor will I allow the people to
pay it or the president to grant me a pardon if I am convicted. I will go
to jail.84
Chibás was in no danger of spending the next two decades behind bars or suffering
capital punishment.

His stretching of the particulars merely embroidered a

situation whose outcome was a foregone conclusion.

Chibás possessed no

parliamentary immunity nor was he protected by a powerful patron. Moreover, his
accusation was based on anonymous tips. Chibás was ticketed for prison and he
knew it. The prospect of martyrdom suited his temperament but was also shrewd
politics. Many Cubans, especially the poor, would be tempted to associate Chibás
with his dearest image of himself – namely, an honest politician who sacrificed to
improve their lot. Nearly three months had passed since the Bohemia survey
comparing him and Batista as potential opposition leaders. His popularity had
surely increased since then and would climb still further if he were incarcerated.
Chibás had labored relentlessly to gain a higher profile in the public imagination.
Further, his crusade against the Cuban Electric Company offered an ideal showcase
for his party. As Chibás headlined rallies in Havana and Santiago de Cuba, Ortodoxo
rising stars like José Pardo Llada and Ventura Dellundé drew large crowds in the
cities of Santa Clara and Matanzas respectively. Meanwhile, President Prío seemed
unwilling or unable to stop gangster violence and risked rebellion in the university.

84

Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 601.

197

Batista, meanwhile, largely confined himself to Kuquine – his country estate on the
Havana outskirts. Surrounded by a stew of sycophants, politicians and journalists,
he discussed goings-on and his prospects in 1952 but often seemed more interested
in playing canasta or working out on his exercise machine. Prío’s vice president,
Guillermo Alonso Pujol, summarized the political panorama by telling a reporter:
The opposition is composed of the popular thunder of Chibás and the
tendency toward order represented by Batista. The first is an
emotional opposition, of the youth, and the second channels sense and
restraint. I’ve always believed the 357 thousand votes for Chibás
mean something and if there is a great disappointment with the
Auténticos, he will capitalize on it…Only older people and traditional
politicians will gravitate toward Batista.
After a pause, the wily Republican chief added, “But we are only in the sixth month
of this administration. Who knows what will happen tomorrow?”85

PRISONER NUMBER 981
The Urgency Court met on Calle Tacón in Old Havana. Its surrounding alleys
were congested with boisterous would-be spectators when Chibás arrived wearing
his customary white suit and clutching a cigarette in his right hand. Ever mindful of
public relations, he composed a statement for the press in the moments before the
trail began – yet again deploring Cuba’s scandalously high electricity prices. At 10
a.m., presiding judge José Cabezas asked the Ortodoxo leader to confirm his
accusation, which he did. Chibás was no stranger to Judge Cabezas. In 1935, he had
sentenced the young revolutionary to half a year in jail. Seeking to avert a similar
fate, Eddy’s lawyer, Francisco Carone, called a string of character witnesses –
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including the publisher of Bohemia, Miguel Ángel Quevedo, the Ortodoxo
congressmen Manuel Bisbé, Roberto García Ibáñez and Beto Saumell along with the
party’s popular radio personalities José Pardo Llada and Guido García Inclán.
Carone, who had participated in many anti-pact delegations during the Ortodoxo
factional struggles, also defended his friend and client in a two hour speech. Among
other things, he argued the Urgency Court was unconstitutional, having been
founded as the instrument of a military regime.

A Bohemia reporter believed

Carone was wasting his time, observing wryly that “the judges were so anxious to
fulfill their duty that they scarcely listened to him.”86 This view was seemingly born
out when Judge Cabezas and his two colleagues announced their ruling of 180 days
behind bars. Chibás responded with a signature phrase, yelling, “While the assassin
of Guiteras lives unbothered in his finca and Alemán enjoys his millions, Prío has
thrown me in prison for defending the people.”87 The pro-Chibás crowd, which
consisted of many who had traveled long distances to see their hero, erupted with
indignation. From the visitor’s gallery emanated whistles and cries of “Viva Chibás!”
The prosecutor, Francisco Zayas, was escorted from the building under police
protection. Another detachment of cops forcibly cleared the courtroom. Even
Roberto Agramonte, whose bland personality had earned him the nickname,
“freezer bottle” among fellow Ortodoxos, found himself being attacked with a club.
Several hours later, the Urgency Court verdict inspired a heated debate in the
chamber of representatives.

Manuel Bisbé declared there had been a “prior
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agreement” between the prosecutor and judges that counted the president’s
blessing.88 Predictably, he was contradicted by Segundo Curti, one of Prío’s close
advisors, who sang the praises of Cuba’s independent judiciary. In contrast to
Curti’s lofty rhetoric, the minister without portfolio, Primitivo Rodríguez, joked that,
“Today they have just crucified the Jesus of our present generation.”89 Reaching
even lower, Rolando Masferrer, who was presently a larger headache to Prío than
Chibás, proclaimed the Ortodoxo leader lacked the “courage” to confront Cuba’s
problems.90 To this, Roberto García Ibáñez replied that Chibás walked the streets
unaccompanied, a habit “tough guys” like Masferrer, would never dare imitate.91
The Auténtico-Republican alliance was unexpectedly delighted when Liberal and
Democratic congressmen also defended the ruling. José Suárez Rivas, brother of the
Liberal senate leader, asserted that, “Ortodoxos exploit the psychosis of many
citizens while Liberals limit themselves to crafting complimentary legislation for the
constitution.”92 This, of course, was quite untrue. Liberals had been in the ruling
coalition between 1940 and 1944 and produced no such laws during that period.
The real issue was that neither they nor the Democrats had any abiding love for
Chibás, whose popularity threatened their perches in the opposition.

The

Communists, who were shunned by all and thus unencumbered by political
calculations, offered the only outside support. Anibal Escalante, director of the
Communist newspaper Hoy, said, “Everyone knows we have nothing in common
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with Chibás,” but stressed that his first obligation was to defend the people against
the Cuban Electric Company.93
In the senate, only 27 members were present – which resulted in the session
being cancelled for a lack of quorum. Pelayo Cuervo had been among the most eager
to comment but contented himself instead by chatting with reporters. From a
strictly legal standpoint, he was indignant that a party leader could be incarcerated
by a quasi legal court on the periphery of the country’s judicial system. He added
that, “I have no political relationship with Chibás, but his honesty and civic conduct
are beyond dispute. While he sits in jail, professional assassins walk around with
impunity, government officials encourage gangsterism, illegal gambling is fomented
and embezzlers of the public treasury are protected by the administration.”94 The
Democrat Antonio Martínez Fraga was no admirer of Chibás but nonetheless
admitted the Ortodoxo chief had realized a “brilliant campaign” against the Cuban
Electric Company.95

Rather than consorting with the press, Miguelito Suárez

Fernández visited Chibás in prison. The senate president arrived bearing a chicken
pot pie courtesy of his wife, which he presented to Chibás and said, “Listen Eddy,
I’ve come to tell you that I’m going to request a pardon. You shouldn’t spend more
time in jail…It’s a political error to keep you behind bars.”
“No, Miguel,” responded Chibás. “I won’t permit Carlos Prío to pardon me.
What’s more, I would consider it an injury to my honor if any supporter or friend
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requested such a favor from the president. I’ve already told everyone. Do you
understand?”
Suárez Fernández was adamant. “I’m going to ask for a pardon anyway,” he
said “and if you’re offended you can demand a duel.” This was a remote possibility,
as Suárez Fernández well knew. The two men had an easy relationship and shortly
thereafter they dissolved into smiles.
Later on, Chibás confessed, “Right now, the most important thing is to fight
the foreign monopolies. I don’t mind being imprisoned and in any case I’ve been
here before.”
“Don’t worry,” replied the senate president, “I assure you the electricity
prices will be lowered.”96
Suárez Fernández was not the only senator advocating a pardon. The Liberal
chief Eduardo Suárez Rivas also backed the idea on behalf of his party. In the
chamber of representatives, most Liberal and Democratic congressmen favored a
similar proposal as did the Auténticos Segundo Curti and Armando Caíñas Milanés.
Even among legislators who disagreed with Chibás, many were uncomfortable with
his sentence – which recalled a harsher era in Cuban politics, barely more than a
dozen years in the past, when party bosses were routinely locked up. Others, like
the Auténtico senate leader Lomberto Díaz, believed incarcerating Chibás was a
“measure of dubious effectiveness.”97 In any case, Chibás was determined to wring
every possible advantage from his situation.

Mrs. Suárez’s chicken pot pie

notwithstanding, he ate common prison fare and used the same canvas folding bed
96
97
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as other inmates. With good humor, he told the journalist Mario Kuchilán that the
view from his cell trumped that of his 14th floor apartment which looked out over
the Caribbean. The Ortodoxo leader added that he was content because, “My being
in prison assists the cause of national liberation.”98 Hence, Chibás asked Francisco
Carone whether there was any legal way to prevent a pardon. Carone answered that
the sentence could be appealed on the basis that it was unconstitutional.
“Fantastic!” Chibás cried. “Submit it today and we will stop the government.”99 This
tactic was unnecessary, however, as Carlos Prío showed no inclination toward
leniency. Speaking for the administration, Prime Minister Tony Varona declared a
pardon would represent a “slight” against Cuba’s judiciary.100 More importantly, the
government looked forward to a respite from Chibás’ Sunday evening harassments.
With the airwaves unavailable, Chibás resorted to his pen. On April 30, he
published an article in Prensa Libre entitled, “To the People of Cuba.” The piece
closely resembled one of his broadcasts – offering readers a familiar and titillating
jumble of gossip, reminiscence and criticism. Among other things, he questioned the
Urgency Court’s legitimacy, claimed Carlos Prío had mandated a guilty verdict in
advance and that Judge Cabezas was happy to comply for personal reasons. The
Ortodoxo leader noted that Cabezas was a cousin of Lieutenant Colonel José
Eleuterio Pedraza, Batista’s former second in command, whom he had often
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revealed that being incercerated was more difficult than Chibás was letting on. According to other
inmates, the Ortodoxo chief was having trouble sleeping and the food damaged his delicate stomach.
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excoriated as an “assassin.”101 Judge Cabezas had been so bent on revenge that he
had denied Chibás the chance to issue “revelations of enormous importance.”102
Had they been aired, he averred, convicting him would have been far more difficult,
“in spite of the president’s orders.”103 Chibás also pointed out that he had been sent
to jail on two previous occasions, in 1929 and 1935, for “defending the people.” 104
In each instance he was offered pardons by the tyrants who ruled Cuba, first
Machado and later Batista, and he had refused both offers – preferring the
penitentiary to accepting favors from unsavory figures.105

Presently, he was

incarcerated by Carlos Prío, his former compañero from the Student Directorate,
fellow political prisoner on the Isle of Pines and erstwhile peer in the constituent
assembly. Unlike the dictators Machado and Batista, Prío lacked the decency to offer
him a reprieve (even though he would have rejected it) and this was because the
president nursed a “grudge” against him.106 Nevertheless, Chibás contended that he
did not harbor “one drop” of hatred for his onetime friend, only “sadness” for what
he had become.107
Eddy’s modest bout of charity toward Prío was perhaps attributable to his
choice of reading materials in the Castillo del Príncipe, which comprised the Bible
and two religious tracts – “The Path to Salvation” and “Human Vanity is the World’s
Natural Sin.” On the other hand, Chibás devoured plenty of worldly literature as
Eduardo R. Chibás, “Al Pueblo de Cuba,” Prensa Libre, April 30, 1949: reprinted in Conte Agüero,
Eduardo Chibás, 605.
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well, including verses from the 19th century Spanish poets Gustavo de Núñez Arce
and Gustavo Adolfo Bécquer, a biography of Alexander the Great, Sugar and
Population in the Antilles by Ramiro Guerra, one of Cuba’s foremost historians, and
of course, the 1940 constitution. In addition, letters of support poured in from all
reaches.

Many echoed the sentiments of Victor Fuentes Castillo, the Ortodoxo

president of Yateras, in Oriente province, who wrote, “Being in the Castillo del
Príncipe is no affront for revolutionaries; we’ve been there before, many of us
worshipping at the altar of Liberty and showing our contempt for tyrants.”108
Chibás mostly read during the evening, since he was allowed to receive visitors
before 6 p.m. His secretary, Conchita Fernández, arrived on a regular basis to take
instructions and keep him supplied with the cigarettes he smoked constantly.
Francisco Carone often dropped by to discuss legal strategies and other Ortodoxos
dropped by to consult on matters dealing with the party. For example, the PPC
planned a Saturday evening rally in Havana’s Parque Central under the banner of,
“Bandits are on the Street and Chibás is in Jail.” However, the interior ministry was
loath to grant permission and dragged its feet – leading José Pardo Llada, Guido
García Inclán and Juan Amador to announce on their radio shows that the event
would be canceled. Nonetheless, party members who spoke with Chibás were urged
to press forward. They did and the government relented at the last minute. Despite
contradictory signals, the gathering would up attracting more people than the
famous May Day parade 24 hours later.

Chibás also saw a steady stream of

journalists along with a record number of visitors, who arrived by the hundreds
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every Sunday.109 In their presence, he cultivated an assiduously positive outlook
but privately, in letters to old friends, the Ortodoxo leader showed hints of
melancholy. Writing to his university pal José Chelala Aguilera, he lamented that,
“There are only a few of us left from the fight against Machado, because many of the
‘crazy kids’ from that era have already been assassinated, while others have
assassinated themselves by betraying the ideals of the ‘Generation of 1930’ and
renouncing their pasts.”110
If Chibás was occasionally blue, he was also heartened by a slew of
encouraging developments. Having always closely followed his portrayal in the
press, Chibás was gratified to learn that most columnists and commentators backed
him. Aside from his usual media allies like Miguel Ángel Quevedo and Sergio Carbó,
Chibás was also supported by some longtime opponents. Notable among these was
Ramón Vasconcelos, the minister without portfolio, who stated it was a “brutality”
to “make an example” of a leader followed by “300,000 souls” while bloodthirsty
gangsters enjoyed impunity.111 Even more encouraging was the public reaction to
those who were hardened against Chibás. Raúl Lorenzo attacked the Ortodoxo
leader in such scathing terms during his show on Unión Radio that the station was
deluged with angry phone calls and telegrams.112 The fury was quelled only when
José Pardo Llada, who hosted the popular program “La Palabra” (The Word),
Luis Conte Agüero counted 824 visitors on May 1; 737 on May 8; 827 on May 15; 987 on May 22
and 761 on May 29. See Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 620.
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Alerta.
112 Raúl Lorenzo was an erstwhile Marxist who subsequently became commerce minister during the
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announced that the station did not agree with Lorenzo’s opinions.

Anecdotal

evidence suggesting the people were behind Chibás was bolstered by more scientific
proof on May 6, when Bohemia hit the newsstands. According to a new survey,
93.82 percent of Cubans were aware that Chibás had been found guilty by the
Urgency Court while 76.01 percent believed he had been wrongly convicted.113
Further, 52.39 percent felt Chibás’ accusations against the judges were true and
66.53 percent thought him worthy of a pardon.114 This unequivocal rebuke almost
certainly influenced Prío’s decision, taken after a cabinet meeting the same day, to
reduce electricity prices to their 1943 levels.
That week’s issue of Bohemia also served up unpleasant reading for
Fulgencio Batista, although by now he knew what to expect when May 8 rolled
around. On that day, a group of ex revolutionaries habitually descended upon the
18th century El Morillo fortress, in Matanzas province, to commemorate the death of
Antonio Guiteras.

Chibás, who regularly attended these processions, would

invariably remind listeners to his radio show that Guiteras died an impoverished
martyr while his murderer, Batista, lived free and swathed in riches. This year,
Chibás would not be visiting El Morillo nor could he offer his annual live obloquy of
the former general. At the same time, Chibás considered Batista more deserving of
censure than ever – particularly as he once again resided in Cuba and was in the
process of forming a new political party.

Hence, Chibás delivered his latest
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vituperative attack on Batista by means of Cuba’s most popular magazine. Entitled,
“My Homage to Guiteras,” the article briefly extolled the man who in many ways
represented the revolutionary ideal for Chibás through a combination of
incorruptibility and willingness to “immolate his life” for Cuba.115 Switching from
victim to executioner, Chibás argued Batista was unfit for politics because he had
committed every imaginable abuse during his seven years as strongman and four
years as president. Hence, he lacked the “moral authority” to address the nation’s
ills, including murders (he had sent plenty to the morgue himself), embezzlement (a
Batista specialty), the lack of a formal budget (he had ruled without one), sleazy
military men (he was the very embodiment of one), bloating the government payroll
with friends and allies (a forte of his finance minister Anselmo Alliegro),
abridgement of press freedom (Batista had closed unfriendly radio stations and
persecuted individual journalists), failure to pass the 1940 constitution’s
complimentary laws (this had never been a priority), the black market (a
phenomenon which began during his time in power) and last, but not least, the
island’s less than perfect democracy (Batista, after all, had engineered the
impeachment of President Miguel Mariano Gómez in 1936, “managed” his successor,
Francisco Laredo Brú and imposed Carlos Saladrigas as his coalition’s presidential
candidate in 1944).116
Chibás believed Carlos Prío was discreetly helping Batista as a means to
“place obstacles” in the Ortodoxos’ path.117 More conspicuously, the president shut
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down Chibás’ radio show, hosted by Manuel Bisbé and Roberto Agramonte, in his
absence. The communication ministry, offering the flimsiest of pretexts, asserted
the Ortodoxo leader’s time slot must be sold to someone else if he personally could
not use it. This was part of a larger assault against unflattering press coverage and
demonstrated Prío’s scant tolerance for public criticism. Earlier, the government
had closed Radio COCO for three days after the station aired a scandalous interview
between Néstor Piñango and the outlaw Orlando León Lemus. From his secret
hideout, the red headed gangster readily described his links with Carlos and Antonio
Prío, which dated to the mid 1930s and continued still. The relationship was both
deeply personal and highly convenient for both parties. For example, El Colorado
had lent his support during the Auténtico registration drive of 1947 in the
president’s native province of Pinar del Río. He also provided a contingent of toughs
during Prío’s political standoff with Miguelito Suárez Fernández, who was backed by
UIR roughnecks.118 In return, Prío and his brothers protected Lemus from the
authorities even though he was one of the most wanted men in Cuba.119 Perhaps
fearing this arrangement could one day break down, El Colorado expressed his
desire to run for a senate seat and therefore seal his impunity for good.
Embarrassing as these remarks were, Piñango’s own observations caused an even
greater uproar. Among other things, the reporter noted that he had been driven to
the meeting in a National Police squad car and upon arriving saw armed soldiers

According to Lemus, other Auténtico patrons of the UIR included Diego Vicente Tejera, Interior
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guarding the location – which appeared to be a finca just outside the city.120 Prío
privately fumed that he would “finish” with Cuba’s gangsters but only journalists
and the media felt his immediate wrath.121 Aside from suspending Radio COCO,
Piñango was apprehended and held incommunicado until he recanted his comments
about police and military involvement. Just before his release from the police
station, which was two blocks from the Urgency Court were Chibás had been
convicted and a stone’s throw from Havana’s seaside promenade, Piñango offered
what sounded like a rehearsed declaration to fellow reporters. “The authorities,” he
said, “have treated me with full respect for press freedom and an evident desire to
bring to a close an era of crime in Cuba that, once finished, will resound to
everyone’s benefit.”122
Even if this were true, the administration was on shakier ground after police
conducting a “search” ended up sacking the offices of Tiempo en Cuba. The weekly
newspaper, run by El Colorado’s associate Rolando Masferrer, was a logical target
for investigation. However, the officers who destroyed, overturned and scattered
everything in their wake aggravated the increasingly frayed nerves of Cuba’s
journalists. Bohemia published a photo of the grisly scene and asked, “Is this the
new way of doing things?”123 Of course, Masferrer was no run of the mill reporter
and represented a less than ideal poster boy for press freedom. In the chamber of
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121 “En Cuba, La Capital: Marejada Antidemocrática,” Bohemia, May 15, 1949: supplement, 2.
122 Ibid. Once free, Piñango immediately went into hiding, as El Colorado and his cronies assumed he
had furnished details of their whereabouts to the police. A Bohemia reporter added with foreboding
that the gangster’s “distrustful” and “determined” friends were already looking for him.
123 “Una foto que parece de otra época,” Bohemia, May 15, 1949: 64.
120

210

representatives, the Auténtico labor leader Emilio Surí Castillo pointed at Masferrer
and yelled, “We need a dictatorship that will eliminate guys like this!”124 Surí
Castillo then requested Masferrer’s immediate expulsion from the Auténtico
parliamentary committee. However, he was mistaken in thinking gangsters could so
easily be separated from the party. Rafael del Busto recalled that during the most
recent Auténtico rally in Parque Central, his ticket to the grandstand had been
stamped by none other than the elusive Policarpo Soler.125 For his part, Masferrer
explained what many already knew and the rest did not care to admit. “Gangsterism
exists for political reasons,” he said. “Almost all political bosses arm their groups
and use them for electoral purposes. It’s not possible to ask favors of them one day
and persecute them the next.”126 He added that the best way to disarm Cuba’s
gangsters would be to arrange an agreement with Miguelito Suárez Fernández and
National Police chief José Manuel Caramés – both of whom maintained ties to the
rival UIR. Instead, Carlos Prío issued a decree creating the Group for the Repression
of Subversive Activities or GRAS after its Spanish initials. This was to be an antigangster outfit commanded by the army. Though fears abounded that he was
resurrecting Batista’s hated Military Intelligence Service, which was disbanded in
1944, the president could no longer rely on gangster infested security forces. Prío
compared the situation to that of a patient who must submit to a risky operation in
order to save his life and added, “If nothing else works, I’ll use the same methods
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against these people that were once used against me.”127 Thus, Prío cast his lot with
Genovevo Pérez Dámera. Masferrer would have to be content with repairing his
broken printing press.
While Prío turned the screws on Cuba’s gangsters, Communications Minister
Carlos Maristany relentlessly attempted to pry Chibás from his soapbox. On May 15,
CMQ director Goar Mestre denounced government demands that he cancel his
contract with Chibás. After suspending the Ortodoxo leader’s show the previous
week, Maristany urged Mestre to wash his hands of broadcasts that were “harmful
and disturbing to the nation.”128 When he refused, Maristany ordered the radio
frequencies to be changed in Pinar del Río and Camagüey in order to block CMQ and
Unión Radio, which featured the popular Ortodoxo commentator José Pardo Llada,
from reaching those areas.

Mestre reminded the Auténticos that they had

wholeheartedly endorsed Chibás when the party was in the opposition and his
criticisms were directed at President Batista. Currently, many of the same figures
who had applauded Chibás and the impartiality of CMQ were sworn enemies of
both. Miguel Ángel Quevedo griped in Bohemia that Capestany was a “Torquemada”
who considered himself “owner and lord” of Cuba’s airwaves even though the
communications ministry was meant to be “purely technical.”129 In his weekly
political comic strip called “The Little Cuban King,” A.R. drew Liborio, the island’s
everyman, speaking into a microphone with Prío looking on in the background. At
one point, Prío pulls a drawstring and the microphone disappears through a trap
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door. Eying the place where the microphone used to be, Liborio asks, “Is this
cordiality or censorship?”130
Government pressure notwithstanding, Chibás’ show was allowed to
continue and Manuel Bisbé reprised his role as surrogate. Rather than speaking
himself, he read a statement written by Chibás which took the form of an open letter
to the president.

The Ortodoxo chief repeated his opposition to a pardon or

provisional release, declaring he would only accept an amnesty voted by the senate
and chamber of representatives. To those who believed his stubbornness was crazy,
Chibás allowed he was an “abnormal case in a political climate where normal
involved robbing, killing and selling drugs.”131 He also reminded Prío that his
political slogans remained the same ones both of them had embraced as young
revolutionaries:
War against embezzlers of the treasury, corrupters of the people and
gunmen! Continue the struggle for national liberation! Let’s clean up
the country’s political culture! Freedom of the press! For a judiciary
free of government interference! Down with the Urgency Court! No
more suspension of radio broadcasts! No Military Intelligence
Service! Down with the lackeys of foreign monopolies! Down with
abusive electricity prices, the Cuban Telephone Company and the
consortium of overseas oil companies (Standard, Shell and Sinclair)!
No more sellouts and gangsters!132
As luck would have it, the last of these catchphrases proved especially timely and
not only in terms of political point scoring. Some days following the broadcast, a
group of prisoners who had been sentenced for gangster related activities began
planning to assassinate Chibás after rumors circulated that the Ortodoxo leader’s
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presence among them was keeping the administration from granting a blanket
amnesty. However, Gustavo Ortiz Fáez, the young agronomy student who murdered
Manolo Castro, caught wind of the plot and notified Chibás – who defiantly
exclaimed, “None of this worries me as I’ve never been the least bit afraid of
dying.”133 Chibás added that if he were assassinated, he wished to clarify, for
“historical” purposes, that the government was responsible.134 As for Ortiz, he had
not tipped off Chibás for altruistic reasons. He was a UIR member with close links to
Fidel Castro. The latter was not only an Ortodoxo, he had also formed a youth
splinter group loosely associated with the party called Acción Radical Ortodoxo
(ARO).135 Aside from publishing a newsletter and commenting on internal PPC
matters, the organization was a stomping ground for the young and violently
inclined, many of whom were university students affiliated with UIR. This crowd no
doubt horrified those Ortodoxos who boasted of the party’s “immaculate rank and
file” but in this instance, at least, it may have saved Chibás’ life.136
In truth, Ortodoxo purity proved maddeningly elusive as provincial party
leaders and section heads continued to ferret out traitors and other undesirables.
Throughout 1949, Chibás was regaled with accounts of unworthy or unsatisfactory
partisans. Gloria Cuadras, who belonged to the Women’s Wing, informed him a
certain Zoila Perozo had been ejected for “campaigning in favor of Carlos Prío” and
Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 616.
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“trying to corrupt the consciences of some compañeras, who civically denounced
her.”137 Of course, the zeal with which such figures hunted the party’s malefactors
was matched only by their personal devotion to Chibás. Cuadras concluded that,
“All my sacrifices, all my efforts, all the minutes of my life are for the PPC and its
honorable boss: my brother more than my friend, he who will bring a happy
resolution to the great work for which many of our friends have shed blood or
died.”138 In a similar albeit less florid fashion, the Ortodoxo municipal chief of
Cárdenas sent Chibás a list of assemblymen who had crossed enemy lines during the
presidential elections. According to some, such measures were not nearly sufficient.
For example, the Youth Section of Sagua la Grande, in Las Villas province, demanded
the expulsion of Ortodoxo congressman Félix Martín after he and fellow legislators
voted themselves a raise in salary.
While Ortodoxo diehards schemed to dislodge real and perceived recreants,
the Auténticos purveyed drama on a grander and more public scale. The crux of the
issue was Guillermo Alonso Pujol, the Republican chief and intriguer par excellence
who also happened to be Cuba’s vice president. His outsized influence had long
been a source of discomfort for Carlos Prío and the president aimed dilute his power
by negotiating a pact with the Democrats. He entrusted the details to his close
confidant Tony Varona, but the prime minister was loath to offend “el Gordo” (a
nickname he shared with the similarly obese General Genovevo Pérez Dámera), who
he hoped would support his presidential candidacy in 1952.

With no results

forthcoming, Prío asked Miguelito Suárez Fernández to head the discussions
137
138

Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 9, Expediente 300, ANC.
Ibid.

215

instead. Although the senate president was no great admirer of Prío, he was happy
to undermine the Republican leader, saying, “I would rather deal with the devil than
Alonso Pujol.”139 By May 13, the two sides had struck a bargain. Not only had the
Democrats agreed to join the government, they also accepted a dissident faction of
anti Pujol Republicans into their party – thereby damaging the vice president even
further. Suárez Fernández was ecstatic, telling a Bohemia reporter it was necessary
to act against the Pujol’s “incessant plotting.”140 Certainly, Republican leverage over
Prío had been substantially reduced. Moreover, the administration’s congressional
majority was now decisive. This was paramount for a president who took the semiparliamentarian system seriously.

Further, a handful of previously contrarian

voices such as Democratic senator Antonio Martínez Fraga would now serve the
government.
Prío was also in a stronger position to obstruct the amnesty law for Chibás
proposed in the senate by Pelayo Cuervo and Federico Fernández Casas. Miguelito
Suárez Fernández, who had earlier vowed to shepherd the measure, discreetly
stalled while he and Prío worked together to lure the Democrats. When the amnesty
was finally considered, the Auténtico majority leader Lomberto Díaz demanded the
murderers of Aracelio Iglesias, the Communist organizer of Cuba’s dockworkers, be
covered as well.141 In an interview for Diario de la Marina (whose editor, Gastón
Baquero was one of the few who agreed with Chibás’ sentence), Díaz explained the
government was against “personalized” laws and any amnesty would therefore have
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to be “general.”142 Closer to the truth was Prío’s steadfast conviction that “nobody
will remember” Chibás after six months in jail. However, the Liberal chief Eduardo
Suárez Rivas astutely noted that Chibás had become a “permanent topic” in the
street.143 Even without his radio show, the Ortodoxo leader counted a regular
platform in Bohemia. In an article published on May 29, he mocked Prío’s reputed
cordiality – writing that the president’s warmth was reserved primarily for gunmen
and embezzlers. Referring to the latter, Chibás observed that, “All of these señores
live very comfortably in their regal palaces, in luxury hotels in New York or Europe,
on the beaches of Florida or on their ill gotten fincas, where they get together in
happy camaraderie with the Urgency Court judges who convicted me for defending
the people against the foreign electricity monopoly.”144 Alluding to a photo in the
previous week’s issue of Bohemia, which showed Carlos Prío, Agriculture Minister
Virgilio Pérez, Genovevo Pérez Dámera and Judge José Cabezas enjoying themselves
on a country estate, Chibás added that he had been incarcerated so as not to “disturb
the tranquility of their digestion.”145
In addition, Chibás maintained his habit of answering those who disagreed
with him in public forums. For instance, when former justice minister José Agustín
Martínez wrote in Prensa Libre that Chibás’ legal strategy seemed wanting, he
replied that his was not a “regular case.”146 Rather, he stated that,
We have tried to stir the sleeping conscience of the Cuban people. If
the knock has not been sufficiently strong to rouse them, we will
“En Cuba, Amnistía: Un Proceso Encubierto de Inhabilitación,” Bohemia, May 29, 1949: 57.
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redouble our efforts and sacrifices. They will not be in vain. We have
faith in the noble and great destiny of our country, which occupies the
gateway to the New World, the best strategic position in history. In
the worst case, the day will arrive in fifty or a hundred years when
others more fortunate than us will be able to wake the people. No one
will be able to take away from us the glory of having been their
precursors.147
While Chibás’ arguments were unlikely to sway detractors, the political cost of
keeping him behind bars was becoming manifest even to those who were close to
the president. On May 29, Prío’s public relations director René Fiallo published an
open letter urging him to remove Chibás from prison “as soon as possible” because
helping “the most insignificant little devil of the opposition” achieve martyrdom
would be foolish.148 Just over two days later, on the first anniversary of his election,
Prío relented. He authorized a conditional pardon, effective on June 4, and a trio of
lawyers informed the reluctant Chibás that he had no choice but to accept. A selfpromoter to the last, he scratched out the words “Chibás was imprisoned here for
combating the electric octopus” on the wall of his cell. 149 The Ortodoxo leader also
gave free rein to another of his manias, sending his faithful secretary Conchita
Fernández to bring him a pair of socks that matched his tie in the minutes before he
was due to be released.
When the gates were opened at midnight, Chibás was effusively greeted by a
multitude of thousands – some of whom immediately hoisted him on their
shoulders. The surrounding area shook with chants of “Shame vs. Money” and
“Shame and Truth.” As the throng accompanied Chibás to his car, the nearby
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thoroughfares of Carlos III and Infanta were so clogged with people that public
transportation was paralyzed. By the time Eddy arrived home, his guayabera was in
tatters from the many adherents who had been anxious to touch him. The next day
Chibás addressed an equally ebullient crowd, composed of all social classes, in
Parque Central. Describing these scenes, Francisco Ichaso wrote, “We are, without a
doubt, in a mystical presence similar to that once aroused in the people by Grau.”150
He added that Chibás, like his erstwhile mentor, possessed certain “magical
elements” and inspired a “quasi religious fervor.”151 These intangible qualities were
felt with particular keenness by Cuba’s youth. Thus, it seemed apropos for 23 year
old José Pardo Llada to warm up the Parque Central gathering while Chibás was
flanked not by old friends, party bosses or even his lawyer but by two other
Ortodoxos in their early 20s – Orlando Castro and Natasha Mella. Chibás counted
this too in common with Grau, who had galvanized university students (such as
himself and Carlos Prío) during the late 1920s. Nor was Ichaso the only one to see
this parallel. Fulgencio Batista had also tabbed Chibás as the inheritor of “Grau-style
messianism.”152 But the ex general represented an even more pernicious paradigm,
that of military rule.
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Chapter 7
“The Cave of Ali Baba and His 40,000 Thieves”

Carlos Prío was less worried about Grau-style messianism than by Grau
himself. After lowering the temperature on his feud with Chibás and taming the
untrustworthy Guillermo Alonso Pujol, he sought to make amends with the man
who was perhaps his most formidable political opponent.1 Hence, Prío summoned
José Manuel Alemán from Florida to help arrange a meeting with Grau. Alemán
arrived on a Pan American flight from Miami, dressed immaculately in white and
reinforcing his opulent reputation by leaving generous tips for those airport
employees lucky enough to serve him. Nor did the regal gestures end there. The ex
education minister, who remained Cuba’s premier political moneyman, also sent
flowers to the wives of leading senators and congressmen. As a result, Alemán not
only received the president at his finca outside Havana but also hosted a number of
eager lawmakers – including Miguelito Suárez Fernández, Lincoln Rodón, Tony
Varona, Eduardo Suárez Rivas and Guillermo Alonso Pujol.

Alemán’s warmest

welcome, however, awaited him in Grau residence, where he was fervently
embraced by his former patron and enabler. After a series of consultations, the
Cuban presidents generally showed scant inclination for retirement after serving their terms. For
example, the Liberal José Miguel Gómez (1909-1913) subsequently ran for president in 1920 only to
be defeated by Alfredo Zayas in an election marred by fraud. The Conservative Mario García Menocal
(1913-1921) attempted to regain office in 1925 but was defeated by Gerardo Machado. Meanwhile,
Fulgencio Batista (1940-1944) was currently constructing a new party to support another bid for the
presidency and Ramón Grau San Martín (1933, 1944-1948) was impatiently waiting until he could
run again. Grau’s control of the Auténtico party machinery mirrored that of Gómez, who dominated
the Liberals until his death in 1921 and Menocal, who similarly ruled the Conservatives and their
successor party, the Democrats, until his demise in 1940.
1
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summit was fixed for June 13 at “Rancho Alegre,” the finca of Genovevo Pérez
Dámera.2
On the appointed day, Prío nervously approached Grau – ready to hug the
man who had bestowed the presidency on him but resented any display of
independence. Grau, however, was in no mood for emotional gestures and stopped
him short, saying, “What’s going on Carlos? How are you?” Prío began to explain
some of their previous difficulties but Grau waved them aside. “No. Nothing of the
past,” he said. “It’s better not to speak about these things. What’s done is done.
We’re here to discuss the present and the future.” Alemán, who was standing
nearby, added, “I came here to reestablish party unity. If we want to remain in
power, we must stay together in order to win in 1952.”3
Having dispensed with the formalities, Grau seized control of the
conversation. Specifically, he felt Prío needed to devise a public works program to
create jobs. “As you know,” said Grau, “the next sugar harvest will be disappointing.
This means public revenues will be greatly reduced. I believe, Carlos, that you must
cover this reduction and the best way to do so is though public works. Moreover,
our government’s success owes a great deal to rising salaries. As long as they keep
going up, the purchasing power of consumers will too.”4 Rather than considering
this advice, Prío gently pointed out that the term “our government” was a misnomer
since he was now in charge. Grau, the ex professor, responded as if he were
Nearly every Cuban politician and military figure of note owned a finca. Prío’s favored estate was
“La Chata.” Miguelito Suárez Fernández owned “La Tranquilidad.” Alemán, of course, had purchased
“América,” the former country refuge of José Miguel Gómez. Grau bucked the trend somewhat by
exchanging his comfortable Vedado residence for swankier digs on Miramar’s Quinta Avenida.
3 “En Cuba, Política: ‘El Lugar no me Importa,’” Bohemia, June 19, 1949: 67.
4 Ibid.
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addressing a petulant student. “When I talk of our government,” he said, “in reality I
am referring to you. You shouldn’t forget that I was only the president while you
were more involved in day to day operations as labor secretary and prime
minister.”5 Following this enigmatic answer, which ridiculed Prío’s attempts to
distance himself from Grau’s administration, the president proceeded to hold his
tongue and listen politely in the name of party unity. This was clearly a shrewd
strategy as Grau left the premises in high spirits. Speaking to some supporters later
on, he pronounced the interview a “success,” and deemed himself a “reverse
Machiavelli” because of his knack for uniting rather than dividing. 6 Grau was so
pleased, in fact, that he also compared his virtues to those of Hamlet and even the
mythical Prometheus.7

POLEMICS AND DUELS
Alemán’s return to Cuba was a boon for most journalists who dusted off old
rants against administrative corruption and famished schoolchildren deprived of
their breakfasts. On the other hand, Humberto Rubio of Pueblo surprised fellow
media types by lauding Alemán as a model citizen who used education ministry jobs
to lower unemployment. Rubio even likened inciso K to the Home Relief Bureau
devised by Franklin Delano Roosevelt during the Great Depression. This was too
much for Jorge Mañach, who kindled a feud with a Diario de la Marina column
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entitled, “Dialogue between Cynicism and Outrage.”

Mañach expressed “bitter

anger” at Alemán for the “many millions” he embezzled as a public servant,
particularly given his responsibility to educate the “Cuban people.”8 Perhaps no one
was more acutely aware of Alemán’s homecoming than Chibás but the Ortodoxo
leader first had to settle some unfinished business.

Shortly before his

imprisonment, Chibás had agreed to a duel with José Manuel Casanova. On the
morning of June 9, the two men touched sabers at a finca owned by the tobacco
growing Placensia family – whose patriarch was sympathetic to Casanova. Chibás
had initially resisted the idea of settling his dispute with Casanova on the so-called
“field of honor” given his opponent’s advanced age.9 The fact that neither man
incurred any wounds was most likely no accident. At any rate, Chibás had scarcely
retired this dispute when he became embroiled in another with René Fiallo. Prío’s
public relations director initially chivvied Chibás for having reacted ungratefully to
his pardon. Fiallo also chided Chibás for renewing his claim, shortly after leaving
prison, that Prío owed his election “exclusively” to vote buying, inciso K, and doña
Pastora (Madame Pastora) – the term Cubans used to refer to money, ill-gotten or
otherwise.10 He then asked, tongue firmly in cheek, whether the only “valid” and
“honorable” votes were those cast for the Ortodoxo party candidate. His most
damaging charge was that Chibás was a hypocrite. He noted that Chibás had stood
exultant on the balcony of the presidential palace in June of 1946, after the
Auténticos had triumphed in that year’s mid-term elections, seemingly untroubled
“En Cuba, Política: ‘El Lugar no me Importa,’” Bohemia, June 19, 1949: 68.
In fact, Casanova would die just over six months after the duel, on December 22, 1949 – 10 days
short of his 66th birthday.
10 René Fiallo, “Pecadores, Apóstoles y Hombres,” Bohemia, June 12, 1949: 72.
8
9

223

that the same tactics he now denounced had been employed. The most irritating
passage for Chibás, however, was Fiallo’s insistence that “Carlos Prío is conducting
the best government that is humanly possible right now in Cuba, with the best
intentions of any Cuban president in recent memory and the cleanest personal
conduct one could ever demand from a chief executive.”11
Chibás replied that, “The good intentions of President Prío and his clean
personal conduct” had not precluded him from visiting José Manuel Alemán, who he
dubbed “the biggest embezzler in contemporary history.” Rather than confronting
the “great crook” and “demanding that he take responsibility” for his
“unprecedented” robberies, Prío, “to the shame of all Cubans” embraced him
cordially and welcomed him back to the island. The Ortodoxo leader added that,
“Barely had the king of thieves landed in Cuba when all the principal figures of the
government, beginning with the president of the republic, the prime minister and
president of the congress ran like crazy to greet and embrace him, in a desperate
race to see who would arrive first. “The marathon,” wrote Chibás, “was won by the
president of the republic.”12 With that, the stage was set for a new polemic. This
played out in the pages of Bohemia, where they took turns hurling accusations at
each other. On July 3, Fiallo allowed that the president’s reunion with Alemán and
Grau had “perhaps” been a “weakness or error.”13 Nevertheless, he asserted that
Cubans were less interested in such gestures than the actual substance of Prío’s
government.

Fiallo noted that the president had made three significant

Ibid., 93.
Eduardo R. Chibás, “Pecadores, Apóstatas y Ladrones,” Bohemia, June 19, 1949: 81.
13 René Fiallo, “Los Sepulcros Blanqueados,” Bohemia, July 3, 1949: 81.
11
12

224

appointments since the meeting took place and none of the new job holders were
creatures of Alemán or Grau. Raúl Roa, Cuba’s new culture director was a respected
University of Havana professor and eminent former revolutionary. Meanwhile,
Carlos Ramírez Corría, the recently installed health minister and Segundo Curti, who
took over the defense ministry were both close associates of Prío. Fiallo concluded
that Prío was prone to mistakes, but his sensitivity to public opinion assured him
these would never be irreparable. By contrast, he deemed Chibás a messianic
demagogue whose party was endlessly obsessed with “ostracizing” and
“excommunicating” those it considered unworthy. Fiallo claimed this guaranteed
“audiences full of fanatics” but would never result in a national majority. 14 He also
referred to Chibás’ study of the Bible during his recent incarceration and likened the
Ortodoxo chief’s self-righteousness to that of the Pharisees. Fiallo then recalled that
Jesus pardoned adulterers, the men who sank a crown of thorns onto his head, the
soldiers who nailed him to the cross, those who mocked his martyrdom and even
the repentant thief crucified next to him but never forgave the egotistical Pharisees
who believed themselves in sole possession of truth and virtue.
Chibás had read the good book carefully while behind bars and was delighted
to engage Fiallo on Biblical terrain. He observed that Prío’s followers harbored
abundant sympathy for the thieves crucified next to Jesus but pointed out that only
the remorseful one was saved. The embezzlers of Prío’s administration, those who
spoke of rectifying previous ills but continued to rob and embrace José Manuel
Alemán more closely resembled the evil thief who was condemned. “Following the
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example of Christ,” wrote Chibás, “I will also not pardon evil thieves.”15
Ortodoxo leader left little doubt as to whom he considered unsalvageable.

The
As

evidence of presidential malfeasance, he offered Carlos Prío’s latest real estate
acquisitions on Havana’s outskirts, including the fincas “La Chata” and “La Altura.”
On the latter, he alleged Prío used construction materials from the public works
ministry to build roads, two regal mansions, a private wharf and a personal airport.
Chibás further charged that Prío had prepared the attacks against him that appeared
under Fiallo’s byline and the publicity director was happy to comply since he had
been “born servile” and “sold himself” to the president.16
An inflamed and exasperated Fiallo answered in kind on July 17. As evidence
of Chibás’ own “servility” he offered up the Ortodoxo leader’s contradictory dealings
with Federico Fernández Casas. In April of 1946, Chibás had denounced Fernández
Casas as an “oppressor of the campesino,” a “land thief” and “persecutor of needy
veterans of the independence war.”17 This was after the sugar magnate demolished
the hut and destroyed the crops of Eusebio Maceo, a peasant from Oriente province.
These actions took on added significance as the man also happened to be a relative
of Antonio Maceo, a revered general from Cuba’s independence war. In June of
1947, Chibás seemed to reverse course, telling Fernández Casas in a letter that
“destiny” had placed him in a position to “harmoniously” resolve Cuba’s “campesino
problem.”18 Fiallo contended that this turnabout was due to the “many thousands of
Eduardo R. Chibás, “Expulsaremos del templo los mercaderes y ladrones,” Bohemia, July 1o, 1949:
reprinted in Conte Agüero, 626.
16 René Fiallo, “El Mal Ladrón,” Bohemia, July 17, 1949: 79.
17 Ibid. Chibás censured Fernández Casas on his radio show and also in print. Fiallo here cites an
article Chibás wrote for El Crisol on April 3, 1946.
18 Ibid.
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pesos” Fernández Casas could provide for Chibás’ fledgling party and his
presidential candidacy.

However, the attempt to paint Fernández Casas as an

Ortodoxo version of José Manuel Alemán was marred by the fact that he no longer
belonged to the party. Moreover, even though Chibás was not above expedience the
public knew he spent weekends in his Havana apartment writing radio speeches
while Cuba’s top political and military figures luxuriated in country estates. In
short, this was not the sort of argument the Auténticos were equipped to win. Fiallo,
though, had two trump cards. First, he repeated the charge, initially leveled by
Arturo Sánchez Arango in 1933, that Chibás had lived a comfortable exile in New
York during the late 1920s and early 1930s thanks to his father’s money but had
been too mean-spirited to help fellow expatriates with fewer means. Sánchez
Arango, in fact, blamed Chibás for the death of the student revolutionary Gabriel
Barceló, who in his estimation contracted tuberculosis from being forced to wander
Manhattan’s wintry avenues.19

Fiallo, however, merely asked why Chibás had

refused to share his “opulence” with émigré compañeros.20 The second accusation,
which Fiallo asserted would “definitively shut [Chibás’] mouth,” also dated from the
1930s. Specifically, he stated that Chibás’ story of having been shot by an unknown
assailant just before elections to the constituent assembly in 1939 was a lie. The
version believed by the Ortodoxo leader’s enemies and now propounded by Fiallo
was that Chibás had wounded himself as a publicity stunt and claimed he was

Lela Sánchez Echeverría, La polémica infinita: Aureliano vs. Chibás y viceversa (Bogotá: Quebecor
World, 2004), 50.
20 René Fiallo, “El Mal Ladrón,” 87.
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“never in any danger of dying.”21 He added that, “Everyone has taken notice of what
extremes Chibás is capable of going to in order to assure a political objective. Faced
with this grotesque spectacle everyone must arrive at the same conclusion: Chibás is
a born clown, a born hypocrite, a born cheat – in other words: he was born vile.”22
Eddy did not bother to pen a response. Rather, he sent Eric Agüero and Beto
Saumell to discuss terms of a duel two days after the article appeared. This turned
out to be a complicated matter. For one thing, Fiallo was unfit to clash swords or
sabers as his arms were beset with cystic tumors. According to protocol, Fiallo
submitted to a medical examination which confirmed the limited use of his limbs.
During the second round of negotiations, one of Fiallo’s representatives withdrew
and was replaced by Raúl Roa, Cuba’s new culture director. Both sides agreed to
pistols as the weapon of choice but did not concur on the exact type until a third
meeting on July 22. After that, further wrangling ensued over whether a Spanish or
French dueling book should be consulted. During a forth meeting the following
evening, at the Havana Yacht Club, Fiallo’s seconds were replaced by the legislators
Néstor Carbonell and Francisco Cairol. This was a common tactic given that dueling
was illegal and lawmakers enjoyed immunity from prosecution. Finally, on July 24,
Chibás and his adversary met at the finca “Milagros” outside Havana. The Ortodoxo
leader violated the laboriously crafted rules straight away by loading one of the
guns and firing a test shot into a tree. After a spate of head-shaking and hand
wringing, everyone settled down and the duel proved uneventful. Each man took
aim twice and no injuries were sustained.
21
22

Ibid., 87-88.
Ibid., 88.

228

Tony Varona was the next government official to try his hand at provoking
Chibás. On October 12, he published an article in El Mundo entitled, “Chibás, the
High Priest of Scandal and Intrigue.” The piece was less concerned with sketching
political differences than getting under the Ortodoxo leader’s skin through a mixture
of epithets and family bashing. Chibás, however, did not take the bait right away.
Instead, he dissembled shock and disappointment in the next day’s edition of El
Mundo, writing:
As a Cuban, I feel ashamed by the miserable spectacle that the prime
minister of my country has offered today, with his infamous
declarations, which are a product of the corrupt and slimy
atmosphere in which he operates, but I am not willing, out of respect
for the Cuban people and of myself, to descend into the filthy pond in
which the premier of the government rolls about, without the least bit
of shame, before the amazed eyes of the nation, which is already
disgusted by so much cynicism and dishonor.23
For good measure and a bit disingenuously, Chibás added that, “No man who is well
born uses this sort of language to attack a political adversary.”24 Even as Chibás had
mastered his emotions and responded relatively moderately in print, he was
furious. Unable to resist his anger, he telephoned Varona multiple times the next
day, leaving a message and his number with the prime minister’s secretary. On
Saturday, October 15, Varona returned the call in the presence of two journalists –
Carlos Lechuga of El Mundo and Ricardo Riaño, of Bohemia.
“Who’s speaking?” said the prime minister, “Chibás? Listen, this is Varona!
Yes, Varona!”
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“What I want from you,” replied Chibás, “is that if you are a man, you will
repeat the insults in your article to my face.”
“Listen, Chibás,” answered Varona, “you know very well I’m no coward but I
don’t have to do anything you say right now. I am going to wait until tomorrow
when you answer me on your radio show so that later on I can unmask you publicly.
You are a farce!”
“And you are a coward!” screamed the Ortodoxo leader. “Tell me those things
to my face! I’m here in my house. Come find me if you dare!”
“I’m more of a man than you!” screamed the prime minister. “You’re crazy
only when it’s convenient. Remember when you were in jail and you would leave
the shower still covered in soap and would dry yourself off that way just to call
attention to yourself?”
“What you need to do,” repeated Chibás, “is to come find me.”
“Enough of that!” said Varona. “Don’t forget that I cut you in the right arm
when we dueled in Camagüey!”25
After the conversation ended, Chibás lingered in his apartment but Varona
never showed up. The following afternoon, the prime minister sent a representative
bearing a letter. He hoped to unnerve the Ortodoxo leader shortly before his
broadcast with yet more incendiary lines. “You need not beat or challenge me as I
am not interested in exterminating cockroaches,” wrote Varona. “What you need to
do is prove before public opinion that what I have said about you is untrue;
explaining the usefulness of the things you have done in your life aside from
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injuring, defaming and living in luxury off the fortune you inherited but have not
been able to conserve.”26 A Bohemia reporter lamented these increasingly caustic
exchanges, observing that Chibás had unwisely abandoned his “initially
advantageous position” while Varona was being “insensible to his constitutional
role” as the government’s chief representative.27 Nevertheless, Varona was very
much doing Prío’s bidding. The president had tried to marginalize Chibás by jailing
him, closing his show and harassing the owners of CMQ. Now, he attempted to
discredit him through a series of polemics. Varona’s intensely personal affronts
were designed to elicit a wild response, something that would remind Cubans that
Chibás was indeed crazy and not fit for high office. However, the Ortodoxo leader
had composed a carefully written reply, recalling the style of Emile Zola’s J’accuse,
and did not deviate from it during his 25 minutes on the air. Avoiding ad hominem
attacks, Chibás focused instead on his adversary’s political shortcomings.

For

instance, he told his audience:
I don’t slander, Antonio de Varona. I accuse you concretely of criminal
connivance with the government inspectors who defraud and extort
money from industrialists and merchants, as proved by the case of Mr.
Gabriel Rodríguez, owner of the furniture shop “La Venecia,” in
Camagüey. This retailer was foolish enough to heed the official
exhortation to denounce government functionaries who deal in
blackmail. He thus installed a microphone on the counter of his
establishment and recorded the words of the inspector who tried to
extort money from him, sending the disc to the police and informing
the prime minister, Tony de Varona. The only thing he obtained was
increased persecution from the inspectors who found all sorts of false
violations and now he is trying to sell the store.28
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Each paragraph began with the same litany, “I don’t slander, Antonio de Varona. I
accuse…” Besides doing nothing to help ordinary Cubans from being shaken down
by their government, Chibás charged Varona with robbing the 100,000 pesos used to
purchase his residence on Seventh Avenue and 24th Street in Miramar and illegally
acquiring the finca “La Dominica,” which was state property. He also alleged Varona
was in league with Ramón Ruisánchez, whose monopoly of Cuba’s dried beef market
artificially raised the price of this item beyond the means of most citizens.
Furthermore, Chibás reminded listeners that his enemy had defended José Manuel
Alemán in the senate in 1947 and subverted revolutionary ideals by investigating a
pact with the Liberals to ensure support for the government’s foreign loan.
On October 23, Varona answered Chibás in Bohemia. Among other things, he
produced a letter from Gabriel Rodríguez, the everyman furniture store proprietor
of Camagüey, which contradicted much of what Chibás said about him on the radio.
Rodríguez had written to Varona the day after hearing the broadcast and revealed
his problem with the government inspector occurred during Grau’s presidency. He
also denied sending his recording to the police or notifying Varona of its existence.
Lastly, he admitted to selling his business but not because of official persecution or
unscrupulous assessors but due to the law requiring retailers to keep 15 years
worth of records on hand at all times. Rodríguez found this provision so onerous
that he planned to seek greener pastures in a Latin American “sister republic” where
maintaining only five years of records was the rule.29

As for Chibás, he had

obviously been sloppy. He had also been imprudent regarding his allegations of
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corruption against Varona. The prime minister lived well but not lavishly so and
was broadly considered to be honest. Rather than sleaze, his foremost political
shortcoming was placing party interests above Cuba’s constitution. Chibás correctly
excoriated him for defending Alemán over the senate’s right to interpellate
government ministers.30 He was on shakier ground concerning Varona’s Miramar
home, which likely attracted his attention because its previous occupant had been
Mirtha Batista – the ex general’s daughter.

At any rate, the prime minister

contended his home had cost 75,000 pesos rather than 100,000 and supplied a
document from Banco Gelats containing some details of his mortgage. Regarding
the finca “La Dominica,” Varona noted it was government property; Grau had stayed
there periodically during his term in office, Chibás himself had visited on various
occasions and the premises were no more his than the presidential palace belonged
to Carlos Prío. Having defended his own probity, Varona turned the tables on
Chibás. He accused him of tax evasion and cashing false checks during his stint as a
congressman. Above all, Varona still aimed to boil Chibás’ blood. Thus, when Chibás
protested against attacks on his family, the prime minister suggested he had none
and deliberately impugned the Ortodoxo leader’s manhood, writing:
What I affirmed previously and I repeat now is that Chibás does not
have his own household; he has no wife, nor does he have children
and these are normal things for a man to have – this being a basic
condition of their nature. And we can doubt his devotion and respect
for the Cuban woman. He has not wanted to make one his wife and
thereby recognize the virtue and goodness of our women. Chibás has

Since Varona could never say he had backed Alemán in 1947 out of political expediency, he
responded to the criticism by pointing out that Chibás had praised his initial appointment as
education minister in May of 1946. He asserted that Chibás turned against Alemán only after Grau
had declined to support his presidential ambitions.
30
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not been able to find a good woman with whom to share his life and
begin an honorable family – which is the basic unit of society.31
Chibás closed out the polemic a week later; reminding Bohemia’s readers that
Varona had initiated the brouhaha to distract public attention from the
administration’s foibles.

These included its treatment of Cuba’s most famous

furniture vendor, Gabriel Rodríguez, whose intent to leave the country represented
“the most terrible accusation that has been made against a government.”32 Rather
than “removing the filth” Chibás observed the Auténticos “aspire to muddy those of
us who are clean.”33

He stated that the checks alluded to by Varona had

corresponded to his regular congressman’s salary and were in no way dishonest.
Chibás added that his lawmaker’s wages and inherited fortune had always been at
the service of Cuba’s people. Hence, while Tony Varona was buying the house of
Mirtha Batista, he was selling his cherished family home, with a “tethered heart,” for
half its value, in order to convert the island into a “great nation.”34 Nor was this the
first time Chibás had sacrificed financially in order to change the island’s politics. In
1944, he borrowed 20,000 pesos against the value of an apartment building he
owned in Vedado, known as the Edificio Chibás, in order to assist the election of
Ramón Grau San Martín. He claimed this money and the intense campaign it
enabled were a “decisive factor” in the Auténtico victory.35 With a distinct whiff of
pathos, Chibás wrote that, “When Grau San Martín became president of the republic,

Manuel Antonio de Varona, “Eduardo R. Chibás y yo,” 70.
Eduardo R. Chibás, “El Primer Ministro y yo,” Bohemia, October 30, 1949: 73.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., 72.
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no one had more influence than I. But I did not ask nor did I accept anything for my
personal benefit. I only urged him to fulfill the program of the revolution. I asked
him on behalf of the campesinos and for Cuba.”36 The Ortodoxo leader, who lacked a
steady income now that he was no longer a senator, then confessed he could no
longer afford the monthly 133 peso payment on that loan and would probably lose
yet another piece of his father’s legacy. Despite his sporadically rash accusations,
Chibás counted on two essential truths to maintain credibility and popular support.
First, he was one of the few politicians who had become demonstrably poorer since
entering politics – a fact not lost on many Cubans. While Chibás remained well off,
the island’s citizens were never regaled with accounts of his weekends at country
estates or exclusive beaches. Second, even as his accusations of corruption against
Tony Varona were off the mark, other Auténticos, notably the Prío brothers, were
widely known to have profited from public office. Chibás sometimes played fast and
loose with details but the larger narrative was undeniable.

“I entered power

branded as a millionaire,” he concluded, “but I left two years later poorer than when
I came. In contrast, the current leaders entered power without fortunes but now
enjoy many millions of pesos.”37

DIVIDED LOYALTIES ONCE MORE
While Chibás tussled with Prío administration officials, trouble was afoot yet
again within Ortodoxo ranks. During a tour of Camagüey province in mid July,
Chibás discovered that many members of the party’s Workers Wing also belonged to
36
37

Ibid.
Ibid.

235

the proletarian themed gangster outfit Acción Revolucionaria Guiteras (ARG). One of
them attempted to play down his divided loyalties, saying, “Here in Camagüey, we
do what we believe is right rather than following the orders of (ARG leader) ‘El
Extraño.’”38 Sometimes, this included persecuting fellow Ortodoxo sugar workers in
the area who themselves manifested divided loyalties by supporting the Communist
line. Isidro Figueroa, who headed the Ortodoxo Workers Wing, admitted such
“confusion” was detrimental to the party’s development and lamented that various
“distinguished” colleagues refused to understand the necessity of working toward
“legitimate (political) independence.”39 This was never going to be easy given the
longstanding competition for workers among ARG, the Communists and Auténtico
sponsored labor organizations.
In Matanzas, the old question of whether Ortodoxos should cut deals with
other parties was revived by a group devoted to the province’s former governor,
Pablo Vega. This effort was discreetly supported by José Manuel Gutiérrez, the
former Ortodoxo boss from the region who had supposedly retired from politics.
Tensions were further stoked by the fact that the local executive council remained
peopled with traitors who had supported outside candidates in 1948. On July 17,
Chibás used his bully pulpit to demand the ouster of double dealers and press
members of the provincial assembly to respect the national party platform. Chibás
explained that “It’s necessary to choose sides: those who are with (Pablo) Vega and
the old tortured politics of horse trading and who would sell the party in exchange
“En Cuba, Entrevista: Un Verdadero Discípulo de Chibás,” Bohemia, July 31, 1949: 68. For the most
part, gangster bosses were referred to by their nicknames. In this case, El Extraño (the strange one)
was the sobriquet of Jesús González Cartas.
39 Ibid.
38
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for government jobs or those who follow the Ortodoxos’ moral rectitude. There is no
room for middle ground or transactions.”40 Chibás was also tested by Guarro Ochoa,
the Ortodoxo mayor of Holguín in Oriente province. Hoping to bolster his re-election
prospects, Ochoa roiled the waters by mulling an offer of support from Fulgencio
Batista’s Partido Acción Unitaria (PAU). Chibás had no intention of allowing such a
move and informed Ochoa that he would have to resign from the party if he struck
such a deal. This, in turn, raised the ire of Guarro’s brother Millo, the Ortodoxo vicepresident. He claimed provincial assemblies were autonomous and told a Bohemia
reporter that, “I sacrificed myself once already for the party and I’m not prepared
now to follow the independent line. I consider it suicide.”41 Despite his brother’s
fiery words, Guarro Ochoa backed down. On July 23, he notified Chibás that the
agreement with Batista was off.
The debate over pacts was not confined solely to the provinces, although at
the national level there were fewer dissident voices. At a meeting of Ortodoxo
heavyweights in Roberto Agramonte’s house, Chibás claimed the party’s
independent line had “perfectly translated” popular sentiment.42 He mentioned the
“warm ovation” he had received during a reunion at his old high school, the elite,
Jesuit-run Colegio de Belén, along with the enthusiastic crowds that greeted him
upon his release from prison and the rally in Parque Central in which Ortodoxo

Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 629.
“En Cuba, Política: ‘Eddy’ o el Instinto Político,” Bohemia, July 24, 1949: 67. Asked by a Bohemia
journalist if he had any comment regarding Ochoa’s remarks, Chibás replied that, “I don’t understand
Millo’s attitude. The truth is that he was one of the party’s most ardent pactistas but after seeing our
success in the elections, he confessed to me that he had been mistaken. I esteem him very highly and
would regret having to confront him over the issue. However, we can’t sacrifice one of the party’s
central tenets for a mayoralty.” See: Ibid.
42 Ibid.
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principles had been reaffirmed by a “human wave.”43 Chibás, who always loved a
good metaphor, compared public opinion to large quantities of oil tucked beneath a
thin layer of soil. “One only needs to drop a match,” he said, “in order to create a
blaze.”44

Chibás subsequently ceded the floor to Roberto García Ibáñez, the

congressman from Oriente province, who argued for a less rigid policy. He cited the
case of Pepillo Hernández, the Ortodoxo mayor of Victoria de las Tunas, who was
offered support from outside parties. “What should we do?” asked García Ibáñez,
“Should we sacrifice Pepillo to maintain our independence?”45

Manuel Bisbé

allowed that independence had been largely tactical before the 1948 elections but
the party’s encouraging showing enshrined it as a guiding formula. The host,
Roberto Agramonte, suggested a historical analogy from the region – noting that in
Argentina, the sustained intransigence of the Radical party, which was also an outfit
dedicated to constitutionalism and clean politics, had eventually led to the election
of its leader, Hipólito Yrigoyen, in 1916.
Closer to home, Chibás almost certainly must have recalled the Auténtico
factional struggles during the late 1930s between “revolutionaries” and “realists.”
The former were dead set against compromise with Batista and advocated militancy
in combination with acts of violence to defeat him while the latter, which included
both Grau and Chibás, had sought the party’s legalization and participation in
elections. While the circumstances obviously differed this time around, Chibás now
enforced the more radical path having watched Auténtico realism mutate into moral
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turpitude. At the same time, discontented whispers and outright accusations of
dictatorship made their way, as they often did in Cuba, to the press. The columnist
Jorge Martí of El Mundo gave voice to some of these and was immediately graced
with a letter by the Ortodoxo chief. Chibás wrote that:
Liberty in the political sphere is not incompatible with discipline in
individual political parties….I will defend the right of any citizen to
found a monarchical party, a communist party, an annexationist party
or a party open to pacts in accordance with their own personal taste
but no one has the right to join the Ortodoxo party, which has a very
defined doctrine, and defend monarchy, communism, annexation to
Spain or political pacts. Every citizen has the right to dip their head
into the pond infected by traditional politics but they don’t have the
right to join the Ortodoxo party and push it into a corrupt swamp.46
Two days later, on July 31, Millo Ochoa appeared on Eddy’s radio show and
proclaimed his adherence to the independent line. A contented Chibás told his
listeners that Ochoa embodied the Ortodoxo ideal of personal sacrifice for the
greater good. Ochoa, however had little choice but to submit. Since the 1948
elections, supporters of independence had gained control of the party.

Ochoa

disagreed with them but bowed knowing that circumstances were relatively fluid.
After all, the national assembly had endorsed pacts in the recent past as had five of
the party’s six provincial bodies. At any rate, Millo Ochoa’s attitude formed a
marked contrast with that of José Manuel Gutiérrez. After failing to reorient the
Matanzas provincial assembly, the latter bitterly declared that, “This Eduardo
Chibás has created a party that seems like those of Mussolini, Hitler, etc. in which

46
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every member must adhere to the unassailable truth, to the word and orders of the
leader whether he’s called Duce, Führer or Chibás.”47
This view was most assuredly not shared by Carlos Márquez Sterling, the
former president of Cuba’s constitutional convention and erstwhile Liberal who was
courting the Ortodoxos but had not yet become a member. From one standpoint,
there was a certain poetic justice in Márquez Sterling, the biographer of Ignacio
Agramonte, joining the party led by his subject’s admiring descendant. 48 However,
the man described by a Bohemia reporter as “the most intellectual of Cuba’s
politicians” was more interested in electoral reform than maintaining an isolationist
posture.

49

Speaking of the 1948 contest, Márquez Sterling averred that, “shame

could not defeat the two large coalitions supported by bribery and electoral
machinery, and the Ortodoxos finished in third place, although they deserved to
win.”50 This fact influenced him to believe that effecting changes in the electoral
code, which unduly favored alliances, should be the party’s first priority. While the
old ways were still in force, Márquez Sterling advocated “temporary” pacts lest the
Ortodoxos run the risk of losing their historical moment.51

To be sure, these

musings were purely theoretical for the time being. Even so, Márquez Sterling’s
dance with the party, which was very much encouraged by Chibás, indicated he was
not quite the hardliner suggested by his rhetoric.

Ibid., 636.
In Jorge Mañach, the Ortodoxos also boasted the biographer of another Chibás hero – namely, José
Martí. As a professor of political economy at the University of Havana, Márquez Sterling added to the
party’s already formidable list of professors, which included Mañach and Manuel Bisbé among
others.
49 “En Cuba, Entrevista: ‘La Vergüenza no Pudo Ganar…’” Bohemia, August 7, 1949: 65.
50 Ibid.
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GANGSTERS RETAKE THE STAGE
On the afternoon of July 20, an employee at Havana’s city dump named
Roberto Enríquez López was returning home from work when he was accosted by
several armed men. They pinned him against the door of his house, jabbed their
machine gun muzzles into his back and opened fire. Upon hearing the shots, his wife
rushed out and hurled herself at one of the attackers. She was quickly brushed
aside, however, and the men proceeded to finish off their victim – who was later
found to have 23 bullet wounds. Enríquez López was not just anyone. Known by
the nickname “Muñeco,” (Puppet), he was a driver for Orlando León Lemus and had
been an incidental participant at Orfila. The authorities thus suspected UIR of the
murder, as the group’s leaders had sworn to kill everyone involved in the Marianao
shootout. Less than 24 hours later, MSR attempted to avenge its lost driver by
targeting Emilio Tro’s erstwhile chauffeur. The man, named Manuel Villa Yedra,
barely escaped with his life by hitting the floor of his vehicle during a drive by
shooting. On July 22, UIR responded by gunning down José Ramón Solís as he was
speaking to some companions a few blocks from the University of Havana.
The police reacted to this violent epidemic in typical fashion; with a
wholesale roundup of suspects. Meanwhile, GRAS, the two month old anti gangster
unit, shocked the Cuban public with an unaccustomed display of competence and
professionalism.

While the lawmen dithered, GRAS officers established some

obvious connections that had hitherto gone unnoticed. For example, they observed
that UIR assaults involved point blank shootings ending with extra bullets for good
measure while the wounded was on the ground. In contrast, MSR favored the drive-
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by method. Aside from such findings, GRAS conducted its own investigation into the
island’s gangster problem. Afterwards, Genovevo Pérez Dámera spoke for an hour
with police chief José Manuel Caramés and directed his subordinates to share
information with the heretofore hapless Bureau of Investigations – which then
formally accused a gaggle of triggermen with ties to the Orfila massacre of
murdering Justo Fuentes earlier in the year and attempting to dispatch Wichy
Salazar a few weeks later.

This unruly group included Orlando León Lemus,

Policarpo Soler, Eustaquio Carmenatti, Mario Aguerreberre and others.

The

suddenly efficient Bureau of Investigations also named two suspects in the murder
of Roberto Enríquez López.52 Finally, one of the witnesses dug up by GRAS officials
and turned over to the police caused a stir by alleging that José Manuel Alemán had
given 30,000 pesos to his gangster friends in MSR as seed money for new
assassinations. Whether this was true or merely a slander instigated by Alemán’s
longtime foe Pérez Dámera is unclear.

Needless to say, the infamous former

education minister dismissed the charge from his comfortable Florida confines.
While Alemán’s denials rang hollow given his wide-ranging improprieties,
some criticisms of GRAS were justified – leading many Havana denizens to consider
the unit’s successes an aberration. Even a few of the unit’s supposed triumphs later
turned sour. For example, after an attempt to blow up the ex senator Joaquín
Martínez Sáenz in the hotel Habana-Madrid, GRAS officers produced a confession
from Francisco Cortés de Lara. However, Cortés later told the Urgency Court judge

The police had previously arrested a man in connection with the murder of Enríquez López, based
on a tip provided by the dying city dump employee himself. Placed in police lineup, the man was
identified by Enríquez López’s wife as the killer but this turned out to be a case of mistaken identity.
52
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that he had only signed after being subjected to the “third degree.”53 This was
hardly the only proof that GRAS was not immune from the vices of Cuba’s other
security forces. On August 8, a young man was found beaten unconscious on the
corner of Malecón and Crespo. After being taken to the hospital and revived, he
described being summoned by some GRAS agents while out for a stroll. He was
subsequently forced into their car, beaten and deposited on the sidewalk. “It must
have been an error,” said the victim with admirable equanimity, “because I am not
involved in politics or secret societies nor do I have any enemies.”54 Perhaps the
surest evidence that GRAS had frustrated Havana residents was its derisive
nickname. The group’s officers were known as “green flies” because they cruised
around in Oldsmobiles of that color and, even at their most benign, were often
irascible pests. They also raised the specter of yet more lawlessness despite their
mandate to restore order.
As for General Pérez Dámera, his hatred of gangsters proved valuable but
this represented a felicitous convergence of interests in an otherwise strained
relationship between himself and Carlos Prío. This was largely because the army
chief, formed in an all powerful military, accepted civilian control on an
intermittent, somewhat random basis. Thus, it was no surprise when the general
considered GRAS a natural extension of his authority. Prío, on the other hand,
viewed himself as the unit’s commander. By now, such tensions were nothing new.
Just after Prío took office, for example, Pérez Dámera had shown scant concern for
Cuba’s precarious finances and demanded inordinate sums for the military. When
53
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the treasury ministry’s head accountant objected, a confidant of Pérez Dámera
gruffly informed some friends of Prío’s that, “This little guy doesn’t realize that
Genovevo can get rid of him and the president whenever he feels like it.”55 On the
other hand, Pérez Dámera was not above occasional conciliatory gestures such as
allowing “Rancho Alegre,” his finca noted for its spectacular pool, to be used for
government meetings. Further, he was a reliable ally in the fight against gangsters –
much more so than Prío, whose ties to gunmen often conferred an air of insincerity
on his efforts to curb them. In any event, the fragile bonds linking president and
army commander began to fray shortly after GRAS won its first plaudits.
On July 19, Pérez Dámera was alarmed by a broadcast from the Dominican
station La Voz del Yuna warning him that his life was in danger. This threat
resonated with particular force because the same announcer had correctly
predicted the death by ambush of Colonel Francisco Javier Arana in Guatemala a day
earlier. Nonetheless, Prío advised his army chief to ignore this provocation from the
Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo. After all, the tyrant was not only an enemy of the
Auténticos, who sheltered anti-Trujillo exiles on Cuban soil, but also of Prío’s family
as well.

The president’s brother-in-law, Enrique Henríquez, was an Auténtico

congressman with Dominican roots who had helped organize a failed plot against

“En Cuba, Destitución: Aliado del Sátrapa Trujillo,” Bohemia, August 28, 1949: sup. 2. Lavish
military budgets were a legacy of Grau’s administration, although the logic behind them was fairly
sound. After ten years of enjoying a privileged place in Cuban politics, Grau’s election in 1944
promised diminished influence for the army. He therefore attempted to buy its loyalty by raising its
budget to 20,037, 442 pesos by his last year in office. By contrast, during Fulgencio Batista’s
presidency military spending never rose above 8,500,000 pesos. Of course, generals and other high
ranking officers enriched themselves regardless of who ruled. Pérez Dámera, for example, lined his
pockets by raiding the army’s retirement fund. Also, in 1946, the pursy general won second prize in
the island’s lottery – pocketing 50,000 pesos in a process that was widely thought to be rigged.
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Trujillo the previous month.56

To place more stock in Trujillo’s hints than Prío’s

assurances would thus represent a double and unforgiveable betrayal. All the same,
Pérez Dámera yielded to his anxiety. He sent two men on a clandestine mission to
Santo Domingo, where they spoke with Trujillo and received information regarding
the supposed peril. Pérez Dámera was sufficiently convinced by the evidence they
brought back that he began surrounding himself with machine gun wielding
bodyguards, a fact that caught Prío’s attention and aroused his suspicions. On
August 22, the president learned the reason behind these precautions. His sources
had uncovered Pérez Dámera’s secret contact with Trujillo and revealed that one of
the go-betweens was Colonel Camilo González Chávez, Cuba’s air force chief. The
next day, Prío obtained a copy of the document that had unnerved his top military
man. Written by an agent of Trujillo posing as a renegade ARG gangster, the text
described preparations to murder the island’s foremost general in minute and
obviously disturbing detail.

These included five different schemes, developed

during the past several years, all of which betrayed intimate knowledge of Pérez
Dámera’s habits. The forgery maintained that ARG leaders Jesús González Cartas
and Eufemio Fernández were behind these plans as they believed Pérez Dámera
would “always be a serious obstacle” to their organization.57 Moreover, Fernández,
who was a close friend of Prío, supposedly had a clear motive given Pérez Dámera’s

In June of 1949, an expeditionary force of 800 Dominican exiles was training in Oriente province
and preparing to set sail from the port of Baracoa as part of a multi-pronged, and ultimately
unsuccessful, attack against Trujillo. As part of the same plan, Enrique Henríquez and the gangster
Rolando Masferrer were in Haiti devising a land invasion while Prío’s ex bodyguard Eufemio
Fernández was overseeing preparations for an air assault from Guatemala.
57 “Este Documento Constituyó una de la Causas de la Caída de Genovevo Pérez,” Bohemia, September
4, 1949: 79.
56

245

“betrayal” of the Auténticos’ first effort to oust Trujillo – the Cayo Confites operation
in 1947.58
After reading the phony letter, Prío declared, “Either the army is an
institution or a political force. If it’s the first, my presence in Columbia (the main
military barracks) will resolve the problem; if it’s the second, the country is lost and
I will share its fate.”59 At 5 p.m., the president ordered Police Chief José Manuel
Caramés to keep his men in their station houses. He then called Defense Minister
Segundo Curti to the presidential palace. Prío was determined to relieve Pérez
Dámera of his position but two obstacles presented themselves. First, his decree
required the prime minister’s signature but Tony Varona was abroad. Second, the
prospective new army chief, Ruperto Cabrera, was vacationing in New York. Prío
resolved the former by naming Curti interim prime minister. As for the latter,
Cabrera arrived home at 10 p.m. that evening – whereupon he was immediately
summoned to meet the president. Prío realized he was in a precarious position even
after General Cabrera agreed to command the military.

To begin with, Pérez

Dámera had named the entire palace guard and its loyalty could not be assured.
Hence, Prío ascended to the third floor living quarters, told his wife he was about to

Ibid. This expedition had been encouraged by Grau, funded by José Manuel Alemán and squashed
by Pérez Dámera after the Orfila shootout. While Cayo Confites had primarily been run by MSR
captains such as Rolando Masferrer and Manolo Castro, members of other “action groups” had also
participated. Eufemio Fernández, for example, had been a battalion commander. Fidel Castro of UIR
was also on hand. Upon returning to Havana, many filibusterers expressed their displeasure with
Pérez Dámera. As they marched through the capital to a hero’s welcome, a radio reporter asked
Masferrer to say a few words. He obliged by cursing the army chief and calling him a traitor. When
the journalist admonished Masferrer to watch his language, the temperamental ruffian smashed him
with the microphone. See: “Filibuster’s End,” Time, October 13, 1947:
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,933727,00.html
59 “En Cuba, Destitución: Aliado del Sátrapa Trujillo,” supplement, 3.
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“take a very serious step” and bid her to leave for his mother’s house.60 At 11:10
p.m., Prío left for the Columbia military base accompanied by Cabrera and two other
officers.

They found the place subdued and quiet, presided over by a pair of

guayabera clad colonels playing dominoes. A farcical scene ensued when Prío
demanded the keys to Pérez Dámera’s office but neither of the colonels had them.
Luckily, an officer spied an open window and climbed through. Shortly thereafter,
the soldiers were stirred from their slumber and assembled on the parade ground.
Prío announced the retirement of Pérez Dámera and his replacement by General
Ruperto Cabrera. He also urged his audience to cast off any lingering allegiance to
their former leader, saying, “I hope that in the following days, Cuban military men
will think more highly of the will they possess than the functions they carry out
because the former is permanent while the latter is fleeting.”61 To his relief, the
president’s oratory was met by a round of applause but there was still no time to
relax. Prío’s most critical task remained at hand; namely to speak with Pérez
Dámera himself, who was rusticating in “La Larga,” his hacienda in Camagüey
province.62
“General,” said Prío, “I have called to inform you that you have been relieved
as army chief of staff.”
“As you order, Mr. President,” answered Pérez Dámera, growing pale as his
family looked on nervously. Moments later, he added, “Mr. President, but why?”

Ibid.
Ibid.
62 Pérez Dámera bought “La Larga” in 1945, while still a colonel, and as with many Cuban officers he
used military draftees rather than civilian laborers to work the land. As army chief, Pérez Dámera
flew to “La Larga” on a weekly basis using a Cuban air force jet.
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“You have lost confidence in me and when a subordinate does not trust his
boss the situation doesn’t go very well,” said Prío coldly.
“Very well, Mr. President. May I speak with someone there?”
“With whomever you’d like, general,” replied Prío.
The telephone was passed to one of the colonels present.
“What has happened, colonel?” asked Pérez Dámera.
“You have been replaced, general, just as the president has informed you.”
“What do the officers say?”
“All are at the president’s orders.”
“And you?”
“I also, general.”63
Pérez Dámera was caught unawares and had no choice but to yield although
he plainly doubted the president’s authority. He seemed to believe he had been
deposed more by fellow officers than the nation’s chief executive – an assumption
that was not altogether mistaken. Shorn of his command and suspected of treason,
Pérez Dámera adopted a more humble demeanor in accordance with his newly
vulnerable position. Thus, he told an intimate, ironically named Trujillo, to notify
the president that he was willing to leave Cuba immediately if his presence was
considered “prejudicial.”64

“En Cuba, Destitución: Aliado del Sátrapa Trujillo,” supplement, 1-2.
“En Cuba, Destitución: ‘Están Hablando con el ex Jefe del Ejército.” Bohemia, August 28,
supplement, 2. This was not the first time a president had appeared at the Campamento Columbia
and rallied the troops against their military commander. In 1941, Fulgencio Batista succeeded in a
similar maneuver against Pedro Pedraza after the latter, who was army chief, demanded control of
the navy as well. Once Batista won over the soldiers, Pedraza was arrested and placed on a plane to
Miami. Of course, Batista had been Cuba’s military leader for seven years before being elected as a
civilian president in 1940. For Prío, the situation was more daunting even though Pérez Dámera was
63
64

248

For a moment, Carlos Prío basked in a hero’s glow. The obese and opulent
Pérez Dámera was no darling of the people nor was he a favorite of journalists, most
of whom lionized Prío for defending the prerogatives of civilian government. Even
the usually hostile Enrique de la Osa registered his approval, albeit by means of an
anecdote. He noted that United States embassy officials were among the first to
detect something had happened. When informed that Pérez Dámera had been
unseated, they requested permission to send observers. Gushing with pride, de la
Osa described how they “verified with amazement” that a Latin American army chief
could be removed without setting off an insurrection.65 On the other hand, Chibás
could not resist portraying the situation in negative terms. Asked by a reporter for
his opinion, the Ortodoxo leader initially expressed surprise that Prío had waited
until “three o’clock in the morning” to exercise his constitutional right instead of
doing so “in broad daylight like any other normal government activity.” The most
dramatic man in Cuban politics added that the episode had developed, “theatrically,
like a horrifying melodrama episode, where the president’s fear constitutes the
main character.” Considering the matter a bit further, Chibás concluded that, “What
has occurred seems more like a surprise attack from one band of gunmen against a
pack of rivals based on differences over how to divide their loot rather than the
constitutional substitution of an army chief realized by the chief of state.”66

less threatening than Pedraza – who at one point had driven to the presidential palace accompanied
by 30 cars full of machinegun bearing officers and bodyguards to press his case. For a more detailed
account of these events, see: Thomas, Cuba, 724-725.
65 Ibid.
66 Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 636.
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Although ungenerous, the Ortodoxo leader’s reference to gangsters turned
out to be prescient. On the afternoon of September 1, Havana played host to yet
another lurid scene as Wichy Salazar and Francisco Fernández Cristóbal were
murdered in a drive-by shooting. Salazar’s sister Efigenia was also wounded in the
attack but the enterprising Ortodoxo Juan Amador persuaded her to concede an
interview from her hospital bed – which was broadcast live on Radio Progreso.
Efigenia Salazar described how they had been walking toward Wichy’s car, parked
near their home in Havana’s Cerro district, when bullets began flying from a vehicle
in the distance. She later clarified that there were two automobiles filled with
“around 12” triggermen along with some others on foot. “I recognized Policarpo
Soler,” she said, “who got out of the car with a machine gun….Policarpo killed my
brother on the ground. He was wearing dark glasses and a guayabera. I screamed:
‘Assassin, don’t kill him!’ He then opened fire on me and believed I was dead. Ah! El
Colorado was also in this automobile.”
“You know him?” asked Amador.
“Of course! Since the era of Batista. I saw him perfectly. Later on, the police
pretended to chase the fleeing assassins. The truth is that I don’t know why they
can’t capture these individuals since they too have machine guns.”67
As a gang member himself with a violent past, Wichy Salazar was not an ideal
repository for sympathy.68 Rather, the shocking aspect of this story was Policarpo
“En Cuba, Atentado: Sangre y Balas Bajo la Cordialidad,” Bohemia, September 11, 1949: 65.
Wichy Salazar and El Colorado had been founding members of ARG but had fallen out over the
latter’s decision to profit from the black market. Later on, Salazar joined UIR and El Colorado jumped
to MSR. The rivalry between them was thus deepened by the feud between these gangs – which
deepened considerably after the Orfila massacre. As for Policarpo Soler, he had once been a family
friend of the Salazars but following an unknown incident vowed to exterminate all of them. This
67
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Soler’s attempt to murder an unarmed woman.

During his Sunday evening

broadcast, Chibás compared this outrage to Aurora Soler’s execution at Orfila and
noted that both had received “a bullet in the belly.”69 Moreover, Chibás incited
anger at the apathetic lawmen who had watched in a nearby patrol car while
Policarpo Soler descended from his vehicle and finished Salazar off.

He also

reproached them for their halfhearted pursuit of the perpetrators once they fled the
scene. This last accusation was not entirely accurate, however. In fact, police trailed
a pair of shooters to the University of Havana’s agronomy school. This was one of
many safe havens, including the houses and country estates of legislators, which
dotted the capital’s landscape and were off-limits to the authorities. Under intense
pressure to act after this latest outrage, Carlos Prío set aside the university’s
autonomy and ordered police to occupy the agronomy school. They duly arrested
the wanted gunmen along with 12 other suspicious characters. Among these was
the agronomy school’s student president, José Buján, who apparently had been
doing more than keeping questionable company. By all indications, he had cut a
deal with MSR gangsters to help win the presidency of the Federation of University
Students (FEU).70

would explain his attempt to snuff out Efigenia. He was also implicated in the murder of Wichy’s
brother Noel in September of 1948.
69 Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 637.
70 “En Cuba, Atentado: El Alma Máter Afectada,” Bohemia, September 11, 1949: 66. According to
fellow university students who were willing to speak to the press, Buján’s use of armed gangsters
was meant to win support and intimidate other candidates from challenging him from the FEU
presidency. Buján was also seen in the presence of El Colorado and Policarpo Soler, who lent their
assistance whenever possible. In one alleged incident, Buján met with the current FEU president,
Enrique Ovares, and asked for his adherence saying: “Look, I am backed by El Colorado. These
(armed) men who follow me around belong to him and you will see how he appears here from one
moment to the next.”
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Buján was also using the agronomy school and adjacent botanical garden,
known as the Quinta de los Molinos, as his own personal fiefdom. Buján resided with
his wife and two small children in one of the school’s buildings and cut down trees
from the botanical garden as if they were his own, selling the lumber for profit. In
an even cheekier maneuver, Buján had removed a wooden house, piece by piece,
from the botanical garden and reconstructed it on land he owned on the Havana
outskirts. Altogether, Buján seemed to possess the same nerve as his patron and
benefactor, José Manuel Alemán. Many students believed Alemán was supplying
weapons stockpiled in 1947 for the cancelled expedition against Trujillo as a means
to bring the university under his control.71 Perhaps even more scandalous was the
arrest of Juan Acosta, a member of the presidential palace secret service. Enrique de
la Osa claimed this proved, “for the man on the street,” that Prío had known all along
what was going on in the agronomy school.72

This theory was bolstered by

documents confiscated during the police raid indicating that Buján and his MSR
sponsors were closely monitoring the student campaign against Prío’s attempt to
secure a foreign loan. On his radio show, Chibás lamented that most students
repudiated gangsters but were defenseless against gunmen who were “armed to the
teeth, present everywhere, enjoying immunity, mocking the courts and boasting
government support.”73 For Prío, the issue was particularly dicey because party
reorganizations were scheduled for October. At that time Prío would need some of
the same gangsters he now harassed to help secure friendly delegates in Auténtico

“En Cuba, Atentado: En la Quinta de los Molinos,” Bohemia, September 11, 1949: 66.
“En Cuba, Atentado: Invasión Policial,” Bohemia, September 11, 1949: 67.
73 Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 638.
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assemblies, particularly as he hoped to impose his brother Antonio as a candidate
for Havana’s mayoralty. For this reason, most of those arrested were likely to find
themselves back on the street before long. The case of Wilfredo Lara García, a driveby shooter of Wichy Salazar nabbed in the agronomy school raid, more or less
predicted this result. Lara already had murder and attempted murder charges
pending against him, but was suspiciously free on bail, when he joined El Colorado
and Policarpo Soler on their deadly mission.
Unfortunately for Prío, the miasmal stew of gangsters, unprofessional
policemen and university violence continued to be a source of embarrassment. On
September 13, José Pardo Llada announced during his radio show that a certain Mr.
Manuel Caramés Monteagudo had been granted permission to construct a three
story house on Avenida Tulipán. Pardo Llada noted the name’s similarity to that of
Havana’s police chief and wondered mischievously if they were the same person or
whether perhaps there was a brother who had won the lottery. Two days later, the
23 year old Ortodoxo broadcaster found a man in uniform waiting for him and was
escorted to police headquarters. He was quickly shown into the office of José
Manuel Caramés Monteagudo.

With nary a word, the latter closed the door,

removed his gold-butted revolver from its holster and cast it aside. Pardo Llada
countered by taking off his glasses. Without further ado, Caramés punched Pardo
Llada in the chest and received a glancing blow to the face in return. The two men
grappled and hit each other for a short while before falling on the police chief’s
leather couch, whereupon Caramés bellowed, “You are a liar!” The affray then
continued for another five minutes or so after which the exhausted belligerents
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began hurling curses at each other rather than fists. Finally, someone opened the
door from outside and two legislators rushed in along with the journalist Humberto
Medrano of Prensa Libre. “What’s going on?” asked Medrano, looking at Caramés.
“Are you crazy?”
“I couldn’t allow what he said,” answered the police chief. “It’s a lie.”
“This is foolishness!” said Representative Armando Fernández Jorva. “You
can’t fight with a reporter!”
The chubby Caramés, answering like a pouting schoolchild, said: “He
attacked me! He’s the one who fought with me!”
“Why then,” remonstrated Pardo Llada, “Did you put away your pistol?”
“And why did you take off your glasses?” asked the police chief.74
Finally, as the affair resembled a makeshift honor dispute, Medrano drew up
a document, in accordance with the rules of dueling, which both men signed and
thereby officially ended their conflict. By that evening, Caramés was a laughingstock
to such an extent that the Puerto Rican singer Daniel Santos had already debuted a
song dedicated to the incident. The island’s cartoonists rejoiced as well. One sketch,
entitled “Man of Prudence,” portrayed a bare-chested figure wearing boxing gloves
approaching police headquarters and saying, “Caramés wants to see me in his office
and I have to be ready just in case.”75
Aside from being imprudent and well neigh illegal, the Havana police chief
had chosen poor timing for his ill advised loutishness. September 15 represented
the second anniversary of the Orfila massacre and UIR militants were certain to
74
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“En Cuba, Policia: ¿Cabriñana o Queensberry? Bohemia, September 25, 1949: 66.
Vergara, “Hombre Precavido,” Bohemia, September 25, 1949: 66.
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commemorate the death of their boss with an attack of some sort. Instead of
concentrating on this eventuality Caramés had spent the afternoon pursuing a
personal quarrel. In light of what would happen later this lapse was both reckless
and unforgiveable. Shortly after 7p.m., a group of UIR triggermen opened fire on
Rolando Masferrer as he left the Capitolio. A gun battle ensued on the marble
staircase and legislators who found themselves nearby hit the ground and tried to
crawl discreetly toward safety. The MSR leader saved himself by shooting his way
back into the building but two of his gangster friends were gravely wounded and
another died from a bullet to the head. As usual, no assailants were detained at the
scene.

A Bohemia reporter snidely observed that, “The so-called Law against

Gangsterism had no effect even in the parliamentary realm, where the police
showed themselves to be just as incompetent as they are in the university.”76 For
Masferrer, this was the fifth time he had escaped unharmed from an assassination
attempt since June of 1948. As with Wichy Salazar, public sympathy for Masferrer
was rather scant but there was considerable fury that gangsters had yet again
crossed a line – this time for bringing their conflict to Cuba’s congress.
This sense of pervasive lawlessness was aggravated five days later when
Gustavo Mejía Maderne, the vice president of the Association of Social Science
Students at the University of Havana, was shot eight times in the back. Mejía had
been a third year law student with no ties to the armed thugs on campus. Rather, he
managed the university’s swimming pool area and noticed its canteen was

“En Cuba, Atentado: Por Quinta Vez,” Bohemia, September 25, 1949: 71. University policemen
tended to complain that they could not arrest the gangsters in their midst because they were
outgunned.
76
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purveying drugs and attracting dubious characters who were not students.
Moments after denouncing this state of affairs to the university deans, he was
riddled with bullets by Modesto González del Valle, who owned the canteen. Raúl
Roa, dean of the social sciences faculty, told grieving professors and students at the
hospital, where Mejía had been delivered dead on arrival, that he had seen González
del Valle brandishing a pistol and overheard him saying, “Blood is going to run.” 77
Heeding the popular uproar, Roa resigned his post and vowed to help rescue the
campus from shady figures. The victim’s uncle, Feliciano Maderne, who had fought
Machado in the 1930s, hoped this episode would call attention to the “tolerance and
protection that the present government reserves for gangsters” and that criminals
would continue to kill “peaceable citizens” until the police began catching them.78
Speaking to reporters in the packed emergency ward that contained his nephew’s
cadaver, Maderne added an emotional plea: “I summon President Prío to grant me
an audience so I may ask him to fulfill his responsibilities and demand the
guarantees and respect the honest citizens of my fatherland deserve!”79
While violence raged in Havana, assassins with government links plagued
Cuba’s countryside as well. On September 21, the Communist leader Lázaro Peña
denounced the murder of two workers’ leaders in the Francisco sugar mill of
Camagüey province. Speaking in the chamber of representatives, he accused the
Auténtico congressman and labor leader Emilio Surí Castillo of sponsoring the
killings. Manuel Bisbé also blamed the administration for these deaths, adding that,
“En Cuba, Universidad: ‘Ha Sido Muerto por la Espalda…,’” Bohemia, September 25, 1949: 65.
Ibid., 66. Maderne also made much of the fact that González del Valle was brother-in-law to the
infamous Mario Salabarría, the assassin of Orfila who was serving a 30 year jail sentence.
79 Ibid.
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“in Cuba human life has no more value than that of an insect!”80

The more

immediate focus, however, involved Havana and its beleaguered police chief.
Armando Caíñas Milanés declared that, “Everyone, from the president of the
republic to the most insignificant policeman, knows who the gangsters are, where
they work, where they live and where they spend their time.”81 He then called for
the resignation of Caramés, who he claimed was incapable of maintaining order.
One triggerman, in fact, was sitting among them right there and then. Hardly one to
remain silent during a lively debate, Rolando Masferrer artfully told the assembly
that administration officials should follow the example of Aureliano Sánchez Arango
– who had removed (mostly MSR) gunmen from the education ministry payroll.
Specifically, he referred to Miguelito Suárez Fernández and Interior Minister Rubén
de León, both of whom sustained UIR militants.
For his part, Carlos Prío bowed to public opinion and unleashed GRAS. This
time, the “green flies” arrested 50 men, including Masferrer’s private secretary but
as Enrique de la Osa noted, these were “third category” suspects.

“The big

gangsters,” including El Colorado and Policarpo Soler “remained untouchable.”82
More compelling was the news that Caramés resigned his position under pressure
from the president on September 22. Shortly thereafter, the ex police chief agreed
to an interview with two Bohemia reporters in which he connected each of the
island’s action groups to their respective Auténtico factions.

For example, he

claimed the government used ARG gunmen to win control over Cuba’s labor unions.

“En Cuba: La Capital: ‘En Cuba la Vida Humana no se Respeta…’” Bohemia, October 2, 1949: 65.
Ibid., 66.
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Caramés also stated that Miguelito Suárez Fernández provided “moral and material”
support for gangsters and had helped the UIR boss José de Jesús Jinjaume flee to
safety in New York. He further averred that the senate president had employed
armed toughs in his electoral campaigns “before and after” the third front. 83 “Each
time (the thugs) committed their misdeeds,” concluded Caramés, “I sent them to the
courts. In spite of the evidence I contributed, they were exonerated. This occurred
with all the groups time after time.”84 Given all the negative publicity, Carlos Prío
was lucky in at least one respect; namely, that Chibás had passed the week
campaigning in Matanzas and Las Villas.

This strenuous six day tour, which

encompassed trips to villages, towns and sugar mills of every size, was undertaken
in the island’s rainy season – meaning he was subjected not only to intense
downpours but also impassible country roads, which were dirt paths during the best
of times and had now become car swallowing brown muck. Chibás returned to
Havana so exhausted that he dashed off a quick condemnation of the Mejía shooting,
which was read over the air by a minor Ortodoxo official named Isidro Sosa.
In conjunction with the first anniversary of Prío’s inauguration, Raúl
Gutiérrez conducted a public survey regarding how Cubans viewed his performance
to date. The news was encouraging despite recent chaos in Havana’s streets and
university. In what was perhaps the most telling question, citizens were asked
whether they preferred Prío over Grau, Chibás or Batista. In the event, they opted
for Prío over El Viejo by seven percentage points, over the Ortodoxo leader by nearly
eight percentage points and over the ex general by almost nine percentage points.
83
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One of the main reasons for this could be found in something Chibás had regularly
denounced during the latter half of Grau’s presidency but had largely stopped
talking about since Prío took office. That is, prices were falling for basic goods and
the black market was diminishing as a factor in Cuban life. As Chibás and others had
pointed out, this was a worldwide phenomenon rather than a local one, driven by
increasing production in the United States and countries devastated by World War
II.85 Nonetheless, Prío and Commerce Minister José Andreu reaped the political
benefits. Asked what was best about Prío’s administration, the fact that he had
“lowered the cost of living (and) ended the black market” was ranked first by
respondents.86 They also chose Andreu as the government’s best cabinet member.
On the other hand, Prío remained unpopular in Cuba’s interior. For example more
than 53 percent claimed the president had done “nothing good” during his first year
in office.87

THE GOVERNMENT LOAN
In the June 26 issue of Bohemia, an interview appeared with Treasury
Minister Antonio Prío. Asked by Mario Kuchilán whether the government was
preparing a loan, he opened his eyes wide and replied, “I would rather not talk

In his open letter to Carlos Prío from May 8, 1949, while still imprisoned in the Castillo del
Príncipe, Chibás wrote that prices for basic goods were falling just about everywhere. For example,
in the United States, 100 lbs. of butter had dropped from $20.00 to $11.25. In terms of grains, rye
had slipped from $2.50 to $1.26, wheat had gone from $3.05 to $2.18 and flour had descended from
$7.65 to $3.70. Other commonly consumed items such as eggs had declined from 47 cents per dozen
to 31 cents per dozen.
86 Raúl Gutiérrez, “Survey Nacional: El Pueblo Enjuicia y Compara el Gobierno del Presidente Prío,”
Bohemia, October 9, 1949: 98.
87 Ibid.
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about it.”88 Three weeks later, Francisco Ichaso noted that the president and his
prime minister remained mum on the subject but found it telling that the
government did not offer any denials. Even as the administration stonewalled about
the loan, two related issues – namely, the pillaged treasury and its capacity to
support an ever expanding bureaucracy, could not be so easily minimized.
Government jobs were the Auténticos’ lifeblood and Prío had insisted the so-called
“deficit” would not endanger them. Hence, there was palpable shock when 12,000
public employees received pink slips in July.

Auténtico congressmen were

particularly outraged. Some suspected that Grau’s “deficit” had diminished the
funds available for government work.89 Moreover, the positions being cut had
specifically been handed out by Auténtico representatives – some of whom counted
more than 1000 places at the public trough at their disposal. Teodoro Tejeda Setién,
a congressman from Las Villas province, was thus being quite honest when he
referred to the displaced as “our employees.”90 Invited to address the AuténticoRepublican parliamentary committee, Tony Varona euphemistically explained that
Cuba was suffering a “post-war crisis.”91 Predictably, those who complained loudest
regarding the government’s newfound penury were legislators loyal to Miguel
Suárez Fernández. The real question, then, was whether the administration was
prepared to antagonize them less than a year before midterm elections.

Mario Kuchilán, “Grafoentrevista exclusiva: Antonio Prío,” Bohemia, June 26, 1949: 21.
Foremost among these was the Auténtico congressman from Trinidad, Eduardo López Deustua.
However, not everyone blamed Grau’s deficit for the layoffs. One of the former president’s devotees,
Albertico Cruz, attributed the lack of money not to Grau’s malfeasance but to the dishonesty of
Lincoln Rodón – the Republican president of the chamber of representatives. See “En Cuba, Cámara:
‘Este es un Congreso Barato…’” July 17, 1949: 70.
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Ichaso, in his Bohemia column, mentioned the persistent rumor that Prío
planned to obtain a “river of gold” in order to bring back the go-go epoch of Grau.92
This would maintain Auténtico unity at the cost of abandoning one of the party’s last
remaining principles. Having been formed during the late 1920s and early 1930s
when President Gerardo Machado negotiated loans on what they considered
exploitive terms, Auténtico founders, including Prío, had considered them anathema
from the start. For this reason, Manuel Fernández Supervielle had campaigned for
Havana’s mayoralty in 1946 on a platform of bringing water to the city without
foreign money or concessions. Of course, Supervielle’s chief propagandist had been
Eduardo Chibás, who was opposed to a loan then and remained steadfastly against
one now. Asked by a reporter for his opinion, Chibás recalled that he had accused
the government of attempting to borrow foreign money six months earlier on his
radio show but the government had accused him of “calumny.”93 The Ortodoxo
leader also could not resist one of his traditional crowd pleasing refrains, saying:
What President Prío has to do now if he wants to behave honorably
and logically is not to look for a loan of 100 or 200 million pesos to
replace the millions that have been stolen from the public treasury
but to throw the thieves in prison and confiscate the money they
robbed. But he cannot do this because he would have to begin by
incarcerating the majority of those who surround him.94
Chibás sprinkled his rhetoric with some sobering facts as well. He observed that
Cuba had taken out 422 million pesos worth of loans in its history and had paid 205

Francisco Ichaso, Está ya muy adelantada la tramitación del empréstito,” Bohemia, July 17, 1949:
104.
93 “Encuestas de Bohemia: Sobre la concertación de un empréstito extranjero,” Bohemia, July 24,
1949, 80.
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million worth of interest on that amount. The most egregious case of abuse had
been a loan for 35 million contracted by the island’s first president, Tomás Estrada
Palma, in 1904, to pay veterans of the independence war. This was finally retired
forty years later, with the government forking over almost 43 million pesos in
interest.95 Chibás was not the only political leader who opposed the loan. Grau
declared that borrowing foreign money was “totally contrary” to Auténtico doctrine
while Fulgencio Batista deemed the prospect of a loan “inconceivable” and an
“ominous weight” on the Cuban people.96 Notable in his dissent was Miguelito
Suárez Fernández, who stood to gain from an infusion of cash and argued against
dismissing a loan out of hand.

He mentioned that Cuba was in danger of

“depression” and referred to the Marshall Plan and President Harry Truman’s
“politics of reconstruction” as evidence of crisis on a world scale that should be
solved by creative rather than rigid thinking. 97 No doubt, Suárez Fernández was
also considering the present crisis of patronage that would disproportionately affect
his disciples without a new revenue source.
On July 31, Bohemia published a layout on the hobbies of Cuban politicians.
The magazine’s readers learned that Miguelito Suárez Fernández was an avid
gardener, for example, on those days when he was not plotting to outmaneuver
rivals within his party. Lincoln Rodón, president of the chamber of representatives,
expressed a fascination with Napoleon during those times when he was not
Every Cuban president before 1933 with the exception of Mario García Menocal (1913-1921)
borrowed money from foreign banks under onerous terms. In 1909, President José Miguel Gómez
took out a 16 million peso loan. Eventually, 21 million in interest was paid. In 1923, President
Alfredo Zayas borrowed 50 million pesos upon which the Cuban government paid 34 million in
interest.
96 “Encuestas de Bohemia: Sobre la concertación de un empréstito extranjero,” 81.
97 Ibid.
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managing the island’s unruly congressmen. After overseeing the bare cupboard of
Cuba’s treasury, Antonio Prío indulged in photography. Fulgencio Batista, who
rarely left his country estate, confessed a devotion to reading – a passion he pursued
in the well stocked library he maintained there.98 The most thrilling pastime
belonged to Aurelio Sánchez Arango, an aviation enthusiast, followed closely by the
mayor of Marianao, Francisco González Orúe, who rode a motorcycle. Conversely,
when reporters reached the 14th floor of Chibás’ apartment building, he offered
scarce recompense for their effort, saying his hobby was, “to moralize Cuban
politics.”99 He proceeded to demonstrate this by sitting at his desk and writing a
critique. Perhaps Chibás was even composing his open letter to Carlos Prío, which
also appeared on July 31.
For Chibás, the loan was further evidence that his erstwhile friend had
become “a servant of imperialist interests.”100 Prío had bowed to Wall Street
through preferential treatment of the Cuban Electric Company and was doing so
again by seeking to borrow money from United States banks. Just as Chibás had
pressured Prío into withdrawing the rate hikes for electricity, he hoped a similar
campaign would scuttle the loan before it was consummated. Although the subject
remained officially taboo, Prío had begun preparing the ground by touting his own
personal honesty and that of his cabinet. Chibás scoffed, reminding Prío that he had
Batista, in fact, owned one of the largest private libraries in Cuba. Moreover, his love of reading
was longstanding. As a young stenographer in the military, he was given the nickname “el literato”
(the literary one) by fellow soldiers. See: Argote-Freyre, Fulgencio Batista, 25.
99 “¿Cual es su hobby?, Bohemia, July 31, 1949: 40.
100 Eduardo R. Chibás. “De Eduardo Chibás a Carlos Prío: Contra un Absurdo Empréstito Extranjero,”
July 31, 1949: 54. Chibás dated Prío’s transformation from revolutionary to imperialist servant to
April of 1942, when, as chairman of the senate committee of finance and taxes, he supported the so
called “Gift Law” that cancelled 10 million pesos worth of debt incurred by public utilities – four
million of which belonged to the Cuban Electric Company.
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known him as a university student who “lived very modestly.”101 He challenged Prío
once again to explain how he acquired so many choice properties since entering
politics. As for the president’s ministers, Chibás accused Antonio Prío of lining his
pockets by directing tax inspectors to shake down Cuba’s merchants and
industrialists. He also pointed out that an ethical cloud hung over Agriculture
Minister Virgilio Pérez, who had manipulated the price of coffee by importing 15
million pounds even as the country was already well stocked. According to Chibás,
this “affaire” netted 1.5 million pesos for Pérez and his cronies while “ruining”
23,000 domestic coffee farmers.102 Chibás concluded that,
Every time a government has requested a loan, they play the same
tune: “the loan is for paving streets and constructing aqueducts in
interior cities,” “the loan is for improving the island’s sanitation,” “the
loan is for stimulating agriculture,” “the loan is for building a new
sewage system,” etc., etc. Nevertheless, in the shadow of these loans
the one thing that has always been constructed is great personal
fortunes.103
While Chibás steadfastly disapproved of any loan, he felt borrowing money
domestically represented the lesser of two evils. He noted that Cuba possessed
300,000 pesos worth of gold in New York’s Federal Reserve Bank and 600,000
million pesos in national bank deposits. The onus of repayment would still hinder
industry, business and the general population – all of whom would endure higher
taxes, but at least this money would stay on the island. Foreign loans were not only
a “bloodbath for the national economy,” they also begat an inevitable swarm of
outside accountants, engineers and other technocrats sent from overseas to ensure
Ibid.
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compliance. 104 In this vein, he warned Prío that, “You know very well that loans
constitute the imperialist instrument of penetration, the favorite weapon of ‘dollar
politics’ in order to economically subjugate the people of Latin America.”105
By now, the loan was such a charged topic that Raúl Gutiérrez, Cuba’s public
survey guru, was commissioned to produce a new poll. His research revealed a trio
of interesting findings. First, 75.56 percent of respondents were aware of the
government’s semi-clandestine project to organize a loan. Second, more Cubans
seemed to think borrowing cash could be beneficial or conditionally beneficial
(45.56 percent) than those who felt it would be prejudicial or conditionally
prejudicial (37.58 percent). This was no surprise as many Cubans hoped renewed
public works employment would cover the loss of jobs caused by a 20 percent
reduction in the sugar harvest. Did this mean Chibás’ usually unerring instinct for
what was popular had deserted him? Not quite. Asked whether the loan should
involve money from the United States or capital raised domestically, only 2.96
percent preferred the former while an overwhelming 77.46 percent opted for the
latter.106
Apart from fanning patriotic feelings and impugning Prío’s credibility or that
of his ministers, Chibás began using the government’s attempt to cadge foreign
funds as an all purpose cudgel to hack away at each of his rival’s political failings. In
an August 28 Bohemia article, he utilized the loan as a metaphor for the
administration’s neglect of everyday Cubans. The Ortodoxo leader was particularly
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galled by Prío’s plan to build a tunnel beneath Havana’s harbor and a tourist area on
the other side’s surrounding land. He claimed the tunnel would connect capital
dwellers more easily to the beaches but would do nothing to help rural farmers, who
lacked decent roads, bring their products to market.

Regarding the future

sightseeing zone, Chibás predicted it would be a “new city overflowing with wealth
for the recreation of tourists and rich Habaneros” while the rest of the island was
“abandoned.”107 To underline his point, the Ortodoxo leader inserted a photo of an
overcrowded tenement in a ramshackle Havana neighborhood. Underneath, the
caption asked, “Will the tourist city in eastern Havana be built before this situation
is remedied?”108
Chibás also believed the loan flowed from Cuba’s overly deferential legal
system.

Rather than enforcing the law, judges permitted venal government

employees to steal without fear. As a result, those who normally pilfered “up to
their elbows” now did so, “up to their shoulders.”109 The lamentable status quo was
encapsulated by Pelayo Cuervo’s lawsuit. At first, the case seemed destined to
reverse decades of impunity for sleazy officials. Aside from Cuervo’s detailed 33page brief, the Ortodoxo congressman Félix Martín had provided documents proving
José Manuel Alemán had bribed legislators from the Auténtico-Republican alliance.
Given this profusion of evidence, Special Judge Antonio Vignier admitted at the time
that, “There’s enough here for an indictment” and “People will wind up in jail.”110
Eduardo R. Chibás, “La Cordialidad en Paños Menores,” Bohemia, August 28, 1949: 62.
Ibid. Another photo showed a dingy hospital bed in the city of Baracoa, in Oriente province,
where money was so short that nurses typically solicited donations in the streets in order to buy
coffee and milk for their patients.
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Cuervo, however, began to express pessimism – telling reporters that Carlos Prío
had offered Vignier and District Attorney Jesús Coll positions on the soon to be
created Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees if they would ease up. As luck would
have it, Vignier and Coll eventually concluded there was not enough evidence to
prosecute.

Chibás found this odd since Alemán, secure in his parliamentary

immunity, had told the journalist Mario Kuchilán that he had filched “a little more”
than 20 million pesos between January and October of 1948.111 While the ex
education minister and current senator was untouchable, some of his accomplices
were almost certainly eligible for prosecution. The most obvious candidate was
Grau. In fact, a Bohemia reporter had recorded Carlos Prío implicating the former
president in February of 1949 and hundreds of thousands of Cubans had read about
it for themselves. “I wonder,” asked Chibás, “what Judge Vignier has to say about
this?”112
Just as the lawsuit appeared fated to languish, Carlos Manuel de la Cruz
entered the fray unexpectedly.

The hoary lawyer and erstwhile Democratic

lawmaker submitted a motion to revive the case and allow time to adduce further
proof of wrongdoing from treasury ministry archives. De la Cruz also sought to
initiate a criminal investigation regarding the disappearance of books, papers and
documents relating to the case – especially as Antonio Prío had publicly admitted to
removing them. He was aided by serendipity, as the unsympathetic Coll and Vignier
were away on vacation, so his appeal was received by District Attorney Rafael Trejo
instead. Trejo immediately placed the matter before Cuba’s Supreme Tribunal. In a
111
112
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grave tone, de la Cruz asserted this was the “last opportunity” for the island’s
judiciary to demonstrate respect for the law but also expressed optimism given the
“irreproachable conduct” of the judges on its highest court.113 Nonetheless, this
flicker of hope was promptly snuffed out by an unfavorable ruling. Appraising the
situation, a Bohemia reporter remarked that Grau had scorned Cuba’s judiciary but
Prío, himself a lawyer, preferred cajolery. Neither man seriously considered Article
170 of the constitution, which mandated “independent” judges who owed obedience
“only to the law.”
Of course, the nation’s most pliable judges occupied the Urgency Courts –
which existed outside the constitution altogether and were despised as instruments
of political repression. In 1947, a lawyer named Emilio Maza brought a suit before
the Supreme Tribunal seeking their extinction. The case was decided after Prío
assumed office and its resolution reflected the new president’s wheedling style. At
the outset, Presiding Judge Julián de Solórzano and a majority of his peers agreed
the Urgency Courts should be abolished.

Later on, Solórzano was suddenly

withdrawn in favor of the more amenable Judge Chaves Milanés, who convinced
enough colleagues to keep the Urgency Courts. Prío wanted them to handle those
accused of violating the Law against Gangsterism and held out the prospect of
nominations to the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees to those who complied.
On the other hand, Cuba’s court system did not always bend to the whims of power.
The Supreme Electoral Tribunal ruled with commendable impartiality during the
island’s voting season, for example, but in general the judiciary had thus far proved
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incapable of standing up to the island’s presidents. In this vein, the philosopher
Mario Llerena indicated that, “Our constitution is admirable, the laws are good, the
form of government is satisfactory” but the problem is one of “spirit.” In other
words, “The evil is not in the law but IN THE JUDGES WHO MUST ENFORCE THE
LAW.”114 For Chibás, this failure was at the root of the administration’s loan
proposal.
By October 10, when Carlos Prío addressed the nation on the first
anniversary of his inauguration, Chibás had been intermittently railing against the
foreign loan for 10 months. Since being released from prison in June, the Ortodoxo
leader’s criticism had evolved into an all-encompassing monomania. During his
speech, broadcast from the presidential palace, Prío attempted to deflect some of
the criticism – promising the loan would be used to create jobs rather than covering
Grau’s deficit. At the same time, Prío warned Cubans against “someone” who
“portrays himself as a national hero by insulting the chief of state on a daily
basis.”115 He added:
Guard your home, Cubans, from the man who slanders me so crudely
because what he does against me, knowing that as president of the
republic I cannot hold him to account, he will one day do against you,
because the slanderer is a slimy type who cannot master his own
criminal weakness!116
The identity of this mystery figure, already quite obvious, became even more
discernable when Prío inveighed against “irresponsible and shrill voices that have
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been attacking the public works plan based on funds from the loan.”117 He did not
explicitly refer to Chibás because of his constitutional responsibility as Cuba’s
“moderating power” and source of “national solidarity.” More importantly, the great
unknown remained the loan itself rather than the name of Prío’s principal foe.
When the island’s citizens turned off their radios that evening, they still had no idea
when the loan would be contracted, how much money was involved, who was doing
the lending and what terms were being discussed. Chibás echoed these and other
concerns in a public reply to the president on October 16. With typical pizzazz, he
claimed the government’s vaunted public works program was so hopelessly vague
that “a child in kindergarten” could produce something “equal or better.”118 Chibás
maintained that construction projects required long months of planning by
engineers and other technical personnel, none of which was being carried out.
Moreover, Prío’s assertion that the loan would not be arranged with any institution
requiring oversight of the money or detailed building schemes seemed like a recipe
for massive embezzlement. Chibás concluded that:
If a bank exists that will lend the money under these conditions, it
better not hope later on that the Cuban people will pay back, with
interest, the millions of pesos it gave the members of this
administration to spend on elections or rob outright. This would be a
political debt for them but never a debt of the republic.119
Regardless of its parameters, the loan would require two-thirds approval in
Cuba’s senate and chamber of representatives.120

This set the stage for the
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legislature’s most pivotal moment since 1941, when it narrowly approved a
$25,000,000 credit from the United States Export-Import Bank.

Back then,

Auténtico lawmakers including Carlos Prío and Tony Varona had vigorously
opposed the measure in terms similar to those now being used by Chibás. Prío had
questioned whether public employees who flaunted “costly luxury items” could be
trusted to administer the funds honestly while Varona proclaimed that, “We will
only be truly free when we have our own economy.”121 Chibás gleefully turned their
previous words against them in what was now an all out campaign. Apart from
denigrating the loan from behind his microphones every Sunday, his friend Miguel
Ángel Quevedo offered a regular space in Bohemia to do the same. On October 23,
Chibás lambasted Prío’s preliminary message to congress – claiming the president’s
promises to build country roads and irrigation canals were insincere because he
offered no specifics.

He also wondered why there was no mention of rural

electrification or an agricultural lending institution.

Once again, Chibás asked

whether the government was only serious about allocating resources to Havana’s
tunnel, which he had long since dubbed, “the cave of Ali Baba and his 40,000
thieves” and the tourist city.
The following week, Chibás emphasized a new wrinkle.

He noted the

president’s loan proposal was in the hands of José Manuel Alemán, who headed the
senate’s finance and budget committee. “This means” that Alemán, as “the biggest
embezzler in history,” and someone who attained his position through “favorable
votes from pro government senators” would be charged with deciding if the loan
121
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was “honest and convenient to the republic’s interests.”122 Chibás also compiled
quotes from Cuba’s pantheon of heroes from previous generations, all of whom had
bequeathed warnings against foreign loans. These included José Martí, the island’s
foremost poet and essayist whose words on almost any subject were usually
considered definitive; Antonio Maceo, a venerable general from the independence
wars; and Enrique José Varona, the father of Cuba’s educational system. In addition,
Chibás reproduced a snippet from his ex nemesis, Ramón Grau San Martín, who had
recently told an ad hoc student group known as the University Committee Against
the Loan, that:
They have asked me not to talk about the loan, to remain silent and be
quiet. But faced with this nonsense that could sink the republic I
cannot just cross my arms. The loan goes against the national interest
and combating it is a duty of the entire citizenry. I would be against
any loan, even if it were only for one peso.123
University of Havana students, in fact, were among the loan’s fiercest opponents.
Since being created in August, the University Committee Against the Loan had
gained support from all 12 faculties. As the congressional debate approached, the
outfit began organizing a march on the Capitolio. Aiming for the largest possible
crowd, invitations were extended to each of the island’s political leaders. This did
not sit well with some Committee members, notably the Ortodoxo youth leader Max
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Lesnik, who objected to courting Batista and Grau, both of whom he dubbed,
“traitors of the university.”124 His was a minority voice, however, even among fellow
Ortodoxos. Chibás himself declared the importance of a truly mass demonstration.
In this vein, students visited the Liberal leader Eduardo Suárez Rivas in his law
office and Ramón Grau San Martín in his home on Miramar’s Quinta Avenida. Suárez
Rivas denounced the loan in its present form as “anti-constitutional” and “antiscientific.”125 As such, he promised to expel any Liberal who voted in favor of the
measure. Nevertheless, he was not opposed to the loan per se, only its current
dearth of detail and thus refused to attend the rally. Grau, of course, was more
sympathetic but he too declined to show his face. The ex-president, who overrated
his popularity, feared the government would claim people had shown up to support
him rather than to protest the loan. He thus promised to send the Auténtico
legislator Humberto Becerra as his representative. Batista also demurred but his
party, PAU, eagerly agreed to participate.126
In the early evening of October 31, as senators met the quorum call, an
estimated 80,000 to 1000,000 people paraded up Old Havana’s grandest
thoroughfare, the Paseo del Prado, toward the Capitolio. Students led the procession
but an honorary place among them was given to Enrique Loynaz de Castillo. Loynaz
de Castillo had been a general during Cuba’s independence struggle but was also
famous for having written the text and music of the Himno Invasor, or marching
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theme of the 1895 war against Spain. Behind them followed the political parties; the
PAU sans Batista, the Ortodoxos headed by Chibás and the Communists, fronted by
Juan Marinello. The throng also contained a substantial number of women, which
drew the attention of Bohemia’s correspondent. Their collective chants were heard
inside the Capitolio and many lawmakers could not resist the temptation to
approach the windows and have a gander at the crowd outside.

Given the

magnitude of their votes, the session was unusually well attended but there were
some notable absences nonetheless. Despite his stated opposition to the loan, the
habitual truant Fulgencio Batista remained at his country estate. José Manuel
Alemán, another regular absentee, stayed away as well. According to the Auténtico
senator Rubén de León, Alemán was actually opposed to the loan and had “given
orders” to his legislative adherents to vote against it.127 This likely explained why
Alemán’s acolytes in the senate, Carlos de Arazoza and Pancho Grau Alsina, were noshows. Liberal ranks were missing José Manuel Casanova, who was in London,
along with Alfredo Hornedo and Eduardo Zayas Bazán. Among these, Casanova was
known to support the loan and had signaled his wiliness to return if his vote was
needed.
Sixty minutes into what would be a 20 hour session, Pelayo Cuervo offered
the simplest and most direct criticism of the loan. Namely, the president refused to
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provide “detailed information” that would allow legislators to vote responsibly.128
This was part of an ongoing pattern. He reminded his peers that the senate had
requested documents regarding the nation’s finances a year ago and Carlos Prío had
refused to comply despite repeated appeals. Cuervo promised to combat this latest
round of obfuscation with a lawsuit if the loan were approved. The Liberal boss
Eduardo Suárez Rivas was equally feisty but far more partisan. Among other things,
he accused the president of using the loan as a vehicle to finance his brother
Antonio’s campaign for mayor of Havana. In any case, after myriad delays, recesses,
motions and speeches, the weary senators voted 37-9 in favor of the loan at 2:10
p.m. the following day. The measure was now confronted with one final obstacle,
Cuba’s unruly chamber of representatives. While gaining the senate’s assent for the
loan had involved a fair amount of drama, the government’s pact with the
Democrats had largely ensured the necessary votes for a two-thirds majority. This
was not the case in the lower house, particularly as many Auténticos harbored
reservations. Such renegades were dealt with harshly. For example, eight public
employees who owed their positions to Rafael del Busto were fired after he
withheld support. Thereafter, del Busto adopted the government line. Victor Vega
Ceballos was more willing to bend at the outset but only up to a point. He told Prío
he would vote for the loan but declined to defend it in the chamber of
representatives, saying the bill was unconstitutional and its justification did not
merit two million pesos let alone the 200 million the administration was seeking.
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On November 11, a session was initiated in Cuba’s lower house. While
opposition representatives such as Manuel Bisbé and the Communist Anibal
Escalante denounced the loan, pro-government legislators feverishly negotiated to
increase their vote totals. Tony Varona tirelessly coursed through the Capitolio’s
nooks and crannies, alternately wheedling and threatening potential targets. After
17 hours, it was clear the majority would fall three votes short of the necessary twothirds. Hence, the Auténticos played for time by requesting the proceedings be
rescheduled on September 15.

This ensured at least one more vote, as the

Republican Manuel Orizondo, who had been vacationing in Paris, was due to return
by then.129 The government also managed to lure two Liberals during the hiatus.
Hence, when the chamber of representatives reconvened, the result was already a
foregone conclusion. However, members of the public were still treated to a show.
The excitement began when José Suárez Rivas asked for a recess so the party could
expel its treacherous legislators, whom he deemed “men without honor.”130 This
delighted the crowd, which burst into spontaneous applause. However, chamber
president Lincoln Rodón was in no mood for theatrics and ordered the visitor’s
gallery to be emptied – prompting even more noise along with shouts of “traitors,”
“thieves” and “botelleros.”131 Once they were gone, only representatives, journalists
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and a handful of politicians remained. During the interminable speeches, which
lasted into the following afternoon, lawmakers beguiled the time by playing poker,
taking naps or gossiping among themselves.

At one point, Grau’s ex interior

minister Alejo Cossío del Pino approached the Communist Joaquín Ordoqui.
Referring to the common cause made by Ortodoxo and Communist congressmen in
censuring the loan, he said, “Listen Joaquín, when Chibás is president he is going to
let the Communists use the radio frequency 1010 once again. He may even give you
a second frequency as well.”
“Chico,” said the gray haired Communist leader, “but that won’t be for
awhile.”
Chibás, who happened to be nearby, said, “Only two more years. By 1952
we’ll already be in power.”
Cossío then touched on the juiciest topic among Cuban politicians besides the
loan; namely, the attempt by Carlos Prío to position his brother Antonio as Havana’s
next mayor and possibly as a future presidential candidate. Alluding to the Prío
family’s thin skin and willingness to shut down critical broadcasts, Cossío added,
“The worst scenario would be if you had to wait for Antonio to grant you a radio
frequency.”132
With the loan now a certainty, Raúl Gutiérrez conducted a second public
opinion poll which showed that a majority of Cubans were now against the measure.
This was a tribute to Chibás, whose denunciatory broadcasts and Bohemia articles
reached a larger combined audience than any other politician or commentator. The
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survey revealed that 46.28 percent of Cubans believed borrowing money would
prove prejudicial while 34.87 percent felt it would be beneficial or conditionally
beneficial. Even more damaging, when Cubans were asked who would administer
the loan more honorably they chose Chibás over Prío by a margin of nearly 15
percentage points.133 Thus, even though the Ortodoxo leader had lost his campaign
against the loan, the issue would remain a potent weapon against Prío going
forward – particularly if questions of mismanagement were raised in the future.

CASTELLANOS FLIRTS WITH THE ORTODOXOS
Since leaving the chamber of representatives in 1948, Alejo Cossío del Pino
bought Radio-Cadena Habana and devoted himself part-time to journalism. He had
become somewhat marginalized among the Auténticos after serving Grau as interior
minister but remained close to Nicolás Castellanos, the mayor of Havana.
Castellanos, for his part, was increasingly worried by Carlos Prío’s manipulation of
the party machinery to install his younger brother Antonio as the Auténtico mayoral
candidate.134

He thus began to consider alternative options, which included

switching parties and running under a new banner. Cossío, who maintained ties
with Grau, the Communists and Guillermo Alonso Pujol among others, was an ideal
emissary. On October 12, 1949, Cossío happened upon Millo Ochoa at the funeral of
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Peru’s ambassador, José Bernardo Goyburu.

Cossío pulled the Ortodoxo vice-

president aside and begged him to arrange a meeting with Chibás. Just over a
month later, Cossío addressed Chibás, Ochoa, Luis Orlando Rodríguez and Orlando
Castro in the Ortodoxo vice-president’s hometown of Holguín. Cossío informed
them that Castellanos was prepared to adopt the party’s independent line and face
Cuba’s voters without pacts.

Chibás expressed doubts that Castellanos fully

understood the party’s “new political style” but promised to consult its higher-ups
and return with a definitive answer.135 The Ortodoxo leader saw Cossío next on
November 16, in the Capitolio, during the legislative session on the foreign loan. He
handed over an envelope with his reply, which dismissed Castellanos as little
different from fellow mayoral candidates Antonio Prío and Panchín Batista – both of
whom were widely considered to be corrupt.136 For good measure, Chibás sent a
copy of his remarks to the press.
The matter was far from decided, however. At noon on November 18, José
Pardo Llada set the nation abuzz when he broadcast that Chibás and Castellanos had
broached the possibility of the latter leaving the Auténtico party and running for reelection as an Ortodoxo. A Bohemia reporter noted that, “It’s been a long time since
an event has been able to excite the man on the street to such an extent.”137

“En Cuba, Política: Otro Suceso de Resonancia Nacional,” Bohemia, November 27, 1949: 73.
During his broadcasts of June 4 and June 28, 1949 Chibás had accused Castellanos of stealing funds
belonging to the municipality and diverting more than a million pesos earmarked for Havana’s
aqueduct to create jobs for day laborers who, in their gratitude, would support the Auténticos. These
were a few reasons why Chibás believed Castellanos was not fit to be an Ortodoxo.
136 Despite his assurances, Chibás had not officially consulted Ortodoxo leadership regarding
Castellanos. His negative response was inspired at least in part by news that Castellanos intended to
meet with Carlos Prío, which undoubtedly convinced Chibás the party was being used. Subsequently,
however, Castellanos cancelled the appointment.
137 Ibid.
135

279

Castellanos had met Chibás the previous evening, having insisted on an audience
regardless of the Ortodoxo leader’s declarations. During their talk, Chibás asked
numerous questions regarding the mayor’s conduct, his efforts to build a new
aqueduct and how he responded to meddling from the central government.
Castellanos offered detailed answers that began to peel away his interlocutor’s
skepticism. Playing on the Ortodoxo leader’s fondness for honest administration,
Castellanos proclaimed that, “43 million pesos have passed through these hands
over the past three years and look, Eddy, they are clean!”138 The mayor also offered
up Havana’s municipal electoral apparatus, which would provide a considerable
boost to a party notable for its lack of organization. While some of his misgivings
had been assuaged, Chibás expressed a reluctance to withdraw the mayoral
candidacy of his good friend Manuel Bisbé. At any rate, he promised Castellanos
that his appeal would be placed before the party’s executive council.
A spirited meeting ensued in the home of Roberto Agramonte. As party
bigwigs discussed Castellanos in the second floor library, delegates from the
Ortodoxo municipal assembly fluttered nervously downstairs. Many could not hide
their enthusiasm for the Havana mayor, who offered control of Cuba’s capital
without compromising the party’s much disputed independent line.139 Conversely,
when Chibás introduced the matter he made no attempt to conceal his reservations.
Aside from his reluctance to retire Bisbé’s nomination, two things gnawed at him.
First, Chibás feared backing Castellanos would give the impression he was a
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hypocrite, particularly as he had publicly censured him a few days earlier. Second,
the Havana mayor’s campaign already counted the outright support of Grau and
Guillermo Alonso Pujol – two toxic figures who Chibás preferred to avoid. The
Ortodoxo leader’s doubts were shared by Isidro Figueroa, the Workers Wing boss
and Orlando Castro, the Youth Section head. Castro claimed the current popularity
of Castellanos would be fleeting, akin to “the foam of a newly poured beer.”140 On
the other hand, Castellanos found fervent support among Beto Saumell and Roberto
García Ibáñez. The former addressed his colleagues in a passionate tone, saying:
Compañeros, the party has now been presented with its best
opportunity to strengthen itself. This may involve a concession of
principle but it will be repaid by winning the island’s second most
important position. It is my understanding that we are a political
party that must confront reality rather than a conclave of cherubs or
Franciscan monks. If we follow the path of rigorous Puritanism, the
moment will arrive in which every Ortodoxo will be obligated to be a
saint with a halo among other attributes. By this avenue, we will
never be a majority party nor will we ever win the presidency of the
republic. Let’s not deceive ourselves: the people of Havana support
Castellanos against Prío’s attempt to impose his younger brother.141
García Ibáñez confirmed the last portion of this comment with an anecdote. He
related that he had been eating in a Vedado restaurant recently and the waiters,
who were all Auténticos, approached him to say they would vote for Castellanos.
Meanwhile, one floor below, Agramonte’s residence was filling up with
telegrams from Ortodoxos on every corner of the island imploring the party
leadership to welcome Castellanos. Although García Ibáñez was unaware of the ever
swelling pile of messages beneath him, he and Saumell, who had been mayor of a
“En Cuba, Política: ‘La Política es el Arte de Organizar la Realidad,’” Bohemia, November 27, 1949:
74.
141 Ibid., 75.
140
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mid-sized town, possessed a keen sense the popular will.142

Unlike previous

wrangles, intrinsic aspects of the party program were not at stake. Essentially, the
question was whether Castellanos was moral enough to be an Ortodoxo. For men
like Saumell, Millo Ochoa and García Ibáñez, this was crossing the line between a
new political style and electoral hara-kiri. As such, García Ibáñez added:
We are a political party, different though we are from all the others,
and not a sect of monks. We have to conquer power by political
means and we will never do so if we maintain this religious aura that
some would like to impose on the Ortodoxo movement. The
incorporation of Castellanos would represent a second rebellion from
within the Auténtico party. This offers a tremendous opportunity for
us. If we nominate Castellanos, we will march at the front of popular
opinion.143
Luis Orlando Rodríguez, who was opposed to Castellanos but allowed that Manuel
Bisbé was a weak candidate, tried to break the impasse by suggesting Chibás run
instead.144 This motion was approved unanimously but rejected by the Ortodoxo
leader. As the meeting stretched past 4 a.m., Chibás spoke one last time before
committee members would cast their votes and stagger home to sleep. He observed
that:
There is no doubt Castellanos has offered us the mayoralty on a silver
platter. It’s true that by nominating him the independent line
wouldn’t be jeopardized but the morals of our movement would
Saumell had been mayor of Bayamo, a city in Oriente province with 90,124 residents according to
the 1943 census.
143 “En Cuba, Política: ‘La Política es el Arte de Organizar la Realidad,” 75.
144 Luis Orlando Rodríguez was hardly the only Ortodoxo who was unhappy with the choice of
Manuel Bisbé as the party’s mayoral candidate. Carlos Márquez Sterling, for example, claimed the
party was isolating itself by choosing someone with no chance of winning. Acción Revolucionaria
Ortodoxa (ARO), Fidel Castro’s quasi splinter organization, was equally displeased. He published a
flyer complaining the “Jesuit” Bisbé had been “imposed” by the party’s higher reaches. Curiously,
Castro reasoned that Bisbé did not deserve the nomination because he had been a traitor willing to
negotiate pacts “even with the Communists.” See Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 7, Expediente
212: 4, ANC.
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certainly suffer. Any other party would accept his nomination
because this would bring in the jamón and everyone would be anxious
for their share. But we don’t do such things. And even though
winning the mayoralty could guarantee victory in 1952 the people
would doubt our conduct and would lose faith in us. It’s preferable to
wait with our prestige intact rather than to arrive in power quickly
and discredit ourselves.145
Shortly thereafter, the groggy assemblage had its say.

When the news that

Castellanos had been vetoed was communicated downstairs an audible groan
spread through the house.
The following day, Chibás received a Bohemia reporter in his apartment.
Chibás, who usually paced back and forth while talking, was shorn of his habitual
restlessness on this occasion. Sitting comfortably in an armchair and infused with
an unaccustomed tranquility, he said, “I know there is a hostile reaction to my
attitude on the street but it doesn’t matter. It’s the natural effervescence of the
moment and will disappear. The people are always sentimental and impassioned
but he who directs a political party must see the larger picture.”146 This was not a
typical statement from Chibás, who normally spoke of the people with near mystical
reverence. But the Ortodoxo leader, who prided himself on his ability to uncover
subterranean plots and hidden machinations, was sure he knew something that had
escaped them. Chibás told the journalist that Castellanos had not been acting on his
own but was rather an agent of Miguelito Suárez Fernández. He explained that
Suárez Fernández had aimed to destroy his party and weaken Carlos Prío in one fell
swoop. At first, Castellanos would flirt with the Ortodoxos so that Prío would feel
“En Cuba, Política: ‘La Política es el Arte de Organizar la Realidad,” 75-76. The term jamón (ham)
was commonly referred to in Cuban politics as the fruits of office, including money, jobs, perks, etc.
146 “En Cuba, Política: ‘Un Inconfundible Sello Miguelista…’” Bohemia, November 27, 1949: 76.
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pressure to remove his brother and restore the Havana mayor on the party ticket. If
the Ortodoxos had accepted Castellanos as their candidate, they would be faced with
the prospect of supporting him in tandem with the Auténticos.

The party’s

reputation for honesty and independence would thus be in tatters. Such a result
would gratify Suárez Fernández both politically and personally since he would
“never forgive” Chibás for foiling the third front in 1948.147
correspondent

reacted

to

these

conspiracy

theories

with

The Bohemia
understated

incredulousness. Others, including some Ortodoxos, were not so polite. This was a
bizarre performance in many respects, particularly as Chibás could hardly have
believed much of what he said.

For one thing, nepotism was a longstanding

tradition in Cuban politics and the president, who possessed immense power and
resources, was never going to jettison his younger brother. Chibás, who had chosen
his cousin to run alongside him in 1948, knew this quite well. Stranger still was the
assertion that a grudge existed between Chibás and Miguelito Suárez Fernández
over something with no basis in fact. Anyone who listened to the radio in 1948
realized Chibás had vigorously boosted the third front. Further, those who read
newspapers or magazines with political coverage knew the Democrat Antonio
Martínez Fraga (whose party was now a member of Prío’s government) had sunk
the third front by engineering its rejection in the Las Villas provincial assembly.
Once again, the Ortodoxo leader’s obsession with posterity appeared to have
influenced his rebuff of Castellanos and was behind the intention to whitewash a
pact friendly past he now considered unbearable.

147
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According to preliminary polls, Chibás had passed up an excellent
opportunity. Raúl Gutiérrez’s public survey of November 22 showed that 57.91
percent of Havana residents preferred Nicolás Castellanos as their mayor, as
opposed to 12.87 percent for Antonio Prío, 10.43 percent for Manuel Bisbé and eight
percent for Panchín Batista – the PAU style nepotism candidate. In addition, 66.91
percent of Auténticos declared themselves ready to buck party discipline and vote
for Castellanos.148 Nevertheless, Chibás was content to demonstrate that he, unlike
other Cuban politicians, was willing to sacrifice expedience in the name of principle.
Thus, he told the Bohemia reporter that, “They won’t be able to brand me as an over
eager aspirant for the presidency because everyone now knows that that I have
scorned my chances in 52 by rejecting Castellanos.”149 At the same time, many
members of the Ortodoxo municipal council remained partial to Castellanos and
some publicly called on Bisbé to step down. The professor of Greek duly satisfied
them by publishing a letter resigning his candidacy. This touched off a new round of
jostling for the party’s nomination along with recriminations from Bisbé’s closest
adherents, including Chibás himself. The most likely replacement was Ventura
Dellundé, who had distinguished himself in the campaign against the Cuban Electric
Company. He was also affluent and demonized by hard-liners as the “BAGA of the
Ortodoxos” for alleged delegate buying.150
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For his part, Dellundé led a group

Raúl Gutiérrez. “Primer Survey Sobre la Alcaldía de la Habana,” Bohemia, November 27, 1949: 82-

83
“En Cuba, Política: ‘Un Inconfundible Sello Miguelista…,’” 77.
“En Cuba, Política: Una Tempestad en un Vaso de Agua,” Bohemia, December 4, 1949: 76. During a
meeting of the Ortodoxo executive council on December 1, Raúl Primelles accused Dellundé of buying
municipal delegates. The congressman Félix Martín, who supported Dellundé, challenged him to
provide specific information. When Primelles offered the name of a delegate from the Havana
neighborhood of Vives, Dellundé offered a less than convincing denial.
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protesting “favoritism” towards their leader’s closest confidants. Chibás, however,
argued that he was not prepared to sacrifice Bisbé for “one who has arrived at the
last minute with a bag of money.”151 The Ortodoxo executive council agreed and
restored Bisbé. Further, pleas to place the matter before the municipal assembly,
which would probably have contradicted this decision, were dismissed. Ironically,
this was the sort of chicanery sanctimonious Ortodoxos ascribed to “traditional”
parties. At any rate, Chibás had demonstrated once again that he feared the wrath
of history more than the ire of his party’s rank and file. On the other hand, Millo
Ochoa was warier of irrelevance, telling a reporter from Pueblo that, “If we don’t
enter into any pacts, I invite you to the burial of the PPC on June 1, 1952 at 6 p.m.”152

Ibid.
Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 654. This, of course, was when the polls would close during the
next presidential election.
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Chapter 8
“I’m Not One of Those Generals Who Dies in Bed”

On January 1, 1950 the cartoonist Carlos Vidal published a satirical take on
Cuban politics entitled, “What Will the New Year Bring?” “Will it bring happiness?”
asked one drawing, in which America’s Uncle Sam handed Carlos Prío a bag of
(loaned) money. “Will it bring political liberty?” inquired another frame in which a
gun toting, well dressed “political sergeant” traded cash for the vote of a barefoot
peasant. “Will it bring sacrifices? posited a further sketch in which Carlos Prío
gamely shares his jamón, the emblem of political goodies, with his brother Antonio.
“Will it bring struggles?” asked yet another in which the Republican chief Guillermo
Alonso Pujol and the Liberal leader Eduardo Suárez Rivas fought over the very same
jamón – in reference to the latter party’s negotiations with the Auténticos to join the
government.

“Or,” asked the final portrait, which portrayed a hungry guajiro

dreaming of a full plate, “will it be exactly the same as last year?”1 While Chibás was
nowhere to be found in this comic strip, he too was the subject of a pressing
question as the new year dawned, namely: Will he continue to defend political
independence at all costs? The latest figure to test this conviction was Eduardo
Suárez Rivas, who visited Chibás on the evening of January 11. Arriving at Eddy’s
apartment in the elegant López Serrano building, the Liberal boss offered to delay
the pact he was discussing with the Auténticos and see whether an agreement with
1

Carlos Vidal, “¿Qué Espera del Nuevo Año?,” Bohemia, January 1, 1950: 59.
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the Ortodoxos could be reached instead. In this vein, he informed Chibás that the
Liberal assembly was ready to nominate him as the party’s presidential candidate in
1952. Intransigent as ever, Chibás rejected the proposal but left the door slightly
ajar by suggesting the Liberals dissolve themselves and join the Ortodoxos as the
ABC party had done in 1947. This was an unlikely prospect, but represented the
only way Chibás could imagine squaring his conscience with Cuba’s political
realities. However, this solution would have involved a different set of intractable
problems. Much to their horror, the Ortodoxos had found that many ABC members
remained loyal to their former leaders even after the party had nominally ceased to
exist. Quite a few had abandoned the Ortodoxos in 1948 after Joaquín Martínez
Sáenz joined the Liberal-Democratic coalition. Absorbing the Liberals now would
have proved far trickier. For one thing, how could Chibás agree to merge with
President Machado’s old outfit? Even if those with ties to the tyrant were excluded,
the symbolism would have been crushing – although realists like the Ochoa brothers
and perhaps Roberto García Ibáñez would not have minded. The Liberals, after all,
had been such an opportunistic party that they had brought Fulgencio Batista out of
retirement in Daytona Beach to bolster their senatorial ticket. In addition, Suárez
Rivas himself had lobbied for the move. Having committed this unholy sin, how
could he hope to fare in a party whose executive committee had refused the
relatively benign Nicolás Castellanos?
The impossibility of admitting an influx of Liberals became all the more clear
on January 28, when the Ortodoxo national assembly convened in Havana. This
gathering, which took place on the 97th anniversary of José Martí’s birth, re-elected
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Chibás as party president and produced a strikingly self-righteous document. One
motion, which was introduced by Chibás and approved unanimously, proclaimed:
It is evident that the Ortodoxo party, the only true opposition party,
would be diluting the ideals that gave it life and would betray its
reason for being if it were to enter…into understandings with the men
and organizations of the present and past who are responsible for the
existing corruption and therefore squander the Ortodoxo moral
revolution and its historical destiny in order to embrace immediate
electoral opportunism.2
Rather, the Ortodoxos pledged to “sweep away the putrefaction of national politics.”3
As a result, there was an obligatory dig at Nicolás Castellanos, who had loomed so
large in the party’s imagination lately and whose acceptance of support from Grau,
Guillermo Alonso Pujol and José Manuel Alemán was exhibit A of the sort of politics
they intended to eschew.4 Chibás and the Ortodoxos added an extra dollop of
legitimacy to their position by including a maxim from the Apóstol himself which
dovetailed nicely with the party slogan, namely: “Shame must become the fashion
while shamelessness should go out of style.”5

Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 657.
Ibid.
4 By this time, Nicolás Castellanos had been brought in from the political wilderness by the
Republicans, who nominated him as their candidate for the Havana mayoralty. This, of course, was
payback courtesy of Guillermo Alonso Pujol for Carlos Prío’s pact with the Democrats. Euphoric at
finally having a party behind him, Castellanos gleefully excoriated the men who had caused him so
many recent difficulties. He deemed Antonio Prío “incompetent,” noting that his adversary had spent
22 years working for the same bank, earning 90 pesos per month, without a single raise or
promotion. “His only ability,” said the Havana mayor, “was in amassing a fortune of six million in two
years (in the treasury ministry).” Castellanos also referred to the fact that Carlos Prío had offered
him a senate seat on the Auténtico ticket for 1950 as a consolation prize, but he replied that Antonio
needed that job more than he, if only for the parliamentary immunity given his “embezzlement” from
the treasury ministry. See “En Cuba, Política: ‘¡Qué no piensen ya en despostularme!’” Bohemia,
January 8, 1950: 78-79. Aside from snagging Castellanos, the Republicans also recruited Grau to run
for the senate under their banner. While flattered by the gesture, El Viejo did not want people to
think he was seeking office in order to secure parliamentary immunity from Lawsuit 82. See “En
Cuba, Política: ‘¡La Dificultad Está en las 174 Millones!’” Bohemia, January 22, 1950: 77.
5 Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 657.
2
3

289

For the time being, however, shamelessness was very much in vogue.
Nowhere was this more visible than in the nomination of Antonio Prío for Havana’s
mayoralty. “Little brother Antonio,” as he was irreverently known by many of the
capital’s denizens, was proclaimed the Auténtico candidate in a Sunday morning
ceremony in the National Theater. This event was open to the public and widely
advertised in Cuba’s newspapers and magazines but most of those in evidence were
conscripted public servants or the quarry of so-called political sergeants.
Employees of the customs service were not only ordered to attend but were told
exactly where to park their vehicles.6 Further, while an understanding with the
Liberals had yet to be consummated, they helped the Auténticos rustle up spectators
in a gesture of good will. Antonio Prío’s inability to attract a large audience without
government intervention was due to his unpopularity but also to the 9 a.m. start
time, an hour when plenty of Habaneros preferred to sleep. Among those who were
awake, quite a few directed insults at the caravan drivers offering free rides to the
National Theater. But inside the neo-baroque edifice, a mere stone’s throw from the
Capitolio, an entirely different atmosphere reigned. Cabinet members were out in
force to commend the president’s younger brother, including Education Minister
Aureliano Sánchez Arango, Foreign Minister Carlos Hevia, Public Works Minister
Manuel Febles, Interior Minister Rubén de León, minister without portfolio and all
purpose yes man Primitivo Rodríguez and Antonio’s successor as treasury minister,

6

“En Cuba, Política: La Proclamación de Antonio,” Bohemia, January 22, 1950: 73.
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Pepín Bosch.7 When his turn to speak was at hand, Antonio had no trouble wringing
an ovation from the assemblage of cowed government workers, well fed political
sergeants, rural laborers bused in from the countryside and random pickups from
the streets lured by curiosity or the prospect of favors.8
Encouraged by this warm reception, Antonio Prío visited the Palacio de los
Deportes (Sports Palace) later that evening, where Havana residents often spent
Sundays participating in raffles sponsored by the Allied Omnibus Company. He
sought to elicit some cheers by telling the announcer he would sponsor a prize of
100 pesos. However, this overture did not stop the thousands of raffle players from
whistling derisively when Antonio appeared before them. When he tried to speak,
the whistles grew louder. Others stood on their seats and shouted, “Out!” or “Go
away!” The raffle announcer ventured to settle the crowd by shouting, “Gentlemen,
Cubans are famous for being civilized.”9

Unfortunately, the restive throng

responded by smashing chairs against the floor. Not knowing how to respond, the
conspicuously upset and pale faced candidate for Havana’s mayoralty remained on
the scene. The mayhem subsided only when a recording of Cuba’s national anthem
was played. This not only tranquilized the seething multitude and allowed the
raffles to continue but also provided “little brother Antonio” with a chance to

Primitivo Rodríguez was a lackey par excellence both for Grau and Prío. For this reason, he was
always portrayed in political cartoons bearing a guataca or gardening hoe, which symbolized
subservience in Cuban slang.
8 A Bohemia reporter observed that the crowd was short on women and wondered sarcastically
whether they preferred the handsome Nicolás Castellanos or the respectable Manuel Bisbé. These
virtues were notably absent from Antonio Prío’s resume. He lacked his older brother’s good looks
and was among the most venal and least qualified figures in the cabinet.
9 “En Cuba, Política: Noche de Angustia,” Bohemia, January 22, 1950: 74.
7
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discreetly escape his most embarrassing moment in politics.10

The cartoonist

Vergara was one of many who reveled in the incident, drawing a bedridden Antonio
Prío flanked by an advisor who tells a colleague, “Since going to the Palacio de los
Deportes he’s been sick with the whistles.”11

Of course, Chibás attempted to

disparage Antonio even more forcefully during his weekly radio show by comparing
him to another former treasury minister who had been nominated for mayor in the
very same National Theater four years earlier. Unlike Antonio Prío, though, the
martyred Manuel Fernández Supervielle had never pilfered state funds. “In today’s
event,” said Chibás, “not one of the speakers referred to the honesty of the Auténtico
candidate.

His only merit consists in being a brother of the president of the

republic!”12 Chibás then proceeded to explain why Antonio was never extolled for
his probity.

For one thing, he had lied to Judge Antonio Vignier, who was

investigating Lawsuit 82, by swearing the nation’s finances were in perfect order
even though he had publicly admitted there was a deficit upon taking office. Chibás
also accused Antonio Prío of ordering subordinates to torch a building in Old
Havana which, “coincidentally,” contained documents proving the previous
government had embezzled 174 million pesos.13

In addition, he alleged the

president’s brother had shortchanged the newly founded national bank and

Subsequently, Antonio Prío and his handlers blamed this humiliating episode on the Communists,
although there was no evidence they had more of a predilection for raffles than the Cuban population
at large. In response, the president’s younger brother attempted to bolster his anti-Communist
credentials by contributing a red-baiting piece to the island’s most right wing newspaper, Diario de la
Marina. This was entirely disingenuous, however, as Antonio Prío spent the day after his debacle at
the Palacio de los Deportes negotiating with the Communists for their support.
11 Vergara, “Enfermo de Gravedad,” Bohemia, January 22, 1950: 75.
12 “En Cuba, Política: Un Reverso Terrible,” Bohemia, January 22, 1950: 74.
13 Ibid.
10
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increased the money supply in exchange for “private commissions.”14 Summarizing
Antonio’s 15 month tenure as treasury minister, Chibás told listeners, “This has
been the worst and least efficient administration the republic has ever had,” adding
that his management had been characterized by, “jokes, santería, gambling and
corruption.”15
On February 5, Chibás published a brief article in Bohemia entitled “Shame
versus Shamelessness,” which endeavored to flog his party’s newest slogan to the
wider public. Chibás wrote that Cuba was living through an “epoch of confusion”
whereby the nation’s politicians had cast aside all scruples in the pursuit of political
advantage.16 In this vein, even entrenched enemies like Ramón Grau San Martín and
Fulgencio Batista could “coincide” in their support for Nicolás Castellanos.17
Meanwhile, Castellanos and Antonio Prío seemed eager to compromise themselves
by courting the favor of Blas Roca and “Stalinist imperialism.”18 And not to be
forgotten was Carlos Prío, a member of the 1930 Student Directorate who counted
the formerly pro-Machado Virgilio Pérez in his cabinet. With his habitual flare for
phrase-coining, Chibás dubbed Grau, Batista, José Manuel Alemán, Nicolás
Castellanos and Guillermo Alonso Pujol the “five children of shamelessness” for their
criticism that he was assisting the government by censuring them. In the face of so

Ibid.
Ibid. While Antonio Prío was undeniably dishonest he was probably not as corrupt as his
predecessor, Isauro Valdés. However, Chibás was fond of superlatives both with regards to himself
and his adversaries. Hence, Chibás regularly characterized attacks against him as the most vicious
campaigns Cuba had ever seen. By the same token, the venality of this or that government official
was often described as the worst in the republic’s history.
16 Eduardo R. Chibás, “Vergüenza Contra Desvergüenza,” Bohemia, February 5, 1950: 68.
17 Batista initially supported his younger brother Panchín for the Havana mayoralty but the two had a
falling out and the latter decided to join the Auténticos.
18 Eduardo R. Chibás, “Vergüenza Contra Desvergüenza,” 68.
14
15

293

much deviousness, Chibás exhorted Cubans to take refuge in the Ortodoxo party,
which had “remained apart from the putrefaction.”19
While Chibás seemed feisty as ever in his politics, he had recently appeared
emaciated and devoid of his usual verve. Unusually for him, he skipped an Ortodoxo
rally in Sagua la Grande due to vomiting and intense abdominal pain. This situation
deteriorated further until the morning of February 12, when Chibás was
hospitalized for a diaphragmatic hernia that doctors linked to his much disputed
gunshot wound from November of 1939. Apparently, the bullet that had nearly
ended his life just over ten years earlier had relaxed the muscles of his diaphragm,
which in turn was harming his stomach and digestive system. This condition
required immediate treatment as the hernia could otherwise become strangulated
and potentially life-threatening. Eddy’s close friends debated whether he should
travel to the United States as diaphragmatic surgery was uncommon in Cuba.
Chibás, however, insisted on staying and chose an eminent local doctor, Vicente
Banet, to perform the procedure. That evening, Chibás gamely said a few words
over the air and ceded his remaining time to Carlos Márquez Sterling. The latter had
recently heated up his flirtation with the Ortodoxos by writing a series of flattering
columns for Bohemia but continued to shun outright commitment. Nonetheless,
Chibás was shrewd in his choice of understudy as Márquez Sterling spoke about the
looming threat of fraud in Cuba’s mayoral vote.

He accused Antonio Prío’s

henchmen of filching 100,000 identity cards from the communications ministry

19
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which would be strategically “managed” on election day.20 Another scheme entailed
arranging city residency for 50,000 rural dwellers who would cast ballots for the
president’s younger brother.

Márquez Sterling also coquettishly exalted his

University of Havana colleague, Manuel Bisbé, as a man of probity while
characterizing Antonio Prío as the embodiment of nepotism and Nicolás Castellanos
as an opportunist without firm beliefs or ideals. He claimed Cubans possessed a
tendency to vote for the candidate who could most damage the government and for
this reason Catholics and Communists, Grau and Batista along with representatives
of everything and everyone in between had coalesced behind Castellanos. In this
instance, though, he attempted to sell Bisbé, whom he had previously deemed
unelectable, by saying, “It’s time for our people to vote in favor of something rather
than against it!”21
Meanwhile, Chibás spent the next two days preparing for surgery in Havana’s
Sagrado Corazón hospital. This in no way implied a hiatus from politics. On the
contrary, Chibás kept tabs on the Ortodoxo municipal assembly to ensure they
would nominate Manuel Bisbé as the party’s mayoral candidate. After the vote was
taken, Bisbé and a group of Ortodoxo councilmen visited Chibás at his sickbed to
deliver the good news. These were hardly the only guests who graced the clinic.
Apart from friends and family, scads of anxious supporters also showed up. Many
assuaged their fears by fastening religious pins and medallions to his pajamas or
praying to Cuba’s patron saint, the Virgen de la Caridad. On the morning of February
15, Chibás passed two and a half hours under the knife. When he emerged from the
20
21

“En Cuba, Política: Márquez Sterling: Huésped de Chibás,” Bohemia, February 19, 1950: 74.
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anesthesia, his friend and personal doctor Pedro Iglesias Betancourt greeted him by
saying, “Shame vs. Money!” The bleary Ortodoxo leader responded with, “We must
fight for Cuba!”22 Although the initial prognosis was promising, Chibás remained in
the hospital during the following two weeks so doctors could monitor his diet and
shoo away most callers.

Afterwards, he convalesced in Roberto Agramonte’s

residence – where he was attended to regularly by his cousin’s family, his younger
brother Raúl and his secretary Conchita Fernández. All the while, he was instructed
to avoid strenuous activities of any sort. Even reading was proscribed. Chibás paid
scant heed to the ban as he was a notorious bibliophile and habitual devourer of
newspapers and magazines. Worse still, the famously fidgety Ortodoxo chief, who
chafed under these restrictions, granted an interview to a Bohemia correspondent.
Having already been dubbed “the impatient patient” by a journalist, Chibás further
justified this nickname by greeting his interlocutor with a barrage of questions and
series of mini-sermons.23 Chibás was particularly eager to comment on Carlos Prío’s
pronouncements regarding nuevos rumbos or new directions for his presidency.
This was Prío’s catchall phrase for a “break with the past” that would involve
respect for the constitution, administrative honesty, economic development and an
end to gangsters.24 The implication was that these things had been lacking under
Grau’s administration and would be remedied during the remaining years of Prío’s
term. Chibás pointed out that Prío’s negotiations to bring the Liberals, with their
Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 659.
“En Cuba, Política: El Infatigable Chibás,” March 5, 1950: 75. Chibás also missed the thrill of his
Sunday broadcast. In his absence, the show was hosted on February 19 by Pedro Iglesias Betancourt
and on February 26 by the lawyer and University of Havana professor Manuel Dorta Duque.
24 Mario Kuchilán, “Grafoentrevista Exclusiva: El Presidente y la Crisis,” Bohemia, February 5, 1950:
82.
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Machado era holdovers, into his government was hardly a step forward. He also
questioned whether Pepín Bosch, the new treasury minister and former head of the
Bacardí Company, could run an honest outfit while thieves and smugglers were
among his subordinates.25 Attempting to allay concerns about his condition, Chibás
exclaimed, “I am not one of those generals who die in bed!” 26 Just the same, the
interview petered out because he eventually became too exhausted to continue.
As the weeks passed and Chibás remained in poor health, his doctors began
to fret. They sent copies of his x-rays to the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota for
a second opinion. The medical staff there replied that Chibás was in serious danger
and should check himself in immediately. For his part, the Ortodoxo leader was
consumed by the idea that he had stomach cancer. He begged Pedro Iglesias
Betancourt and the other doctors not to conceal the truth from him. Above all, he
was frightened by the prospect of dying in the United States and refused to make the
trip. Despite these worries, Chibás projected an impishly cheerful façade for public
consumption. When a reporter from Alerta called, he claimed to be “perfectly well”
and confessed to having eaten chocolate ice cream, black beans with rice and fried
pork – much to the horror of his doctors.27 Chibás also forsook his sickbed now and
then. On one occasion, he snuck out of the Agramonte residence in order to attend a
meeting of the Ortodoxo municipal assembly. News had reached him that a potential
candidate for city council was being vetoed by hardliners because of his wealth.
Chibás, who found this unfair, wished to argue in his favor. Lastly, and most
Specifically, Chibás mentioned Guillermo Padilla, director general of the Cuban customs service
and the lottery, who he deemed a “contrabandist.” See Ibid.
26 Ibid., 74.
27 Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 664.
25
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predictably, Chibás would drag himself out of bed to visit Bohemia headquarters at
6:30 a.m. every Thursday so he could receive his advance copy of the magazine.

THE DEATH OF JOSE MANUEL ALEMAN
Chibás was not the only prominent Cuban politician whose wellbeing was in
doubt. On the evening of March 24, José Manuel Alemán lost consciousness at his
home in Havana’s exclusive Alturas de Miramar district. He had been suffering from
Hodgkin’s disease since 1942 and tried a variety of treatments, including radiation
therapy, mustard gas injections and urethane.

However, medical science was

largely helpless in the face of this ailment and those afflicted usually lived between
two and 10 years after its onset.

When Alemán regained his senses, he was

overwhelmed by pain. Sensing the end was near, he summoned Guillermo Alonso
Pujol and entrusted him with his final political instructions. Shortly after 1:30 a.m.
the next morning, Alemán was dead. Although he had seldom fulfilled his duties as a
senator and prized the office mostly for its parliamentary immunity, Alemán
nonetheless insisted on a state funeral in the Capitolio. The ex education minister’s
desire for a grand public ceremony was slightly odd given his tendency to work
behind the scenes while he was alive. However, this may have owed something to
his extraordinarily distinguished father and a wish to be acknowledged for his own
achievements – even as these seemed dubious to most Cubans.
He had spent the first 25 years his life under the shadow of José Braulio
Alemán, a general during Cuba’s independence struggle, delegate to its 1901
constitutional convention and governor of Santa Clara province. During his lengthy
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career in the Liberal party José Braulio had also been named ambassador to Mexico
by President Gerardo Machado and later served as education minister. The latter
position allowed him to arrange a plum job for his young son, José Manuel, who had
graduated from Westchester Normal School in Pennsylvania with a degree in
accounting. Given his connections, José Manuel rose quickly within the education
ministry and soon become chief of personnel. At the same time, Alemán was not
without talent nor was he content to coast on the basis of his father’s credentials.
He mastered the ministry’s bureaucratic minutiae so thoroughly that he became
indispensible to successive education ministers and finally to President Grau
himself. In the words of Enrique de la Osa, he was also an “astute psychologist.” 28
This allowed him to cultivate and accommodate men of vastly different personalities
and political ideas. Thus, during the mass strikes of 1935 against Fulgencio Batista’s
de facto military regime, Alemán ran the education ministry while its chief,
Leonardo Anaya Murillo, sought to deal with the 300,000 students, teachers and
university employees who had joined the demonstrations. His support for one quasi
dictator did not preclude him from attempting to overthrow another in 1947,
especially as he was now an Auténtico and his new boss, Ramón Grau San Martín,
hoped to oust Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic as part of his plan to
encourage democratic regimes in the Caribbean region. Hence, Alemán organized
and bankrolled the ultimately unsuccessful Cayo Confites expedition.
Alemán’s pliable principles and penchant for opportunism were by no means
exceptional. Neither was the fact that he had pinched public money. Alemán’s

28

“En Cuba, Deceso: Un Personaje de Leyenda,” Bohemia, April 2, 1950: 70.
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notoriety derived from unprecedented larceny and his creation of a blunt political
instrument out of cash designated for Cuba’s schoolchildren. Certainly, prosperous
figures had always swayed politics and underwritten friendly legislators. Alemán
took this a step further by diverting the nine centavo tax on every bag of sugar sold
toward a slush fund whose name became synonymous with corruption. In the years
1946-1948, BAGA subsidized Auténtico campaigns, including Carlos Prío’s
presidential bid, purchased lawmakers, who were colloquially known as baguistas,
co-opted the interior, treasury and health ministries, financed MSR gangsters,
bought friendly press coverage, notably in Pueblo, and won Alemán a place in the
party’s highest reaches. Alemán also pursued personal enrichment with more zeal
than any of his predecessors. In September of 1949, a Miami Herald reporter named
Bert Collier estimated Alemán’s Florida real estate empire was worth between $70
and $200 million. These included luxury hotels and residences on Collins Avenue in
South Beach along with apartment buildings in downtown Miami. He was also a
player in the land development business, buying up much of Key Biscayne through
his Ansan Corporation. Alemán’s dearest possession, however, was “Il Mío Castello,”
his pretentiously named mansion on Pine Tree Drive acquired toward the end of
1947. The parvenu-like moniker originated with the home’s previous owners, who
had it inscribed above the doorway.

Nonetheless, it suited Alemán’s desire to

inhabit one of the most coveted houses in South Beach. Its amenities included a
bronze gate, marble staircases, a wharf for his yacht and a six car garage. Moreover,
Alemán invested in three construction companies owned by Anselmo Alliegro, a
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former Machado supporter and Batista ally who had been his boss in the education
ministry between 1940 and 1944.
Shortly after Alemán’s death, the journalist Manuel Hernando Torres
attempted to calculate the value of his Cuban holdings. Among Alemán’s known
possessions was a cargo transport company called Línea Cuba Aeropostal, which
counted a fleet of seven planes and whose primary route was Havana-Miami.
Almost certainly, Alemán sought to capitalize on those like himself who pilfered
things in Cuba and aimed to place them beyond the writ of local authorities. As in
Florida, he acquired great quantities of land for future development – chiefly on
Havana’s outskirts, where he hoped to construct an international airport and build
new towns. Alemán also cultivated Cuba’s primary cash crop, having procured and
remodeled the sugar mill “Portugalete” near San José de las Lajas.

His tentacles

even extended to the island’s national pastime as he purchased the Marianao Bears,
one of Cuba’s four professional baseball teams. Last but not least, as with any man
of means, he presided over a luxuriously outfitted finca, the “América,” on which he
had spent more than a million pesos in renovations. After surveying these and other
assets, the author believed Alemán’s fortune was impossible to calculate but
remained certain his heirs would gain “the most fabulous inheritance” any Cubans
had ever received.29
In political circles, there was less interest in Alemán’s lucre than his senate
seat. The Liberal lawmaker Carlos Miguel de Céspedes declared that his party
should wage a sincere effort to capture it, especially as the death of José Manuel
Manuel Hernando Torres, “Es Incalculable la Fortuna Que Deja Alemán,” Bohemia, April 2, 1950:
98.
29
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Casanova in January had raised the danger of losing a seat in Pinar del Río.
However, the Liberals lacked a natural candidate and occupied a nebulous middle
ground between the government and opposition.

Meanwhile, the compulsive

intriguer Guillermo Alonso Pujol encouraged Grau to run as a means of fortifying the
motley coalition of Republicans, Communists and Batista’s PAU known as the
Coincidencia.

However, El Viejo politely refused their entreaties, citing his

determination to avoid seeking parliamentary immunity.30 Alonso Pujol’s second
choice, Pepe San Martín, turned him down too, despite heavy lobbying by Grau. This
left the ad-hoc group with little choice but to nominate the non-descript Guillermo
Belt – who had served as unelected mayor of Havana under Batista during the 1930s
and had also been Grau’s former ambassador in Washington.
As for the Ortodoxos, they deemed this a perfect opportunity for Chibás,
despite his health woes.

At a meeting of party higher-ups in Manuel Bisbé’s

residence, the host argued that candidates for congress and the city council (not to
mention himself) would benefit from Chibás’ considerable coattails. Luis Orlando
Rodríguez put the matter in starker terms, demanding that Chibás reward the party
for its loyalty to his principles by giving it a presence in the senate. After all, he said,
“We have accepted, despite its risks, the heroic line of political independence.”31
Millo Ochoa added that Eddy’s prestige would allow him to win from his sickbed if
necessary. Leonardo Fernández Sánchez chimed in that Alemán’s seat “historically
The columnist Francisco Ichaso discounted this excuse, asserting that Grau refused to run because
he knew his popularity had diminished significantly and losing a senate election would have been a
“mortal blow” to his political career. See Francisco Ichaso, “Panorama de las Elecciones Parciales,”
Bohemia, April 23, 1950: 51.
31 “En Cuba, Política: ‘Ir Contra ese Monstruo de Popularidad Sería un Suicidio,’” Bohemia, April 2,
1950: 76.
30
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corresponded” to the one Chibás relinquished in 1948 and implied it was bound to
return to its rightful owner.32 The uncharacteristic harmony of this session, which
must have surprised its normally disputatious participants, reflected Chibás’ rare
combination of the ethical credentials craved by Ortodoxo hard-liners and the
political viability cherished by realists. Nevertheless, their gusto was tempered by
Pedro Iglesias Betancourt, who informed Eddy’s Sunday evening radio audience on
April 2 that its idol was seriously ill even if his life was not directly in danger.
Iglesias Betancourt also confessed that the “impatient patient” would require
another operation. He concluded by saying, “I beg Ortodoxo compañeros to set their
desires aside and oblige Chibás to rest for the good of his health.”33 This plea not
only failed to convince the party faithful, it was dismissed by Chibás himself – who
delighted in discounting or ignoring nearly every recommendation provided by his
medical handlers. On April 8, looking visibly pallid and slender, he attended the
party’s Havana provincial assembly meeting.

This took place in the home of

Heriberto del Porto, an Ortodoxo candidate for Havana city hall, because the party,
always short on cash, had sold its headquarters. Chibás was greeted with typical
euphoric fervor but also by solicitous shouts and instructions. Some voices urged
supporters not to embrace him too tightly, while others bid Chibás to sit down and
preserve his strength. All the while, his friend Iglesias Betancourt stood nearby
carrying a small briefcase containing an emergency injection in case he faltered.
When Leonardo Fernández Sánchez nominated Chibás as the party’s senatorial
candidate, he praised him as “the man without fear and without defects” who
32
33

Ibid.
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“showed the way in 1948 with an intense campaign that resonated in the conscience
of the Cuban people.”34 Shortly thereafter, Chibás rose and addressed the packed
salon – promising to serve the Cuban revolution and fulfill his party’s orders by
winning. The excitable José Pardo Llada subsequently exclaimed that, “We will fill
the most dishonest of vacancies with the most honorable of all Cuban politicians!”35
The nomination of Chibás was met with a mixture of fear, resignation and
eagerness among Auténticos. Some, like Alberto Inocente Álvarez, believed he was
too formidable an opponent.

The venal former commerce minister who was

contesting the vacant seat in Pinar del Río, told reporters, “I wouldn’t dare challenge
Eddy. To go against this monster of popularity would be political suicide!” 36 Other
potential nominees declined for different reasons. Foreign Minister Carlos Hevia
believed the moment was inopportune while Education Minister Aureliano Sánchez
Arango, who was urged to run by René Fiallo, was loath to abandon his current post.
This left two keen but unloved contenders. The first was Agriculture Minister
Virgilio Pérez, who was dogged by sparse personal appeal and copious dirty
laundry. He had dishonestly managed Cuba’s Institute of Coffee under Grau and
been a policeman during the Machado era. His rival was minister without portfolio
Ramón Vasconcelos, who was also director of Alerta. In the latter capacity, he had
disgruntled Carlos Prío for lambasting the imprisonment of Chibás in 1949 and thus
ruined his chances of garnering any favors.

Vasconcelos further realized the

bleakness of his prospects when he spied Pérez for senate posters on his way back
Ibid.
Ibid.
36 “En Cuba, Política: ‘Ir Contra ese Monstruo de Popularidad Sería un Suicidio,’” Bohemia, April 2,
1950: 76.
34
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from Alemán’s funeral. Even as Pérez seemed to have the inside track, Miguelito
Suárez Fernández was determined to put forward a more distinguished contender
lest Chibás win in a romp and use the victory as a springboard for 1952. He
therefore suggested the party try three of the island’s best known brand names –
Pepe San Martín, Miguel Mariano Gómez and Raúl Menocal. Grau’s cousin and
popular former public works minister, whose lack of political enthusiasm had
rendered him very much in demand, reiterated his desire to remain a private
citizen. Gómez, who was the son of Cuba’s second president and had occupied the
top office himself in 1936, also declined as did Menocal, the child of a two time
president and former Democratic boss.

MIDTERM ELECTIONS
With midterm election campaigns already in high gear, Raúl Gutiérrez
published a survey measuring the “political sympathy” for Cuba’s primary movers
and shakers.37 The questionnaire guru asked respondents who, among Carlos Prío,
Ramón Grau, Guillermo Alonso Pujol, Fulgencio Batista and Eduardo Chibás, they
believed was “most beneficial” for Cuba.38 Despite an uneven record, Prío topped
the list with 23.86 percent. Chibás was next with 20.74 percent. Batista registered
17.17 percent and Grau followed in fourth place with a mere 12.82 percent. Alonso
Pujol had the worst showing by far, rating an embarrassing 0.67 percent nationwide
and zero in the province of Pinar del Río. Prío’s relative popularity was in marked

Raúl Gutiérrez, “En Un Survey Nacional el Pueblo Opina Sobre el Gobierno, el Nuevo Rumbo, Grau,
Batista y Chibás,” Bohemia, April 2, 1950: 87.
38 Ibid., 86.
37
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contrast to that of his government. In a different query, where Cubans were asked
to judge his administration, 23.19 percent replied that it was “good,” 29.71 percent
said it was “bad” and 35.06 percent answered it was “average.”39 The most notable
finding was that Grau, who had been so revered in 1944 and whose smile still
tickled the masses in 1948, had seen his standing sink lower than Batista’s. This
owed much to the sensational revelations of José Manuel Alemán’s vast and varied
shopping spree with state funds. If Pelayo Cuervo’s Lawsuit 82 against Grau and
those who sacked the treasury during his term seemed somewhat abstract or
politically motivated, as El Viejo himself liked to believe, there was no facile
explanation for the seemingly endless possessions of his favorite minister. The
columnist Francisco Ichaso styled these a “new and forceful blow to Grau’s solar
plexus,” adding that the former physiology professor could no longer claim “It
wasn’t me.”40
The timing of this poll may have appeared curious since, among all these
figures, only Chibás was seeking elective office in 1950. At the same time, they were
fixtures of Cuban politics and each one was running a proxy in the pivotal Havana
mayoral race. Antonio Prío’s demoralizing experience in the Palacio de los Deportes
had sketched the limits of his brother’s boosterism. The only question was whether
he could buy off his unpopularity or frighten Habaneros into voting for him. In
advertisements, Antonio promised to build a “true” aqueduct, suggesting his
proximity to the president would facilitate this project.

His slogan was thus,

Ibid., 88.
Francisco Ichaso, “La Opinión Pública Brinda Escaso Apoyo a los Liberes de la ‘Coincidencia,’”
Bohemia, April 9, 1950: 90.
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“Whatever Havana Needs, Havana Will Have.”

Also, having failed to lure the

Communists himself, he derided his rival Nicolás Castellanos for accepting their
support. One poster showed a pair of children praying at their bedside under a
portrait of the Virgin Mary while the ominous shadow of Joseph Stalin hovered
above them. Castellanos remained the frontrunner despite being supported by two
men, Grau and Alonso Pujol, who were held in low public esteem. Most importantly,
he relied on incumbency and the fact that he was not Antonio Prío. His campaign
emphasized all manner of “tangible achievements,” including renovated day care
centers, improvements in city hospitals and new schools.

Hence, Castellanos

proclaimed himself, “A Mayor Who Shows the People His Works.” Lastly, there was
the well meaning but grayish Manuel Bisbé. He boasted the moral stature of Chibás
sans charisma, but this was not an auspicious formula according to polls. His
candidacy would test whether Cubans were willing to vote for the upright but often
bland figures proposed by Ortodoxo fanatics in major elections.

Bisbé’s

announcements stressed his revolutionary credentials, including expulsions from
teaching jobs by Machado and Batista. They also lionized the fact that his current
position at the University of Havana had been gained through an “open competition”
rather than favoritism. Moreover, he was touted as an industrious congressman,
who proposed numerous bills and a man of principle, who had spent seven hours
combating the president’s foreign loan. His motto declared that, “His Clean and
Useful Life Guarantees That He is the Best Candidate.”
On April 16, Bisbé was featured in a Bohemia series called “Twenty-four
Hours in the Lives of the Mayoral Candidates.”

Readers of the magazine and
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potential balloters were offered a photo essay of Bisbé at his steady best. As such,
he was shown inscribing Greek phrases on the blackboard of his university
classroom, sitting with sympathizers at his campaign headquarters and chatting
with colleagues who were also respectable Ortodoxos such as Herminio Portell Vilá,
Vicentina Antuña and Roberto Agramonte.41 While these portraits portrayed a
decent man who associated with an honorable crowd, Bisbé’s main liability was
highlighted by something missing in the captions. Pictured next to Chibás in one
frame and José Pardo Llada in another, his companions were both described as
“popular” while Bisbé was attached to laudatory but less handy adjectives like
“honest” and “trustworthy.”42 In fact, the 25-year-old Pardo Llada was shaping up
as the party’s newest superstar, having built his following, like Chibás, though a
popular radio show and charismatic, scandal-mongering style. Pardo Llada first
drew national acclaim in 1944 with his commentary on the vastly destructive
hurricane that wrecked Havana harbor and killed an estimated 300 people. Like
Chibás, he championed causes dear to the island’s rural and urban working classes.
For example, he advocated higher salaries for sugar workers and denounced a rise
in bus fares. While Pardo Llada was far from unique in espousing these stands, he
also possessed what the journalist Walfredo Vincente called a “contagious
popularity.”43 This was reflected in the top ratings of his daily afternoon broadcast,

Herminio Portell Vilá was a University of Havana professor and one of Cuba’s most notable
historians. He was also running for Havana city council on the Ortodoxo ticket. Vicentina Antuña was
a Latin professor and officer in the Ortodoxo Women’s Wing. Aside from being his cousin’s ex vice
presidential candidate, Roberto Agramonte was head of the Ortodoxo provincial assembly for Havana
and a sociology professor.
42 Eduardo Hernández, “24 horas con los candidatos a Alcalde: Manuel Bisbé,” Bohemia, April 16,
1950: 44, 46.
43 Walfredo Vicente, “El Pardo Llada que Usted no Conoce,” Bohemia, May 14, 1950: 32.
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which outperformed all other news shows of its kind.44 In addition, he could neither
walk nor drive through Havana without being stopped and effusively greeted by
people of every sort. His run in with former Police Chief Caramés notwithstanding,
even officers of the law happily paused and chatted with him. Aside from his
magnetism, Pardo Llada’s background as a schoolteacher’s son and generally
modest personal habits pleased Ortodoxo moral guardians.45

His closeness to

Chibás, who he saw nearly every day, also stood him in good stead. Although still
quite young, the party astutely nominated him to run for congress and the
enthusiasm aroused by his candidacy was second only to that of the man he so
consciously emulated. With no need for a political machine, Pardo Llada gathered
tremendous momentum using his radio popularity, the genuine affection of Havana
residents and endorsements from respected men like the independence hero
Enrique Loynaz del Castillo and Cuba’s foremost public intellectual, Fernando Ortiz.
In this too, Pardo Llada was treading a path previously blazed by Chibás. For
the party’s established luminary, however, this would be a different campaign given
his very considerable physical limitations. Ecstatic rallies culminating with leaps
into the arms of his aficionados were out of the question. Nor could Chibás tour the
numerous towns and villages of Havana province to personally state his case. The
Ortodoxo leader still had his wits about him though and on April 9 delivered a
blistering contumely against his two opponents. In his first live and complete radio
In Cuban Advertising Association surveys tracking radio listeners in Havana and the neighboring
municipalities of Marianao, Regla and Guanabacoa, Pardo Llada’s show regularly appeared first in the
category of “news shows lasting four minutes or longer.” Between February 2 and February 19,
1950, his broadcast drew a 9.52 rating, beating out CMQ’s news program, which tallied an 8.50 share.
See “El Ultimo ‘Survey,’” Bohemia, March 19, 1950: 58.
45 Pardo Llada shared a simple apartment in the La Sierra district of Havana with his wife, María
Luisa Alonso, who was a dentist.
44
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address since February, Chibás recalled that Virgilio Pérez, the erstwhile judicial
policeman, had arrested him in April of 1929 and sent him to prison for four
months, thereby rendering a valuable service to President Gerardo Machado. He
also accused Pérez of raiding Cuba’s Institute of Coffee and agriculture ministry to
the tune of five million pesos. Moreover, just as Pérez had succeeded José Manual
Alemán as Auténtico party boss in Havana, he also desired to replace him in the
senate using the same methods favored by the late education minister – namely via
“large scale bribery.”46 Chibás referred to his second opponent as “Mister William
Belt.” This was a reference to his American roots as the grandson of John Benjamin
Belt, who had settled in Cuba after the United States Civil War. In this vein, Chibás
wondered whether Belt aspired to represent Cubans or “Boston aristocracy.”47
Continuing with this theme, Chibás recalled that as Havana’s mayor in 1933 Belt had
betrayed the revolution by “screaming for American intervention.”48 In the end, Belt
did boast one Cuban trait, although it was the rather disappointing one of
opportunism. Hence, in 1935, now serving as Batista’s appointed mayor of Havana,
he placed a medal of honor around the neck of Pedro Pedraza after he had
suppressed the mass strikes of that year.
Besides returning to the airwaves full time, Chibás also took up his pencil.49
As always, his friend Miguel Ángel Quevedo happily ceded him space in the island’s

“En Cuba, Política: ‘El Partido me ha Señalado un Puesto de Combate,” Bohemia, April 16, 1950: 78.
Ibid. Chibás’ suggestion that Belt was not really Cuban scored political points but also contained a
fair bit of hypocrisy. After all, Eddy’s father, Eduardo Justo, was naturalized as a United States citizen
in 1891 at a court of Quarter Sessions in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where he had been working as a
civil engineer.
48 Ibid., 79.
49 Chibás wrote the first drafts of his articles and radio speeches in pencil, usually while chain
smoking, after which they were typed by his secretary Conchita Fernández.
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most popular magazine – which was already running regular pro Ortodoxo columns
by Jorge Mañach and Carlos Márquez Sterling. On April 23, Chibás published an
article entitled “Message to the Cuban People” which reiterated and amplified his
earlier criticisms of Virgilio Pérez and Guillermo Belt. Apart from painting Pérez as
a pro Machado stooge and abuser of public office, he provided an embarrassing
anecdote. Chibás related that after Machado was ousted and angry mobs sought
revenge against government agents, Pérez had “hidden behind the skirts of female
family members and friends” who begged revolutionary leaders to pardon his
“wickedness.”50

Chibás lacked similar juicy details about “Mr. William Belt,”

dismissing him instead as an “unconditional servant” of Wall Street who would feel
more at home in Washington’s Capitol than Cuba’s Capitolio.51 Finally, Chibás
reserved some harsh words for a newcomer – the Communist Anibal Escalante.
Unlike, Pérez who he deemed a crook and Belt who he called a lackey of United
States bankers, Chibás considered Escalante a flunky for Moscow’s “despotic”
empire – which he termed “the most dangerous and bloodthirsty” of the current
century.52 In presenting his own case for election, Chibás recycled choice bits of
rhetoric from his presidential campaign. Paraphrasing his classic speech from 1948,
he asked, “What are we counting on to win Havana’s vacant senate seat?”53 Rather
than a political machine or money, Chibás answered, “My history as an incorruptible

Eduardo R. Chibás, “Mensaje al Pueblo Cubano.” Bohemia, April 23, 1950: 71.
Ibid., 93. Chibás was far from the only one to poke fun at Belt’s American origins. For example, the
political satirist Niko published a cartoon in which two men of obvious American appearance are
walking down a Havana street. Off to the side, one Cuban tells the other, “To tell the truth, I don’t
know whether they are tourists or political sergeants of William Belt.” See Niko, “Confusión,”
Bohemia, April 30, 1950: 77.
52 Ibid.
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combatant during a quarter century of incarcerations, persecutions and constant
sacrifices.”54 He reminded readers that the Prío family, Nicolás Castellanos, Virgilio
Pérez and Alberto Inocente Álvarez had all enriched themselves in public office.
Conversely, he had refused to “exchange shame for money” and was now
measurably poorer.55
Chibás also reprimanded the government for abetting an epidemic of
“siblingism” in Cuban politics. This began at the top with Carlos Prío’s imposition of
his younger brother Antonio as the Auténtico mayoral candidate of Havana, his
sister Mireya as a congressional hopeful from Oriente and his sister-in-law’s
brother, Tino Fuentes, as a prospective representative from Las Villas. 56 Those who
followed suit included Tony Varona, who had his brother Roberto nominated to run
for mayor of Camagüey; Virgilio Pérez, who tabbed his brother Gerardo to fill the
congressional seat he was vacating; Diego Vicente Tejera who lined up a
congressional bid for his brother Titi in their home province of Matanzas; Octavio
Rivero Partagás of Pinar del Río, whose brother César was up for re-election as a
representative; and the infamous Rolando Masferrer, who placed his brother Kiki on
the congressional ticket in their native Oriente. On the other hand, Chibás was not
entirely immune from the tendency toward nepotism – which was pervasive in all of
Cuba’s political parties.

He conveniently neglected to mention that his cousin

Ibid., 70-71.
Ibid., 71.
56 Of course, Carlos Prío’s older brother Paco was already a senator from Pinar del Río while his
brother-in-law Enrique Henríquez occupied a congressional seat from Oriente province.
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Roberto Agramonte had been elected Ortodoxo party boss in Havana at his behest
and the two delegates who had raised charges of favoritism had been expelled.57
As Chibás pressed on in characteristic style, the Auténtico senator and Prío
confidante Lomberto Díaz described a different though no less captivating
panorama. While Chibás railed against the status quo from outside, Díaz detailed
the thinking of those who ruled the island. Having invited a Bohemia reporter to his
country house in Pinar del Río province, Díaz spoke frankly, assisted by several
drams of guayabita, a local guava infused liquor. Among other things, he stated that
Carlos Prío rather than party assemblies would choose the Auténtico presidential
candidate for 1952. As a consequence, legislators loyal to the president were
anxious to modify the electoral code and eliminate the veto currently wielded by
provincial bodies over party nominees. Apart from anti-democratic, this change
would cause considerable rifts within the party – particularly among followers of
Miguelito Suárez Fernández.58 As to whom Prío would actually select, Díaz said the
president was awaiting the midterm election results. If Antonio were to win the
Havana mayoralty “by an ample margin,” as many in the party expected, he would
be the standard bearer in 1952.59 In the event that Antonio lost, the field would be
more wide open. Díaz claimed Carlos Hevia would have the inside track as the

They were Segundo Abreu and Baltasar Arroyo, both of whom abstained from voting out of protest.
See Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 654.
58 Díaz mentioned that the Auténtico party chief in Matanzas, Diego Vicente Tejera, “doesn’t content
himself with the trust of Carlos (Prío) but rather wants to keep the knife of the veto in his hands for
his defense.” See “En Cuba, Entrevista: ‘La Mayoría Votará por Chibás…’” Bohemia, April 23, 1950: 80.
59 Ibid.
The fact that Díaz and other Auténticos believed Antonio Prío could handily win the
mayoralty despite his obvious unpopularity was a testament to their nearly unlimited faith in the
party’s political machine and the government’s resources.
57

313

president held him in “great esteem.”60 However, circumstances were still fluid. For
instance, if Virgilio Pérez upset Chibás at the polls, he could reasonably expect the
party’s laurels although Díaz recognized the Ortodoxo leader was a “fearsome”
opponent and would probably emerge victorious.61 Even in the likely event of his
defeat, Pérez was “lending a great service to the government” because no one else
had been willing to challenge Chibás.62 In fact, for an Auténtico nabob, Díaz offered a
surprisingly nuanced assessment of his party’s bête noire. The standard Auténtico
appraisal portrayed Chibás as an irresponsible rabble rouser who was unfit for high
office and a ruinous influence on the nation. On the contrary, Díaz allowed that
Chibás alone among opposition figures “had something to say.”63 Alternatively,
Grau, Batista and Alonso Pujol were “washed up” and “electoral cadavers.”64
If his campaign advertisements were any indication, Chibás was saying the
senate was a den of iniquity and vowed to construct a wall against “vile exploiters of
the people” if elected.65 He thus urged voters to “place their brick” by marking their
ballots for him. Another poster limned a battle scene and proclaimed that Chibás
would be the people’s “trench.”66 As there were no Ortodoxos in the senate and only
two open seats there, he would have scarce opportunities to introduce any bills.
However, as a party chief and future presidential candidate, the press was
understandably interested in his legislative proposals. One afternoon a reporter
Ibid.
Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid. Díaz reserved his highest praise for the Ortodoxo leader’s campaign skills, saying “any other
candidate would need three months to gain the ground Chibás could cover in 30 days.” This may
have been hyperbolic but only slightly. Chibás was far and away the best campaigner in Cuba.
64 Ibid.
65 “¡Ponga su piedra…!,” Bohemia, April 30, 1950: 25.
66 “La Trinchera del Pueblo Debe Ser…,” Bohemia, May 19, 1950: 81.
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stopped by the Agramonte residence to ask Chibás about his program and found
him still in pajamas. Smiling, the Ortodoxo leader related that he had attended a
rally in Cárdenas (75 miles east of Havana) the night before and gone to bed at 4
a.m. This had not been a campaign stop as Cárdenas was in neighboring Matanzas
province and nobody there could vote for him. Rather, he had felt obliged to
support a local Ortodoxo candidate and made the trip despite violent objections
from Pedro Iglesias Betancourt. Chibás answered the journalist’s questions with
gleeful good humor and offered, with consummate showmanship, to pose at the
desk where he wrote his Sunday radio speeches. At one point, he turned on the
radio and said, “Permit me listen to Virgilio (Pérez) so I can amuse myself.”67 Soon
enough, Chibás dived into a lecture on nepotism, as he explained that all four Pérez
brothers were elected officials or state employees and dishonest ones at that.68
Regarding his legislative agenda, Chibás mentioned passage of the 1940
constitution’s complimentary laws. He was especially keen on imperatives that
would curb corruption such as a general accounting law, establishment of a national
comptroller’s office and an act that would establish defined standards for state
employees. Chibás also wished to tinker with the electoral code so that senators
would be elected based on majority vote rather than by coalition.

His most

ambitious scheme was a crowd pleaser and hoary campaign staple that involved
handing “thieving functionaries” over to the courts for prosecution and devising
legislation that would recover stolen funds and invest them in “urgent” projects
Antonio Perdomo, “Mi Programa Legislativo Responde a las Necesidades Morales y Políticas del
Pueblo Cubano,” Bohemia, April 30, 1950: 69.
68 On the other hand, Eddy’s younger brother Raúl directed the Havana Military Academy – private
high school for boys.
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including aqueducts, hospitals, country roads and rural schools.69 This project was
timelier than ever in the wake of Alemán’s lavish accoutrements but had no chance
in an Auténtico controlled senate.
Shortly after this interview, Chibás began feeling the effects of his ill advised
trip to Cárdenas. Besides staying out until the wee hours, Chibás had insisted on
delivering a speech and passing through the gigantic crowd on foot, accompanied by
José Pardo Llada. Within days, Chibás began vomiting after meals and required
regular infusions of saline, blood and plasma. Moreover, his weight plummeted
since he could not digest any solid food.

On April 27, he had planned to

commemorate the first anniversary of his incarceration by addressing an Ortodoxo
throng next to the Castillo del Príncipe. That morning, however, Chibás fainted
multiple times. Pedro Iglesias Betancourt told him to stay home, warning he could
die in the middle of his speech otherwise. Chibás spent the afternoon in his room
pondering the counsel of his friend and doctor but by 7 p.m. he had decided to
forsake sound medical advice yet again. This seemed foolish, particularly as Chibás
threw up twice before leaving the house and three more times as he waited his turn
at the pulpit. When the Ortodoxo leader finally stood to address the multitude, he
was interrupted by concerned voices begging him to stop. Chibás marveled that
never before had “his people” asked him not to speak.70 Later on, having safely

Antonio Perdomo, “Mi Programa Legislativo Responde a las Necesidades Morales y Políticas del
Pueblo Cubano,” Bohemia, April 30, 1950: 69.
70 Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 671.
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returned to the Agramonte residence, he asked his cousin’s wife, “Don’t you think
the Cuban people, who are so good, deserve what I just did?”71
On April 30, the Havana senate contest swerved in a highly unexpected
direction. That evening, Chibás offered breaking news to his Sunday audience.
Shortly before he began broadcasting, Cuba’s Superior Electoral Tribunal had
disqualified Virgilio Pérez from running because of an erroneous coalition
agreement. Specifically, he had sought to be listed on the Auténtico, Democratic and
Liberal ballots but the Liberals had never formally nominated him and the pact was
thus invalid according to the island’s electoral code. Upon learning the verdict,
Prime Minister Tony Varona announced over the radio that the court had initiated a
“coup” and claimed, with notable indelicacy, that it “could not do this to a
government party.”72

The ornery Varona thus expressed officially what most

Auténticos had long assumed – namely, that they were entitled to rule and the law
was a useful cudgel against opponents but did not apply to them. Virgilio Pérez
echoed the belief that Cuba’s courts were a government plaything by wondering
how the judges had dared to “rebel against the president of the republic.”73 For his
part, Carlos Prío telephoned one of the magistrates and accused him of “negligence”
for not clarifying the rules pertaining to special elections.74 This was a disingenuous
gripe since the electoral code had not changed one iota. Further, Pérez had been the
only candidate to run afoul of the regulations. The real problem was that he had
trusted his bungling advisor and lawyer, Rigoberto Ramírez, to submit the
Ibid.
“En Cuba: Tribunales: ‘Esa Sentencia es Justa…’ Bohemia, May 7, 1950: 73.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
71
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paperwork. Chibás, who was no stranger to legal disputes, convened the Ortodoxo
executive committee for a consultation. In a dig at Varona, the party conveyed
“support” for the electoral tribunal’s decision to “apply the same legal precepts to
the government parties as those that oblige everyone else.”75
The government, of course, was not inclined to stand pat and submitted an
appeal that was considered on May 2. Judge Eloy Merino, who had been extensively
lobbied by the president, seemed ready to change his mind. He argued the court had
created “public anxiety” and urged his peers to grant an extension allowing the
Auténtico, Democratic and Liberal parties to put their pact in order.76 His revised
criteria drew a strenuous and verbose objection from the court’s Ortodoxo observer,
Joaquín López Montes. Speaking for 90 minutes, López Montes denied the existence
of any public anxiety – claiming the only citizens suffering unease were the prime
minister and friends of Virgilio Pérez. He concluded darkly that, “A state of public
anxiety will reign only if the people, who have respectfully accepted the Supreme
Electoral Tribunal’s egalitarian sentence, now contemplate its retraction and thus
lose faith in the courts.”77 Regardless, Judge Merino and Judge Aurelio Álvarez
Maruri reversed course and their votes swung the majority in favor of repeal.
Weighing in as a “responsible citizen,” Chibás deplored the government’s “brutal
coercion” and pronounced himself “profoundly ashamed” by this turnabout.78 At
the same time, he had relished the prospect of “soundly defeating” Pérez and
Ibid.
Ibid., 74. The Bohemia reporter observing this case was convinced that Judge Merino had been
tampered with, noting that he lacked his “habitual composure” while citing his new, pro-government
line. The journalist added that, “Those familiar with the judge’s habitual eloquence suspect
something strange is happening with him.” See Ibid.
77 Ibid., 75.
78 Ibid.
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confessed to feeling a certain “personal satisfaction” that the race would continue.
Chibás repeated and expanded on these thoughts in a subsequent Bohemia article.
The Ortodoxo leader asserted that he was “sure” Cuba’s Court of Constitutional
Guarantees would invalidate Pérez if given the chance.79 However, his party had
decided to forego this route.
because everything that the ex porrista Virgilio Pérez represents –
stolen money, political machinery, vote buying, fraud, shady political
deals – all this corruption is going to be swept from public life in the
six provinces, not by means of legal appeals but through the clean and
incorruptible votes of the Cuban people, in an avalanche of ballots
without precedent in Cuban history.80
The obsession of Chibás and the Ortodoxos with public dishonesty,
particularly in terms of vote buying, seemed to be gaining traction not only among
hard core followers but also for the island’s shapers of opinion. During the second
week of May, the theme was taken up by Francisco Ichaso in Diario de la Marina,
Rafael Estenger in Alerta, Carlos Lechuga in El Mundo and Prío’s minister without
portfolio Ramón Vasconcelos. A Bohemia correspondent quipped that even sleazy
politicians were none too happy with the situation as the price of purchasing their
positions was becoming onerous.81 Buying votes had not always been part of Cuba’s
electoral process, but the practice boasted a long and varied history – dating from at
least 1914, when two unpopular politicians found success by bribing those who
marked ballots for illiterate citizens. In those days, they tore 100 peso bills down
the middle and provided one half to their accomplices prior to elections and the

Eduardo R. Chibás, “Sangre y Cieno,” Bohemia, May 14, 1950: 70.
Ibid., 71. The porra was slang for members of President Gerardo Machado’s security forces.
81 “En Cuba, Política: El Dinero en la Política,” Bohemia, May 14, 1950: 74.
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other once victory was assured. Given the multitude of choices on each ballot,
including candidates for congress, provincial government and town or city council,
voters could opt to sell their votes in bulk (a ploy known as the pineapple) or keep
one or more for themselves. In Havana, such machinations eventually gave rise to
an early political vehicle known as the Cenáculo or Circle, which entrenched Liberals
in the city’s bureaucracy and elective offices. During Gerardo Machado’s presidency
this operation was centralized and positions were auctioned from the presidential
palace, often costing up to 100,000 pesos. With the advent of BAGA in 1946, a joint
venture between José Manuel Alemán and Francisco Grau Alsina to help them
capture senate seats snowballed into the most powerful political machine in Cuba’s
history – capable of co-opting entire municipal assemblies. BAGA’s essentially
unlimited funds, siphoned directly from Cuba’s treasury, provided Carlos Prío with
approximately 30 million pesos for his 1948 election campaign. Alemán spent an
estimated 10 million pesos on his senate seat. This infusion of money raised the ante
for everyone else, including fellow Auténticos, some of whom had paid upwards of
300,000 pesos for places in congress.82
Alemán’s demise and the dissolution of his political apparatus did not
diminish the preeminence of mammon.

On the contrary, costs continued to

skyrocket. This was nowhere more evident than in the Havana mayoral race. Aside
from trying to buy the city’s hostile denizens, Antonio Prío also needed to appease
his coalition partners and other useful individuals with cash inducements. With
habitual indiscretion, he admitted to shelling out 350,000 pesos for Liberal support.
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The amount paid for continued Democratic fealty was less well publicized but
undoubtedly substantial as well. Panchín Batista, the governor of Havana province
and an erstwhile mayoral candidate himself, was also lured to the Auténticos
through a generous cash reward. Moreover, Antonio supplemented his budget by
distributing an endless supply of lottery tickets – which served as a form of cash.
While the precise extent of his expenses remained unknown, he bragged to an
adherent of Nicolás Castellanos that, “The money I’m spending resembles a tale
from A Thousand and One Nights!”83 Needless to say, the legislative races involved
similar tactics. Alberto Inocente Álvarez, the Auténtico senate contender for Pinar
del Río told the press he expected to spend a million pesos on his campaign.
Moreover, the average bid for an Auténtico congressional seat, which often
surpassed 900,000 pesos, required only slightly more modest outlays.84 A Bohemia
reporter blamed these swelling prices on candidates who “brilliantly” manipulated
the “bribery industry” including Edgardo Buttari, Prío’s ex labor minister; Armando
Da’Lama, a venal treasury ministry official; Gerardo Pérez, brother to the
unscrupulous Virgilio; and Guillermo Ara, who employed UIR gangsters along with
Cuba’s dubious political sergeants to harvest votes.85
Although vote buying proved phenomenally successful over the years,
Cubans had usually been willing to forgo the extra lucre if they felt strongly about a
candidate. Hence, the sports journalist Victor Muñoz topped the list for Havana city
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council in 1920 because he was adored by the island’s myriad baseball fanatics.86
Ramón Grau San Martín achieved the same result in Cuba’s constituent assembly
elections of 1939 by riding a wave of popular emotion and messianic fervor. The
man who placed second in that contest, Eduardo Chibás, was currently headlining
what a Bohemia reporter called “an historic duel between opulence and civicmindedness.”87 A public survey by Raúl Gutiérrez, published on May 14, suggested
most Cubans would vote their consciences rather than selling them – at least in his
case. The poll indicated that 33.14 percent of Havana residents preferred Chibás,
while 20.11 percent favored Virgilio Pérez. Third place belonged to the Communist
Anibal Escalante with 8.25 percent and Guillermo Belt of the ad hoc Coincidencia,
who lacked both riches and devoted followers, placed last with 4.10 percent.88
These statistics, while not encouraging for Pérez, nonetheless implied that vote
buying was having an impact. This was especially true in rural parts of Havana
province, where Pérez led Chibás by more than seven percentage points. Pérez,
whose policies as agriculture minister had proved disastrous for coffee farmers, was
no darling of country dwellers. Rather, poverty and desperation inclined them to
sell their votes more than wealthier urban inhabitants. In fact, every candidate
except for the well heeled Pérez counted less support in bucolic areas.89 Then again,
this advantage was offset by Pérez’s unpopularity within his own party and coalition

Victor Muñoz wrote for El Mundo and was the first Cuban baseball chronicler to substitute Spanish
equivalents for the game’s original English terminology. He turned “home run” into jonrón and “hit
and run” into corrido y bateo. As a city councilman, he is best remembered for proposing a law to
celebrate Mother’s Day – which was approved in 1928, six years after his death.
87 “En Cuba, Política: El Dinero en la Política,” Bohemia, May 14, 1950: 75.
88 Raúl Gutiérrez, “Tercer Survey Sobre la Alcaldía y Primero Sobre los Senadores,” Bohemia, May 14,
1950: 84.
89 Ibid.
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partners. Only 37.64 percent of Auténticos showed a willingness to vote for him and
27.01 were prepared to mark their ballots for Chibás. Among Democrats, Chibás led
Pérez by more than ten percentage points. Liberals also opted for Chibás by a lesser
but still decisive margin of almost five percentage points.90
While Chibás was among the handful of Cuban politicians whose popularity
could surmount a well financed pro-government opponent, his friend Manuel Bisbé
lacked the same crossover potential. Unlike the Ortodoxo leader, Bisbé encountered
no significant backing outside his party. According to the public survey of May 14,
only 4.95 percent of Auténticos intended to vote for him. Bisbé registered similarly
dismal figures with every other political grouping except his own – never surpassing
single digits for any of them. Even worse, 26.51 percent of Ortodoxos preferred
Nicolás Castellanos.91 Bisbé was not entirely without appeal, given his election to
Cuba’s chamber of representatives, but he was in no way capable of overcoming the
municipal machine of Castellanos or prodigal spending of Antonio Prío. Bisbé did
not blame his projected third place finish on either of these things, however. Rather,
he irascibly accused Raúl Gutiérrez of distorting the results and claimed his
numbers would improve if he could afford to pay for his own research. If anyone
had the resources to co-opt Cuba’s premier pollster, it was Antonio Prío, but his
second place showing, more than 22 points behind Nicolas Castellanos, implied his
wallet was being utilized elsewhere. In many respects, he resembled Virgilio Pérez
given his huge war chest and meager likability. Even as he bought votes and slowly
rose in the polls, the distaste many Havana residents harbored for Antonio was a
90
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poor omen. Since the last public survey in March, his overall rating had increased
from 20.53 percent to 26.32 percent.92

This reflected the unwillingness of

Auténticos and members of pro-government parties to back him uniformly. For
instance, 40.09 percent of Auténticos and 38.70 percent of Democrats favored
Castellanos.

Most embarrassing was that 58.82 percent of Liberals preferred

Castellanos even though the party hierarchy had been bought off by the
government.93
With election day looming, the moment for eleventh hour surprises was at
hand. Despite his comfortable lead in the polls and uncooperative diaphragm,
Chibás set to work on a new Bohemia piece featuring sensational revelations about
Virgilio Pérez. From back issues of Diario de la Marina, El Crisol, Información and El
País, he reconstructed a lurid incident from March 19, 1934 in which Pérez shot and
wounded his vaudeville actress girlfriend during a lovers’ quarrel and then
murdered a man who crossed his path as he fled through Old Havana’s streets.
Pérez was accordingly arrested and tried in the city’s Instructional Court, where his
defense lawyer happened to be Miguelito Suárez Fernández. Chibás declared that
“enormous pressure” had been exerted on the judges to absolve Pérez and they duly
complied.

He also found it “curious” that Pérez’s file had been subsequently

“robbed” from the court’s archives. Chibás concluded that, “Anyone who does not
believe what I am saying about Virgilio Pérez can visit any public library, request the
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newspapers I referred to in this article and verify the truth for themselves.”94 Not
surprisingly, Pérez was livid. He threatened violent reprisals against the magazine’s
director, Miguel Ángel Quevedo, its staff and even their premises.

Pérez also

denounced Bohemia before Cuba’s Association of Journalists, albeit to little effect.
The following week, Bohemia ran a defiant editorial stating it would not be
“frightened” by “boasts” of an “ex servant of Machado and modern ‘revolutionary’
millionaire.”95 On the other hand, Carolos Lechuga, writing in El Mundo, upbraided
Chibás for exposing Pérez’s former paramour to unwarranted scrutiny. The woman,
whose full name and home province had been furnished by Chibás, appeared to
agree. She published an insulting public letter to him in a wide swath of Havana’s
newspapers. Undaunted, the Ortodoxo leader charged Pérez with having ghost
written the abusive missive and forcing his old sweetheart to sign or forfeit her
government job. In fact, so many rumors emerged regarding this affair that Chibás
felt compelled to refute some of the more scurrilous ones. He acknowledged that
people were saying his article had ruined the woman’s marriage, that her husband
had vowed to kill him and her small grandchildren were crying desolate tears. In a
last Bohemia column before the elections, Chibás explained the lady was actually
single and childless. The incessant hearsay, he averred, was nothing more than a
government sponsored “farce.”96

Eduardo R. Chibás, “Virgilio Pérez: Porrista, Homicida y Otras Cosas; William Belt, Machado y
Pedraza,” Bohemia, May 21, 1950: 143.
95 “Poniendo las Cosas en su Lugar: Independencia y Verdad,” Bohemia, May 28, 1950: supplement. 1.
96 Eduardo R. Chibás, “¿Acaso Virgilio Pérez Representa a la Mujer Cubana?” Bohemia, May 28, 1950:
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As the campaign drew to a close, Chibás continued to exasperate his doctors.
On May 30, he attended an event honoring him in the Hotel Inglaterra but was so
weak he could hardly say more than a few words. Since his diaphragmatic hernia
was diagnosed in February, Chibás had dropped 50 pounds from a frame that had
never been stout to begin with. Twenty-four hours before the polls closed, looking
wan and ghost-like, he toured Havana’s neighborhoods with Manuel Bisbé and
planned last minute strategies with Ortodoxo candidates for congress and city hall.
Dressed in a white guayabera and bowtie, he contemplated updated surveys by Raúl
Gutiérrez indicating his polemic with Virgilio Pérez had damaged his case but still
showed him ahead “by a nose.”97 Pérez’s gains, which may have been the result of
frenzied ballot buying as well, were not enough to carry him past Chibás – who won
by just over 17,000 votes.98 Chibás blamed the closer than expected result on
concerted attacks by the Communists, who were fairly strong in Havana and barely
mustered a peep against Pérez. The Ortodoxo leader allowed that he disagreed with
the Communists on international matters but noted his vigorous protest when Jesús
Menéndez had been murdered. “Do they believe Virgilio would have done the same
as me?” he asked. “(Virgilio) would have supported the government against any
transgression against our democracy.”99 At the same time, Chibás obtained an

Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 676. Chibás, who devoted obsessive care to his personal
appearance, had not worn a guayabera by accident. This was a traditional shirt and quintessential
symbol of Cuba. Carlos Prío had incited howls of outrage a few years earlier by banning it from the
presidential palace in favor of suits. Conversely, during a visit to Cuba in 1948, President Harry
Truman had earned plaudits for donning a guayabera. As for Guillermo Belt, who had spent the
previous two months being called “William,” he emphasized his Cuban bona fides by wearing one to
the voting station.
98 The official vote totals were as follows: Eduardo Chibás: 200,287, Virgilio Pérez: 183,220,
Guillermo Belt: 93,143 and Anibal Escalante, 73,359. See: Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 676.
99 “En Cuba, Elecciones: La Lección del Primero de Junio,” Bohemia, June 11, 1950: 77.
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unexpected boost from Mayor Francisco Orúe of Marianao, who gladly accepted
cash from Pérez to deliver votes but ordered his constituents to support Chibás
instead. Commenting on Eddy’s victory in Diario de la Marina, Francisco Ichaso
wrote,
Electoral machines and money are losing the dominance they once
possessed. The Ortodoxo candidate has won on the basis of his
superior personality, his influence with the masses (and) the respect
his behavior has awakened…The people see in Chibás an implacable
critic, a prosecutor who fearlessly attacks shamelessness and iniquity
wherever he finds them. In a sphere where silence, dissimulation and
complicity are the norm, he represents an exception.100
The government’s reach absorbed an even greater blow when Nicolás Castellanos
was re-elected as Havana’s mayor by a margin of 16.5 percentage points. While
Virgilio Pérez was amply assisted by the Auténtico apparatus and his own personal
affluence, he was not a member of Carlos Prío’s inner circle nor had he been the
president’s preferred choice to succeed Alemán. By contrast, the administration
spared neither expense nor effort to elect Antonio Prío.

Ignoring polls that

predicted a distant second place finish, Auténtico operatives fancifully viewed a
landslide victory in the offing.101 When the bad news became evident, Carlos and
Antonio Prío covered assorted advisors with epithets.
These prominent setbacks notwithstanding, electoral bribery continued to
yield fruit more often than not. Despite losing in Havana, and also in Camagüey,
Ibid.
Each of Havana’s mayoral candidates was unhappy with the various polls taken by Raúl Gutiérrez.
Castellanos complained they underestimated his popularity, Antonio Prío pretended not to notice
them and Manuel Bisbé whined that surveys reflected the whims of those who paid for them.
However, the May 31 questionnaire proved highly accurate. Castellanos was favored by 53.85
percent of respondents and won 53.36 percent in actuality. Antonio Prío was chosen by 34.35
percent and garnered 36.88 percent on election day. Lastly, Manuel Bisbé was named by 11.80
percent and came away with 9.76 percent.
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Cuba’s third largest city, where Tony Varona’s brother Roberto was defeated, the
Auténticos snagged more than 100 mayoralties.102 Some of these were won by
genuinely popular candidates such as Luis Casero in Santiago de Cuba, but many
others resorted to shady methods. The government also added to its congressional
majority. In Las Villas province, the Auténticos spent approximately 500 thousand
pesos to elect six representatives. One of these, the president’s brother-in-law Tino
Fuentes, was accused of funding his campaign with government checks meant for
road construction and selling pardons to criminals via the justice ministry. 103 The
midterm elections thus offered consolation along with dollops of bitterness for each
of the island’s political groupings. Guillermo Alonso Pujol and Ramón Grau San
Martín reveled in the victory of their protégé, Nicolás Castellanos, who retained
Cuba’s second most powerful political office. However, Castellanos, who had been
an obscure Havana city councilman before the suicide of Manuel Fernández
Supervielle, had primarily won because he was not the president’s brother. Other
Coincidencia nominees such as Guillermo Belt and René Benitez, who ran for senate
in Pinar del Río, finished poorly in their respective races. As for the Ortodoxos, they
regained a presence in the senate after a two year hiatus and Chibás, who had
conducted a heroic campaign, showcased his presidential bona fides for 1952.
Ortodoxos advanced in the lower house as well. In particular, José Pardo Llada
provided a spectacular boost by collecting 72,000 votes – more than any
Roberto Varona lost despite outspending his opponent, the incumbent Francisco Arredondo, by a
10 to 1 margin or 500,000 pesos to 50,000. The prime minister’s brother was also given 2000
government jobs to distribute where necessary. See Conchito del Río, “La 2nda Zafra de Cuba: 63
Millones Costaron las Elecciones,” Bohemia, June 18, 1950: 38.
103 “En Cuba, Elecciones: La Lección del Primero de Junio,” Bohemia, June 11, 1950: 76. Then again,
José Ramón Fernández, who was a protégé of Education Minister Arturo Sánchez Arango, engaged in
similar shenanigans and was defeated.
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congressional candidate in Cuba’s history.

He thus established himself as the

island’s most dynamic young politician. Pardo Llada represented a new generation
that had neither fought in the independence war nor tussled with Machado and the
ensuing military flavored governments. His credibility derived from being a Chibásstyle muckraker who was always, in the words of a Bohemia reporter, “risking his
life in daily combat for the public benefit.”104 Ortodoxo fixtures such as Luis Orlando
Rodríguez and Millo Ochoa were also elected. While these men embodied the
Ortodoxo ideal of relative poverty, not all the party’s winners fit this profile. In Las
Villas, an Ortodoxo coffee baron named Aurelio Nazario Sargent rode to victory on a
flotilla of jeeps that crisscrossed the countryside and blared his message. Even
more enterprising was the prosperous Gerardo Vázquez, who accrued the highest
vote total in Camagüey by hiring a dozen airplanes to spread Ortodoxo slogans
across the skies. These successes were tempered by the poor showing of Manuel
Bisbé, who could not muster even 10 percent of the vote in a party stronghold.
With the elections over, Chibás acquiesced to his doctors finally and
remained inactive for nearly all of June. His devotees, however, busied themselves
with letters of congratulations. A “great admirer” from Panama who read Chibás’
articles in Bohemia and commended his “righteous conduct” requested an
autographed photo.105 A 30 year old sugar worker from Las Villas province who had
previously shown negligible interest in politics wrote that he was now enthusiastic
about campaigning for him. A Cuban man residing in New York City related that, “I
pray for the triumph of (your) party and your ideals and also for your personal
104
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health, knowing that you are my country’s salvation.106 Ricardo Pareja Lodosa, a
member of the Young Ortodoxos in Matanzas, claimed Chibás was bound by a pact
“with the entire nation and our martyrs to care for your well being.” He added that,
“You must not abandon your health and cannot forget that you are the only and
supreme hope of the entire Cuban people, which trusts in you alone.”107 Chibás read
these missives and others with great satisfaction, underlining as always his favorite
passages with a red pencil.

He was further gratified by a fresh opinion poll

published on June 25 that confirmed him as Cuba’s leading presidential contender.
Asked who they preferred in the island’s highest office, 26.25 percent of
respondents chose Chibás. His nearest rival, Fulgencio Batista trailed in second
place by nearly eight percentage points. The third place candidate, Miguelito Suárez
Fernández, was just over 12 points behind. In addition, Chibás led in five of Cuba’s
six provinces and the three most populous ones, Havana, Oriente and Las Villas.
Chibás was also undoubtedly pleased that his erstwhile adversary, Virgilio Pérez,
gleaned a measly 0.84 percent.108 Asked by a journalist for his view, Chibás said,
“This clearly indicates that in Cuba space is being cleared for shame in the face of
political machines and the government’s corruptive money.”109
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CAUSA 82
In the simplest terms, Chibás and the Ortodoxos aimed to change Cuban
politics by offering honorable candidates for public positions. For Chibás this was
not merely a political strategy but a duty to the country’s founders. Responding
around this time to a letter from a young aficionada, he noted, “Our forbearers, who
knew how to write pages of glory and bequeathed us a free and sovereign republic,
deserve something better than what our present unscrupulous rulers have
delivered. This,” he concluded, “is the task to which the Ortodoxo party has pledged
itself.”110

Although the organization’s civic-minded gestures had aroused

considerable enthusiasm, these tactics by themselves were not a blanket solution.
Reform also required curbs on the ability of politicians to fund campaigns and buy
votes from the national treasury.

Reasonably effective deterrence, involving

prosecution and incarceration for embezzlers, was therefore essential. Hence, on
June 30, Chibás submitted a brief avowing that approximately 50 million pesos had
been pilfered from the Sugar Workers Retirement Fund during the Grau and Prío
administrations. Chibás proclaimed that,
Justice should reign for everyone. The weight of the law should fall
equally, without favoritism, on all those who have put their hands in
the till and not only the ones who are less influential or powerful or
have lost proximity to executive power. It is neither civic-minded nor
brave to accuse only ex President Grau San Martín and not his ex
prime minister and the current president of the republic Carlos Prío;
the same goes for he who was director of rents and taxes under Grau
and who was treasury minister in this administration. Both (Prío)
brothers were as responsible for these outrages as Grau…111
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However, it was one thing to make denunciations before the courts and quite
another for them to be acted upon, as Chibás well knew. In this sense, the fate of
Causa 82, the lawsuit brought by Pelayo Cuervo against thieves from Grau’s
administration, was highly significant. During its initial go-round, the case yielded
little except a fine against Cuervo for publicly criticizing the lethargic and reluctant
judiciary. Special Judge Antonio Vignier had actually closed the indictment and
recommended the lawsuit be discontinued. In a rare display of independence, the
Havana municipal court disagreed and reassigned the case to Judge Arturo Hevia
with instructions to investigate more than 30 potential instances of malfeasance.
Before Judge Hevia could pursue this mandate, however, he was recused on a
ridiculous pretense. Specifically, a man named in the lawsuit, who had fought in the
independence war, claimed Hevia was prejudiced against veterans. The next judge
appointed eventually recused himself as well, this time because Grau’s ex finance
minister, Isauro Valdés, alleged personal enmity. In truth, Valdés worried that an
honest magistrate would send him up the river. Toward late May, Judge Federico
Justiniani took over and within a month he filed charges against the men he deemed
“scoundrels.”112 These included Valdés and four associates who were arraigned for
stealing nine and a half million pesos from the Havana customs office. Asked by a
reporter for his opinion, the usually stern Pelayo Cuervo pronounced himself “very
satisfied” that the “dignity” of Cuba’s judicial branch had been salvaged. Addressing
the customary unwillingness of government officials to pursue these cases, he said,
“the justice minister should not forget that the state is harmed above all by such
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crimes.”113 Judge Justiniani expressed fewer doubts about the process, affirming
that, “criminal lawsuits are like a sudden storm. You walk outside one day to sun
and a fresh breeze and just like that you are soaked!”114
Unfortunately, these exultations proved premature. In the early morning
hours of July 4, six masked men toting machine guns appeared at the courthouse in
Havana’s La Víbora neighborhood where the Causa 82 documents were stored.
Although Judge Justiniani had instructed the guards not to open the door for
anybody, one of them insouciantly ignored his orders and moments later he and his
companion were bound, gagged, blindfolded and had their ears plugged. Wasting no
time, the burglars forced open a cabinet and removed all 6032 relevant pages. Such
surgical efficiency was curious as the folders holding them were unmarked. Further,
not a single piece of paper pertaining to any other cases was taken. Even an
adjacent civil suit concerning a certain purveyor of frog’s legs remained
undisturbed. After stowing their precious loot in a sack, the villains fled without
further ado. Thus, rather than an unexpected tempest of justice there was only
more scandal. José Pardo Llada, who was informed right away by a police reporter,
called it “the news of the year” and rushed to the courthouse with Pelayo Cuervo in
tow.115 One of the guards, Julio Gutiérrez Santana, told his version of events to a
Bohemia correspondent. Speaking with visible uneasiness, he disclosed that he and
his partner had unlocked the door because they believed the intruders were night
patrolmen. He also confirmed that the robbery was an inside job, indicating that
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one man seemed to know exactly what they were looking for. Judge Justiniani, who
was justifiably livid, contributed his own more extensive commentary. He refused
to forgive the guards, particularly as they had been warned not to admit anyone
during strange hours, not even himself. This was because there had already been an
attempt to tamper with the evidence. Some days earlier a man impersonating
Pelayo Cuervo had tried to enter the courthouse after midnight.

Justiniani also

revealed that his phone had been ringing incessantly of late. The callers, who
universally claimed to be journalists but who were probably political operatives,
always sought information regarding the next round of indictments so they could
plan accordingly.

Exactly who they represented was a matter of feverish

speculation. Popular suspicion implicated Humberto Becerra, Grau’s close friend
and ex interior minister, who was arrested that afternoon. In custody, Becerra glibly
maintained that he and Grau were anxious to see the case go forward in order to
ascertain “who had robbed in Cuba.”116 He blamed Carlos Prío for the break-in and
maliciously wondered how “two unhappy policemen” could have been the lone
custodians of such important documents.117
The eminent lawyer and retired Democrat Carlos Manuel de la Cruz, who had
recently joined the prosecution of Causa 82, estimated that only seven people were
familiar enough with the case to know the exact folders that contained its pages.
These were Judge Justiniani, his secretary, the court clerk, Pelayo Cuervo, Justice
Minister Oscar Gans, State Prosecutor Jesús Coll and de la Cruz himself. He thus
believed someone from that group had supervised the assailants. Otherwise, the
116
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precision and speed of their operation would have been impossible. De la Cruz
suspected Coll, who had been added to the legal team just 72 hours before the
robbery. He avowed that stealing the documents was “ridiculous” since copies could
be had from the various ministries within 20 days. Conversely, he allowed that
powerful figures would aim to thwart any such effort.118 These included Antonio
Prío, who had served in the Grau era treasury ministry and was among those “most
compromised” by the case.119 For his part, Pelayo Cuervo guessed that Coll and
perhaps Gans had a hand in the burglary. Given his pro government orientation and
previous efforts to smother the case, Coll certainly possessed a compelling motive.
At any rate, Cuervo admitted he was already preparing a brief for the Supreme
Tribunal to assist in reconstructing the lawsuit. The press was also anxious to hear
from Chibás on this matter. In his statement, the ailing yet spirited Ortodoxo leader
saw an irrefutable link between the stolen documents and a meeting on July 1
between Grau and emissaries from Prío. He claimed they discussed reconciliation
so as to present a common front against the threat of legal investigations involving
both sides.
During his July 9 broadcast, Chibás, as he often did, reiterated what was
already being said in the newspapers and on the street. Unlike Carlos Manuel de la
Cruz and Pelayo Cuervo, both of whom pointed implicit fingers at the president,
Chibás opted for a more unequivocal tone. He told his audience:
Tonight, before the people of Cuba, we concretely accuse the
president of the republic, Carlos Prío Socarrás, of being the
intellectual author of the armed assault against the courthouse where
118
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the lawsuit against the embezzlement of 174 million pesos is being
processed and which was perpetrated in order to save his brother
Antonio…who was about to be indicted by Judge Justiniani…120
For good measure, he added that the Causa 82 fiasco demonstrated the government
was unworthy of foreign credit. “When we announced more than a year ago that
American bankers should not provide one cent to the Prío government,” he said,
“the president’s paid spokesmen disparaged us as slanderers and demagogues.
Once again, time has proven us right.”121 Chibás then contrasted the “corruption”
and “incapacity” of Prío’s administration with the probity of Ortodoxo congressmen,
who had recently agreed to forego their parliamentary immunity.122

At the

government’s behest, State Prosecutor Rafael Trejo sent a transcript of the radio
show to the Urgency Court and recommended that Chibás be charged with
defamation.123 Relishing the prospect of another popularity boosting row, Chibás
shunned his election certificate – which would have exempted him from being tried.
On July 16, Chibás took to the airwaves and excoriated Trejo for doing the
administration’s dirty work.

Trejo’s lack of backbone also served as a potent

allegory since his son of the same name was a revolutionary martyr who had been
murdered by Machado’s policemen in 1930. Chibás noted that:
Judge Trejo has passively watched, without pressing any charges, as
hundreds of assassinations have taken place in full public view and
hundreds of millions have been impudently robbed; the only thing he
has bothered himself with is accusing me of denouncing the thieves by
“En Cuba, Denuncia: Chibás Vuelve a Urgencia,” Bohemia, July 23, 1950: 75.
Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 678.
122 Ibid.
123 Noting that Trejo had also tried to suppress Causa 82, a Bohemia reporter noted sarcastically that,
“Lack of respect for the current government rather than repeated mockery of the law and justice
seems to be, in the opinion of Judge Trejo Loredo, the only offense punishable by his office.” See: “El
Fiscal Trejo,” Bohemia, July 23,1950: 75.
120
121

336

their first and last names and for uncovering the intellectual author of
the famous Causa 82 burglary; in brief, his indescribable behavior is
offending the memory and civic example of his son Rafael Trejo…124
Chibás also accused the government of attempting to use his delicate health against
him. Since he required a second operation and soon, any jail sentence would
essentially prove fatal. Chibás told his listeners the president hoped silence him by
effectively threatening his life.

“But Carlos Prío made a mistake,” he said

defiantly.125 Chibás not only refused to recant, he offered a detailed narrative of the
Causa 82 thefts. He alleged that Antonio Prío and Oscar Gans had directed the
operation in accordance with the president’s orders.

Moreover, he claimed

Miguelito Suárez Fernández had offered “advice” and the chief of the Bureau of
Investigations had provided “technical support.”126 Looking forward to his day in
court, Chibás chose the juridically nimble Carlos Márquez Sterling as his legal
counsel – who likened the action against his client to the false accusations against
Captain Dreyfus in France. If the administration insisted on bringing the case to
trial, a public relations disaster beckoned since both Pelayo Cuervo and Carlos
Manuel de la Cruz were eager to testify. By far, the surest indicator of government
complicity was the fact that all the initial suspects had been released and the case
was in danger of being dropped due to a lack of indictments. This situation was
mercilessly lampooned by Cuba’s cartoonists. Carlos Vidal sketched a boy asking his
father, “So, Chibás is the only one who will be prosecuted for the Causa 82 robbery,
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is that right papi?”127 Determined to avoid this eventuality, Cuervo submitted a
denunciation against Ernesto Figueras, the guard who had opened the courthouse
door and seemed curiously untroubled by the whole affair. Specifically, Cuervo
suspected him of having been planted and believed he had let the criminals in
without them bothering to knock.
Judge Justiniani did not rest either.

Citing the indictment Chibás had

submitted in June, he petitioned the Urgency Court to consider criminal charges
against Carlos Prío for raiding the Sugar Workers Retirement Fund. Since the
president could only face prosecution before Cuba’s Supreme Tribunal, the Urgency
Court was essentially deciding whether to elevate the case before their superiors.
As often happened when so much was at stake, one of the magistrates, Eugenio
González, apparently had trouble making up his mind. In a move that hardly
inspired confidence, he spent July 20 at “La Chata,” Prío’s finca, where he received
less than objective instructions and perhaps an inducement or two.

Not

surprisingly, González voted no as did his colleague Fidel Vidal. This excused the
president from the awkward and unprecedented spectacle of appearing as a
defendant before the nation’s highest court. Somewhat unexpectedly, however, the
verdict was not unanimous. Chibás hailed the dissent of Antonio Barreras as a
“glorious achievement for Cuba’s judiciary.”128 As for his own prospective date with
the Urgency Court, Chibás was disappointed to learn that Havana’s Provincial
Electoral Authority had sent his credentials to the senate and he was therefore
immune from prosecution. This by no means ended the proxy war waged by Prío
127
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against Chibás via the Urgency Courts.

During his July 30 broadcast, Chibás

contended that Carlos Prío met secretly with Fulgencio Batista at the finca of
Senator Manuel Pérez Galán – Cuba’s pineapple king.129 Prío roundly denied this
and resorted to the Urgency Court once again, which requested a waiver of the
Ortodoxo leader’s parliamentary immunity. Chibás complied with alacrity, but as his
second operation loomed this new skirmish would have to wait.

THE SECOND SURGERY
Given the failure of his operation in February, Eddy’s doctors and many of his
supporters urged him to schedule his second surgery in the United States.
Nevertheless, Chibás flatly refused, holding that if he were going to die he preferred
to do so in Cuba. Thus, on August 1, he checked into the Miramar clinic – one of
Havana’s newest and most advanced hospitals. Chibás would need a few weeks of
rest and close monitoring by his medical staff before going under the knife. Almost
immediately, he required two blood transfusions. In the early going, at least, the
Ortodoxo leader’s repose was strictly enforced and only his brother Raúl, his cousin
Roberto Agramonte and his secretary Conchita Fernández were allowed to visit.
While Chibás was indisposed, Communications Minister Sergio Clark issued
the controversial Decree 2273, guaranteeing a “right of reply” to anyone singled out
for censure during radio transmissions. This measure, which became known as the
“gag decree,” had actually been devised by Justice Minister Oscar Gans. He justified
it as a remedy for the “great number of citizens” whose “prestige” was being
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“compromised” on the island’s radio shows.130 Under the new rules, radio stations
were obligated to cede space for the injured parties so they could personally rectify
any insults directed against them. Enrique de la Osa claimed the justice minister’s
real aim was to curry favor with Carlos Prío, especially as a cabinet reshuffle was in
the offing. That Prío desired a new instrument for suppressing media criticism was
undeniable. Just before the midterm elections, he had told a crowd in the town of
Bauta that, “soon, Cuban women will no longer suffer attacks on the radio.”131 This
allusion to the feud between Chibás and Virgilio Pérez during their senate campaign
hinted at the decree’s real purpose. After being publicly accused of responsibility
for the Causa 82 robbery, Prío proved willing once again to compromise the island’s
constitution for imagined political advantages over Chibás and José Pardo Llada.
The decree almost certainly violated Article 33, which guaranteed freedom of
expression and absolutely breached Article 24, which prohibited the confiscation of
property without payment.

Perhaps worst of all, Cuba’s director of radio, a

functionary in the communications ministry, was granted the power to decide
whether a complaint merited the right of reply rather than the nation’s courts. This
contradicted Article 170, which declared that, “Justice may be administered only by
persons who permanently belong to the judiciary.”
Despite these imperfections, Gans crowed that he had extended free thought
and expression to all of Cuba’s five million inhabitants. He further declared that, “To
deny a citizen the right to defend himself against distorted claims would be a
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manifestation of ambitious totalitarianism.”132 In a swift response, the Ortodoxo
radio host Guido García Inclán stated,
The five million citizens Gans refers to have no need to protect
themselves from radio attacks but rather against the government
itself. Isn’t it true that hospitals lack thousands of beds and many
poor people die due to a scarcity of medical assistance? Isn’t money
robbed from the people in order to build luxurious apartment
buildings? Does the farmer feel secure in his land and does he have
access to roads so he can sell his products? These things that are
denounced on the radio constitute an effective defense of the citizens
against the government’s outrages.133
Goar Mestre, the director of Circuito CMQ, concurred; affirming that radio campaigns
generally defended the “great masses” against the “egoism, ambition and venality of
our politicians.”134

Alejo Cossío del Pino, who owned Radio Cadena Habana,

asserted that men who had illegally enriched themselves wished to avoid the
embarrassment of being called thieves. In fact, the decree was reviled among
reporters of all political stripes and every independent press organization. More to
the point, Cubans already exercised the right to defend themselves against all
manner of accusations – doing so vigorously in the many polemics conducted via
radio, magazines and newspapers. The government’s objective, gussied up in fancy
garb, was to intrude on the broadcasts of Chibás, Pardo Llada or any other
opponents.
Although he was ostensibly out of commission, the Ortodoxo leader was
planning a surprise – which he hinted at during a visit by Carlos Márquez Sterling.
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Chibás swore he would return to the radio “very soon” and indeed, on August 13, he
escaped from the hospital and broadcast an open letter to the president.135 While
journalists made much of his flair for the dramatic, Chibás was also convinced he
could die in surgery and felt the need to condemn Prío’s “gravest” error.136 His
strong voice belying a faltering body, he pointed out that Cubans had no reason to
expect anything constructive from an “evil machadista” like Oscar Gans.137 Chibás
also mentioned that Goar Mestre offered the government a 30 minute time slot on
CMQ immediately after his show in order to rebut any prospective inaccuracies but
it had refused, insisting instead on replying, if need be, during his own half hour.
“This,” he said, “demonstrates the hypocrisy of Decree 2273, which the people, with
their formidable intuition, have baptized the gag decree from the first moment.”138
Chibás further noted that the president had all of Cuba’s media at his disposal while
he possessed only a single show. “And this half hour, once a week, on one radio
station floor,” he declared, with rising indignation, “you want to take from me with
tricks, using my illness to your advantage.”139 Lastly, Chibás reminded Prío of their
time as delegates to the constituent assembly in 1940, where they had advocated
the creation of Article 40. This nullified any provisions by the government or courts
impinging upon constitutional guarantees and condoned “adequate resistance”
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against them.

Thus, he concluded, “Whenever you attempt to violate public

liberties, you will have to confront me, your incorruptible adversary.”140
As if to demonstrate the needlessness of Decree 2273, Antonio Prío
fulminated on Unión Radio later that night against José Pardo Llada, Carlos Márquez
Sterling and Goar Mestre. Further, Humberto Medrano, the editor of Prensa Libre’s
evening edition, responded in print to an offensive remark by Chibás. This included
an invitation to duel once the Ortodoxo chief recovered from his surgery. As the
insulted party, Medrano had the right to choose the weapon – a fact that caused
panic among Eddy’s friends since the Prensa Libre editor was a champion
marksman. Nonetheless, Chibás told his seconds, Luis Orlando Rodríguez and Pardo
Llada, to accept whatever terms were proposed. As a result, both men withdrew
saying they refused to “lead Chibás to the slaughterhouse.”141 Impervious to all
pleas, Chibás named new seconds, who were relieved when Medrano’s
representatives opted for sabers. Having settled this matter, Chibás finally gave the
go-ahead to his medical staff. On August 17, Dr. Antonio Rodríguez Díaz sutured the
hernia and signs of success abounded almost immediately. Chibás began gaining
weight within days. On August 26, for his 43rd birthday, the doctors allowed him to
eat steak fillet and roast chicken. In a show that political disagreements did not
always constitute grudge matches, Commerce Minister José Andreu was among
those who visited Chibás in the hospital. Miguelito Suárez Fernández also inquired
about the Ortodoxo leader’s health.
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On the afternoon of September 1, Chibás checked out of the Miramar clinic
with a provisionally clean bill of health. Amenable at last to his doctors’ orders, he
agreed to depart for a recuperative vacation in Canada and the United States that
evening. Before setting off, however, he supervised an Ortodoxo meeting in the
house of Manuel Bisbé. While Chibás had been convalescing, the administration had
ventured into dubious legal territory once again by arbitrarily closing the
Communist daily Hoy. Instead of seeking a court order or legislative approval, the
government favored a ministerial resolution. Unfortunately, Labor Minister José
Morell Romero, whose signature would have been required, expressed serious
qualms about its legitimacy. Tony Varona thus proposed that Morell Romero feign
illness so he could temporarily assume control of the labor ministry and shut down
the newspaper. The prime minister warned cabinet members that, “The next loan
we will be requesting, which we need so badly and will guarantee us victory in
1952, depends on what we do now against the Communists.”142 Minister without
portfolio Ramón Vasconcelos, who had attended the meeting and vehemently
opposed the prime minister’s reasoning, subsequently resigned in protest. Speaking
to reporters, he pointed out that even the United States government, which
currently was at war with communist North Korea, did not restrict publication of
The Daily Worker. Chibás, whose thinning locks had grown noticeably grayer since
enduring two surgeries over seven months, informed the assembled Ortodoxos he
feared the government was “on the road to dictatorship” but remained confident the
“En Cuba, Clausura: El Periódico “Hoy” y el Artículo 33,” Bohemia, September 3, 1950: 78. Senator
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party would thrive during his absence.143 He added that the Ortodoxos were the
only party with the moral standing to criticize the closing of Hoy, which he termed
“unjustifiable” and a “flagrant aggression,” because they had never cut any deals
with the Communists.144
Even as the Ortodoxos in attendance were grateful to see Chibás, many
disagreed with him and were not shy about saying so. The newly elected Havana
city councilman Herminio Portell Vilá spoke first, asserting that Hoy was not really a
Cuban newspaper like Diario de la Marina or Alerta but rather an “organ of
Moscow.”145 As evidence, he pointed out that Hoy reproduced the same articles that
ran in Communist dailies from throughout the world. Portell Vilá also challenged
the official Ortodoxo posture that the attack against Hoy endangered political
freedom, believing the government was focused solely on the Communist threat.
The onetime Communist José Chelala Aguilera agreed, saying he knew better than
anyone that Cuban Marxists were “puppets of Moscow.”146 Gerardo Vázquez, the
recently elected congressman from Camagüey, urged the party to outflank the
administration by demanding an outright ban of the Communist party. On the other
hand, Joaquín López Montes, the Ortodoxo delegate to the Supreme Electoral
Tribunal, explained that seizing Hoy’s offices without compensation contravened
Cuba’s constitution.

Then, abandoning his legal emphasis for a moment, he
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declared, “Closing a newspaper means closing an idea and we cannot fully develop
our democracy without allowing opposing views.”147 Beto Saumell and Luis Orlando
Rodríguez concurred; with the latter claiming Ortodoxos were above all, “militants of
democracy.”148 By 6 p.m., time was running short as Chibás would soon have to
catch his flight. In his closing appeal, Chibás referred to a New York Times editorial
which argued that banning Communism in the United States would betray the
principles of freedom espoused by its Founding Fathers. When the vote was taken, a
majority supported his position.

He thus boarded the plane with an air of

contentment.
As Chibás was whisked northwards, a Bohemia reporter conducted an odd
sort of interview with Diego Vicente Tejera, the inevitably quotable Auténtico party
boss of Matanzas and his lieutenant Sergio Megías. Having been granted permission
to sit in the back of Tejera’s Cadillac and discuss politics with the two bigwigs, the
journalist was treated to numerous intriguing snippets.

Regarding the 1952

presidential race, Tejera averred that the only Auténtico candidate capable of being
elected “without difficulty” was the ostensibly retired Pepe San Martín.149 If Prío
chose someone else, which was likely, he stated the party would merely “utilize
certain procedures” to ensure victory.150 Asked what he meant by this phrase,
Tejera frankly replied, “It’s foolish to think we will hand over power the way Batista
did in 1944.”
Ibid.
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“And what about the popular will?” inquired his interlocutor.
“What popular will?” responded Tejera with obvious contempt. Motioning to
the sidewalk, he said, “Do you think we will permit that man, for example, who is
waiting for the bus to decide our future? Don’t even think about it!” In this vein, he
confirmed that, “Life in Cuba is becoming increasingly difficult. For me, the voter
who seeks to resolve his personal problems on election day is more valuable than
the one depositing a ballot influenced by hysteria on the radio.” Tejera concluded
that, “We will follow the lead of Mexico, where the government party always wins
even as it takes some work to obtain votes from the opposition.”151

IN NORTH AMERICA
Eddy’s doctors had prescribed a vacation abroad with the idea that he would
avoid the strains of Cuban politics. However, during the course of his journey,
Chibás was never far removed from the island’s hustle and bustle. For one thing, he
remained well informed though constant telephone contact with Conchita
Fernández. During one call in late September, she conveyed that MSR gangsters had
murdered Tulio Paniagua Recalt – a treasury ministry official and confidant of
Miguelito Suárez Fernández.152 He subsequently denounced the killing during a

Ibid.
Suárez Fernández charged the government with responsibility for Paniagua’s death and resigned
his post as senate president in protest. In Cuba’s upper house, Suárez Fernández read a public
statement claiming he had been warned that he, his family and his friends had been targeted for
assassination. Of course, his longstanding ties to UIR deprived him of any moral high ground. Gang
violence, after all, was one of many ways in which Auténticos settled their internal squabbles. During
the same session, Pelayo Cuervo struck while the iron was hot and shared his own gangster story. He
related that gunmen had approached Judge Antonio Vignier and offered their services against him
and another accuser in the Causa 82 case. When Cuervo found out, he demanded that Vignier
denounce the ruffians to the police, otherwise, he would do so himself before the Supreme Tribunal.
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wide ranging press conference. As part of his talk, Chibás invited the popular
Communist radio commentator Salvador García Agüero to join the Ortodoxos and
promised to nationalize the Cuban Electric Company and Cuban Telephone
Company if elected president. Chibás was also more than happy to discuss politics
with reporters from New York’s Spanish language daily, La Prensa. For every bit of
tourism he indulged in, including visits to the Empire State Building observatory
and Bronx Zoo, there were politically oriented excursions to places like the United
Nations or NBC studios in Rockefeller Center, where Chibás recorded a message for
his compatriots. Even his modest room in the Hotel Edison near Times Square was
no sanctuary. Once Cuban expatriates learned of his whereabouts, he was besieged
by would-be callers. On October 10, Chibás addressed the Cuban Athenaeum of New
York and lambasted the Prío administration before a packed house. Further, Chibás
eagerly contributed to a Bohemia survey regarding the views of Cuban politicians on
the second anniversary of Prío’s inauguration. Swollen with ire over Decree 2273
and convinced that Prío had dishonorably exploited of his infirmity, the Ortodoxo
leader was decidedly ungenerous in his assessment. Chibás affirmed that Prío’s
government “could not have been more negative for the republic.”153 The man who
usually exalted his country and told reporters he preferred the Caribbean vista of
his bedroom window to the panorama from New York’s tallest building then cast
Cuba as a land of gangsters, nepotism, rural misery, urban decay, red-baiting
Eventually, Cuervo submitted his evidence to the Bureau of Investigations and no action was taken.
He concluded that, “Since then, I am among those who doubt the efficiency of this Bureau, especially
when the government intends to cover up a crime.” See “En Cuba, Senado, ‘Mientras el Gangsterismo
Siga Protegido por el Gobierno,” Bohemia, October 8, 1950: 75.
153 “Opinan Sobre los 2 Años del Gobierno del Doctor Carlos Prío Socarrás,” Bohemia, October 15,
1950: 87.
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hysteria and untrammeled venality. Further, Chibás used his commentary as a
vehicle to mock the president’s long awaited cabinet reshuffle. He observed that the
“prelude” to these changes, which included replacement of the widely disliked Tony
Varona as prime minister, were the gag decree and “hypocritical attacks” against the
press.154 Fellow Ortodoxo Jorge Mañach was asked to comment as well and he
furnished a more nuanced analysis.

Among other things, he praised Prío for

wriggling free of the men who made him president – namely Grau, Guillermo Alonso
Pujol and José Manuel Alemán. In addition, Mañach lauded him for dismissing the
crooked army chief Genovevo Pérez Dámera and purging the education ministry of
thieves. The national bank, Tribunal of Guarantees and new University of Oriente
were also tangible achievements. Mañach, who Chibás had designated as his future
culture minister, qualified these positives by confirming that many of Cuba’s “great
necessities” remained unsatisfied and lamenting the “tone” of its political life.155
Despite Eddy’s frenetic schedule and inability to absent himself, even
fleetingly, from Cuban politics, his condition swiftly improved. When Chibás left
Cuba, he weighed a mere 119 pounds. By the first week of October, he had reached
143 and seemed finally to fill his clothing. Chibás had planned to return on October
14 but extended his stay so he could pass through Washington, D.C., where he had
lived with his father in 1932 and Tampa, home to a substantial émigré community.
In the latter city, Chibás paid homage to an elderly matriarch who possessed two
quasi sacred artifacts. These were a gold ring bestowed by José Martí and a revolver
that had once belonged to Máximo Gómez, the chief general of Cuba’s liberation
154
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army. The woman was so moved by Chibás that she offered to make a present of
them but he demurred, requesting only to borrow the ring. Thereafter, he told a
gathering of more than 5000 people in the local baseball stadium that he would
keep it if he continued to pursue the work of Martí. “But if I frustrate the longings of
my people,” he said, “if I am unfaithful to revolutionary ideals, please señora do not
send Martí’s ring, send instead Gómez’s revolver so I may castigate the brain that
has betrayed my heart.”156 As in Cuba, the multitude fervidly hugged and touched
him as he exited – many with tears welling up in their eyes.

EXPANSION
Chibás arrived in Havana on October 28, allowing him sufficient time to
prepare for his Sunday radio broadcast the next day. After a year in which he had
rejected a deal with the Liberals and shunted aside Nicolás Castellanos, the Ortodoxo
leader attempted to present a more inclusive message. He declared that:
The Cuban Peoples’ Party is not a closed sect that cultivates hate,
vengeance and grudges but rather a party of open doors. No decent,
honorable and honest Cubans – be they Liberal, Democrat or
Auténtico – will find among us a single voice of censure. This is a place
for those who aspire to consolidate the republic and to eradicate
crime, thievery and vice.157
Later on in his speech, Chibás took this idea a measured step further, announcing
that:
The Ortodoxos do not discriminate against anyone willing to serve the
nation and lose their life for it if necessary, even if they have
previously committed political errors involving tactics or strategy.
156
157
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Proof of this can be found within our ranks, where those who once
marched under different banners and who, on occasion, were our
bitterest opponents now work together…The only ones who have no
place in the Cuban Peoples’ Party are those who have mocked the
people’s trust, unseemly politicians, thieves of all epochs and people
who only pretend to believe in democracy.158
After the show, Chibás headlined a rally in Parque Central where he addressed
masses of broom wielding supporters. He reiterated that Ortodoxos welcomed all
Cubans with clean hands and concluded by reprising a version of the ritual he had
debuted in Tampa. In a deliberate swipe at the last three Cuban presidents, Chibás
swore before the statue of José Martí that after being elected in 1952 and serving his
term he would possess no more gold than the ring he had been entrusted with in
Florida.
On November 9, Chibás arrived at the house of Roberto Agramonte – where
he presided over his first Ortodoxo meeting since returning.

The agenda was

particularly important as Pelayo Cuervo, José Manuel Gutiérrez, Agustín Cruz,
Federico Fernández Casas and Carlos Márquez Sterling had recently asked to join
the party. Eddy’s rhetoric had almost certainly been a factor in their decision and he
argued strenuously for their acceptance. He related that other politicians had
expressed a willingness to sign up as well; suggesting the party’s softer tone could
broaden its appeal.159 First, however, some men who had once been considered
traitors would have to be readmitted into the fold. Chibás himself had feuded quite
Ibid.
The personal popularity of Chibás also acted as a magnet and was not lost on the island’s
politicians. He claimed that a recent public survey commissioned by Carlos Prío had showed him
winning 41 percent of voters. Whether this was the case or not, some political leaders, notably
Eduardo Suárez Rivas of the Liberals, sensed that Chibás represented the future and kept their lines
of communication open with him.
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acrimoniously in the past with Cuervo, Gutiérrez and Fernández Casas but now
claimed he was beyond grudges or pettiness. He also pointed out that none of the
five applicants had stained their reputations with blood or stolen money. Lastly,
Chibás sold the advantages of having three Ortodoxo senators rather than one.
Above all, he emphasized that, “we just affirmed that (our) doors are wide open to
Cubans of good will so how can we reject them?”160 The most obvious reason to do
so was that each had a fondness for pacts but so did the party’s vice president, Millo
Ochoa. In the end, this did not prove to be an obstacle. José Chelala Aguilera
proposed they sign a declaration recognizing the independent line but was waved
away. Several expressed reservations about Federico Fernández Casas, who they
considered ethically suspect, but the vast majority agreed with Chibás and the final
vote was unanimous. In fact, the combination of Chibás’ restored health and the
prospect of adding five political heavyweights inspired a feeling of giddiness among
the attendees, one of whom blurted out that, “We ought to win the presidency
because we are going to save everyone!”161
Similar emotions bubbled over after Raúl Gutiérrez conducted his latest
opinion poll. The results, which fittingly arrived on Christmas Eve, were greeted
with euphoria by Ortodoxos as they contained all manner of encouraging news.
Asked to rate Carlos Prío’s administration, only 17.97 percent of Cubans nationwide
volunteered that it was “good.” By contrast, 34.50 percent answered “bad” and

“En Cuba, Política: ‘Yo no Transijo Cuando se Trata de Principios,’” Bohemia, November 19, 1950:
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37.09 percent said “average.”162 Questioned which electoral block they preferred in
general terms, an astounding 58.63 percent chose the opposition against 31.40 for
the government. In part, this reflected disillusion among Auténticos, 36.70 percent
of whom were willing to vote against their party. Regarding those who planned to
run against the government in 1952, Chibás was easily the most popular contender
– more than 19 points ahead of Fulgencio Batista.163 Further, Chibás retained the
crossover appeal that proved decisive in his election to the senate. For example,
25.34 percent of Auténticos backed him as did 24.24 percent of Democrats, 30.72
percent of Republicans and 25.52 percent of Liberals.164

Raúl Gutiérrez, “Survey Nacional: Oriente, Camagüey, Las Villas y Toda la Isla, Opinan Sobre el
Gobierno y Los Posibles Presidentes,” Bohemia, December 24, 1950, 74.
163 Ibid., 77. Nicolás Castellanos, who was already touting his presidential candidacy with full page
ads in newspapers and magazines, finished fourth – with only 2.47 percent.
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Chapter 9
“Time Will Prove Me Right Once Again”

The year 1951 arrived in tandem with an intermittent cold spell, which sent
Havana residents scurrying for their warmest clothing. In Diario de la Marina, the
inclement weather was a regular theme for cartoonists – one of whom, with equal
parts facetiousness and despair, dubbed Cuba the “Alaska of the Caribbean.”1 Even
so, the plummeting temperatures did not distract Chibás’ core of fanatical followers
from their two obsessions – bringing administrative honesty and decency to Cuba
and worrying whether the man who embodied these ideals enjoyed sound good
health. In this vein, on January 4, Manuel Padial Vidal of Santiago de Cuba’s humble
Mariana de la Torre neighborhood, wrote Chibás to inform his “esteemed friend”
that he had been “very worried” during the months when Eddy had been sick,
especially as he was “the only hope of the Cuban people,” and if he had died the
country would have been left in the hands of “this dog Carlos Prío.” In addition to
asking God and Don Bosco2 to preserve Chibás’ well being, Padial Vidal relates that
he recently visited his uncle’s farm in the mountains and told the local guajiros of
the “benefits that you represent for Cuba, or that is, for us Cubans for a government
to arrive composed of a single party without shady deals or coalitions.”3 In contrast
to this handwritten letter’s lined paper, looping script, mangled grammar and easy
José Roseñada, “En la Alaska del Caribe.” Diario de la Marina, February 4, 1951: 46.
Giovanni Bosco (1816-1888), an Italian priest and pedagogue, was canonized in 1934 by Pope Pius
XI.
3 Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás: Legajo 38, Número 1135: 53-54, ANC.
1
2
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informality was a missive directed to Chibás on January 5, by Manuel Belver, an
accountant and erstwhile PRC “militant” from Havana’s working-class Guadalupe
neighborhood who meant to join the Ortodoxos.

Belver’s correspondence was

meticulously proper in every respect, right up to the rubber-stamping of his name at
the bottom of the page. Just the same, his sentiments were typical – if perhaps a bit
more nuanced. He confessed his belief that Chibás was the only member of the
party capable of implementing its program and declared that while many Ortodoxos
were honorable, Chibás was unique in his “integrity of character” and “revolutionary
conscience.”4
Despite the incessant worry of supporters, Chibás remained a picture of
vigor. After welcoming the new year with a dinner at the Havana Country Club, 5
Chibás picked up where he left off during the final months of 1950 by launching
barrages against two of his bitterest opponents, Fulgencio Batista and Carlos Prío.
Hence, on the morning of Friday, January 5, Chibás submitted a formal accusation
against the former before a judge at the Tribunal of Justice. The initial rather
breathless press reports suggested that Batista was being charged with embezzling
money from the Sugar Workers Retirement Fund. The chronically truant senator
replied with calculated indignation, stating the accusation was, “so absurd and
perverse, that public opinion, if it hasn’t realized before, should now be convinced
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that a serious presidential candidate can’t be someone, like Mr. Chibás, who has
become a [public] figure based on mendacities, calumnies and injuries.”6
The next day, Chibás clarified the situation, claiming he had never accused
the “ex military dictator”7 of robbing the Sugar Workers Retirement Fund. Instead,
he asserted that Batista had pilfered millions of pesos earmarked for medicines,
school lunches, the military retirement fund and neighborhood roads during his
administration (1940-1944) and had therefore “speculated with the hunger and
misery of workers and peasants.”8 For proof, Cubans need look no further than the
fact that Batista had been a mere sergeant in 1933 with a 30 peso per month salary.
Given these circumstances, Chibás asked, what explanation aside from corruption
could explain his immense wealth? As one of a handful of men in Cuba who had
become visibly less affluent (although he was far from poor) through the practice of
politics, Chibás was all but invincible on this issue. Nonetheless, Batista did not shy
from the fight. “For Chibás, lying is as natural as breathing,” he proclaimed. 9 Going
forward, he dismissed the notion, repeatedly propagated by Chibás, that he owned
luxury properties in numerous countries – allowing only for “a modest house” in
Daytona Beach, Florida, which was actually for sale.10 In any case, Chibás’ attempt
to conflate Batista’s dishonest administration with working-class and rural misery
was a clear gambit to weaken his rival’s still considerable appeal among Cuba’s
urban laborers and peasants.

Some members in both groups undoubtedly

“Absurdo lo que dice E. Chibás del R. Azucarero,” Diario de la Marina January 9, 1951: 6. See also,
Fernán Villalva, “Radiografías,” Carteles, January 28, 1951: 26.
7 Virgilio Ferrer Gutiérrez, “Nuestra política es así.” Carteles January 21, 1951: 102.
8 Ibid.
9 Fernán Villalva, “Radiografías,” Carteles, January 28, 1951: 26.
10 Ibid.
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remembered Batista’s stint as military chief and behind the scenes ruler (19341940) with fondness. Many workers, for instance, surely associated him with his
decision to allow the founding of the Cuban Workers Confederation in 1939. As for
country-dwellers, plenty recalled the government-underwritten leases for small
sugar farmers promulgated in 1937 along with the civic-military schools established
beginning in 1936.11
In addition to relying on his singular talent for public accusation, the effort to
diminish Batista was also taken up Carlos Márquez Sterling. In his weekly Bohemia
column, he alleged that Batista represented, “revenge, resentment, persecution and
return to a past best left to rest at the bottom of history.” 12 Márquez Sterling also
argued that Batista had far more ambition than popular support. In this way, he was
the opposite of another military figure cum president, José Miguel Gómez (19091913), who, on a sunny day in 1920, spent seven hours on his balcony in Old Havana
waving his arms as hundreds of thousands of men and women passed by in a show
of delirious support – all this despite the fact that he no longer aspired to public
office. The crowd was perhaps mistaken to advocate the return of the corrupt
general, known affectionately as the “shark that bathes but also splashes,” but at
least their will was unmistakable.13 Márquez Sterling added that the populace now

Robert Whitney, State and Revolution in Cuba, 160 and 132-133.
Carlos Marquez Sterling, “La emoción del candidato en el pueblo de Cuba,” Bohemia January 7,
1951: 29.
13 Charles E. Chapman, A History of the Cuban Republic: A Study in Hispanic American Politics (New
York: Macmillan, 1927), 297-316. Chapman estimates that Gómez stole $8 million during his
administration. At the same time, the “shark” also ensured that those surrounding him benefited. In
this sense, his friends were “splashed.” See also, Hugh Thomas. Cuba, the Pursuit of Freedom. (New
York: Harper & Row, 1971), 504-505. Specifically, he notes that Gómez “ended his presidency a
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clamors for Chibás because, after years of being defrauded, Cubans desire a leader
who will never steal or embezzle.14 Lastly, he ventured an apology of sorts for
Chibás, explaining that the “necessity to castigate and condemn” is a function of
widespread fraud and thievery in Cuba and that, when and if such qualities are
eradicated from public life, the island’s politicians will be free to argue over
“construction and progress.”15
A week later, an interview with the Havana city councilman Herminio Portell
Vilá provided a small but useful fillip for Chibás’ latest accusation. Asked about the
“political panorama,” he characterized the ex general in the following terms:
Just imagine Batista, the millionaire at the expense of the public
treasury who doesn’t visit the Capitolio nor does he occupy his senate
seat, but nonetheless collects his salary. This absent legislator, who
doesn’t dare show his face so as to remind everyone in the chamber of
his guilt, governed the country for 11 years without authority or
ability. He did and undid at his whim…What can we hope for from
him?16
While Ortodoxo heavyweights continued to jab at Batista, Chibás latched onto an
enticing new target – the so-called “one-percent” decree, a controversial and
unpopular deduction from the salaries of the nation’s sugar workers (even those
who were unaffiliated) meant to fill union coffers. This recent concession had been
“snatched” from the Prío administration by Eusebio Mujal, the burly labor leader
and Auténtico senator who was all but certain to raid the funds to strengthen his

tolerated.” Thomas also points out that, “The word summing up the Gómez years was chivo, a goat;
but since it is slang for ‘crumbs,’ its colloquial usage is graft.”
14 Carlos Marquez Sterling, “La emoción del candidato,” 121.
15 Ibid, 212.
16 “en Cuba, Entrevistas,” Bohemia, January 14, 1951: 59.
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own position and that of the party17 The resulting furor was such that a Bohemia
correspondent compared the measure word for word to one enacted by Mussolini in
1926 and claimed, tongue firmly in cheek, that “If it were possible to raise oneself on
a pedestal of accusations, there is no doubt Eusebio Mujal…would acquire the
proportions of a statue.”18 Bohemia’s disapproval was part of a larger frenzy of
criticism that also encompassed Diario de la Marina, El Mundo and Alerta. Political
chieftains of all stripes added denunciations as well, including Liberal party head
Eduardo Suárez Rivas and Guillermo Alonso Pujol.
For Chibás, the “one-percent” exemplified nearly everything he found
distasteful in Cuban politics. The deal between Prío and Mujal smacked not only of
unconstitutionality but also of cronyism, corruption and contempt for the island’s
multitude of sugar workers who, in effect, were now to be officially pick-pocketed at
the president’s behest.

This situation, which aroused the Ortodoxo chief’s

considerable outrage, also presented an ideal opportunity to make inroads among
rural voters – a constituency that had sometimes eluded Chibás, often but not
always because of vote buying. Most recently, during his 1950 campaign for the
senate Chibás proved far more popular among urban dwellers than residents of the
countryside. One reason for this was suggested by a PPC partisan named José
Hernández Oliva of Meneses, a village in Camagüey province so obscure, it doesn’t
appear on most Cuban maps.19 He asserted that many campesinos, when asked
“en Cuba, Trabajo,” Bohemia, January 14, 1951: 61.
Ibid.
19 For example, Meneses does not appear on the modern, 25 x 36 inch map of Cuba published by
Editiones GEO and sold in the Aeropuerto Internacional José Martí in Havana. The website
http://www.fallingrain.com/world/CU/5/Meneses.html estimates the current population of
Meneses to be 6414 within a radius of seven kilometers.
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about the Ortodoxo leader, typically reply, “Chibás! He’s very honorable, yes, but he
has never done anything in our favor, nor for anyone…he does nothing more than
talk, he hasn’t introduced any law that would support us against evictions nor does
he say what his platform is, none of that.”20 Such a view prevailed, according to
Hernández Oliva, because farmers were less familiar with Chibás than their urban
compatriots. The scarcity of media outlets in the island’s more isolated corners
meant that they were often unaware of the Ortodoxo leader’s efforts on their behalf.
Given the national attention being paid to the “one-percent” and its universal effect
on the nation’s peasants, Chibás undoubtedly aimed to captivate this group and
imprint a grand gesture on their collective memory.
During his first radio broadcast of 1951, on Sunday evening, January 7,
Chibás addressed a “veritable harangue” to Cuba’s sugar workers – urging them to
mobilize against a measure he deemed, “unconstitutional, totalitarian and fascist.”21
He began each paragraph with the same intonation: Trabajador azucarero, sugar
worker. False union leaders were betraying them. Their one-percent contribution
would fall into the hands of the dishonest politicians that impeded the investigation
into the embezzlement of the Sugar Workers’ Retirement Fund. “Write immediately
to your boss, let him know that you won’t accept any reduction in your salary in
order to pay the arbitrarily imposed union dues.

You will be backed by the

Constitution and the law!”22 Ironically, listeners tuning into to CMQ that evening
had been given no inkling that Chibás would focus on the issue. The advertisements
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preceding the show in Diario de la Marina, for example, mentioned only that Chibás
would present Pelayo Cuervo Navarro, Federico Fernández Casas, José Manuel
Gutiérrez and Agustín Cruz in order to make public their re-incorporation into the
PPC.23

Nevertheless, Chibás’ condemnation of the “one-percent,” which went

beyond those of all other politicians and publications,24 was warmly received by the
nation’s sugar workers.
In the days and weeks that followed, he received a torrent of mail from
grateful peasants.

Some, like Juan Marín of Central Hormiguero en Las Villas

province, were local Ortodoxos and union members who feared the “one-percent”
was a government ploy to dispossess their “purely Ortodoxo” sugar workers
unions.25 Many more, like José Fernández Carranza of Central Zaza in Las Villas
province26 or Luis Gamez of Finca Aranguito in Havana province27 were indignant
over the prospective reduction in their salaries by an untrustworthy and crooked
administration. For men such as these, who wrote by hand on notebook paper, who
spelled and misspelled words the way they were pronounced,28 to whom the price
The advertisement, which appeared during the week of January 2-7, 1951 in Diario de la Marina
proclaimed: “EDUARDO R. CHIBAS Hablará hoy domingo a las ocho de la noche por la hora del
PARTIDO DEL PUEBLO CUBANO para presentar ante los micrófonos del Circuito CMQ a los
fundadores de la Ortodoxia que esta noche harán pública su reincorporación al PARTIDO DEL
PUEBLO CUBANO, los señores Pelayo Cuervo Navarro, Federico Fernández Casas, José Manuel
Gutiérrez, Augustín Cruz.” (Eduardo R. Chibás will speak tonight, Sunday, at 8 p.m. during the hour of
the Partido del Pueblo Cubano in order to present before the microphones of the CMQ radio station
the founders of the Ortodoxo party who tonight will make public their reincorporation into the
Partido del Pueblo Cubano, Messrs. Pelayo Cuervo Navarro, Federico Fernández Casas, José Manuel
Gutiérrez and Agustín Cruz).
24 “en Cuba, Trabajo,” Bohemia, January 14, 1951: 63. The author of this section, with understated
delicacy, wrote that Chibás, “did not limit himself to offering opinions that were more or less
conventional.”
25 Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 38, Número 1135, p. 99, ANC.
26 Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 38, Número 1136, p. 64, ANC.
27 Ibid., 157-158.
28 To present but one example, the all purpose verb “hacer,” meaning to make or to do, was nearly
always spelled “acer” by Cuban peasants because the letter h in Spanish is silent.
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of a stamp was far from negligible, Chibás seemed something more than the rare,
honest politician. How else could the lines of sugar workers forming each Sunday
evening on plantations throughout the island, each hoping to inch a bit closer to the
voice emanating from the radio set, be explained?

MANHATTAN SKYSCRAPERS
The period between December 24 and January 6 was traditionally a dead
spell of sorts in Cuba. The thoughts of Havana’s middle class temporarily drifted
from more serious matters toward seasonal culinary delights or the circus, with its
elephants, dwarves, lion tamers and alluring equestriennes performing in the
Palacio de los Deportes. The Bohemia columnist Néstor Piñango opined that the
season, ushered in with roasted pork on Christmas Eve and ending with the clank of
toys received on the day of the Three Wise Men, was best withstood by “enjoying it –
if possible – or just letting the days pass.”29 Chibás, a restless workaholic with few
interests outside politics and no family of his own, showed little inclination for such
customs. The Carteles columnist Virgilio Ferrer Gutiérrez, with blithe sarcasm and a
dollop of truth, describes a nation contentedly indulging in Christmastime delicacies
ranging from cassava with sour garlic sauce and oven cooked turkey to succulent
congri and hazelnuts. In the midst of such bliss, among the gifts left under the bed
by the Three Wise Men, next to the mended shoes, were the “frightful” declarations
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of Chibás (and Batista) that suddenly and unexpectedly jolted Cubans back into
reality when they opened their newspapers on Saturday, January 6.30
After weighing in against the “one-percent” the following evening, Chibás
turned his attention to Carlos Prío. Health Minister Juan Antonio Rubio Padilla
provided him with a perfect pretext in the form of an unflattering Bohemia article.31
Among other things, he claimed the Ortodoxo party had been rendered irrelevant by
the achievements of Prío’s administration, notably the Tribunal of Accounts and the
Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank. The Minister of Health also harked
back to the days when he, Prío and Chibás were members of the Student Directorate
in 1931. During that era, he recalled the need to “interrupt” his friendship with
Chibás in order to accuse him of, “grave misdeeds against the ideology and
discipline of the organization” – a charge that allegedly led to the future Ortodoxo
leader’s expulsion.32
The following week, Chibás noted that Rubio Padilla’s life had long been
marked by hypocrisy, beginning with the fact that he had never taken up arms
against Machado but nonetheless participated in looting the homes of pro-Machado
figures after the dictator had been toppled. Chibás further pointed out that he had
never been expelled from the Student Directorate. On the contrary, Rubio Padilla
had asked for and obtained the dismissal of another member, Pío Álvarez, who
Chibás described as, “the most pure, valiant, loyal and audacious revolutionary of all
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time.”33 This action had so upset Chibás that he and another member, Reynaldo
Jordan, had resigned in protest.

Returning to the theme of hypocrisy, Chibás

reproduced an excerpt of an article by Rubio Padilla that had appeared in Bohemia
on October 23, 1949, before he had joined the cabinet, in which future minister
harshly criticized the very administration he now praised. Chibás’ primary goal,
however, was not to parry the barbs of a minor Prío lieutenant34 but rather to
spearhead a new campaign against the president himself.
The crux of the issue involved the government’s decision, on December 21,
1950, to secure a second public loan of 25 million pesos,35 coupled with the fact that
the pro-government majority in the senate voted down a motion to investigate
possible embezzlement of funds from the Sugar Workers Retirement Fund.
Moreover, as the recently re-incorporated Ortodoxo senator Federico Fernández
Casas explained, the loan had been concluded while the Supreme Tribunal was still
considering whether the law authorizing it was constitutional.36 To Chibás and the
Ortodoxo hierarchy, the strategy of their rivals seemed not only transparent but also
timeworn. Prío’s new loan would be used to cover up peculation of the Sugar
Workers Retirement Fund just as the $200 million the administration borrowed in
1949 had mitigated the “deficit” left by Grau. Lastly, an article that appeared in the
Eduardo R. Chibás, “Respuesta a un reto del gobierno,” Bohemia, January 14, 1951: 56.
Perhaps the most damaging criticism of Rubio Padilla came not from Chibás but from a tubercular
resident of Camagüey named Carlos Santalo. In a letter to Chibás, dated January 10, 1951, he asked,
“How is it possible that the Minister of Health employs his time in defending the Honorable President
of the Republic, who is a Doctor of Law and capable of defending himself and not employing it in
trying to resolve the problem of those suffering from tuberculosis in his country?” The fact that
Santalo makes no mention of belonging to or supporting the Ortodoxo party gives his complaint
added credibility. Archivo Nacional de Cuba, Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás: Legajo 38, Número 1135, 4.
35 Cuba’s currency had been the U.S. dollar until its National Bank was created in 1948. Afterward,
the value of the Cuban peso was equivalent to one U.S. dollar.
36 “en Cuba, Política,” Bohemia, January 7, 1951: 64.
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November 12, 1950 real estate section of the Sunday New York Times provided just
the right kindling for Chibás’ imagination.

This piece reported that “Havana

interests” had been purchasing choice Manhattan properties; the latest of these
being the 25-story Heckscher Building on the southwest corner of Fifth Avenue and
57th Street, whose value was estimated at $5 million. In a tantalizing twist, the
buyer’s identity was not revealed. The only certainty was that, “Cuban plantation
money” was involved.37 On January 7, Bohemia brought this irresistible story to the
attention of its readers, running a suggestive piece called “Cuban Millionaires Make
Mysterious Investments in New York Properties.”38 Aside from reprinting the brief
New York Times article, close-up photos of Manhattan skyscrapers now in Cuban
hands were splashed across the magazine’s pages.

The journalist, Baldomero

Álvarez Ríos, reported that Havana residents were already guessing which of the
nation’s parvenu politicians would turn out to be the new José Manuel Alemán.
Chibás, of course, already had his own ideas.
Who are these Cubans of the capital who are buying gigantic
buildings, immense skyscrapers, whole blocks in the heart of New
York, on a colossal scale that is only comparable to the acquisition of
Rockefeller Center, and surpasses those of Henry Ford, Vanderbilt and
J.P. Morgan? It is a mystery. Nevertheless, among the real estate
agents of the Babel of Iron, who are shocked, it is insistently rumored
that the principal axis of the new New York empire in valuable
properties is none other than the President of the Cuban Republic,
Carlos Prío Socarrás.39

“Cuban Money Takes Choice N.Y. Realty Through Florida Broker Operating Here.” The New York
Times, November 12, 1950.
38 Baldomero Álvarez Ríos. “Misteriosas inversiones en propiedades hacen en New York millionarios
cubanos.” Bohemia, January 7, 1951: 32-33, 99.
39 Eduardo R. Chibás. “Respuesta a un reto del gobierno,” Bohemia, January 14, 1951: 57.
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After leveling this rather explosive charge, Chibás recounted that such “fabulous”
acquisitions easily superseded those of Batista, Anselmo Alliegro and José Manuel
Alemán in Miami – the three of whom had previously set the gold standard for
purchases of foreign real estate using stolen taxpayer funds. Chibás also reminded
his readers that the rightful recipients of this money were the nation’s sugar
workers. But if part of Prío’s loan were meant to replenish the Sugar Workers
Retirement Fund, as Fernández Casas and fellow Ortodoxo senator Pelayo Cuervo
Navarro believed, the real victims would be the Cuban public. It would, in effect, be
subsidizing the thieves and paying interest to unscrupulous bankers at the same
time. As such, Chibás asked, “Do the bankers of the government of cordiality believe
the Cuban people are such idiots that they will later spend many years paying them
the money they lent to Carlos Prío so he could buy skyscrapers in New York?”40
Curiously, Chibás did not revisit any of the above themes during his
broadcast of January 14. Even more peculiar was the fact that Chibás’ article was
never discussed during his appearance on Ante la Prensa (Meet the Press), a
televised political talk show hosted by CMQ. The panel of questioners included
distinguished journalists such as Rafael Estenger, Ángel Pubillones and Miguel de
Marcos, whose bylines graced the political sections of Cuba’s premier newspapers
and magazines. Surely each had read Chibás’ article accusing the president of
buying New York skyscrapers with stolen cash. Perhaps they believed more serious
issues, such as when and under what terms Cuban troops should participate in the
Korean War, trumped their guest’s foray into rumor and hearsay. In any event,

40
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Chibás benefited from the omission and his performance demonstrated why this
“candidate of the street” was also favored by so many of the island’s intellectuals.
Eschewing the tone he had so recently employed in responding to the Minister of
Health, his answers were largely well considered and rational with only an
occasional whiff of stridence – as when he referred to the Prío administration as
“eminently putrid.”41 At one point, Miguel de Marcos was so impressed by a rapid
and prudent response to a difficult query regarding the “average provisional sugar
price” that he wryly said Chibás was, “ceasing to be a man of shrieks in order to be a
man of the State.”42
From an Auténtico perspective, few images could have been more harrowing
than that of a statesmanlike Chibás transmitted on national television43 with
excerpts of the show being disseminated in the press. As the 1952 presidential
elections loomed, Auténtico bigwigs considered Chibás far more dangerous than
Batista in their quest to retain power.44 At the same time, in confronting Chibás’
multiple political personalities, they much preferred the irresponsible shouter and
reckless accuser to the man who provided compelling answers to the island’s

“En Cuba, Política,” Bohemia, January 21, 1951: 59.
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43 Broadcast television was less than a year old in Cuba and largely confined to affluent homes.
However, poorer Cubans who lived in cities and towns often watched in local bars or hotels.
44 In an interview with Aureliano Sánchez Arango, an Auténtico presidential candidate for 1952 and
the current Minister of Education, he referred disparagingly to Batista as “the general of Kuquine”
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problems45 and whose stubborn honesty led him to sell his childhood home to pay
for his 1948 presidential campaign. Surprisingly, despite the injunction of Cuba’s
1940 constitution that the president behave as a “moderating power of national
solidarity,” Prío responded personally to his adversary. On Wednesday, January 17
at 10:30 p.m. he read an indignant and unprecedented statement over the national
airwaves. Prío dismissed Chibás’ charge that he had bought New York skyscrapers
with the loan money as a “frightful invention.” He also targeted Chibás’ threat to
repudiate the loan, asserting that the Ortodoxo leader intended to sacrifice “the
honor and credit of Cuba” on the altars of political advantage and personal
resentment. Further, Prío claimed Chibás had waged a campaign of “incessant
defamation and injury” against him since he became president. Nevertheless, his
credentials as an anti-Machado revolutionary and member of the Generation of
1930 allowed him to value “public liberties” over the Ortodoxo chief’s “excesses.”
Lastly, Prío summoned the “responsible organs” of the PPC to declare whether they
supported their chief’s threat to disavow the loan.46
The island was transfixed by this “gigantic” polemic. Even commentators
who covered non-political topics offered opinions. For example, the literary critic
Juan J. Remos devoted his column of January 20 in Diario de la Marina to the issue,
The most pressing of these, by Chibás’ own admission, was the wretched state of many of Cuba’s
peasants. One solution he was investigating involved large-scale cultivation of rice, which could be
grown from April to December – during the so-called “dead season” of the sugar industry. In
addition, there already existed a large domestic market for rice in Cuba, most of which was imported
from the United States. The above points were underlined in a letter to Chibás from Julio R. Arellano
of the Arrocera Oriental, dated January 16, 1951 in response to a missive the Ortodoxo leader had
sent on December 8, 1950. The last paragraph of this letter noted that, “it has made a very good
impression on me to know, through direct experience, that a political party occupies itself with the
study of national economic problems instead of dedicating itself exclusively to the conquest of
power.” Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás: Caja 38, Legajo 1135: 111, ANC.
46 “Emplaza el Dr. Prío a los ortodoxos por el bien de la República,” Diario de la Marina, January 18,
1951: 1, 20.
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despite confessing that he found the medium of political polemics to be “too
debased.”47

Nonetheless, he claimed the need to weigh in because Chibás’

accusation represented not garden-variety mudslinging but rather an attack on the
nation itself. At the same time, Remos, who was a longtime associate of Batista,
could hardly claim to be unbiased.48 Certainly, objectivity was in short supply on all
sides. A Bohemia reporter claimed Prío’s “involuntary” pro-Chibás propaganda had
provided the Ortodoxo chief with “the greatest resonance of his career.” It also
wondered dryly how “one more political paragraph” was such a threat to the
republic in an era marked by a surfeit of scandals and robberies. 49 The Diario de la
Marina columnist Francisco Ichaso allowed that Chibás had the potential to be
Cuba’s “Savonarola,”50 but warned that he should, “accentuate his feeling of
responsibility, of not making false steps, of rigorously monitoring his words and
deeds.”51
After two days of unrelenting press coverage and behind the scenes
maneuvering, the controversy reached a spectacular denouement over the weekend.
On Saturday, January 20, Orlando Puente, the secretary of the presidency appeared
on Unión Radio Televisión wielding an affidavit from a “certain American
businessman,” signed in the presence of a New York notary. The document averred
that, to the best of his knowledge, neither Carlos Prío nor any member of his family,
nor any Cuban government employee nor anyone that represents them was
Juan J. Remos, “Deslindes,” Diario de la Marina, January 20, 1951: 4.
Remos, for example, had been Minister of Education in 1936 under Federico Laredo Bru (19361940), Batista’s puppet president.
49 “En Cuba, “Política: Una gigantesca polémica,” Bohemia, January 28, 1951: 61.
50 Girolamo Savonarola (1452-1498), an Italian religious reformer and Dominican friar who criticized
Church excesses, among other things.
51 Francisco Ichaso, “Política: Catonismo frenético,” Diario de la Marina, January 20, 1951: 6.
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involved, directly or indirectly in the purchase of Manhattan skyscrapers. 52 Then, in
a tirade reminiscent of Chibás’ most exaggerated moods, Puente claimed the
Ortodoxo leader harbored a “monstrous aspiration…to sink all that exists in order to
achieve power on the ruins of the fatherland.”53 Chibás, whose gambit of arming a
scandal and drawing the nation’s attention had already proved a fantastic success,
responded immediately. Utilizing the radio slot of his friend and protégé José Pardo
Llada, Chibás proclaimed that the government, with the immense resources of its
propaganda machine, had launched “the most intense campaign of defamation ever
realized in Cuba against any political leader.”

Moreover, as a result of his

accusations in defense of the “impoverished masses,” high-level government figures
were planning to expel him from the senate, dissolve his political party and
incarcerate him. The Ortodoxo leader, who reveled in the avalanche of attention,
related to his legion of listeners that he would not be swayed by threats of any kind
and that the party slogan of Shame vs. Money resonated now more than ever.54
Later that day, Luis Orlando Rodríguez appeared on the televised news show
of Unión Radio. “What matters to the country,” he began, “is not to know whether,
through an American affidavit, Prío has or doesn’t have buildings on Fifth Avenue in
New York but to know whether it is true that he has them in general, whether in
New York or in Havana.” Then, addressing himself directly to secretary of the
presidency, he continued:
Tell me it’s not true, Dr. Puente, that the current president of the
republic won’t be the richest ex-leader once his term has finished; that
“En Cuba, Política: Una gigantesca polémica,” 61.
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54 Ibid., 61.
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no other man who has governed Cuba permitted his brothers to
become millionaires to such an extent…I’m not going to show a New
York affidavit but rather a televised photograph of a building that isn’t
on New York’s Fifth Avenue but on Fifth Avenue in Havana. Show me,
Dr. Puente, a new affidavit that proves that this monumental building
costing 300 thousand pesos isn’t the property of Francisco Prío
Socorrás. The essential thing, what you aim to avoid, is the accusation
that the Príos embezzle public money, not how, not where the stolen
funds are invested; that the current administration enriches itself at
the cost of the country and that there is a national conscience that
repudiates, with disgust, this farce.55
In the same vein, a Bohemia editorial from January 28, stated that, “…the country
has been living for some time in a period of bonanza and if the treasury runs into
difficulties this is not due to a lowering of revenues – which have never been higher
– but poor management of public funds…”56 In a slightly different vein, Néstor
Piñango, a Prío sympathizer, asserted that Chibás may have been crazy once but his
attack on the loan demonstrated that he was now “perfectly well in the head.” After
all, his censure was directed at the most “momentous and scandalous” of the
administration’s shortcomings – namely, the borrowed millions. These were not
being robbed, in his opinion, but neither were they benefiting the Cuban people in
any tangible manner. 57
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Of course, Saturday’s recriminations were a mere prelude.

During the

preceding days, Ortodoxo advertisements promised Chibás would respond on
Sunday evening to the “surprising summons of the President of the Republic.”58
These were most assuredly a waste of money as Cubans were already eagerly
awaiting the Ortodoxo leader’s 8 p.m. show.

That morning, however, the

administration sought the public’s attention one last time. Thus, Tony Varona read a
statement on behalf of pro-government legislators in both houses of Congress
charging Chibás with attempting a “parliamentary golpe de Estado.”59 Varona’s
solemn performance before the microphones of Unión Radio was complemented by
a frothy obloquy courtesy of Antonio Prío. The president’s brother, sensing the
momentum tipping toward Chibás, railed against the Ortodoxo leader’s “diabolical
genius” for wiggling out of “compromised situations.”60
Normally, Chibás spent all day Sunday preparing for his evening radio show.
On some occasions, when additional rumination or research was required, Saturday
was also devoted to this endeavor. In this case, Chibás and various Ortodoxo higherups began deliberating on Thursday, January 18 in the residence of Roberto
Agramonte. The assembly was delayed until 11 p.m. that evening as it awaited the
arrival of Carlos Márquez Sterling, who was charged with writing a position paper
that would form the basis of the Ortodoxo reply. Chibás opened the meeting by
claiming “knowledge of a vast plan,” hatched in “La Altura” by the president,
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Aureliano Sánchez Arango and others.61 The Orotodoxo chief believed his rivals’
threefold objective involved destroying him as a presidential candidate, fomenting
divisions in the Ortodoxo party and forming alliances in the provinces so as to
minimize the chances of PPC victories in senate races.
After Chibás’ remarks, everyone read Márquez Sterling’s memorandum. A
debate soon ensued between those who approved of the text or advocated only
minor changes and a group, consisting of Luis Orlando Rodríguez, Herminio Portell
Vilá, Pelayo Cuervo and Jorge Mañach, who felt thorough revisions were necessary.
In particular, they objected to the personal tone employed by Márquez Sterling. For
example, Rodríguez singled out a paragraph describing Prío as “having used all the
resources of power” to help install his brothers Antonio and Francisco in high places
and his desire to do the same for his sister Mireya in Oriente province – eventually
preparing all three for positions in the Senate, a “fantastic” prospect that would be
“a first in the history of nepotism.” He argued that the Ortodoxo response should
aspire to “great historical importance” and thus needed to remain on a more
intellectual plane.62 Mañach, taking a similar position, maintained that the final
document should, “express the party’s political doctrine of order and constructive
sentiment.”63

He also found fault with the memorandum’s excessive length.

Márquez Sterling promptly reminded Mañach of the anecdote whereby Napoleon
rejected a verbose document produced by his diplomat Talleyrand and the latter
allegedly replied, “Sire, if I had had more time to write it, it would have been
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shorter.” Mañach, with good humor, smiled. By now, they were immersed in a
meeting that would not conclude until 2:30 a.m.
To be sure, the preponderance of intellectual luminaries in Agramonte’s
house was a feather in the cap both of Chibás and the Ortodoxo party. More
impressive still was the lengthy intra-party debate, permitted and encouraged by
Chibás, during a time when his political future hung in the balance. The initial,
vituperative position paper of Márquez Sterling could easily have been written by
Chibás himself and certainly embodied the Ortodoxo leader’s pugnacious style.
However, Chibás proved receptive to a more moderate position and a new
committee, composed of Rodríguez, Mañach, Marquez Sterling and Cuervo, was
assigned to write the final draft. Perhaps most importantly, excerpts of this internal
discussion were reproduced in Bohemia and Carteles – allowing the Cuban public a
glimpse of all the goings-on. Among these was a change of venue on Friday morning
to Cuervo’s hom on 15th Street in Vedado. There, he and his three partners began
working on the final draft, which was mostly complete by 11 p.m. that evening. At
noon on Sunday, January 21, the Ortodoxos convened again at Agramonte’s house to
vote on the completed document, which was approved unanimously.
At 8 p.m., Chibás faced the microphones at CMQ’s headquarters on 25th Street
in Vedado.

The Ortodoxo pronouncement, three of whose four authors were

lawyers,64 was logical, legalistic and conveniently vague. Speaking for the party
rather than himself, Chibás affirmed that the Ortodoxos believed the loan had been
“imposed on the nation without necessity” and had passed Congress on a narrow
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partisan basis. For this reason, the Cuban people, in accordance with international
law, retained the future right to review and repudiate the loan if, in addition to being
unnecessary, it had also been squandered or dishonestly managed.65

For the

moment, Chibás appeared to be the most statesmanlike figure in Cuba, bolstered by
the full support of a party that had often proved unruly but now sensed, with good
reason, that its leader’s popularity would carry it to power in 1952. Guillermo
Alonso Pujol, noted that, “Chibás has succeeded. No one would dare deny it.”66
Without a doubt, the eminently fickle Pujol, who had switched from the Democrats
to the Republicans in 1944, joined the Auténtico coalition in 1948, and, along with
the Auténtico mayor of Havana Nicolás Castellanos, inaugurated the Cuban National
party late in 1950, had reasons for praising Chibás. Specifically, he was interested in
aligning with whoever seemed likely to rule Cuba next and had thus spoken with the
recently re-incorporated Ortodoxo José Manuel Gutiérrez, assuring him of his
willingness to “make viable an understanding between (Nicolás) Castellanos and
Chibás.”67 At the same time, Chibás’ waxing appeal could do nothing but strengthen
his conviction that pacts, like the loan, were unnecessary and distasteful – an
attitude perfectly summed up by the political cartoonist Antonio Prohias. In a
sketch, entitled, “Insinuation” a smiling, cigar chomping Guillermo Alonso Pujol
appears at the door of Chibás’ home bearing a shoe-shine kit and says, “Listen
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Chibás, can I be of use in some way? Rather than respond, Eddy turns his squinting,
disgusted face to the side and prepares to plunge his finger down his throat.68
The Liberal boss Eduardo Suárez Rivas also continued to pursue an
agreement.

In public declarations, he proclaimed the Liberals’ willingness to

consider an “understanding” with the Ortodoxos, which would include support for
Chibás’ presidential candidacy.

Rafael Guas Inclán, the former Liberal senator

(1940-1944) and governor of Havana province (1944-1948), affirmed that senators
from his party had negotiated with Chibás regarding a possible alliance.

The

Ortodoxo chief, however, had merely advised them to change sides in order to run as
Ortodoxos in the next election.69 In any case, the overtures of Alonso Pujol and
Suárez Rivas, if nothing else, were evidence of the growing power of the PPC and
surely must have fed the Ortodoxo leader’s confidence.

Chibás was the most

charismatic figure in Cuban politics and his main opponents in the next election
would be an ex dictator with limited popularity and an unknown candidate from a
party that, despite significant achievements, had disappointed expectations over the
past eight years.
Perhaps above all, Chibás basked in the supportive telegrams and letters that
flowed toward his office from every part of the island. He customarily read them
accompanied by a red pencil, underlining phrases that cheered or encouraged him.
For instance, a missive from an Ortodoxo councilman of Central Chaparra in Oriente
province, conveyed the following greeting, most of which was underlined: “…I want
you to know that I’m with you unconditionally and it pleases me to inform you that
68
69
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the majority of the people are with you.”70 Another letter from Elida Mallea Sánchez
of Central Adelaida in Camagüey province articulated the ire felt by many rural
Cubans against the government loan. While listening to Chibás on the afternoon of
January 20, she heard a knock on her door and upon opening it saw two poor
guajiros, a father and son from the neighboring region of Santa Clara, who had
arrived for the sugar harvest. Unfortunately, the harvest had not yet begun so the
men were without work and going from house to house asking for food in order to
keep from starving. Mallea Sánchez relates that their faces were “pained and
ashamed” and the scene filled her eyes with tears. Gravid with frustration, she
began a new paragraph that was underlined in its entirety by Chibás. The first
sentence is instructive: “And the current government hopes to force unhappy fellow
countrymen like these two to carry the heavy bundle of the debt which they will
have to pay later.” A few sentences later, exasperation yields to anger as she
exclaims, “No, a thousand times no, Senator Chibás!”71
Despite the unsolicited advice of Alonso Pujol, who, after the Ortodoxo reply
proclaimed, “If I were Carlos Prío, I would leave the controversy right here,” the
administration pressed its case one last time.72

During the ensuing week,

advertisements appeared in all the nation’s major newspapers for a televised
announcement at 7:30 p.m. on Friday, January 26. The purpose was to lay open the
government’s “financial thinking.”73 Hence, the director of the National Bank, a
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deputy of the Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank,74 the Minister of
Finance and the director of the National Development Council were drafted to
defend the loan. While this tactic was sensible, given the rectitude of these figures,
all lacked charisma (which made for a boring spectacle) and none could quash the
national uneasiness about the loan. Afterward, Carlos Prío appeared and boasted of,
“attempting to do an effective job in the economic field” and expressed a desire to
“turn the page on this unfortunate chapter.”75
Two evenings later, Chibás demonstrated once again why, despite periodic
lapses into recklessness, he was a force to be reckoned with in Cuban politics.
Abandoning the caution he displayed the previous week, Chibás averred it was
“logical” to believe Carlos Prío was somehow involved in the purchase of New York
skyscrapers by unnamed Cubans. Why else, he asked, would their identity remain
such a closely guarded secret? The Ortodoxo chief then reminded his listeners that
six years before, when he was the first to accuse Batista, Anselmo Alliegro and Jaime
Mariné of buying properties in Miami and Venezuela, he was called a liar but in time
he was proved right.76 When, three years ago, he accused José Manuel Alemán of
robbing public funds, he was called a calumniator but in time he was proved right.
Two years ago, when he accused Carlos Prío of owning “La Chata” and “La Altura,”
two lavish estates in the Cuban countryside, he was denounced but in time he was
proved right. In this instance, cried Chibás, “Time will once again prove me right!

The director of the Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank, Justo Carillo, was a longstanding
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History will repeat itself!”77 Chibás then invoked José Martí, who had been born on
that day 98 years earlier, and summoned the government to appoint a special senate
commission that would investigate the personal finances and property holdings of
himself and the president in order to see how each had acquired what they
presently own. Hence, Chibás not only gave the Cuban people a compelling show,
his discourse, laced as it was with a catchy mantra and straightforward challenge,
easily surpassed in appeal the droning, technocratic rambling of Friday evening. A
Bohemia reporter quipped, with good reason that Chibás remained, “the incorrigible
man of Cuban politics.”78

CAPORAL
Even as Cubans were engrossed by January’s polemic, politics remained a
distant second to baseball as the island’s most consuming passion.79

Cuba’s

professional baseball season reached its conclusion each February and in 1951, the
pennant race was particularly intense. The Almendares Scorpions, known as the
“Blues” for their uniforms of that color, and the Habana Lions, called the “Reds” for
the same reason, completed their schedules with identical records.

This

unprecedented result required an extra game between the two archrivals to decide
the championship. First, however, the league had to alleviate suspicions that the tie
had been fixed beforehand as a money-earning gambit. Hence, it agreed to donate
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the proceeds of the game’s ticket sales to the city’s Casa de Maternidad y
Beneficencia – a Catholic charitable organization that housed orphans and
abandoned children.
The contest was scheduled for Monday afternoon, on February 19. By all
accounts, this was a most unproductive workday. The famed sportswriter Eladio
Secades acknowledged that the “all the island” was anxious to know the result.80
The Havana city council, which customarily met each Monday and Thursday,
cancelled its afternoon session so members could attend the game. A Diario de la
Marina reporter noted that the incessant arguments between Auténtico and
Ortodoxo town councilors, which mirrored those on the national stage, were
fleetingly superseded by “baseball fanaticism.”81 He also stated that a majority of
the councilmen, along with Mayor Nicolás Castellanos, were Almendares fans
although none would confess their preferences publicly out of fear of upsetting
supporters of other clubs.82 In any event, the “Reds” eked out a win by a score of 43. Afterwards, Habana’s manager was overcome by tears and confessed that he had
just experienced the most profound happiness of his long life dedicated to the sport.
The team’s fans enjoyed a less introspective brand of satisfaction, many of whom
stormed the field waving red banners after their team’s victory.

An overly

enthusiastic handful even tried to lower the blue flag of Almendares, which flew
over the stadium in recognition of the club’s championship the previous year, and
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raise the a red Habana standard in its place. The next day, a cartoon by José
Roseñada satirized the consequences of life without baseball. Entitled “Realities,”
the sketch depicted Liborio, Cuba’s everyman, confronted by a tall, ungainly and
highly unattractive woman whose black dress was adorned with the word “politics.”
Full of disgust he exclaims, “The baseball season is finished; now I have to deal once
again with this!”83
Despite playing second fiddle to the island’s national pastime, Chibás
managed to keep himself in the news even if sometimes his efforts were
unintentional. On Saturday, February 3, Chibás indulged in a rare bit of leisure,
visiting “Buena Vista,” the estate of his high school friend Miguel Ángel Quevedo. A
number of other Chibás intimates were there as well, including Enrique de la Osa
and his brother Tony along with José Chelala Aguilera. At one point, Chibás was
good-naturedly needled about not being able to roller skate. Eddy claimed he could
only there were no roller skates to be had that would allow him to demonstrate.
With a smile, Chelala Aguilera walked to his car and produced a pair. The Ortodoxo
chief promptly laced them up and commenced darting about with ease, delighting all
those assembled. Fresh from this triumph, Chibás insisted on mounting one of
Quevedo’s horses. First, he climbed onto an Arabian steed and subsequently set his
sights on an “indomitable” white stallion named Caporal.84 Ignoring the advice of
his host, he made the horse rear up on its hind legs. Shortly thereafter, it dashed off
at top speed and crashed into a tree. Chibás was hit in the face by a branch and
knocked violently to the ground. Fortunately, he was not badly wounded. In fact,
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Chibás proceeded to eat lunch with an undiminished appetite and then bowled and
played pool with his pals.85
The following evening, during his radio broadcast, Chibás thanked everyone
who had expressed concern for his well being. He then provided a fanciful account
of the previous day’s accident, claiming he had mounted a “wild horse” that had
been unable to buck him despite thirty minutes of trying and finally resorted to
“throwing itself against a tree trunk, breaking its head, while I lightly scraped my
nose and face against a tree branch.” Then, in a statement bordering on self-parody,
he proclaimed, “I never fall from horses.”86 Regardless, the term “Caporal” became
the newest condiment in a Cuban vocabulary always on the lookout for piquancy.
For example, a cartoon by Niko shows a statue of a smiling horse, mounted high on a
pedestal, with its back legs raised in the air. At the bottom, one man tells another,
“And this is the monument to Caporal, the one who bucked Chibás.”87 A sketch by
Carlos Vidal depicted a bureaucrat warily eying a smug job seeker with his arms
crossed. A messenger whispers in his ear that the man, “brings a recommendation
from ‘Caporal.’”88 José Roseñada portrays two men, one of them a Habana fan,
discussing that team’s recent victory over Almendares. The first asks, “What did you
think of the last game between Habana and Almendares? The grinning “Reds”
supporter replies, “It was exactly the same as when Caporal bucked Chibás.”89
Finally, the feisty steed himself graced the cover of Bohemia’s March 11 edition,
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evidence that Quevedo had an ampler sense of humor regarding his friend than
Chibás had in relation to himself.
Of course, plenty of Cubans were dismayed by the Ortodoxo leader’s
shenanigans in “Buena Vista.” A peasant mother of 10 from Cruces in Las Villas
province, whose common sense far outweighed her knowledge of syntax wrote,
“you must live in order to save us, the guajiros, who I can tell you are tired of
suffering and as the only hope of my Cuba.”90 Xiomara Serra of Cascorro, a village in
Camagüey province reminded Eddy that he had recently been operated on and
urged him to take better care of his health.91

These expressions of concern,

sprinkled as they were among the Ortodoxo leader’s mail in the weeks after he
became an unwitting national punch line, were likely a source of comfort. This was
especially so given that many were from humble workaday Cubans, the apple of
Chibás’ eye and quintessential pueblo in the Partido del Pueblo Cubano. Maintaining
their good will and devotion was essential both for his emotional and political
welfare. Learning they were worried rather than disappointed was surely a relief.
Far more than mere solace was offered by a letter of February 5 from Daniel
Cortina of La Grifa, a hamlet on the outskirts of Guane92 in Pinar del Río province.
Cortina recently had the good fortune of purchasing ten winning lottery tickets, each
of which was now worth 1000 pesos apiece. He enclosed five along with the letter
so that, “I will have the satisfaction of having contributed to the great PPC with
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something more than my physical, mental and emotional energies.”93 While reading
the missive, Chibás underlined most of this sentence with his habitual red pencil,
presumably with enormous satisfaction. To put this contribution in perspective, the
average salary in Cuba was $378 in 1957.94 By all appearances, Cortina, who
handwrote the letter on a sheet of notebook paper, was very much an ordinary
Cuban of the provinces. For such a man, donating $5000 to a political party, an
amount equivalent to more than 12 years salary, seems astounding – particularly as
he expected no favors, jobs or anything else in return. At the same time, Cortina’s
letter embodies a significant phenomenon of the era. That is, the degree of faith
placed in Chibás by peasant and working class devotees was unrivaled in Cuban
politics. Supporters expressed a desire to do anything for the party, even die if need
be. Quite a few considered Chibás a family member. An even larger number
believed he represented the only chance for the nation’s happiness and salvation
and prayed to the saints or Virgen de la Caridad, whenever Chibás’ health was in
question. René Ayala Pomares of Santa Clara, echoed the sentiment of these Chibás
adherents when he declared:
I joined the Partido del Pueblo Cubano for two reasons; first, because I
have absolute faith that you will fulfill your promises, because you are
among those who fought in the past for sincere ideals that,
disgracefully, have still not been recognized by the politicians we have
suffered through and whom we are still suffering through; and second
for the tenacity, constancy and self-denial that you continually
demonstrate before the people of Cuba, showing that nothing or no
one is capable of making you renounce your resolutions.95
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THE POLEMIC WITH MASFERRER
One such resolution that Chibás continued to honor was his vow not dilute
the Ortodoxo program by forming pacts with other parties. Even so, Diario de la
Marina reported on February 7 that the Ortodoxo chief and Eduardo Suárez Rivas,
his Liberal counterpart, met for discussions at the residence of Millo Ochoa. That
Ochoa hosted this interview was hardly surprising.96 Unlike Chibás, he continued to
believe political alliances were a necessary, pragmatic way to win power and
govern. Recent Cuban history corroborated his view, as no president since the
Constitution of 1940 was approved had gained office without resorting to pacts. In
any event, Chibás repeated that certain Liberals were welcome to join the party “one
by one” but he was not willing to accept them wholesale.97 Of course, the Ortodoxos
were not his only potential ally. That same week, Suárez Rivas spoke with President
Prío in “La Chata.” He had also been in contact with representatives of Batista and
Alonso Pujol.98 Nonetheless, he publicly stated that, “the ideal pact for me is with
Chibás” but “the anti-pact policy is an insuperable barrier.”99
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The next day, Chibás attended the wake and funeral of Carlos Hevia’s mother.
Hevia, a longstanding Auténtico and potential opponent in the 1952 presidential
election, was director of the National Development Council. The Ortodoxo leader
had not shied from criticizing him, more for his association with a corrupt
administration than for any personal dishonesty – of which there was no evidence.
Chibás had known Hevia since he was 17 years old, when they and both their
families were passengers on the Lafayette, a Europe-bound steam ship in July of
1925. In any case, there was nothing unusual about Chibás’ gesture. For example,
he had also attended the wake of Mario Kuchilán’s father, staying until 2 a.m. even
though he and the journalist often sparred on political matters.100 This interlude of
magnanimity was to be short-lived, however. At noon on February 8, Roberto
Agramonte received an anonymous telephone call, asking whether an Ortodoxo
meeting would take place that evening as planned and specifically if Chibás would
attend. Receiving no answer, the caller hung up. At 10 p.m. that night, Agramonte’s
servant, a young girl named Margarita Pérez Martín, was leaving after the day’s
work and on her way out she spied a strange looking package in the walkway
covered by a page of dampened newsprint. Apparently, the rainy weather was the
only thing that kept the 10 sticks of dynamite contained inside from exploding and
thereby destroying the library of Agramonte’s house.101
Chibás seized on the situation to underscore another Auténtico failure:
namely, the inability to control violent action groups whose spectacular murders
embarrassed the government and enraged the capital’s middle classes. During his
100
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Thursday spot on Unión Radio, Chibás attacked the administration’s anti-gangster
law, claiming it only served to disarm law-abiding people while at the same time
facilitating terrorists who acted with impunity because they were supported by the
government. Nevertheless, he concluded by saying that, “The voice of dynamite will
never be able to silence the voice of truth.”102 On his Sunday broadcast of February
11, Chibás held Rolando Masferrer responsible. Chibás lacked evidence tying the
MSR leader to the bomb but he rarely passed up an enticing target, and Masferrer,
one of the nation’s most prominent gangsters, was an ideal foil. Also, Chibás, who
had earlier been inspired by New York Times accounts of Cubans purchasing
Manhattan real estate, almost certainly was stirred by Bohemia’s recent coverage of
Masferrer.
The magazine described Havana’s latest crime wave featuring the signature
murders, kidnappings and tortures that the government had promised to end.103
This had begun on January 10, when Antonio Bayer, editor of the political page for
Masferrer’s mouthpiece, Tiempo en Cuba, was killed in a hail of 29 bullets. He and
three co-workers had been drinking beer at the Corbón bar, a few blocks from the
paper’s offices in the seedy neighborhood of Colón. Interior Minister Lomberto Díaz
had recently designated the area a centerpiece of a new anti-vice campaign. After
all, he said, “We can’t allow a place so central, that’s a short distance from the
presidential palace and where many decent families live to continue to be infested
by prostitution and public scandal on a daily basis.”104 As a result, policemen were
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conspicuous on every street corner and the sordid figures that formerly prowled the
area had all but disappeared. At the same time, the city’s gangsters were clearly not
intimidated, nor did they appear to show any fear of being apprehended. Rather
than vacating the scene immediately, the man who shot Bayer approached his
victim, who was lying on the floor, and pulled the trigger again at point blank range.
The three other gangsters accompanying him then paused to fire their weapons in
the air before driving away in the car they had parked just outside. Enrique De la
Osa noted that “for the thousandth time” the police arrived on time to pick up the
wounded but too late to arrest the criminals. People nearby were scandalized by
the usual display of incompetence demonstrated by the city’s lawmen, who were
obviously in close proximity but showed themselves to be altogether harmless. 105
Bayer himself was a rather “turbulent” figure.106 He had been affiliated with
ARG until being expelled as a traitor and fleeing to Argentina, where he remained
for a few months. Upon returning to Cuba, Bayer joined the rival MSR, offering
inside knowledge of his old comrades in exchange for protection. Just before his
murder, he had also spent a year in prison for possession of an illegal firearm. In
any case, Bayer’s death set in motion an unsavory series of events. The day after his
murder, a tearful woman rushed into Havana’s seventh precinct police station. In a
voice thick with desperation she shouted, “Masferrer has just kidnapped my
husband and will surely kill him!”107 Identifying herself as the wife of Humberto
Huguet Domínguez, a docks worker and ARG member, she related that witnesses
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had seen Masferrer and four cronies force her husband into a car at gunpoint.
Toward midnight that same evening, a young man, “with a singular air of suffering
about him” entered Havana’s Bureau of Investigations and asked to see Chief Díaz
Biart.108 This turned out to be none other than Humberto Huguet, who related that
Masferrer had indeed abducted him. He had been brought to the Havana forest,
threatened with death unless he divulged the names of those who had murdered
Bayer and tortured. At one point, his assailants placed a noose around his neck and
told him that if he didn’t confess, he would be hung – a death that could easily made
to appear as suicide.

Finally, having convinced themselves that Huguet knew

nothing, they freed him on the condition that he not reveal any details of his ordeal.
Otherwise, he would be killed, “like a dog.”109
The following evening, at 1 a.m. a boy burst into the military barracks at
Jaimanitas and blurted out, “Run, corporal, run! Near my house there’s a group of
men beating two captives and I heard one of them say that if they didn’t talk, they
were going to bury them.”110 The captain and some enlisted men quickly drove off
in a pair of jeeps and approached the spot, where they observed various figures
arguing in the darkness – one of whom carried a machine gun. Quietly, they
encircled the suspects, whereupon the captain shouted at them not to move, that
they were surrounded by the army. Immediately, they raised their hands and
dropped their weapons except for two men, one carrying a pick, the other a shovel,
who fled. When the captain threatened to shoot, they turned around. Realizing they
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were no longer in danger, one of them, trembling, thanked him for saving their lives.
In any case, the entire group was brought to the barracks for questioning. The two
men who had been digging were Salvador Hernández Garriga and Luis Díaz Duque.
According to Hernández, Masferrer and his group had appeared at their houses
claiming to be police officers and forced them to into his automobile. Later on, in
their formal statement, the victims asserted that Masferrer pointed a gun at them
and demanded to know who was responsible for Bayer’s murder. Eventually, the
car stopped in a secluded location. The two men were beaten for a while until
Masferrer decided on a different tactic. They were given a pick and shovel and
forced to dig their own graves.
For his part, Masferrer marveled that he had been surprised and captured by
“a simple little corporal.”111 At the same time, he declared the above testimony to be
“completely false.”112 He was also quick to point out that as a legislator he could not
be detained or tried. However, an official reminded Masferrer that according to
Article 127 of constitution, parliamentary immunity did not apply in cases where
suspects were caught while in the act of committing a crime. Regardless, Masferrer
was released at 4 a.m. that morning, while his henchmen and their two victims were
sent to Castillo del Príncipe – the latter as suspects in the murder of Antonio Bayer.
Later that week, Masferrer explained himself. He averred that Bayer was killed on
orders from the ARG leader Jesús González Cartas. Bayer’s published accounts of his
“scandalous depredations,” which appeared in Masferrer’s newspaper, had enraged
him. In revenge, he had rounded up a bunch of “common delinquents” to do his
111
112

Ibid.
Ibid.

390

bidding.113 These included Salvador Hernández and Luis Duque, who feared further
embarrassing accounts by Bayer could result in their expulsion from the unions they
belonged to – where they served as gunmen for the Auténtico senator Eusebio Mujal,
the Auténtico congressman Francisco Aguirre and other unscrupulous figures of the
so-called workers’ movement. Further, Masferrer contended that the kidnappings
of January 11 and January 12 were part of a plan, hatched in conjunction with the
Bureau of Investigations and GRAS, to assist in the interrogation of Bayer’s
murderers. Their identities had already been revealed “privately” to him and he
claimed that psychologically, encouraging them believe they were about to die was
far more effective than physical violence.114 In fact, this method had been yielding
some very useful information when the Rural Guard interrupted him. Asked to
respond to this version of events, González Cartas disingenuously claimed his group
sought only to advance working class interests and “is the first to regret, combat and
repudiate acts of bloodshed such as those which have recently happened in the
capital.”115
In any case, Chibás accused Masferrer of planting the bomb under
Agramonte’s library exactly one month after he and his underlings had seized
Humberto Huguet off the street in broad daylight and tortured him throughout that
evening. Aside from being an unsympathetic figure with a checkered history of
violence, Masferrer was an Auténtico congressman. Confronting him would afford
Chibás the opportunity to underscore Auténtico links with gangsters, hardly a new

Ibid.
Ibid.
115 Ibid.
113
114

391

revelation, but one that rankled residents of the capital. Moreover, such a fight
promised to further invigorate his party and could attract new adherents. This
strategy, assisted yet again by government missteps, succeeded beyond all
expectations. First off, Masferrer responded by invoking the much derided gag
decree. Among those who immediately denounced this measure were Goar and
Abel Mestre, owners of the popular radio station CMQ. To quell the initial uproar
over Decree 2273, Prío had arranged a private compromise with the Mestre
brothers shortly after it was issued. In exchange for dropping their campaign
against the decree, the president promised it would never be put into effect. 116 The
fact that Masferrer had done so after consulting with the secretary of the
presidency, indicated the administration remained very nervous about Chibás.
Thus, Communications Minister Sergio Megías assigned the first ten minutes of
Chibás’ broadcast to Masferrer so he could respond to the accusation. In breaking
one promise, the Auténticos were carrying out another, proclaimed on behalf of the
party by the young lawyer Nestor Carbonell, who declared: “We’re ready to
prosecute you, Eduardo Renato Chibás, so as to keep you and your words from
destroying Cuba in an immense negation of hatreds and vengeances.”117 On the
other hand, the sizeable hatreds and vengeances of Auténticos seemed to be
undermining the administration’s better judgment.

This would soon become

apparent to all involved.
On February 14, Chibás released a brief statement. He claimed the right of
reply was the gravest of all recent Auténtico “provocations” against his party,
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including the bomb placed under Agramonte’s library – which he now believed was
planted on orders from the defense ministry. Chibás also pointed out that the
Ortodoxos never attempted to interfere with the administration’s radio
transmissions. Citing articles 33 and 40 of Cuba’s constitution,118 which guaranteed
individual freedom of speech and authorized resistance against government acts
that abridged rights guaranteed by law, he declared Masferrer “will not speak under
any circumstances during the Sunday radio hour of the Partido del Pueblo
Cubano.”119 The following day, a “manifesto” by the Ortodoxo National Executive
Committee was distributed to the press and printed by Diario de la Marina and
Bohemia among other publicatons. The text underlined the party’s unequivocal
support for Chibás and chastised the Auténticos for “attaching themselves to the
most irresponsible elements” in an attempt to silence Cuba’s “only existing
opposition.”120 The gag decree was thus portrayed not only as an attack on freedom
of speech but also as a boon to gangsters. Adding to the commotion was a statement
by Masferrer, who revealed the existence of a “diabolical plan” to murder Chibás and
blame his death on the government. According to him, this situation would benefit
the estranged Auténtico, Miguelito Suárez Fernández – who would assume
leadership of the opposition. For this reason, Masferrer claimed he would convert
himself into Chibás’ bodyguard for the foreseeable future.121 This did not mean,
however, that Masferrer’s opinion of the Ortodoxo chief had improved. On the
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contrary, he referred to Chibás as a “libidinous satyr” and “old homosexual.” Nor
was his invective reserved exclusively for Chibás. For example, he charged that
Manuel Bisbé “exchanged passing grades in his classes for the caresses of young
girls in the faculty of philosophy.”122 Needless to say, such statements, some of
which were issued during radio appearances, made a mockery of the government’s
intent to muzzle Chibás.
On February 16, an Ortodoxo plug for Chibás’ Sunday broadcast called for an
“imposing popular demonstration” in front of CMQ’s headquarters on 23rd Street
and Avenue L in Vedado.123 With tensions mounting and the public anticipating yet
another extravagant row, Sergio Megías informed the press that he had approved
the “pages” Masferrer was set to read over the airwaves. He observed that would
expend a paltry eight minutes, hardly worth all the fuss.124 On the other hand, he
affirmed the government would not tolerate “unauthorized street actions” that
threatened to impede the proprietors of a radio station from fulfilling their legal
obligation.125 Lomberto Díaz added that a heavy police presence would be called
upon to guarantee public order and prevent the owners of CMQ from being coerced
or endangered. Police Chief Quirino Uría thus prohibited “masses of people” from
forming near the station.126 This rhetoric conveniently ignored the actual directors
of CMQ, Goar and Abel Mestre, who felt neither menaced by prospective protesters
nor particularly pleased with their duty under the decree. In an official press
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release, they reiterated their opposition to the right of reply from its inception as
“unconstitutional” and “disturbing in many respects.”127

Meanwhile, a new

advertisement by the Ortodoxos reproduced an excerpt from Article 40 of the
constitution that read:
Government laws or any order that regulates the exercise of the rights
guaranteed by this Constitution will be nullified if they diminish,
restrict or adulterate them. Adequate resistance for the protection of
these individual rights is legitimate.128
The ad invited Cubans to congregate in front of CMQ’s offices at 6 p.m. in order to
defend the constitution and block Masferrer from speaking during the party’s
broadcast. It also taunted Oscar Gans for his machadista past and warned the gag
decree could provoke another August 7 – the day in 1933 when Machado’s reviled
police chief, Antonio Ainciart, oversaw the massacre of 18 people during an antigovernment demonstration.129
On Sunday, February 18, the national police and army cordoned off a fiveblock radius surrounding CMQ’s studios beginning at 1 p.m. The show of force was
such that a Bohemia reporter remarked that, “To someone who didn’t know what
was going on, it would seem the city feared a foreign invasion or imminent social
revolution.”130 One beleaguered man, who lived within the prohibited area and
attempted to return home was brusquely told to, “Go to the movies and stay there
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until 9 p.m.!”131

Seemingly, only the deceased merited lenience as a funeral

procession was allowed to pass through – albeit after some discussion. Before
setting out for CMQ, Chibás addressed his followers from the top of a news truck. He
implored them to remain calm, come what may, and to refrain from violence. “We
are not gunmen,” he said. “We are directing a movement of moral and political
renewal.”132 At 7:15 p.m., in the dark winter evening, a vast throng headed by
Chibás and his party’s parliamentary contingent began moving southeast along
Avenue L. As the demonstrators approached the main thoroughfare known as Línea
or 9th Street,133 they found the intersection obstructed by a patrol car. Once the
crowd began to bypass the vehicle, its lights began flashing. Immediately, a group of
sirens wailed as police cars rushed to block the next intersections. Soon thereafter,
officers bearing machineguns, rifles and pistols blocked the assemblage. Their
commander, Rafael Casals, yelled, “Stop! Not one step further! Back! Back! 134
Nonetheless, the multitude continued forward. In response, the policemen fired
warning shots into the sky. Even so, the marchers kept going. The police then
lowered their aim and fired once again but this too had no effect. Finally, they
targeted the mass of protesters. As people fell to the ground, wounded, many
carried on but others fled in the direction of a nearby park or the hospital on 13th
Street and Avenue L. The police, however, did not allow them to escape. Rather,
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Some streets are also known by names as well as letters or numbers. For example, Línea, one of the
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they battered them with machine guns. The main group stopped and waited for
instructions from Chibás and also assisted the wounded. One of these, a young
Ortodoxo worker named José Otero Ben had been shot in the eye.
Quirino Uría, the police chief, appeared in the midst of this grisly scene clad
in civilian clothes and requested a meeting with Chibás. The two, who were a
picture of contrasting temperaments, briefly conversed while bullets still flew in all
directions and those who attempted to escape were manhandled. Uría calmly said
he had been ordered not to permit the demonstration.

Only Chibás and the

Ortodoxo legislators could proceed to CMQ headquarters. Chibás shouted that the
rally was supported by Cuba’s constitution and the police should be protecting
defenseless men and women rather than knocking them around. Uría offered to
personally escort Chibás and his party’s lawmakers to CMQ’s studios if the Ortodoxo
chief would tell the crowd to congregate outside the nearby López Serrano building
and stay there. Chibás discussed this proposal with Millo Ochoa, Pelayo Cuervo and
José Pardo Llada. A few minutes later, he climbed onto the hood of a police car and
advised his supporters to wait for him at his residence on 13th Street and L. Despite
loud groans of disagreement, Chibás’ supporters heeded his instructions. Among
the thousands who had been assaulted or wounded were Pelayo Cuervo and the
Ortodoxo congressman Manuel Dorta Duque – both of whom had been beaten with
clubs. Another Ortodoxo congressman, Andrés Nazario Sargent, had been jabbed in
the chest with a machinegun by the overzealous Rafael Casals. Carlos Márquez
Sterling had been attacked by a group of vigilantes. Ángel Castro, director of the
party’s youth section, was roughed up by a particularly determined policeman who
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was called off only at the behest of Police Chief Uría himself. In addition, members
of the press attempting to cover the demonstration were harassed and threatened.
Reporters and photographers who ventured near CMQ’s offices risked being
“splashed” by soldiers manning water cannons.135
In a twist worthy of the island’s soap operas, Chibás and the Ortodoxo
parliamentarians reached the radio station at the same instant as an Auténtico
motorcade bearing Rolando Masferrer, Tony Varona, Rubén de León, Sergio Megías
and other party stalwarts. Chibás chased after them but was detained by Millo
Ochoa and Luis Orlando Rodríguez. Moments later, when the Ortodoxos entered the
building, they encountered Lomberto Díaz. “Give my respect to the police,” shouted
Chibás, “who have followed their orders!”136 The interior minister responded only
by removing his foggy spectacles. As the Ortodoxos continued down the hallway,
they passed studio 3, where Masferrer was preparing to broadcast. Chibás and Luis
Orlando Rodríguez directed a final unflattering remark at him before entering
studio 4. Pelayo Cuervo reminded Chibás to compose himself, as he would address
the nation shortly. While Chibás paced impatiently back and forth in the studio,
Masferrer was on the air next door.

The MSR chieftain undermined the

government’s case for the gag decree by inviting the audience to tune into his 9 p.m.
show that evening on RHC-Cadena Azul, in which he would give a “complete
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response, in his own language, to Senator Chibás.”137 As a Bohemia correspondent
noted, “It was clear [Masferrer] had a radio space to utilize his ‘right of reply.’”138
When Chibás was cleared to speak, he did so in a voice trembling with
indignation.139 He asserted that the police and army were not responsible for the
bloodshed, as they merely followed orders. Those who were truly culpable before
the Cuban public were President Prío, Defense Minister Rubén de León, Interior
Minister Lomberto Díaz, and, of course, Oscar Gans. Chibás concluded that:
While the government protects the gangster Masferrer with a grand
show of force in order to rob us of our radio time and the right to
disseminate our thinking, a right guaranteed by the
constitution…honest and decent citizens were not permitted to arrive
here as they have done every Sunday evening for seven years. Neither
Batista nor Grau restricted these rights despite the fact that we
combated them tenaciously. Carlos Prío was the first to do this!140
Chibás lacked the time or perhaps did not feel the need, given its obviousness, to
mention what many residents of the capital were almost surely contemplating.
Namely, these very police who were so miserably incompetent on January 10, who
proved incapable of stopping gangsters from committing murder in broad daylight
or making an arrest even though they were clearly nearby, seemed perfectly
assured when faced with a group of ordinary, unarmed citizens devoid of political
connections. The next day, with the island’s attention diverted by the championship
match-up between Almendares and Habana, José Otero Ben died from his wounds.
On Tuesday afternoon, February 20, an “uncountable” crowd of Ortodoxo leaders
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and supporters attended his burial.

A Bohemia reporter described with

unmistakable irony how the funeral procession passed along 23rd Street, which had
been so aggressively guarded two days earlier, on the way to the cemetery and how
the event came off with nary a single “accident.”141 During his eulogy, Chibás
praised the deceased and painted his party as a beacon of legality and coolheadedness. He observed that Otero Ben had fallen “defending the constitution” and
promised Ortodoxos would remain loyal to his “magnificent example” by seeking
redress in the courts because “we are not gangsters and are against criminality.”
Chibás added that, “When we are in power, we will present your assassins before
the tribunals of justice so they may be sentenced to prison. The constitution
prohibits the death penalty and we respect it and the law.” He concluded by saying,
“José Otero Ben, to you as with the people of Cuba, we will bring justice.”142
With this affair seemingly at an end, the government braced for the nation’s
wrath. Carlos Prío, who had opposed precisely this sort of brutality as a member of
the 1930 Student Directorate, had seriously blundered. Further, the administration
could expect no quarter from the island’s journalists given the disdain with which
they had been treated by policemen. In an article published in Prensa Libre, the
Republican senator Santiago Rey Perna claimed, “President Prío didn’t have a single
friend at his side.”143 Sadly for Cuba’s chief executive, this piece had been published
on Sunday, February 18, before the mass beating had taken place or José Otero Ben
had died.

His situation had certainly taken a turn for the worse since then.
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Nonetheless, the Auténticos pleaded their case. Lomberto Díaz, who lacked for
words when confronted by Chibás in CMQ’s studios, rejected the accusation, put
forth by Roberto Agramonte, that he had ordered the police to fire on the crowd.
Moreover, he claimed armed protesters had attacked the police and injured some of
them – although he failed to produce any wounded officers. Tony Varona opined
that Chibás “declared an insurrection against the government and incited the people
to attack it.”144 He also argued for more stringent measures that would allow the
president to shut down any radio station, newspaper or magazine whose behavior
was deemed disrespectful. The columnist Nick Machado replied that, “Varona is in
love with press censorship. In Argentina, he would collaborate very well with
Perón.”145 Ramón Vasconcelos, who had resigned his cabinet post over government
attacks on free expression, expressed his dismay in the form of a parable. He said,
I have just seen two contrasting scenes on television regarding the
events of a few days ago. In one Rolando Masferrer appears smiling,
conceited and self-satisfied after having had his way. He was
accompanied by the ministers of defense, interior and
communications along with the senate president and Senator Tejera.
All of them seemed satisfied as if they had won a great battle in favor
of democracy or Cuban brotherhood. In the other scene, an injured
man appears in a bed, wounded and suffering from terrible pain. A
doctor is trying to save him. At his side, their faces filled with
indignation and sadness stands various Ortodoxo leaders who are
worrying over the patient’s fate. They are Chibás, Márquez Sterling
[and] Agramonte. The first group descends jovially from the staircase
of a radio station. The second visits a hospital room. All are Cubans
but behold the moral chasm separating them! On one side are those
who persecute their countrymen who have differing opinions and
confront them with trigger happy police. The others, by contrast,
defend the people’s rights to express themselves freely…146
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Ortodoxos rallied around their party’s first martyr, collecting money in some
instances to raise a monument to him. Chibás had been receiving letters for years
now in which men and women declared their willingness to sacrifice themselves.
Within days of the funeral, an Ortodoxo from the town of Santo Domingo in Las
Villas province declared that Otero Ben had died “at peace” as he never “sold or
tried to make money from his ideal.”147 Others, while lamenting the “assault” were
almost delirious at the prospect political advantages they would reap from the
government’s heavy-handedness. Ernesto Buch López, a lawyer from Santiago de
Cuba, wrote to Chibás claiming the party would gain 100,000 extra votes because of
the incident. Eddy, with presumable delight, underlined this phrase with his red
pencil.148 The administration’s excesses in other areas, particularly its fervor for
shaking down wealthy citizens, were also potentially as harmful. In this vein,
Ramón Grau San Martín, who always reveled in pointing out Prío’s mistakes, told an
anecdote about a prosperous farmer in Camagüey province who had been forced to
pay 10,000 pesos to corrupt treasury ministry inspectors. Furious, the man, who
was not an Ortodoxo, told him, “I am voting for Chibás because things can’t continue
like this!”149
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Chapter 10
“I am Going to Open My Briefcase”

In late February, Chibás was confronted by a potentially embarrassing
situation. At that time, a group of campesinos appeared in Havana and claimed they
were being exploited.

This was fairly commonplace but these peasants also

happened to be employees of a coffee plantation near Guantánamo, whose part
owners were none other than the Chibás family. Eddy had inherited a one-sixth
share of the property from his father, which meant the self-styled protector of
Cuba’s rural poor was apparently profiting from their misery. Curiously, these
oppressed laborers did not direct their complaints to him, as Chibás had always
urged on his radio show but rather they spoke with reporters from the capital’s
major newspapers. This raised suspicions among Ortodoxos that the government
had staged the entire affair. Regardless, Chibás sensed an occasion for a grand
gesture. On February 24, Chibás announced he would donate his earnings from the
plantation to found and maintain a free school for the farmers’ children so they
could “learn to read and defend their rights.” He added, “May this example spread
among the new rich of our politics.”1 That evening, he journeyed to Guantánamo,

Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 738. This statement was actually the sharpest of double-edged
swords. In his will, José Manuel Alemán had designated five million pesos for the construction of a
hospital to treat children with tuberculosis. This caused a heated debate on the island, as the money
had obviously been embezzled and many, including Chibás, believed it should return to the state’s
coffers. In this sense, even acts of charity by Cuba’s nouveau riche politicians were stained by
thievery. Conversely, Chibás stressed that his family’s coffee plantation had been acquired via
“legitimate work” rather than stolen funds.
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signed the divestment papers and paid a visit to the plantation in question. Chibás
and a retinue of Ortodoxo eminences, including Millo Ochoa, Leonardo Fernández
Sánchez and Beto Saumell also used the trip to inaugurate party offices in the town.
Although an impending scandal had been defused and even turned to an advantage,
the fact that mid-sized Guantánamo, with more than 60,000 inhabitants, was only
now gaining a public headquarters proved Ortodoxos were still lagging in their
attempts to build a national party apparatus.

THE AUTENTICO-LIBERAL PACT
For more than a year now, Eduardo Suárez Rivas had been seeking a home for
the Liberals. Their traditional electoral partners, the Democrats, had long ago
signed up with the government. Ever since, Suárez Rivas had spent much of his time
flitting between Ortodoxo and Auténtico representatives. With presidential elections
on the horizon, talks had intensified in recent weeks. On February 27, Chibás sent
Suárez Rivas a missive that all but settled the issue.

He pronounced himself

unwilling to engage in further negotiations, underlined his commitment to
independence and, as he had done numerous times before, welcomed Liberals with
clean records to join the party on an individual basis. Suárez Rivas was thus nudged
toward the Auténticos and settled preliminary terms with Prime Minister Félix
Lancís and Senate President Tony Varona. In exchange for Liberal support, he
demanded three cabinet positions immediately along with nine senate seats, two to
three provincial governments and the vice presidency on the 1952 ticket.
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Upon hearing these conditions, Auténtico bigwigs gathered to discuss the
deal let out a collective gasp. Miguelito Suárez Fernández was the first to object,
saying the agreement was “premature” and “imprudent.”2 He claimed the party
would gain popularity with campesinos after congress approved the Agricultural
Development Bank. Suárez Rivas also expressed a preference for “old allies” over
the Liberals if assistance was required.3 To everyone’s alarm, Antonio Prío also
argued against the understanding, asserting it was needless in light of guarantees by
Suárez Fernández not to bolt the party. He also noted that “new directions” policies
discouraging corruption meant there was less cash and other incentives to lure
additional coalition partners. In fact, he observed that Democrats were already
chafing because they had fewer goodies than promised.

These opinions were

refuted by a red faced Diego Vicente Tejera, who responded in a voice taut with
urgency and anger. He protested that,
I have heard…Miguel Suárez talk of revitalizing the party through its
collateral sections, organizing the workers, the campesinos, the
women (and) the youth; but this makes me laugh. It is true, for
reasons we are not here to analyze that we can longer portray
ourselves as great social reformers nor anything of the sort. No one
believes in us any longer after having been in power for six
years…Gentleman, let’s not pretend. We are among family and can tell
the truth.4
In Tejera’s view, the pact was about winning and all other considerations were
secondary. “On the first of June in 1952,” he concluded, “I don’t want to find myself
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Ibid.
4 Ibid.
2
3

405

in limbo! I want the Auténticos to have won yet again.”5 Tensions rose further when
Paco Prío denounced the pact, leading some to believe the president himself was
less enthusiastic about it than they had imagined. This impression was swiftly and
heatedly dismissed by Tony Varona. A visibly perturbed Félix Lancís wondered
why, if there was no consensus, he and Varona had wasted their time in the first
place. “This is ridiculous,” he huffed, “and I’m too old for this!”6 When news leaked
out that the agreement was on hold, Eduardo Suárez Rivas fumed and publicly
scuttled the bargain. This prompted Carlos Prío to send his presidential airplane for
the liberal leader so they could talk things over in “La Altura.” After plying his guest
with a sumptuous breakfast, Prío assured him a deal would go through “regardless
of what happens” in the Auténtico executive committee.7 At the same time, Prío
advised Suárez Rivas to be flexible in his demands as he hoped to bring Grau and
Castellanos into the fold before election time.
For his part, Chibás wasted no time condemning what he called a “pact of
renegades.”8

This was the ultimate cynical combination and Chibás delighted in

identifying the hypocrisy of both parties. The Auténticos, as everyone knew, had
incessantly vilified their Liberal opponents in the 1948 presidential campaign –
equating their possible victory with a Machado style restoration. Indulging in some
brazenness of his own, Chibás scolded the Auténticos for belittling Ricardo Núñez
without recognizing his “undeniable personal prestige.”9

Chibás, after all, had
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leveled more devastating attacks against Núñez and placed him closer to Machado
than any other candidate. Relying on the short memories of his fellow Cubans, he
advertised that Ortodoxos distinguished between Machado loyalists and regular
Liberals who were “deceived and exploited” by the party hierarchy.10 Chibás was
more effective at highlighting the growing divide between Auténtico and Liberal
chieftains and their rank and file supporters. “What,” he asked, “will the thousands
Auténtico party members say after having been taught for the past 15 years to hate
anything that smells Liberal?” In the same spirit, he inquired, “What will Liberal
masses say about being used as a trampoline by the Auténticos so they can retain
power for four more years?”11 Eddy’s intuition on this matter was corroborated by
a survey of Auténticos published on March 18. Asked which electoral partner would
prove most valuable to the party’s prospects in 1952, only 8.05 percent chose the
Liberals. By contrast, 59.73 thought reuniting with Grau would greatly enhance
their chances.12 Further, a poll of the general population was equally discouraging
as 42.69 percent of respondents believed the Auténtico-Liberal pact would damage
Cuba. Conversely, a mere 13.27 percent held that it would benefit the country. 13
Among Liberals, evidence of discontent was more anecdotal but the signs were
ominous. For instance, the Liberal congressman Radio Cremata complained the
party had “been turned into a cash cow” and predicted the agreement would herald
its demise.14 The Liberals suffered a symbolic blow on March 18, when Emilio
Ibid.
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Núñez Blanco, the young nephew of Ricardo Núñez, appeared on Eddy’s show and
announced he was joining the Ortodoxos.15 Other less prominent Liberals expressed
their disgust in personal letters to Chibás. One man, who was a sugar worker,
wrote:
…the person writing to you is a born Liberal who will die a Liberal,
one who is not for sale and cannot be bought for any price contrary to
what the party leaders believe and I want them and the people of
Cuba to know that honorable Liberals with a sense of shame still exist
and these Liberals will know what to do with their votes, getting rid of
this heap of assassins, thieves and traitors to the fatherland and
replacing them on June 1, 1952 with the only man who can honorably
rule the destiny of Cuba, Eduardo R. Chibás.16
To underscore how bizarre the Auténtico-Liberal arrangement really was,
Chibás reproduced various statements from Carlos Prío and Eduardo Suárez Rivas
regarding each other and their respective parties. For example, in April of 1948,
Prío asserted that Liberal higher-ups had “enriched themselves by pillaging the
Cuban people.”17 The following month he said that,
…the Liberal party, which arrived at its climax with the tyranny of
General Machado, was characterized by its subjugation to Yankee
imperialism and by the utilization of foreign loans to construct public
works; the negation of fundamental liberties; the destruction of labor
unions; (and) muffling freedom of speech, the press and assembly.18
Meanwhile, in September of 1950, Suárez Rivas told a journalist that, “Prío wants to
avoid supervision of the treasury so he can use the people’s money according to his
whims.” A month later, he affirmed that the government “lacks a moral basis,
Emilio Núñez Blanco would later support Fulgencio Batista after his coup in March of 1952. He
subsequently became notable for marrying Mirta Díaz-Balart, the ex wife of Fidel Castro.
16 Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 39, Expediente 1144: 54, ANC.
17 Eduardo R. Chibás, “Pacto de Renegados,” Bohemia, March 11, 1951: 54.
18 Eduardo R. Chibás, “El Pacto de la Desvergüenza,” March 18, 1951: supplement, 20.
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violates rights, ignores the law and knowingly contradicts the constitution.”19
Vitriolic as they were, the above statements lost all significance once Suárez Rivas
gained proximity to the jamón. Without further ado, he was named agriculture
minister while Ramón Zaydín displaced Democratic chief José Andreu in the island’s
commerce ministry. Even as many everyday Liberals fumed, the party’s nabobs
were ecstatic and effusively congratulated their leader. When Suárez Rivas broke
the news of his meeting with Prío in “La Altura,” a Bohemia reporter snidely noted
that his audience behaved as if, “their souls had been returned to their bodies”
because “There was still an opportunity snatch a slice of the budget even if they
would be last in line.”20

THE INDICTMENT OF GRAU
The pact between Auténticos and Liberals occupied the nation’s attention
only a short time before being eclipsed by something astonishing. On March 17,
Judge Federico Justiniani announced the indictment of Ramón Grau San Martín as
part of the Causa 82 proceedings. As Justiniani had promised, the burglary of his
office nine and a half months earlier had not derailed or even substantially delayed
the case. In November of 1950, he charged Eduardo Sánchez Alfonso, the former
director of Havana’s customs house, with illegally transferring roughly 9.5 million
pesos to the national treasury – where they were ultimately siphoned off under
diverse guises. Unfortunately, Sánchez Alfonso had fled the country with his booty
and was beyond the reach of justice. Grau, on the other hand, defiantly remained in
19
20
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his Miramar mansion and had refused to run for public office as a way of avoiding
prosecution. Judge Justiniani answered his regular protestations of innocence with
a carefully researched brief, covering 17 pages, offering Cubans extensive evidence
to the contrary. Much space was devoted to Grau’s scandalous enablement of his
favorite minister, José Manuel Alemán.

Ultimately, this was the crux of

unprecedented and by now well publicized acts of shamelessness. These included a
bacchanalia of thievery during the final ten days of Grau’s term in which 20, 765,872
pesos, or approximately 10 percent of the national budget, disappeared.

Also

documented was Alemán’s habit of selling teaching positions in Cuba’s public
schools for up to 2000 pesos and generally using the education ministry as his own
personal piggy bank even after he had been replaced. Judge Justiniani averred that
Grau was “principally responsible” for this conduct given that he “could have and
should have put a stop to these activities.”21
This was the most spectacular story in Cuba and journalists descended upon
Grau’s home to hear what he had to say. Mostly, they were treated to a series of
bizarre explanations and thinly veiled barbs. Among other things, Grau declared he
had been tried under Machado and now history was repeating itself because
Liberals were once again part of the government.22 Subsequently, he asserted that
Cuba’s polytechnic schools were the “pride of the country” during his
administration.

He thus staunchly defended Alemán, insisting his erstwhile
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education minister had “left behind many beneficial things for the people.”23 Above
all, Grau was incensed with Carlos Prío and though he never mentioned him directly,
many of his remarks targeted his onetime disciple. His reference to the Liberals was
a case in point. Another was his assertion that:
I am willing to demonstrate publicly how I acquired my properties.
They are a product of my own hard work, in caring for my patients
and though long nights of study. By the same token, I will demand on
the radio, in the press and on the street that everyone does the same
as I! Let them show how they entered into official positions without a
centavo and later on, how they enjoy lots of money!24
Grau had been especially enraged during his arraignment, when Judge Justiniani
informed him that Prío’s presidency showed signs of dishonesty as well. This was
precisely why the trial promised to be so tricky. Any investigation into corruption
during Grau’s rule would shed light on Prío’s foibles and implicate the Auténtico
party as a whole. For this reason, the Grau stalwart Alberto Cruz lamented that, “We
will no longer be able to campaign based on the positive advantages achieved during
our government.”25 The party’s ultimate pragmatist, Diego Vicente Tejera, spoke
more bluntly when asked for his opinion – volunteering that, “There were only two
ways out of this: resolving the matter by paying everyone off or letting things play
out as they have. And here you see the consequences!”26
As the scandal broke on a Saturday, Chibás readied himself to pounce 24
hours later. During his broadcast, he commended Judge Justiniani for “writing an
exemplary page in the annals of Cuba’s judiciary” and revealing how “modest public
Ibid.
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employees or politicians” including Alemán, Alberto Inocente Álvarez, Carlos Prío
and Virgilio Pérez had “magically” become “opulent businessmen.”27

Claiming

thievery of state funds was a “crime against the fatherland,” he said, “Delinquency in
government circles should be punished like any other offense” and stipulated that
“Sleazy big shots should also go to prison!”28 In this vein, he urged Judge Justiniani
not to forget Fulgencio Batista, saying, “While he was in power, Batista robbed
everything he could. If he didn’t steal more it was only because he presided over a
less prosperous era.”29 Eddy’s rant against Cuba’s overnight millionaires did not go
unanswered, of course. At 8:30 p.m., Antonio Prío appeared on Unión Radio with a
rebuttal. Employing all manner of colorful language, he styled Justiniani a “venal
judge,” a “prevaricator,” a “zombie” and an “automaton in the hands of Chibás and
Pelayo Cuervo.”30 For good measure, he tapped him as a Communist sympathizer
too. Antonio had every reason to smear Judge Justiniani for he would likely figure in
future Causa 82 indictments. As a pre-emptive defense, the president’s younger
brother asserted that he had never behaved incorrectly in the treasury ministry and
as proof of his innocence vowed never to abandon the country or seek refuge in
parliamentary immunity.31
Curiously, Antonio’s tirade made no reference to Grau. The reason for this
soon became apparent when a coterie of Auténticos and ex Auténticos, including
Félix Lancís, Miguelito Suárez Fernández, Tony Varona, Nicolás Castellanos and

Ibid., 79-80.
Ibid., 80.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Fernán Villalva, “El Procesamiento del Ex Presidente Grau,” Carteles, March 25, 1951: 74.
27
28

412

César Casas appeared at Grau’s house in an impressive show of solidarity.32 Also
present was the ever protean Guillermo Alonso Pujol along with Carlos Arazoza, a
former education minister and acolyte of José Manuel Alemán. Even Luis Caíñas
Milanés was on hand. The Auténtico congressman was a living testament to the evils
of parliamentary immunity, having murdered a fellow Auténtico legislator in broad
daylight three years earlier. Everyone appreciated the danger Causa 82 represented
for their political futures and set all grudges aside. However, as Grau issued a new
public statement, the decision to surround himself with embezzlers, black
marketers and a known murderer seemed dubious. This was especially true since
Grau based his defense on ethical deficiencies of Judge Justiniani and the Ortodoxos.
Rather than offering evidence for his charges, he resorted to folksy aphorisms,
noting that “(The Ortodoxos) speak constantly of morality and honor but the truth
resembles the Spanish proverb that says, ‘Tell me what you possess and I’ll tell you
what you lack.’”33 He also employed old fashioned name calling, describing Pelayo
Cuervo as “acromegalic” and “abnormal” while likening Chibás to a howling
monkey.34 Later that day, a Bohemia reporter visited the Ortodoxo leader at home to
hear his reaction. Not surprisingly, Chibás was in a jovial mood and received him
with alacrity. Rummaging through his collection of old press clippings Chibás
withdrew a Carteles article from July 16, 1939 in which Grau was quoted as saying:
Cuba must do everything it can to change the prevailing mentality so
that the public believes robbing the treasury is infinitely more
After Grau’s anti-government harangue on Saturday, Carlos Prío dispatched Félix Lancís to
negotiate a truce between both sides. In exchange for official support, Grau dispensed with his
criticism of the Auténtico-Liberal pact and agreed to assist the administration in its war of words
against the Ortodoxos.
33 “En Cuba, Tribunales: ‘Ni Acuso ni me Defiendo; soy un Juez,’” Bohemia, March 25, 1951: 80.
34 Ibid.
32
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dangerous than robbing a bank. We cannot continue with the same
moral dissolution our country has suffered since it became
independent, in which government employees, after occupying their
posts for some time, become fabulously wealthy. Such overnight
fortunes at the treasury’s expense must be adequately sanctioned.35
Grau, of course, never acted upon his lofty oratory. To illustrate the abyss between
word and deed, Chibás produced the transcript of a radio broadcast by Carlos Prío
from May 30, 1950. He called this “the most forceful reply to the grand corruptor of
Cuban politics.”36 At the time, Prío announced that:
When I took office, the treasury ministry was the scandal of Cuba. It
took me more than a year to clean up the embarrassments there. I
received a nation in debt so extreme that no supplier was willing to
provide medicine to the sick, food for the imprisoned and cement or
treenails for public works. I received a country divided by hatred in
which men hunted each other with guns in the streets. Upon
becoming president, I found 101 unfinished construction projects
whose completion required 205 million pesos. The public works
ministry owed suppliers and workers 20 million pesos, of which two
million was for salaries. Everyone in Cuba knows that on October 10,
1948 there was no money in the register.37
Later that week, Alerta columnist Rafael Estenger added a new wrinkle to the
polemic. Shunning crude or eye catching phrases in favor of lawyerly logic, he
advanced a highly provocative argument. He indicated that Grau was basically
being tried for tolerating José Manuel Alemán’s sleaze. However, according to the
constitution, the prime minister bore responsibility for the government’s “general
politics” and ruled hand in hand with the president.38 This seemed to imply that
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Grau’s prime minister, none other than Carlos Prío, was also culpable for Alemán’s
offenses.
On March 25, Grau appeared as the weekly guest on Ante la Prensa and
offered another outlandish performance. Asked why he stubbornly defended a man
like José Manuel Alemán, who had been “totally repudiated” by the Cuban public,
Grau responded that his former education minister was, in fact, a darling of the
masses. As proof, he cited Alemán’s election to the senate. He then mused rather
wistfully that, “[Alemán] was accused of so many things but people showed up to his
funeral, they came to be there with him!”39 Grau was wrong on both accounts but
did not allow reality to besmirch his logic. Alemán obtained his senate seat because
he was on a winning party slate in 1948 not due to personal popularity. Regarding
his burial, it was modesty attended as befit a man known for depriving
schoolchildren of their breakfasts. In any case, Grau offered equally unsatisfying
answers to ensuing queries. When asked if Alemán had embezzled state funds, Grau
stonewalled. As to how Alemán could have amassed so many properties without
robbing the treasury, Grau changed the subject.

Forced to contemplate the

possibility of Alemán’s dishonesty, Grau waxed allegorical, saying, “It’s as if you
allowed a friend to stay in your house and he kidnapped your child. I wouldn’t be
responsible because I didn’t put him there to kidnap. In this case, it’s the same
thing: I didn’t put Alemán in the education ministry to enrich himself, I put him

preside. The prime minister represents the general politics of the government, and shall represent
the latter before congress.”
39 “En Cuba, Política: Grau San Martín Ante la Prensa,” Bohemia, April 1, 1951: 60.
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there to work.”40

Grau was no more forthcoming about other aspects of his

administration. For example, questioned about gangsterism, he rambled about how,
“Many of them, although they behaved badly, were not bad people,” and denied his
administration maintained links with gangsters or allowed them to act with
impunity.41
Despite this embarrassing spectacle, the Auténticos had no choice but to back
him. The next evening, the party’s executive committee praised Grau and rebuked
Judge Justiniani in a public statement. In a parallel gesture, Eusebio Mujal, chief of
the Auténtico controlled Cuban Workers Confederation, affirmed the “working
classes” were behind Grau.42 He also mimicked a favorite tactic of Chibás by
declaiming the injustice of Grau’s trial while known murderers such as Fulgencio
Batista and “hundreds more” roamed free.43 Eduardo Suárez Rivas conveniently
forgot his long history of Grau bashing by declaring Causa 82 “legally unjustified.”44
The Liberal chief, who wished to please his new coalition partners, lamented quite
disingenuously that Cuba’s courts were destroying “our great national leaders.”45
Responding to this barrage of official disparagement, 14 Havana Instructional Court
judges published an open letter in the press.

They appealed for an end to

“unjustified demagogic attacks against the prestige of the republic’s courts” whose
object was to “interfere with judicial independence.”46 Aside from its campaign
against Judge Justiniani, the government availed itself once again of press
Ibid.
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42“Opinan Sobre el Procesamiento del Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín,” Bohemia, April 1, 1951: 72.
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censorship – this time against the Ortodoxo radio host Guido García Inclán. He had
recently pioneered a new format that entailed interviewing guests via telephone and
broadcasting the conversations over the air. Unhappily, his choice of subjects,
including Ramón Vasconcelos, Pelayo Cuervo and Chibás, was not to the
administration’s liking nor was their tendency to discuss Grau’s impending trial and
the Auténtico-Liberal pact. Thus, Communications Minister Sergio Megías all but
banned the interviews by requiring their texts to be handed over for approval five
days in advance. Conversely, Chibás was not obstructed in any way. He remarked
that:
The uproar nurtured by the embezzlers against the courts of justice is
even less justifiable given that the indictment handed down by the
upright Judge Justiniani is notable for its moderation and prudence
and shows extraordinary consideration to ex President Grau. For
example, he is not being held on bail but is free to enjoy his liberty.
Nevertheless, followers of Grau, Prío, Batista and the Liberals who
show support for embezzlers never think for a moment about the
millions of senior citizens, women and children who have died in
hospitals during the past ten years because thieves in the
administrations of Batista and Grau robbed the money for medicines.
The same thing is happening under Prío. These are the true victims;
these are the real unhappy ones. These are the people defended by
the Cuban Peoples’ Party, not the bandits, the impudent or the cynics
who have become multi-millionaires and who have bought palaces
and fincas with the money they have robbed and who now
hypocritically pretend to be unhappy.47
On April 3, the administration’s relentless harassment of the judiciary sparked
debate in Cuba’s bar association. The topic was broached by Emilio Núñez Blanco,
the recent Ortodoxo convert who urged his peers to pass a motion backing Judge
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Justiniani against “inconsiderate attacks.”48

However, several members were

reluctant to involve the organization in what they considered a partisan matter.
Mario Lamar remarked that the bar association had remained mum when Chibás
accused a judge of taking bribes after ruling in favor of the Cuban Electric Company.
While not against a pronouncement of some sort, he argued the one submitted by
Núñez Blanco should be shorn of its references to Judge Justiniani so as to be
generic and apolitical in nature. Another lawyer named Ovidio Mañalich disagreed,
saying:
What Justiniani has done is so exemplary that it has no parallel in the
history of Latin America. The idea that the law should apply equally
to the powerful as well as the weak will no longer be just another
aspiration. This indictment means that Cuba can truly function as a
complete and dynamic democracy. In defending Judge Justiniani, the
judge who has tried for the first time in our hemisphere an ex
president, we are giving a great lesson to our citizens. This being the
case, we can mention him by name and I don’t have the slightest
doubt the bar association will be fulfilling its duty by approving this
motion.49
Humberto Sorí Marín added that the time was right to “define ourselves without half
measures or euphemisms,” especially while government figures such as Tony
Varona, himself a lawyer, was assailing the judiciary so aggressively.50 The naïve
Núñez Blanco proved more pliable. He allowed bar association president Gastón
Godoy to alter the document if he promised not to alter its fundamental spirit. In
fact, this led to a heated row as Godoy rendered his motion entirely neutral after it
was approved by majority vote. Even Núñez Blanco’s signature phrase about justice
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applying equally to the powerful as well as the weak was removed because,
explained, Godoy, similar words appeared in the constitution. Sorí Marín tried to
console his younger colleague by stoically saying, “This is the first time you have
been disappointed here. I have suffered the same fate many times.”51
This minor frustration would pale by comparison to what was in store. On
April 27, Judge Justiniani received a complaint demanding that he recuse himself
because a relative of his was among the defendants and contending this “intimate
friendship” compromised judicial objectivity.52 While this seemed a reasonable
objection at first glance, its author was the infamous spoiler Froilán Núñez. The 90
year old veteran of Cuba’s liberation army, who maintained close ties to Carlos Prío,
had already gained the recusal of one Causa 82 judge on spurious grounds. A day
later, Núñez added an additional charge – namely, that Judge Justiniani was an
Ortodoxo “sympathizer” serving the interests of Pelayo Cuervo. 53 No one believed
Núñez was acting alone, particularly as the Grau loyalist Carlos Estévez had been
bragging between court sessions that he knew a way to save his political patron.
Judge Justiniani responded that he was only distantly related to the man in question,
Luis Arango Fumagalli, and claimed the two were not close. Even so, he had no
recourse but to leave the case. An outraged Pelayo Cuervo observed that Núñez was
a “front man” for the Prío family and a convicted criminal as well, having once
murdered a man only to be pardoned by President Alfredo Zayas in the early
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1920s.54 Cuervo also derided Núñez’s lawyer, Israel Algaze, who was on the public
payroll as an agriculture ministry employee and always enthusiastic about serving
his patrons. He concluded that, “All these tricks, in total, are little more than a new
plan, devised with the consent of the president of the republic, to hinder the
implementation of justice in the most scandalous trial in our history as a republic.”55
Ramón Vasconcelos wrote that, “Every time there is an honest judge, the
government looks for a stooge whom it can maneuver from behind the scenes by a
minister of Injustice.”56 For his part, Froilán Núñez said nothing to dispel the idea
that he was a government pawn. In an interview with a Bohemia correspondent he
was asked to explain his decision to the Cuban public. Núñez replied:
Let me be frank. When I saw that the presidents of the senate, the
Cuban Workers Confederation, the Auténtico party and other
responsible people signaled that Judge Justiniani sympathized with
the party of Chibás and that he and other leaders of his party
defended him, I felt that Judge Justiniani should not continue because
he appeared partial.57
Cuba’s cartoonists saw things rather differently. One sketched a beaming Grau
driving a truck bearing a sign saying, “Froilán: Available for Rent.”58 Another drew a
walking billboard which read, “You Don’t Have to Go to Prison! Froilán: He Does All
Types of Recusals for Modest Prices!”59

Regardless of these jibes, there was

rejoicing in government circles but this was tempered by the Havana court’s
unanimous selection of Gilberto Mosquera as Justiniani’s replacement. Known as an
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honorable man cut from the same cloth as his predecessor, Judge Mosquera was
certainly no flunky.
Grau’s lawyers were nonetheless optimistic that Judge Mosquera would
prove more sympathetic. In short order, they submitted a brief requesting that the
charges against their client be dismissed. As Grau was represented by José Miró
Cardona and Carlos Menció, both of whom were among Cuba’s leading attorneys,
many who were familiar with the case anticipated a favorable verdict. Essentially,
their argument was threefold. First, they invoked Article 145 of the constitution –
which stated that presidents could only be judged by the Supreme Tribunal. Second,
they asserted that Grau himself had not committed any crime. Lastly, they reasoned
he was innocent of malversation since no public money had been under his personal
control. On May 18, however, Judge Mosquera rejected their appeal. José Miró
Cardona’s logic had relied heavily on a Supreme Tribunal precedent from 1935,
whereby a mayor and his treasurer were tried for fraud but only the latter was
convicted. Judge Mosquera ruled this was irrelevant since it was based on a statute
from 1870 rather than the current Code of Social Defense. The updated law cast a
wider net of culpability, which Judge Mosquera explained to a Bohemia reporter in
the following terms:
The problem of profit is a question that should be very clear for a
judge. From a popular point of view, profit suggests gaining material
benefit from a deal regardless of whether the intent was good or bad,
but for a judge, this concept has a wider meaning. If an individual, for
example, steals a pair of glasses in order to make a gift to someone
who really needs them, he’s profiting from the interior satisfaction
that comes from the act and even the good reputation he acquires for
having done it. But it’s a crime that should be punished even if people
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believe he was pursuing altruistic ends and not for his own private
gain.60
Applying this to Grau, he allowed that the ex president may not have personally
robbed the treasury but he certainly profited from Alemán’s misbehavior. As for the
contention that Grau was only subject to judgment by the Supreme Tribunal, Judge
Mosquera noted this applied exclusively to sitting presidents.
No one relished this turn of events more than Pelayo Cuervo, who asked,
“What will the government and Grau’s defenders say about Judge Mosquera’s
decision now? Will they accuse him too of being an Ortodoxo and aspiring to a
senate seat, the way Senate President Varona did, so irresponsibly (with Judge
Justiniani)?”61 The gravity of Grau’s situation was beyond dispute, highlighted by a
ruling stuffed with foreboding references.

Point by point, Judge Mosquera

demolished Grau’s pleas, legal and otherwise, that he had stood aloof from the
sordidness of his administration. He noted that Grau had re-appointed Alemán as
education minister and subsequently as minister without portfolio despite the
“public scandal” provoked by his “well known” thefts.62

Judge Mosquera also

observed that Grau continued to support his favorite minister in the face of day-byday press accounts, both in Cuba and abroad, of his “real estate acquisitions worth
millions of pesos.”63 In addition, he affirmed that Alemán had utilized a portion of
his ill gotten gains to form BAGA along with the ex president’s “close relative,”
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Francisco Grau Alsina.64 Judge Mosquera was all but saying Grau should reserve a
cell in Havana’s Castillo del Príncipe. Given his expansive view of culpability, many
high level Auténticos, including all three Prío brothers, could easily find themselves
behind bars some day as well. The administration thus did not tarry in seeking to
remove Judge Mosquera from the case.

By early June, he became the third

consecutive judge to be recused on flimsy pretenses.

THE LATEST POLL
On May 17, Raúl Gutiérrez appeared as a guest on Guido García Inclán’s radio
show. Cuba’s public survey guru had recently conducted a fresh round of interviews
and the results would appear in Bohemia shortly. With elections now barely a year
away and given the accuracy of previous forecasts, his conclusions were anxiously
awaited. Gutiérrez related that his poll was “absolutely national,” with rural and
urban Cubans in every province consulted.65 Lastly, he cautioned that his work was
not a “prophesy” but rather “a register of current opinion.”66 When Bohemia hit the
newsstands, readers encountered an admixture of familiar and novel queries but the
data once again proved encouraging for Chibás.
Questioned about Carlos Prío’s administration, 22.80 percent of Cubans
replied that it was “good.” This represented a nearly five point improvement on the
president’s rating from December of 1950 but was still quite low. At the same time,
35.00 percent of Cubans answered “bad,” which was half a percentage point worse
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than the previous poll. An additional 25.22 percent said it was “average.” Another
troubling sign was that a mere 40.44 percent of Auténticos were pleased with Prío.
His popularity among the party’s coalition partners was much lower, as only 22.92
percent of Democrats and 18.23 percent of Liberals viewed him positively.67
Among the 60.22 percent of Cubans who considered Prío “bad” or “average” their
four biggest complaints were the poor economic situation, a lack of construction
projects, corruption and abuses against workers. In many ways, these problems
were interrelated. For example, construction projects served as a prime source of
jobs but resentment simmered because they were not distributed evenly
throughout Cuba.68 Moreover, despite Prío’s promises to improve the lot of rustic
dwellers, their misery sometimes played to the party’s advantage.

After all,

desperate peasants were more likely to sell their votes when elections rolled
around. Another sore point was the black market’s resurgence, which raised the
cost of living.

The island’s myriad sugar workers were also angered by the one

percent tax levied on their salaries to fund the Cuban Workers Confederation,
especially as that money was funding the government controlled union’s often
violent acts against rival outfits.

Naturally, some of that cash was bound to

disappear into venal pockets as well.
Not only were Cubans broadly dissatisfied with Prío, they showed scant
enthusiasm for his probable successors. Carlos Hevia and Tony Varona, who were
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the president’s favorites, polled 2.59 percent and 2.20 percent respectively.
Miguelito Suárez Fernández tried to portray himself as a more pragmatic choice but
was unloved outside his native Las Villas.

Paradoxically, the most desirable

Auténtico was not even seeking the nomination. This was Pepe San Martín, the
acclaimed former public works minister, picked by 7.73 percent of Cuban voters. As
in December of 1950, the most popular candidates were Chibás and Batista. The
Ortodoxo leader remained ahead by a wide margin at 29.70 percent, but this was
five points lower than his previous rating. Chibás, who had benefited from an
outpouring of sympathy after his surgery, may well have slipped now that he was
once again in rude good health. At the same time, Batista had climbed four points to
19.03 percent but Chibás led in all six provinces and was preferred by members of
every social class.69 He was also more admired by Auténticos than Pepe San Martín
or Miguelito Suárez Fernández. His lone weakness appeared to be among Cubans
over 50 years old. Even in this category, he trailed Batista by less than three points.
This disparity was remedied by his dominant showing among the nation’s youth as
Cubans aged 20 to 30 opted for Chibás over Batista by more than 19 points.70
Shortly after appearing, the poll was relentlessly parsed by commentators
and common citizens alike. “What can be guessed from this survey?” inquired
Ramón Vasconcelos, “What we already know: that the government has lost the
street definitively.”71 Rafael Estenger ventured that the Auténticos would need a
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“miracle” to win in 1952.72 The columnist Manuel Alfonso of El Crisol observed that
this was the third consecutive survey showing Chibás ahead, indicating the Ortodoxo
chief’s magnetism was “deeply rooted” among the Cuban electorate.73 As expected,
those with close ties to the presidential palace such as Antonio Prío, Félix Lancís and
Aureliano Sánchez Arango interpreted the results far differently. They argued that
respondents who classified the administration as “average” were actually
supporters. By this reckoning, 48 percent of Cubans were behind them. This
curious logic was also adopted by Gustavo Herrero of El País, the pro Liberal
broadsheet which now toed the government line. Raúl Gutiérrez himself arrived at
a very different conclusion, telling viewers of Unión Radio-Televisión that, “If
elections were held tomorrow, Chibás would be president with majorities in all six
provinces.”74
Unlike his younger brother or other close associates, Carlos Prío did not
publicly mention the survey or its implications. Instead, he took to the radio on May
22 and reminded Cubans of his achievements in a wide ranging speech. Prío was
especially proud of his work with congress, which enacted laws creating the
National Bank and Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank. He bragged that
the newly minted Tribunal of Accounts and State Bookkeeping Law would
transform embezzlement from an unfortunate habit to a common crime. Prío also
crowed about tax increases recently approved by the legislature that would
guarantee solvent retirement funds and raise judicial salaries. In a bid to mollify
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rural Cubans, Prío alluded to a special four percent levy on utility companies that
would help purchase land for poor peasants. Further, he promised five million pesos
for agricultural reform and one million pesos for a children’s hospital. Of course,
Chibás was unwilling to cede the momentum and during his Sunday show he
denigrated or denied each of these accomplishments with characteristic flair. He
said Prío deserved no applause for the National Bank, Tribunal of Accounts or State
Bookkeeping Law as these were merely “demands of the constitution.”75 Chibás
added that the latter two were actually Ortodoxo initiatives since Manuel Dorta
Duque had introduced the bill to establish the Tribunal of Accounts while Pelayo
Cuervo designed the State Bookkeeping Law. These measures would not have been
approved without the government’s consent, but even this was turned against Prío
for Chibás claimed they would take effect too late to ensure honesty in the current
administration. Thus, Prío seemed to be telling future presidents, “Do what I say,
not what I do.”76 Regarding the other Auténtico policies, Chibás found them wanting
or insufficient and concluded each criticism with pledges to do things better. For
instance, he noted that Ortodoxo lawmakers had attempted to amend the tax bill so
retirees and veterans of Cuba’s independence struggle would receive back pay on
their pensions. Although this was rejected by the pro-government majority, Chibás
said, “We will do this when we are in power.”77 In the same fashion, he observed
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that Ortodoxos tried to raise judicial salaries by half but the administration held the
line at 20 percent. Once again, he repeated, “We will do this when we are in
power.”78 As for the four percent duty on public utilities, Chibás claimed the
government would use the proceeds to subsidize its electoral campaign rather than
acquiring lots for campesinos. “We will annul such tricks,” confirmed Chibás, “when
we are in power.”79 He also calculated that the five million pesos earmarked for
agricultural reform amounted to just one percent of total government revenue – a
proportion he deemed “ridiculous” and “humiliating.”80 By comparison, he pointed
out that waiters never received less than 10 percent in tips. Finally, Chibás boasted
that Prío could lay the first stone for a Havana clinic but the Ortodoxos would
supervise its completion and also that of five other hospitals – one in each province.
In short, anything the Auténticos could do, his party would do better.
Apart from scolding the administration, Chibás sought to expand his lead in
the polls by associating with well-liked or emblematic figures. Thus, on his June 3
broadcast, he presented the Afro Cuban boxing champion Kid Gavilán along with the
Salvadorian general Gregorio Bustamante Maceo. Gavilán was the island’s newest
sporting hero, having captured the world welterweight title a few weeks earlier in
New York’s Madison Square Garden. Pugilism was second only to baseball as a
national passion and hundreds of Cubans had attended the bout. In fact, shortly
after Gavilán’s victory was announced, a delirious multitude of his compatriots
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rushed the ring to congratulate him – overcoming the determined resistance of Big
Apple cops in the process. As an idol of the masses himself, Chibás recognized a
popularity magnet when he saw one. Not only did Chibás feature Gavilán on his
radio show, but he, José Pardo Llada and the Ortodoxo representative Gerardo
Vázquez made a public show of having lunch with him as well. Eddy’s other radio
guest, Bustamante Maceo, represented a different sort of compelling story. A citizen
of El Salvador, he nonetheless claimed to be a son of Antonio Maceo; the general and
independence martyr reverently known as the Bronze Titan. Most likely, Chibás had
learned about him in 1950 when Bohemia published an article exploring his
background. Bustamante Maceo’s current visit had set off a storm of debate, though
his putative aunt accepted him as a family member. As Chibás took over the
microphone, puffed up with endorsements from an adored athlete and son of a
founding father, his moment was ruined somewhat by an odd turn of events. While
he addressed the audience, a portion of the wall behind him slowly became
detached and produced an unnerving sound before crashing to the floor. Chibás,
who had no clue what was going on, briefly ignited a panic throughout Cuba by
yelling, “Nobody move, whatever happens!”81 The confusion was soon cleared up
and if his adversaries viewed this as a metaphor for the man they believed was
prone to overexcitement; Chibás knew his instincts had carried him to the brink of
Cuba’s highest office.
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THE FINAL LOUD KNOCK
In late May, the Prensa Libre correspondent Mario Lliraldi conducted an
interview with José Pardo Llada. During their conversation, he inquired why Chibás
never attacked Aureliano Sánchez Arango. As a close advisor of Carlos Prío and
potential presidential rival, Sánchez Arango certainly seemed a ripe target for the
Ortodoxo leader. “Is there mutual respect?” asked the inquisitive reporter. “Fear,
perhaps?”
“No, it’s not fear,” responded Pardo Llada, “because Chibás is not afraid of
anyone.”
“Well then?”
“Chibás will attack Aureliano when it’s convenient for him not when it’s
convenient for Aureliano.”82
For the time being, there was no need to pick a fight. Sánchez Arango had a
meager popularity rating of 2.01 percent and Chibás felt he would not be chosen as
the Auténtico standard bearer.

Further, the education minister was currently

embroiled in a dispute with Batista’s ex police chief, Manuel Benítez. At a Causa 82
hearing, Benítez had accused him of spending 50,000 pesos in public funds to bribe
Judge Justiniani against Grau. Benítez could not prove these charges and a Bohemia
correspondent called them “an example of irresponsibility.”83 Even so, there was
plenty of anger against Sánchez Arango in some quarters – particularly among the
thousands of teachers and education ministry employees he had fired. Many of
those who had been displaced possessed links to José Manuel Alemán and were
82
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unqualified for their jobs. However, there were also grumbles about schools being
shut down for political reasons. For example, in April of 1950 Sánchez Arango
decided to close the highly regarded Holguín Normal School in Oriente province
even though it covered its own expenses and cost the state nothing to operate.
Similar schools in Guantánamo and Manzanillo met the same fate. In each instance,
they were simply declared illegal. Regardless of whether their dismissals were
justified, Cuba’s vast pool of laid off teachers and school inspectors eagerly believed
the worst about Sánchez Arango. When the allegations of Benítez were reported, a
group of ousted teachers from Camagüey wrote Chibás and urged him to take up the
issue on his radio show. Above all, they were anxious to see the education ministry
“dictator” ridiculed.84 Chibás declined to involve himself in the matter, probably
because he considered Benítez untrustworthy. At any rate, a full blown polemic
developed between Sánchez Arango and Batista’s old chum.85
On June 1, Sánchez Arango interrupted this quarrel to launch a contumely
against Chibás. The Ortodoxo leader was unruffled but a spat ensued among his
followers. This was because Jorge Mañach, perhaps the most non-partisan of all
Ortodoxos, saw fit to praise Sánchez Arango in his Diario de la Marina column two
days later. Mañach had not been impressed by Sánchez Arango’s derogatory words
but rather his sponsorship, through the education ministry, of diverse cultural
Fondo Eduardo R. Chibás. Legajo 39, Expediente 1144: 15, ANC.
This flare-up merely reprised a longstanding hatred between the two men. During the years 19341939, Sánchez Arango belonged to the Auténtico party’s armed wing – which was devoted to toppling
the Batista backed government by force. Meanwhile, Benítez was a military officer who persecuted
the outlawed Auténticos along with other violent, anti-Batista revolutionaries. Along with other
Batista intimates, he enriched himself during this period as well. Later on, he became associated with
Cuba’s gambling industry. During their back and forth, Sánchez Arango alluded to this, calling his
adversary a “racketeer” who had gained great wealth “from the sweat of our people.” See “En Cuba,
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events all over Cuba. Recently, the oratorio Joan of Arc at the Stake had been
presented in Havana’s oldest public square.86

This piece of high brow

entertainment had so tickled the Harvard educated University of Havana professor
that he rhapsodized unreservedly in favor of its patron. He claimed Sánchez Arango
had achieved nothing less than the “fertilization of the public spirit” and concluded
that “we will never be able to thank him enough.”87 Naturally, these breathless
compliments did not sit well with many Ortodoxos. Raimundo Lazo encapsulated
their views in an Alerta article entitled, “Dr. Mañach Exaggerates.” Lazo, who taught
literature at the University of Havana, observed that Joan of Arc at the Stake had
beguiled its primarily middle class audience but few poorer citizens showed their
faces. This was not a question of taste but learning. “How can we speak seriously of
spreading culture to the masses,” thundered Lazo, “when the government has spent
three years ignoring the illiteracy and physical and moral misery of hundreds of
thousands of children and adults?”88 At any rate, this disagreement soon petered
out because Mañach was poised to visit Paris in his capacity as a UNESCO
representative.
Having caused no damage to Chibás and inciting only mild ripples among his
followers, the government tapped Eduardo Suárez Rivas for its next round of
broadsides. On June 17, the Liberal chief appeared on Unión Radio and accused
Chibás of overcharging for the coffee produced at his family owned plantation in

Under Sánchez Arango’s stewardship, such exalted entertainment was commonplace. A few weeks
earlier, for example, the education ministry had sponsored a production of Les Sylphides by the Ballet
Alicia Alonso in the very same square.
87 “En Cuba, Polémica: Dos Profesores en Discordia,” Bohemia, June 10, 1951: sup. 7.
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Oriente province. Cubans had been up in arms lately over the rising cost of their
favorite drink and Suárez Rivas attempted to direct their anger at Chibás. Eddy had
seen this attack from far away as various newspaper advertisements during the
week had aimed to drum up publicity for Suárez Rivas’ remarks. On his own show,
Chibás not only defended himself but retaliated in spectacular fashion. To begin
with, he reiterated that all revenues from his share in the plantation paid for the
construction and maintenance of an area school. Next, Chibás trotted out Emilio
Núñez Blanco for the evening’s sensational news. The young ex Liberal who was
now a zealous Ortodoxo shared a “regretful episode” with his former colleagues and
the Cuban people.89 Specifically, he revealed that shortly before the 1948 elections
Guillermo Alonso Pujol had suggested an agreement between the Republicans and
Liberal-Democratic coalition. Had the fine points been ironed out, this effectively
would have assured Ricardo Núñez of the presidency. Among those entrusted with
negotiating the deal was Eduardo Suárez Rivas but instead of doing everything
possible to ensure its realization, he had notified José Manuel Alemán and urged him
take action. To corroborate this charge, Núñez Blanco read an incriminating letter
from Suárez Rivas over the air which had been found among Alemán’s papers after
his death.90 In a voice seething with indignation Núñez Blanco summed up the
situation thusly:
…A traitor to Ricardo Núñez Portuondo; a traitor to the opposition;
Eduardo Suárez Rivas now wants to win points with the government
“En Cuba, Polémica: La Carta Delatora,” Bohemia, June 24, 1951: 66.
The text of the letter was as follows: “Dear José Manuel: I have tried to communicate with you by
telephone but have been unable to reach you. Just now, Ricardo Núñez Portuondo has told me that I
have been designated as a representative in the negotiations with the Republican party and I am now
leaving immediately for Miami. You must act quickly to avoid this, otherwise Ricardo will be
president and this is convenient for neither of us. Yours, Eduardo.” See: Ibid.
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by attacking Eduardo Chibás but fortunately the people know him
well and say, Suárez Rivas, enough already with your claims that there
is no funny business going on with the price of coffee because you are
at the center of it; you are the hero of café con leche, capable of making
money from the drink of the poor, of the unhappy, of the majority of
the Cuban people.91
This explosive revelation completely hijacked a senate session, ostensibly devoted
to budget issues, less than 24 hours later.92 Suárez Rivas was so visibly incensed
that Chibás had been advised to summon some Ortodoxo legislators for his own
protection. The Liberal chief, however, resorted to rhetoric rather than fisticuffs
and in a long winded speech he blamed Chibás for poisoning the political climate.
Chibás retorted that the polemic began when Suárez Rivas slanderously accused
him of being a coffee speculator. Most importantly, five hours of recrimination and
debate could not erase the scandalous letter to José Manuel Alemán from the public
mind. Not only was Suárez Rivas’ credibility damaged but another exodus from his
party now seemed a distinct possibility. As Chibás exited the Capitolio, he was
congratulated by the always pliable Santiago Rey – who told him he had just
behaved like a “true presidential aspirant.”93 The Republican senator was not
merely being polite. His party was currently moribund after losing its place at the
government table and being abandoned by Guillermo Alonso Pujol, who had formed
a new outfit with Nicolás Castellanos. He was thus on the lookout for a new meal

Ibid.
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ticket. As Chibás gained in momentum, such overtures were certain to become
increasingly commonplace.
Meanwhile, the failure of Suárez Rivas meant a new government champion
was required. The role was energetically filled by Aureliano Sánchez Arango, who
renewed his quarrel with Chibás in an epithet laden broadcast on June 24. Apart
from repeating the spurious charge that Chibás was a coffee speculator, he used all
the old pejoratives and a few new ones too. By now, the Ortodoxo leader was
accustomed to terms like “demagogue,” “slanderer” and “false prophet” being
bandied about. On the other hand, Chibás, who rented his Havana apartment and
conspicuously lacked a weekend retreat in the countryside, had rarely been painted
as a “feudal lord.”94 At any rate, this was politics as usual although an extraordinary
degree of mutual loathing lurked just beneath the surface. During his radio show,
Chibás shot back that Sánchez Arango had embezzled education ministry funds and
invested them in Guatemalan real estate. Two days later, the pugnacious Sánchez
Arango upped the ante by submitting libel charges against Chibás in the Urgency
Court.

Sánchez Arango supplemented this classic gambit from the Auténtico

playbook with a novel twist. Knowing quite well that Chibás could no longer be
dispatched in a government friendly Urgency Court, Sánchez Arango hoped to sway
public opinion by proposing a “tribunal of honor,” which would investigate his
supposed Guatemalan properties. Sánchez Arango boasted the tribunal could look
anywhere between “the North Pole and Patagonia” for his riches. 95 Nonetheless,

Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 759.
Sánchez Echeverría, La Polémica Infinita, 93. Sánchez Arango’s suggested candidates for the
tribunal of honor were Fernando Ortiz, Miguel Angel Quevedo and Alejandro Herrera Arango, who
94
95

435

Chibás insisted his opponent was corrupt just as Sánchez Arango stubbornly stated
at every opportunity that the Ortodoxo leader was an exploiter of peasants and a
coffee speculator. Eddy’s next sally was a Bohemia article, published on July 1, in
which he noted that the education ministry had budgeted two credits of 175,000
pesos each for “very mysterious services.”96 He also claimed the 644,000 pesos
earmarked for free school breakfasts was being raided because it reached “very few
students.”97 Lastly, Chibás asserted that he possessed a “private document,” signed
by 25 Auténtico congressmen, confirming Sánchez Arango’s dishonesty.98 Sánchez
Arango replied to these sketchy charges with some of his own, estimating rather
lamely that the Ortodoxo leader’s “black market operation” in coffee had netted
2027 pesos and 50 centavos.99 While not a negligible sum, this was hardly the stuff
of scandal. Further, he could not prove Chibás had pocketed the cash or played any
role in managing the plantation.

The education minister also purchased

advertisements in various Havana dailies and through them challenged Chibás to a
debate at Parque Central.
The Ortodoxo leader refused this proposition but his explanation left him
open to derision. On one hand, he feared Cubans would lynch Sánchez Arango once
they found out about the government’s shameless behavior. At the same time, he

headed the National Industrial Association. Ortiz declined the invitation, citing his absence from
politics since 1926 and the advice of his doctors to refrain from “polemical activities.” He added that
the increasing incidence of polemics was proof of the “disorganization and ineffectiveness of the
republic’s basic institutions.” For his part, Quevedo passed due to an excess of work, ownership of an
“impartial” magazine and his “longtime friendship” with both men. See: Ibid., 95.
96 Eduardo R. Chibás, “Los Presupuestos Nacionales, La Cuota Azucarera de Cuba, Los Pesqueros
Cubanos,” Bohemia, July 1, 1951: 62.
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asserted that citizens attending the event were likely to be injured or killed by
government thugs.

He also chafed at the debate’s rigid format, which would

examine only two questions – namely, whether Sánchez Arango owned Guatemalan
real estate and if he had bought it with education ministry funds. As an alternative,
Chibás suggested the senate or education ministry as preferable venues and
demanded that a wider range of topics be allowed. Miguel de Marcos, for one, was
thoroughly unimpressed. In a Prensa Libre column, he wrote that, “After launching a
false accusation, Chibás has avoided trying to prove it.”100 He also dismissed the
Ortodoxo leader’s “absurd pretexts” and mocked the notion of him trying to save
Sánchez Arango from an angry mob using his “short arms.”101 De Marcos was
obviously not well disposed toward Chibás but he hardly qualified as a government
hack. Another respected journalist, Francisco Ichaso, criticized Chibás as well. Not
everyone in the press lined up against him, however. Carlos Lechuga of El Mundo
sympathetically counseled him to adopt a more temperate and conciliatory persona.
In addition, he warned Chibás that treating politics as a “captivating spectacle”
damaged his reputation among “people who think.”102 Chibás gratefully thanked his
“friend” Lechuga in a personal letter but defended his brand of politics too.103 For
one thing, he pointed out that opinion polls had consistently validated his style and
methods. Moreover, despite living one of the “most turbulent epochs” of his life and
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fighting “practically alone” against “bad faith, slander and conspiracy,” he expressed
optimism regarding his prospects.104 Thus, he explained:
What is certain – and it bears repeating – is that the presidential
palace is waging a campaign to scare the fearful and innocent, trying
to make them believe in the myth of a Chibás incapable of exercising
power, whose promotion to high office would mark the start of grave
public calamities and irreparable institutional disequilibrium. Don’t
let them fool you, Lechuga. Disgracefully for these figures, the Cuban
people have reached the age of their political maturity and will not be
frightened by ghosts. When one looks at the quality of those
politicians, it is easy not to believe in them. And because the people
have never seen Chibás engage in lies, profit from public office,
support or exploit the black market, embezzle from the treasury, deal
in contraband or any of the thousand hobbies of our adversaries, they
will not mind accusations that I am strident, that I come on too strong
or that I am overly combative.105
The Ortodoxo leader’s confidence was bolstered not only by auspicious survey
results but also because he had consistently extricated himself from similar fixes
many times before. In many respects, the situation was shaping up as a rerun of
Eddy’s skyscraper accusation. He had escaped that bind by deflecting attention
from his unproven charges toward the veritable dishonesty of Auténtico leaders. His
intent to widen the debate with Sánchez Arango beyond its initial parameters
indicated that he would utilize this strategy once again.
Chibás spent July 8 in Parque Central but rather than confronting his foe he
led a rally against the reduction of Cuba’s sugar quota and the closing of the Gulf of
Mexico to the island’s fishermen.

Both developments were unwelcome and

promised economic hardship, especially as sugar typically accounted for 80-89
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percent of Cuba’s exports by value.106 The diminished quota also stung for political
reasons. This was because the United States had elected to buy more sugar from the
Dominican Republic and Peru, completely disregarding the fact that they were ruled
by dictators.

Besides being democratic, Cubans contributed to their northern

neighbor’s economy. During the years 1948-1950, an average Cuban bought $83 in
imports from the United States. By contrast, Dominicans and Peruvians purchased
only $20 and $7 respectively in the same period.107 In short, Cubans had every
reason to feel angered and betrayed. However, Sánchez Arango was not anxious to
see Chibás rile up the populace and hastily organized something he hoped would
divert its attention. Hence, the education ministry sponsored National Song Day
hoping musical entertainment would trump Chibás style political theater. This
effort was largely for naught as 10,000 people showed up in Parque Central and
several thousand others appeared on its outskirts. To maximize turnout and infuse
the event with a non-partisan flavor, many invited speakers were not Ortodoxos.
Such generosity of spirit had limits, though. For one thing, Chibás rigidly excluded
Communists from the proceedings. Further, while the purpose was to protest
decisions taken by foreign governments, plenty of scorn was heaped on Cuba’s
rulers.108
Guillermo Belt, who had served as ambassador to the United States under
Grau, was among those who blamed the president. He proclaimed the oft heard
motto that, “Without sugar there is no country” and told the audience that Carlos
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Prío bore “a responsibility so grave” for the diminished sugar quota that he was
“resorting to every type of subterfuge, excuse and pretext to absolve himself.”109
Belt noted that Dominican and Peruvian efforts to raise their quotas had begun at
the end of 1949 but the administration had responded half-heartedly. “They were
notified in advance,” he said, “but did not act in defense of our sugar industry.”110
Pelayo Cuervo used the occasion to denounce government manipulation of sugar
prices in league with known speculators. Already this year, he declared, a pair of
decrees had artificially lowered sugar prices. This benefited insiders and higher-ups
who resold their purchases on the world market for a hefty profit. Chibás, who
spoke last, suggested that his adversaries should reconsider their priorities. “While
the government was busy wasting time with petty and counterproductive attacks
against the Ortodoxos,” he said, “it should have employed its energies in attempting
to prevent the present assault on the stability of sugar exportation.” 111 For good
measure, he added that, “Carlos Prío and his clique are obsessed with attacking us
rather than defending Cuba!”112 No doubt, Chibás was refining this argument for his
polemic with Sánchez Arango. As Chibás implied in his letter to Carlos Lechuga,
Cubans had always forgiven his foibles but he knew they would be less indulgent
with an administration that chipped away the island’s economic pillar. As a cabinet
minister and close presidential advisor Sánchez Arango was guilty by association.
In the future, Chibás could turn this failure against Carlos Hevia with even greater
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force. After all, the presumed Auténtico nominee had been foreign minister for most
of Prío’s term.
While Chibás tinkered with this strategy and cast about for other potential
advantages, he nearly won his grudge match with Sánchez Arango by default. A few
days after the spectacle in Parque Central, the education minister crashed his plane.
He was carrying dental supplies to some towns in Pinar del Río province but his
landing was complicated by an aircraft inexplicably parked in the middle of the
runway. To avoid a collision, Sánchez Arango steered clear of the landing strip and
touched down in a patch of mud – whereupon his AT6 military plane promptly spun
around and flipped over. Sánchez Arango, who very easily could have lost his life in
the accident, emerged with only light wounds. Without delay, he immersed himself
once more in the polemic. On July 15, he accepted Chibás’ offer to debate in the
education ministry and outlined nine conditions by which it should be conducted.
In short, the education minister recommended that each man argue his case for 30
minutes and a tribunal, staffed by the hosts of Ante la Prensa, would decide the
winner. Chibás rejected this idea later that night on the radio, saying he was only
accountable before the Cuban people.113 The Ortodoxo leader also insisted on
“absolute freedom of speech, without restrictions or gags” and claimed he needed
“at least an hour” to expound on his points but bragged he could easily spend ten

Chibás had at least two good reasons to avoid being judged by the Ante la Prensa hosts. First, one
of them was Miguel de Marcos, who had already called him a “defamer.” Second, he almost certainly
feared the government would offer all manner of inducements to the others. After all, this was how
the administration behaved when dealing with the judicial branch. Given the stakes here, he had no
reason to doubt the cards would be stacked against him – even though another Ante la Prensa
panelist, Rafael Estenger, often defended him.
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hours detailing the government’s misdeeds.114 In the days that followed, both men
haggled over particulars. All the while, Chibás was giddy at the prospect of winning
his greatest victory to date. To a group of intimates, he said:
This publicity is worth millions of pesos! These people are offering me
the presidency on a silver platter. They cannot claim before the
country to be honest, that they have never embezzled money nor
engaged in business deals prejudicial to the public. Every move they
make is a new scandal and offers further proof of their clumsiness.
For any citizen, the situation is clear: they have the money and we
have the honor.115
The problem was that Sánchez Arango refused to provide Chibás with a forum for
ridiculing government shortcomings. During their negotiations, they agreed to hold
the debate on July 21 at 9:30 p.m. In addition, they concurred on a moderator,
naming Francisco Ichaso.

However, Sánchez Arango wanted only to discuss

Guatemalan real estate and Chibás demanded free reign. Ichaso sought to resolve
the impasse by composing a binding document for both men to sign. However, he
too felt the dispute should focus solely on Eddy’s accusations and included this
among the terms. Sánchez Arango gladly affixed his name but the Ortodoxo leader
balked. Ichaso responded by resigning, leaving them without a moderator or an
agreement 24 hours before their highly anticipated meeting. As the deadline drew
closer, Chibás declared he would accept any conditions except those restricting his
choice of topic. In other words, he barely budged. The same held true for Sánchez
Arango, who entrusted his response to the new moderator, Octavio de la Suarée –
director of Cuba’s journalism school. He met Chibás, José Pardo Llada and Luis
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Orlando Rodríguez at noon on July 21. All three Ortodoxos scoffed at the education
minister’s proposal to allow freedom of speech providing Chibás did not “stray from
the only topic” or mention “the president, his family, or the government as an
entity.”116 Nonetheless, Chibás remained eager to take advantage of what he felt
was a singular opportunity. He thus signed the revised contract but modified the
section circumscribing his choice of themes, which he called “a joke.”117 Predictably,
Sánchez Arango nixed this amendment later that evening. After a last ditch round of
negotiations proved fruitless, an exasperated de la Suarée quit as well. At 9:30 p.m.,
Chibás appeared at the education ministry surrounded by an Ortodoxo coterie,
trailed by photographers and expecting his most sensational victory yet. Upon
reaching the entrance, though, he was handed the identical set of rules from earlier
that afternoon and ordered to sign.118 When Chibás crossed out those he considered
untenable, he was barred from entering. Sánchez Arango had no intention of
engaging in a debate he could not control and was content to address the nation on
his own terms.
Chibás was livid at being denied his chance to discredit the government once
and for all, with all of Cuba watching or listening. Rather than returning home, he
visited the offices of various Havana dailies to register his protest and issue a
statement. He told Alerta, “Now Sánchez Arango and the government are on the run
because they know I have documented, overwhelming, truthful and sensational
Conte Agüero, Eduardo Chibás, 770. Earlier in the week, the Diario de la Marina editor-in-chief
Gastón Baquero published an open letter to Sánchez Arango warning, “This polemic is total craziness.
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proof in my possession, the most impressive evidence that has ever been presented
in Cuba against a government functionary.”119 He appealed to CMQ for an hour of
air time, boasting that, “I am ready to open my briefcase and prove to the nation that
funds for children’s breakfasts and school supplies were stolen, that there is a shady
land deal in Guatemala and other things even worse, to demonstrate that this
administration of Carlos Prío is the most corrupt the republic has ever had.”120
During that week, Eddy’s briefcase became the subject of rabid speculation. Sánchez
Arango dared him to, “Open your briefcase and show your proof to the nation!”121
Newspapers ran photos of a smiling Chibás brandishing the “famous” leather
attaché case. Even Cuba’s songwriters joined in, with one popular verse asking,
“Where is the proof, where is it?” and the chorus answering, “When the briefcase is
opened, you will see.”122

Chibás also received telegrams and letters from all

quarters criticizing Sánchez Arango’s performance as education minister.

A

telegram from the village of Sitiecito in Las Villas province confirmed that none of its
1000 children received free breakfasts and parents were obliged to buy school
supplies for their kids, who were taught in crumbling buildings. “We challenge the
minister to investigate this,” concluded the authors.123 A couple from the town of
Bejucal in Havana province wrote that their son received nothing more than a pencil
during the entire school year and added, “(Sánchez Arango) cannot fool the people
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by saying he’s keeping an eye on the schools.”124 From the Central Carolina, a sugar
mill in Matanzas province, a man wrote that students at the local school not only
lacked free breakfasts and school supplies but also had no desks.125 Another man,
from the town of Yarey de Vázquez in Oriente province, described the familiar
dearth of desks, school supplies and free breakfasts but also included another
frustrating detail – namely that the local teacher was so overwhelmed by these
difficulties that he sometimes disappeared for a month at a time.126 These and other
similar missives reinforced Eddy’s belief that money was being misappropriated in
the education ministry.
On the other hand, Chibás was running a tremendous risk by hyping the
contents of his attaché case. The sub director of El Mundo, Raoul Alfonso Gonsé,
claimed, “if the celebrated briefcase is not opened or lost or its contents defraud
public opinion we can already begin publishing the Ortodoxo party’s obituary.”127
Gonsé predicted taunts of “Chibás, open your briefcase,” would replace “Shame
against Money” on the campaign trail if the accusations proved baseless. Chibás also
faced skepticism and derision from those within his party. Around this time, the
Ortodoxo executive committee convened in Eddy’s apartment. Most of those in
attendance believed their chief had fallen for a trap and deceived them. Pelayo
Cuervo was particularly critical. After much heated discussion, the general view
was that Chibás should expect no help unless he could prove his accusations.128

Ibid., 97.
Ibid., 146.
126 Ibid., 115.
127 Sánchez Echeverría, La Polémica Infinita, 124.
128 Prada, La Secretaria de la República, 135.
124
125

445

Hence, he once again faced the specter of a divided party. Afterwards, Emilio Núñez
Blanco offered to visit Guatemala and look for evidence. Having nothing to lose,
Chibás authorized the mission but nothing useful turned up.129 If Chibás was
dismayed by the executive committee’s unwillingness to stand behind him, he
remained publicly defiant and stoked the embers of his conflict with Sánchez Arango
while awaiting his chance in the limelight.130
As expected, the owners of CMQ agreed to extend Eddy’s upcoming radio
show by half an hour for no extra cost. Chibás asked that his address be televised as
well because Sánchez Arango had enjoyed the same courtesy a week before, but
they declined citing commercial obligations. In newspaper advertisements, Chibás
promised to expose, “the enormous corruption of the present regime and Education
Minister Aureliano Sánchez Arango’s culpability.”131 Meanwhile, Sánchez Arango
heckled Chibás all week. Calling him “Renato,” a play on his middle name, René, the
education minister goaded him to open his briefcase before Cuba’s Supreme
Tribunal. Chibás emptied its contents instead for a packed room inside CMQ’s
studios on July 29. However, the island’s consummate showman disappointed this
audience along with his multitude of listeners by serving up a farrago of recycled
charges and fresh unverified allegations. Ultimately, Cubans did not tune in to hear
that Sánchez Arango may have held a ghost job under Batista or had been
reprimanded by the bar association for slander.

The ten photographs Chibás
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exhibited of ramshackle schools, while gripping, were more suitable for television
than a radio broadcast. His mention of a private document signed by 25 Auténticos
accusing Sánchez Arango of fraud had been mentioned during recent broadcasts. As
for the polemic’s central accusation, he now said, again without proof, that Sánchez
Arango owned a lumber yard in Guatemala rather than residential real estate.
Chibás asserted that the venture’s beneficiaries also included Carlos Prío,
Guatemala’s former president Juan Arévalo and the current ambassador of that
country in Havana, Raúl Osegueda. After being primed all week for a scintillating
finale, the mass of citizens waiting outside the station trudged home disgruntled.
Stating the obvious, Enrique de la Osa observed that the performance, “was far from
being what the people were anxiously waiting for.”132 He further detected “a
different tone of voice” in Chibás.133 This, no doubt, was because the Ortodoxo
leader, who usually aroused his countrymen’s passions with uncanny precision,
lacked the means to do so on this occasion.
Well before Eddy’s latest broadcast, Sánchez Arango was scheming to use
their polemic as a springboard toward the Auténtico nomination. Half an hour after
the Ortodoxo leader finished speaking, Sánchez Arango commenced with a
meticulously planned homage to himself in a Havana theater called, with no lack of
irony, Principal de la Comedia. The invitees were greeted by a colossal image of
Sánchez Arango draped in Cuba’s national colors of red, white and blue. Nor could
they miss assorted posters publicizing Sánchez Arango’s achievements in the
education ministry, replete with documentation regarding free breakfasts and
132
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school materials distributed. Official approval was insinuated by a large portrait of
Sánchez Arango next to Carlos Prío but, as everyone knew, the former had
challenged Chibás precisely because he was not the government’s preferred
candidate.134 At any rate, Sánchez Arango lavishly promoted himself and while
there was no evidence this effort had been financed by Guatemalan timber, all signs
pointed to Cuban taxpayers footing the bill. What they paid for was an extravaganza
of calumny and bombast on a par with Chibás in his most reckless moments. One of
the education minister’s cronies accused Chibás of colluding with Argentina’s
President Juan Domingo Perón, a proposition both laughable and outrageous. When
Sánchez Arango took the microphone, he engaged in a foul-mouthed tirade of such
exaggerated proportions that it became fodder for Cuba’s cartoonists. Afterwards,
Sánchez Arango promised to have Chibás expelled from the senate, deprived of his
parliamentary immunity and jailed “in the name of the superior interests of the
Cuban people.”135

This torrent of self-righteousness was ill advised for the

education minister given that his party harbored gangsters and murderers among
its legislators. Nor did the holier than thou Sánchez Arango seem to mind counting a
known embezzler like Antonio Prío among his guests and propitiators. Sensing an
opportunity to regain the momentum, Chibás challenged Carlos Prío to convoke the
senate so he could be judged. In the same breath, he added that, “(Prío) won’t do it
because each and every one of my accusations, including those referring to the

Addressing this point, Enrique de la Osa wrote that Sánchez Arango “had nothing to lose…and
much to gain” by confronting the Ortodoxo leader. By the same token, he chastised Chibás for the
“error” of engaging in a polemic against an opponent who was his political inferior in every respect.
See: Ibid.
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enormous thievery of Cuban authorities and those relating to their secret
investments in Guatemala are true, rigorously true.”136
Just as Chibás had never backed down from the allegation that Carlos Prío
owned skyscrapers in Manhattan, he steadfastly clung to the notion that Sánchez
Arango was conducting dirty business in Guatemala. At first glance, there was no
reason to believe this stubbornness would damage him. Guillermo Alonso Pujol,
who was no friend of Chibás but very politically astute, believed any fallout from the
polemic would be both minor and transitory.

Chibás seemingly agreed and

appeared before the Supreme Tribunal on August 2 to formally charge Sánchez
Arango with numerous counts of malversation. At the same time, there were signs
that he was suffering a personal crisis. Chibás had always derived a great deal of
satisfaction and well being from his encounters with common people but some were
no longer pleased to see him – at least on his jaunts around Havana. On one
occasion, Eddy and José Pardo Llada were walking down San Rafael Street and
instead of being mobbed by adoring citizens, which was usually the case, they were
serenaded by chants of “la maleta, la maleta” (the briefcase, the briefcase).137 For
Chibás, this almost certainly recalled the harassment of Manuel Fernández
Supervielle just over four years before.
As he prepared his next radio address, Chibás summoned Millo Ochoa and
the Ortodoxo youth leader Luis Conte Agüero to Havana. Chibás hoped to sound out
Ochoa, the party’s quintessential political realist. He also wanted to exchange
impressions with the 27 year old Conte Agüero, who had strafed Sánchez Arango in
136
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broadcasts emanating from his native Santiago de Cuba. Chibás consulted the
polling expert Raúl Gutiérrez as well and was assured his recent dip in popularity
was within the statistical margin of error. Above all, he was determined to press
forward against Sánchez Arango and turn the tide of public opinion. Chibás thus
accepted an invitation from Carteles to continue the polemic in that magazine’s
pages. On the evening of August 4, he delivered a new article to its director, Alfredo
Quilez. While sticking to his story that Sánchez Arango kept sordid investments in
Guatemala and “other Central American republics,” Chibás added another more
devastating line of attack.138 Specifically, he reproduced two education ministry
documents indicating that money had been diverted from the budget for acquiring
school supplies to fund “propaganda” activities in February, March and April of
1951.139 He concluded that Sánchez Arango was depriving Cuban schoolchildren in
order to pay for his presidential campaign. Even as the amount, which totaled 6509
pesos, was fairly modest, Chibás had hit a soft spot. Sánchez Arango was not a
notorious peculator but his presidential bid required cash as did his enormous
public relations effort against Chibás.

In this vein, the Auténtico congressman

Gilberto Leyva said, “If I were (Chibás), with the evidence of thievery and
embezzlement in the education ministry, I would have published what Aureliano
spends on banquets, parties and trips to Guatemala with money taken from the
budget.”140 Basically, Sánchez Arango had succeeded by steering the debate toward

Eduardo R. Chibás, “¡Yo Acuso!,” Carteles, August 12, 1951: 73. In a further jibe, Chibás held that
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him unwelcome there.
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favorable terrain but he was vulnerable in other respects and could not
circumscribe the polemic indefinitely. Once again, Chibás was betting that Cubans
would forget his occasional imprudence in the face of government malfeasance.
The following day, on August 5, Chibás invited Luis Conte Agüero over to
read a draft of his remarks for that evening. At one point, Chibás absentmindedly
picked up the Colt .38 on his desk and inquired of his guest, “Listen, which one is the
safety lock?”
“You don’t know?” asked Conte Agüero incredulously. After a moment’s
pause, he proceeded to demonstrate how the gun functioned while remaining
certain that Chibás was pulling his leg.
Looking out his bedroom window, with its Caribbean vista, Chibás then
asked, “Why don’t we try it out? If I fired from here do you think the bullet would
reach the sea?”
“I don’t think so,” replied Conte Agüero.

“Besides, the bullet might hit

someone.”
“Yes, that’s true,” said Chibás. As he holstered the pistol, a bullet dropped out
and fell to the floor. Conte Agüero picked up the projectile and advised him to
reinsert it in the clip.
“That’s all right,” said Chibás. “I already have all I need.”141
At 7:45 p.m., Pelayo Cuervo showed up with his driver and Chibás, who
customarily walked the five blocks to CMQ studios followed by a bulging throng,
arrived this time via automobile. He ceded the first 15 minutes to José Pardo Llada,
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who had lately caused a stir by resigning from his popular daily gig on Unión Radio.
The station had recently changed hands and the new owners had named José Luis
Pelleyá, a close friend of Antonio Prío, as administrator. Pardo Llada accused the
administration of masterminding the purchase as a means of censoring him. He
claimed this was part of a larger scheme to “control all the organs of publicity” using
the government’s “millions of pesos.”142 By the time Chibás took the microphone,
only 10 minutes of airtime remained. Employing a favorite trope, he recalled the
case of Galileo, who had been deemed a “liar” and “deceiver” for lacking “physical
proof” that the earth revolved around the sun.143 Chibás then reminded listeners
that he had been called a “liar” and “slanderer” when he accused José Manuel
Alemán of acquiring a real estate empire in Miami. “I did not have physical proof
that he was robbing from the national treasury,” said Chibás, “but I kept repeating,
firm in my moral conviction: ‘He’s stealing! He’s stealing!”144 Concerning the
present situation, he explained:
Last Sunday, during this same broadcast…I offered irrefutable proof of
the enormous corruption of Prío’s administration, including photos of
schools and hospitals in miserable condition and contrasting them
with ostentatious fincas and mansions of government officials who,
not long ago, lived in poverty. Nevertheless, in spite of continual
depredations, Machado, Batista, Grau San Martín and Carlos Prío have
not been able to dull the Cuban people’s moral sensibility, which
speaks very highly of the firmness of its virtues, but still my words
from last Sunday did not have the resonance required by such a grave
situation. Cuba needs to wake up. But my knocking was not, perhaps,
sufficiently strong. We will, however, continue to count on the
conscience of the Cuban people.145
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Afterwards, Chibás reiterated two ideas which were quite familiar to his regular
audience. First, he emphasized that Cuba’s “historic destiny” has always been
frustrated by the “corruption and blindness” of its rulers. Second, he affirmed that
Cuba would never fulfill its “mission” under the current administration, nor would
this be possible through Batista’s “false opposition” or the “spiteful group” led by
Grau.146 Only the Ortodoxos, who eschewed “transactions” and “shady deals” would
suffice.147 Right about then, the transmission was cut as Chibás had exceeded his
time limit. While the island’s citizens heard an advertisement for Café Pilon, Chibás
steamed ahead with his final call to arms. “People of Cuba,” he yelled, audible now
only to those surrounding him in the studio, “Rise up and walk! People of Cuba,
wake up! This is my last loud knock!”148 He punctuated this statement by slamming
down his left fist. With his right hand, he searched for something. Moments later,
seemingly out of nowhere, a shot rang out. The studio was immediately thrown into
confusion. No one had seen a gun as Chibás had fired from beneath the desk. Some
Ortodoxos reacted by fleeing toward the exit while others pushed forward trying to
make sense of things. In the first moments, neither Millo Ochoa, who sat to Eddy’s
right nor Roberto Agramonte on his left knew what had transpired. Soon enough,
Chibás slumped over and his pistol clanged against the floor accompanied by
freshets of blood. Voices urging calm were interrupted by orders to detain the
supposed aggressor. The would be assassin, of course, was Chibás himself. Finally,
a band consisting of José Pardo Llada, Millo Ochoa, Pelayo Cuervo, Orlando Castro
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and Luis Conte Agüero took charge. They carried the bleeding Ortodoxo leader to a
nearby automobile and rushed him to the nearest hospital. Before going into
surgery, Chibás told them, “I’m going to die, but the party has to unite now more
than ever. It must confront the corrupt government and pseudo-opposition.”
“Where are you hurt, Eddy?” asked Orlando Castro.
“In the belly…What a shame it wasn’t in the heart!” 149
Although the shot had not been audible over the air, news of it traveled fast
and a sizable gathering soon formed outside the Vedado clinic where Chibás was
being treated. Men and women from all walks of life lingered throughout the
evening, waiting nervously for information on Eddy’s condition. Many donated
blood as well. Sitting on a nearby patch of grass, some wept openly while others
consoled themselves with prayer. At midnight, the medical staff finally provided an
update. Chibás had suffered a punctured colon, eight perforations in his small
intestine and a fractured vertebra. His condition was critical and may have been
worse but for a dash of serendipity. Antonio Rodríguez Díaz, the gifted surgeon who
repaired his diaphragmatic hernia nearly a year earlier, had just returned from out
of town and led the operation. The next day, Chibás told him in a frail voice, “Doctor,
I was able to save myself from the other thing but I won’t escape this time.”
Rodríguez Díaz responded by asking Chibás whether he hoped to survive. “The
truth, doctor, is that yesterday I didn’t but now I want to live.”150
The Ortodoxo leader’s newfound will to endure was confirmed a few hours
later by Luis Orlando Rodríguez, who had checked into the same hospital with an
149
150
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aliment of his own. Entering Chibás’ room, Rodríguez clasped his friend’s hand and
said, “Eddy, we have to win this battle!” Chibás smiled weakly and agreed. 151 As
someone who had always reveled in attention, Chibás may have changed his mind
upon learning how many of the island’s most prominent men had arrived to wish
him well. These included political figures of every persuasion, including Guillermo
Alonso Pujol, Nicolás Castellanos, Emilio Núñez Portuondo, and Pepe San Martín
along with representatives of the exiled democratic governments of Venezuela and
Peru.152 The eminent hero of Cuba’s independence war, Enrique Loynaz de Castillo,
was in evidence as well. Of course, old friends such as Miguel Ángel Quevedo and
the Mestre brothers also stopped by as did his newer ally Ramón Vasconcelos.
Chibás was surely gratified when Conchita Fernández, who had attended to all these
guests, informed him of their visits. In his mind, this proved they had heard his
“loud knock” and sided with him against Aureliano Sánchez Arango.
As a supremely political deed, Eddy’s suicide attempt was naturally pored
over and spun throughout Cuba in a variety of fashions.

During an Ortodoxo

meeting immediately after the shooting, Joaquín López Montes called it “an act of
historical grandeur” and claimed, “this is not the suicide of a depressed or
disappointed man but a self-sacrifice by a great combatant who desired to hand
over his life to a great cause.”153 On August 6, Roberto Agramonte, Luis Conte
Agüero and Guillermo de Zéndegui published a statement in Alerta that sought to
inculcate this saintly vision in the public mind. They deemed Chibás, “the most
Ibid.
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extraordinary, valiant and honest figure of the Cuban revolution” and “the grand
titan of national honor.”154 With an eye on the present political situation, they
added:
No one tended to Cuba’s historical destiny more carefully than Chibás
and yet he was shamelessly plotted against by a vile and corrupt
government and a pseudo-opposition bereft of virtue and stripped of
all grandeur. In order to inflict a mortal wound on the skepticism
spread by the dominant immorality, to shake up the people’s souls
and awaken Cuba’s conscience made lethargic by apostasy and
frustration, the great leader tried to take his life in a gesture of heroic
idealism.155
Conversely, Auténticos close to Carlos Prío felt Chibás had engaged in yet another
publicity stunt. Many believed he had shot himself in 1939 to amplify his vote totals
just before the constituent assembly elections. For them, this was a reprise of the
same old show and they worried Chibás would emerge as an even greater threat
than before. Asked for his thoughts, the perpetually irascible Tony Varona said,
I see no reason why I should feel sorry. If the deed been the result of
aggression, of chance or a natural accident, then I would deplore it.
But an act committed with political and electoral ends in mind and in
the security that he would not die it is in no way lamentable.156
The Auténtico labor leader Eusebio Mujal was even harsher, describing Eddy’s
suicide attempt as, “an explosion of hysteria” and “a product of his mental state
upon finding out that public opinion was fed up with his slanders and lies.” 157 This
dismissive attitude did not extend throughout the party, however. Miguelito Suárez
Fernández and Félix Lancís ignored the president’s wishes and visited Chibás in the
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hospital. So did the Auténtico congressman Luis Pérez Espinós, who declared that, “I
don’t believe there is a single Cuban who doesn’t fervently hope to see Chibás
recover.”158 The Auténtico governor of Camagüey, Jorge Caballero Rojo, counseled
his more partisan colleagues that the “humane and chivalrous” attitude would be to
“cease their passions” and “consider the man himself” as he struggles for his life.159
While cooler headed Auténticos aimed for a magnanimous posture above the
fray of politics as usual, Chibás sought to seize every possible advantage for himself
and his party.

At a devastating cost, he had placed the Auténticos in an

uncomfortable position – not only by exposing their internal fissures but also
because they could not criticize him now without appearing mean spirited and
contemptuous of public opinion. Even as Chibás overcame frequent brushes with
death, he seemed more interested in what the newspapers were saying and was
particularly anxious to read the August 12 edition of Bohemia. At one point, Chibás
admonished Pedro Iglesias Betancourt to tell him when the end was near as he had
final instructions for the Ortodoxo executive committee.

Subsequently, Chibás

notified Conchita Fernández that if he died suddenly, she should tell Millo Ochoa to
organize a rally on the second Monday in September at the rural school built with
the revenues from his share of the family coffee plantation. “Let the people see,” he
said, “that while the government has abandoned the schools, we founded one to
benefit peasants.”160 On August 13, Chibás eagerly asked José Chelala Aguilera how
the people viewed his gesture of self-sacrifice. He was gratified to learn that
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Catholic masses throughout the island had been dedicated to him the day before and
Cubans were “fervently praying” for his recovery.161
With the passage of time, hopes that Chibás might survive gained traction.
His doctors cautioned that the period between 10 and 15 days after the wound,
which Chibás was now entering, promised to be tricky but they remained guardedly
optimistic. On August 15, Antonio Rodríguez Díaz brashly told Eddy’s secretary
that, “I am ready to do anything, to operate on his lungs even his heart. This man
cannot die on me.”162 Just before midnight, however, Chibás complained to the
attending physician of pain in his stomach and said, “Listen, you must do something.
Otherwise I’m going to die.”163 During surgery a hemorrhage was discovered, the
result of blood thinners administered to ease a clot in his small intestine. He
received multiple transfusions but to no avail. At 1:55 a.m. the man cherished by
nearly one third of Cuba’s population passed into myth.

José Chelala, “Mis Últimas Entrevistas con Chibás,” Bohemia, August 26, 1951: 57.
De la Osa, Segundo Tiempo, 369.
163 “Falleció en la madrugada de hoy el Senador Eduardo Chibás Ribas,” Diario de la Marina, August
16, 1951: 1.
161
162

458

Conclusions
1. Despite checks on executive power written into Cuba’s 1940 constitution, those who
held the island’s highest office were, in fact, constrained only by the military – which
was temporarily placated by raises in soldierly pay and enrichment opportunities
for top officers. The shape of laws in Cuba thus conformed to the whims of its
presidents. Ramón Grau San Martín treated the legislature and courts with disdain
and ruled by decree. He did, however, allow free reign for Cuba’s press. Carlos Prío,
on the other hand, worked with Cuba’s lawmakers but meddled with the courts at
every opportunity. He also had little patience for press criticism and constantly
sought to limit expressions of free speech. In this context, Chibás and Ortodoxos
such as Pelayo Cuervo publicized government breaches of the constitution and
exerted pressure for closer compliance with the law. Chibás often explained during
his radio show which constitutional provisions were being discarded, spreading
knowledge of the document among his considerable audience and proving to be one
of its most effective advocates. Hence, it was not sufficient for Cubans to produce
one of the western hemisphere’s most progressive constitutions in 1940. They also
required a charismatic figure that would believe in the document and sell its virtues
to the public.

2. In an era when political machines dominated Cuban politics, Eduardo Chibás
devised a new approach based on unparalleled mastery of the mass media –
particularly radio. His ratings far outpaced those of all political rivals and
sometimes his show garnered higher shares than the island’s ever popular
novelas or soap operas. Of course, Chibás’ third place result in the 1948
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presidential election demonstrated the limitations of this strategy. On the
other hand, at the time of his death, Chibás was Cuba’s leading presidential
contender and boasted leads in all six provinces and among nearly every age
group. Moreover, other politicians, most notably José Pardo Llada, followed
in his footsteps by utilizing popular radio shows as a springboard to elective
office.

This new strategy was an attempt to neutralize the often hefty

financial advantages of larger, highly organized outfits like the ruling
Auténticos. While the Ortodoxos had improved their party apparatus and
were opening new offices in areas of the country where they previously had
no official presence, their network was still fairly rudimentary. For example,
the Ortodoxos did not count a branch in the mid-sized town of Guantánamo
until February of 1951 – almost four years after the party was founded. The
fact that Chibás was nonetheless able to mount a credible presidential
campaign proves that radio had become a powerful political tool in the right
hands. This also explains why the Prío administration constantly sought to
limit, curb and harass Chibás’ broadcasts.

3. Cubans who came of age in the 1930s during the presidency of Gerardo
Machado and military backed governments sponsored by Fulgencio Batista
often harbored enormous expectations for the nation’s political life. Chibás
recognized and capitalized on these feelings, which later mutated to grave
disappointment during the Grau administration, better than any of his peers.
Many of these disillusioned citizens communicated personally with Chibás
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via letters and described the many hardships they had suffered as protesters
or revolutionaries. Many expressed their wish that Chibás would “save” the
nation. Given these outsized hopes, incremental but important advances by
Carlos Prío, namely passage of the 1940 constitution’s complimentary laws
or the relative honesty of his cabinet, yielded him scant plaudits with the
public. In many respects, Cubans preferred the messianic style of Ramón
Grau San Martín and Chibás. The Ortodoxo leader’s overwhelming popularity
among the generation of Cubans who came of age in 1950 demonstrates that
this tendency also was a factor among the island’s younger citizens.

4. From a political standpoint, the Auténticos aimed to construct a party that
would permanently rule the island much like Mexico’s Partido Institucional
Revolucionario.

The Auténtico party boss from Matanzas, Senator Diego

Vicente Tejera, confessed as much to a Bohemia reporter in 1951.

By

bloating the government payroll, purchasing votes and co-opting opposition
parties with offers of cabinet seats and other perks, the Auténticos believed
they could remain indefinitely as Cuba’s governing party. By March of 1951,
the Auténtico coalition counted its old rivals from three years before, the
Democrats and Liberals. Moreover, the opposition Communists boasted a
history of pacts with the Auténticos as did Guillermo Alonso Pujol – leader of
the new Cuban National Party. Chibás’ insistence on political independence
for the Ortodoxos was thus of paramount importance.
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5. Eduardo Chibás brought politics down to a common level unlike any previous
Cuban politician. His habit of jumping into the arms of followers from stages
and truck tops after campaign speeches would have been unthinkable for any
other politician of national standing. When Chibás was released from prison
in June of 1949, he permitted zealous followers to literally shred his clothes.
Devoted crowds also followed him each Sunday evening as he walked from
his home to CMQ studios where he delivered his radio addresses. This
intense emotional communion was fortified though frequent walks in poor
and working class Havana neighborhoods. Chibás also did not shy away from
visiting some of Cuba’s remotest rural areas. As with most Cuban politicians,
Chibás often attempted to assist constituents who were desperate for jobs,
places in hospitals, scholarships or other favors whenever possible but he
also gained a more intimate role in the lives of his countrymen. Many
considered him a friend or family member. The novelist Reinaldo Arenas
related that his great grandmother died on the same day as Chibás and at one
point, his weeping mother told him, “I’m not crying for my grandmother, but
rather for Chibás.” Arenas added that, “I believe the rest of my family was
crying for the same reason.”1 This too represented a new type of politics,
designed to diminish voting as a financial transaction in favor of voting as an
expression of personal devotion. For his part, Chibás derived an enormous
sense of well being from the enthusiasm of his supporters. In fact, the

1

Arenas, Antes que anochezca, 52.

462

Ortodoxo leader shot himself in large part because he felt Cubans had become
deaf to his appeals against the government.

6. While the 1940 constitution was regularly ignored or violated by Cuba’s
presidents, portions of the judiciary showed a great deal of independence.
The quasi legal Urgency Courts were beholden to the island’s chief executives
but the Superior Electoral Tribunal, Supreme Tribunal and municipal courts
sometimes rendered decisions unfavorable to the ruling Auténticos. In 1948,
for example, the Superior Electoral Tribunal refused to strike down the
provision allowing a party’s provincial assemblies to veto pacts and
presidential candidates. This angered President Grau, who was determined
to impose Carlos Prío over the objections of two of his party’s assemblies. It
also gratified Chibás, who wanted to use his control of the Ortodoxo Havana
assembly to veto any deals he considered unsuitable. In 1951, Cuba was
rocked by the news that ex President Grau would be indicted on corruption
charges. This was a direct challenge to the custom of presidential impunity.
Further, no party attempted to use the courts as a way of limiting
government abuses than the Ortodoxos. In 1949, the attempt to revoke an
increase in electricity prices was brought by Chibás’ friend Ventura Dellundé.
Of course, no one resorted to the courts as a counterweight to Auténtico
power more than Pelayo Cuervo. Chibás heartily approved of this method,
although he was not above castigating the nation’s judges when he felt their
rulings were incorrect. The most famous instance was when he accused a
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Supreme Tribunal judge of taking bribes, a charge which subsequently
landed him in prison.
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